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ABSTRACT 
Given that the military is widely recognized as one of the central sites of gender 
definition and production in society, my dissertation explores the ways in which women 
who voluntarily enter the military, a traditionally male preserve, may be acting in ways 
that are subversive to the gender order.  Most research on women in the military has 
focused on their efforts to do gender in a manner that helps them fit in to this 
androcentric environment.  The aim of my research was to explore the performance of 
gender by women in the military from a different perspective: one that focuses on their 
agency in resisting rather than conforming to traditional gender norms.  My project 
investigated whether or not Navy women actively attempted to “un-do” traditional 
gender definitions and expectations while simultaneously attempting to expand the 
boundaries of femininity and what it means to be a woman.  Military women often must 
walk a gender tightrope.  They seek acceptance as legitimate warriors, but must at the 
same time be cautious not to ultimately surrender their femininity to the hegemony of 
masculinity within this institution by “doing masculinity” instead.  This study used 
qualitative methodology to investigate: (1) the performance of gender among military 
women, focusing specifically on their resistance to traditional gender norms; (2) how 
women’s social location in the military bureaucracy and rank structure influences their 
resistance to traditional gender norms; and (3) how race and class are implicated in 
women’s resistance to traditional gender norms within the military context.  My work is 
grounded in Navy women’s personal experiences and daily interactions with their male 
colleagues.  Data was collected through in-depth, semi-structured interviews with 23 
active-duty officer and 9 enlisted Surface Warfare-Qualified Navy women. Data was 
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analyzed using grounded theory methodologies.  In moving beyond theory to explore 
the experiences of women in the military empirically from this unconventional 
perspective, I hoped to further illuminate our understanding of gender and the gendering 
process, and resistance to it.  I found outcomes differing from those we might expect 
given existing gender theory.  Specifically, I found that women who focus on presenting 
their “authentic selves” while doing gender “a la carte” offer the greatest hope for 
altering the gender order, even if their actions seem least satisfying to the outside 
observer as forms of “resistance.”  Furthermore, I found that women who actively 
project their femininity or, conversely, downplay their femininity do so in response to 
negative male stereotypes of military women.  Several intervening variables not 
presently addressed in gender literature have combined over the past decade to make 
the Surface Navy more welcoming to women, especially officers.  These include: the 
establishment of the All-Volunteer Force, short-term and long term structural manpower 
shortages, differences in the way the military justice system handles officer and enlisted 
misconduct, and uneven support for and enforcement of Navy policy at the deckplate 
level.  I conclude from my research that recent high-profile problems of sexual 
harassment and sexual assault in the Navy are rooted in mundane daily practices and 
attitudes associated with underground sexism.   
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For all the American women across the centuries who refused to be “channeled” by 
gender ideology and followed their dreams into occupations then thought to be the 
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1 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION, REVIEW OF THEORY, RESEARCH METHODOLOGY,  
AND OUTLINE OF CHAPTERS 
If gender is something that is performed, enacted, and embodied in every day 
actions and interactions, then there is space for individual and collective agency to 
resist socially imposed gender norms without rejecting them wholesale.  The military is 
potentially a site where the hegemony of masculinity can be contested and the definition 
of what it means to be a woman or “feminine” can be enlarged.  This project sought to 
investigate how Navy women, in the course of daily actions and interactions with male 
colleagues, resist traditional sex roles and gender norms and challenge orthodox 
assumptions that military service and especially combat are a “man’s” job.  I provide 
four vignettes below that document just such resistance to illustrate my point: 
Rocking the Boat 
In 1987, when the combat exclusion law was still in effect and women were not 
allowed by law to be assigned to combatant ships, I was a young Navy Ensign.  I ran a 
division of shore-based, small amphibious craft consisting of 14 boats and the 50-some 
male Sailors needed to maintain and crew them.  There were not more than 5 women 
out of the more than 5000 Sailors who comprised the entire Amphibious Group, 
consisting of more than 20 ships plus shore-based supporting commands and the other 
4 women all worked in some administrative capacity.  Technically, I could not go to war 
with the men I commanded, but none-the-less, as long as our nation was at peace, I 
was their leader.  I would occasionally get underway with my men on routine training 
operations with large amphibious assault ships.  We would “steam” out to the mouth of 
the San Diego harbor to rendezvous with the ship and as we got within communications 
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range we would establish initial radio contact to advise the ship we were there and 
ready to begin training.  I relished the opportunity to radio the ship as the Boat Group 
Commander.  “Devil Dog, this is Boat Group 3 Actual, over”, my soprano voice 
broadcast to one and all in the ship’s Combat Information Central.   It gave me no small 
sense of satisfaction and I never ceased to feel complete delight when the ship’s radio-
telephone talker responded with audible shock and disbelief, first that he was talking to 
a woman, and second that this woman was commanding the assault boats with which 
they were about to begin amphibious warfare training.   
The training consisted of the ship “ballasting down”, purposely “sinking” in the 
water to flood its “well deck” in the belly of the ship, so that the small boats could “drive” 
in to the well-deck to discharge or on-load cargo.  This served to train the boat crews, 
the ship’s well-deck crews, and the embarked Marines.  Because of the effects of sea 
state, even on the best of days this was frequently a dangerous and physically violent 
evolution.  Once inside the well-deck, the boats had to be secured with heavy lines until 
the ship could de-ballast (dewater and re-float itself) leaving the flat-bottom assault 
boats sitting securely on the floor of the ship’s well-deck.  My boat coxswains and I 
would then disembark and proceed on a long, stare-provoking trek up many decks and 
ladders, through the ship to the wardroom1 (officers’ dining room) to participate in the 
pre-training safety briefing with the Ship’s Commanding Officer, Executive Officer, and 
department heads, all of whom were significantly senior to me, all of whom were men, 
and none of whom were used to seeing military women on their ship.   
Truth be told, my enlisted men did not need me to go with them to get underway 
or to accomplish those missions.  I went in part because it was fun to be out of the office 
and on the water on those warm, sunny, blue sky San Diego days, but mostly I went 
because my presence as a woman in the midst of warfare training was an act of 
defiance to the sexed and gendered military system that said women could not belong 
to the warfighting fleet and to these warrior men who would never want me on their 
warship.  I’m not sure if any of the ships’ Commanding Officers ever protested my 
                                            
 
1 On a ship, the wardroom is the officers’ dining room, which often also functions as a meeting room and 
a lounge.  Within the Navy, “wardroom” is also used metonymically to refer to the officers of a command 
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participation to my Commanding Officer, but he never prevented me from getting 
underway.  Those days on the water in San Diego are still among my most cherished 
Navy memories because I know now as I knew then that I was “rockin’ the gender boat” 
long before the confluence of very public, sexually-charged events (Tailhook, the 
Persian Gulf war, Anita Hill/Clarence Thomas hearings) forced Congress to lift the 
combat exclusion law opening all surface ships and combat aircraft to women.  Today, it 
is not only common in ships’ Combat Information Center to hear women’s voices on the 
radio telephone network, from other ships and aircraft, it’s becoming less rare to hear 
women’s voices over the ship-wide communications system – when the Captain 
addresses her crew.  Despite this obvious progress, however, lifting the combat 
exclusion did not usher in a new era of uncontested welcome and acceptance of women 
in combat roles in the Navy or any one of the other branches of service. 
It’s All in Your Head 
Less fun than a day on the water in the sun and salt-spray, distressing male 
warriors with my mere presence, but no less defiant, was my choice of restroom options 
when I stood Watch Officer duty for the Naval Beach Group, the command to which my 
unit reported.  Beach Group’s building was of WW II vintage and, in a throwback to the 
more visible class distinctions between officers and enlisted of that era, the 
Headquarters building still had three bathrooms (“heads” in Navy vernacular):  “Men”, 
“Women”, and “Officers”.  Only Officers were allowed to use the “Officers” head, the 
presumption being that officers only came in the “male” variety.  Male and female 
enlisted personnel and civilians were to use the non-Officer, sex-appropriate heads.  
There were no women Officers on the Beach Group staff, and only 4 or 5 among the 
500 people that comprised their subordinate commands, so this arrangement usually 
went unchallenged.  However, when I had occasion to be in the building and needed to 
use the facilities, I would always make a point to knock loudly on the “Officers” restroom 
door, announce “Woman on Deck” and proceed into the head.  I’m sure my actions, 
aside from annoying the Commodore who definitely did not like having women in his 
command, had much impact on my male colleagues on the staff, but I always had a 
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sense of satisfaction at challenging the sexist assumptions of the obsolete sign that 
presumed “Officers” in the amphibious Navy came in only one sex. 
We’ve Got You Covered 
In 1995, then-Major Martha McSally, one of the US Air Force’s first women 
fighter pilots, started a campaign to end a policy instituted by the Commander of the 
320th Air Expeditionary Group in Saudi Arabia that required all military women under his 
command wear the Abaya2 with head scarf when venturing off the US military base, 
including when performing official duties.  Additionally, women were forbidden to drive, 
had to sit in the back seat of all vehicles, and be accompanied by men whenever off 
base.  If stopped by Saudi authorities, the male service member had to claim the female 
service member as his “wife”. “Sensitivity to host nation culture and religion”, as well as 
“force protection concerns” were the justifications for this order.   
Taking the position that wearing the Abaya was both sexually discriminatory and 
against her religious principles as a Christian, McSally worked unsuccessfully within her 
chain of command and the official military system for over 6 years to rescind this policy.  
By 2001, as a Lieutenant Colonel, she was the highest-ranking female fighter pilot in the 
Air Force.  Finally, exasperated by the lack of progress within the military and 
harnessing the power of her “first” leadership status, McSally took her complaint to the 
mainstream media via the USA Today (Pound 2001), initiated a lawsuit against the 
Department of Defense (DoD), and, with the help of her Republican Congressman, 
pursued legislation through Congress in her attempt to get the policy rescinded.  This 
strategy was politically ingenious because it “forced” an unlikely alliance between 
Democrats, who believed in women’s equality, and Conservative Christian Republicans 
who believed Christian women should not be forced to cloak themselves in accordance 
with the tenants of a non-Christian religion.  Both the House and the Senate 
unanimously approved an amendment to the Defense Authorization Act of 2003 
                                            
 
2 The abaya is the traditional head-to-toe black robe Muslim women are required to wear in Saudi Arabia.   
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prohibiting the Department of Defense from forcing military women to wear the abaya.  
The measure was signed into law in December 2002.  
Ironically, American women serving in Saudi Arabia benefited from this “win” for 
less than one full year.  The last American military unit left Saudi Arabia in late August 
of 2003 as the result of the changed US-Saudi relationship since the September 11 
attacks in which 15 of the 19 suicide hijackers were Saudi.  In July 2004, McSally took 
command of the 354th Fighter Squadron at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Ariz. -- 
becoming the first woman to command a fighter squadron.  In December of 2006 she 
was promoted to the rank of full Colonel.  I think it is very likely the strategic and tactical 
choice to couple her religious beliefs with her beliefs in women’s equality to contest the 
Abaya policy helped save her career, rather than seeing it destroyed by her prolonged 
and very public resistance to this sexist policy.   
Pardon me General, it appears the insurgents are women … 
Finally, in August of 2004, while I was participating in a Joint and Combined 
warfighting exercise in South Korea, I was present at a theater-wide video tele-
conference (VTC) when women Colonels were in command of 4 of the 5 major US 
elements participating.  Three sites were commanded by Army Colonels, while my site 
was commanded by an Air Force Colonel.  All of these women were logisticians, freshly 
arrived from extended tours in Iraq or Afghanistan while the vast majority of their male 
counterparts and superiors in Korea had not yet served in the Afghanistan or Iraq..  
Although male Generals would normally have been in command of each of these 
elements, and they would have been the ones visible in the VTC, on this particular day 
they were all otherwise engaged with a rare visit to South Korea by then-National 
Security advisor, Dr. Condoleeza Rice.   
These women Colonels, second in command to the absent male Generals, took 
advantage of this rare opportunity to make a powerful statement.  In a coordinated, 
premeditated effort, they each asked the most senior women officers available at their 
location to fill prominent seats in the VTC, I among them, effectively “packing” the panel 
of participants visible on the screen at each VTC location so it appeared, at least on the 
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US side, that the “war” was being run almost entirely by women.  The few US and 
Korean male officers participating in this particular teleconference barely masked their 
surprise when confronted by this veritable phalanx of commanding women.  Unseen on 
the VTC screens, but watching this spectacle unfold on their own television screens 
monitoring the high-level VTC across the South Korean Peninsula and on the waters off 
its coast among the assembled warships of the US 7th Fleet, were  tens of thousands of 
US and South Korean military men and women, officers and enlisted personnel of all 
ranks.   Upon the conclusion of the official VTC, the lone visible US male commander 
asked the other US commanders to remain on-line after our Korean counterparts had 
logged off the VTC.  His single, bemused comment was “Well, I see you ladies have 
finally pulled off a coup.”   
The women Colonels had accomplished their goal:  they had conspired to make 
women’s engagement in this war game powerfully visible, across the Korean Peninsula 
and beyond, a symbolic act of resistance to the gendered order of the military.  Each of 
these four Colonels was obviously “feminine” while simultaneously displaying the calm, 
measured control and commanding presence we are conditioned by the traditional 
gendered order to expect only from men.  We were all perversely pleased to flip the 
taken-for-granted gendered power dynamics, if only superficially and temporarily. 
I relate these four acts of “gender defiance,” the majority small and fleeting, by 
military women in the face of seemingly overwhelming military masculinity, to give the 
reader a sense that resistance to traditional gender norms among military women, 
whether small and individual, or more noticeable and collective, are not unique to me.  
Gender defiance and resistance to the traditional gender order among Navy women 
were not rendered obsolete when the combat exclusion law was lifted in 1992.  Many 
Navy men remain opposed to women’s presence (Barrett 1996 and Cohn 2000) and 
resentful of their new official status as “warfighters,” the embodiment of federal law and 
Navy policy that technically makes women truly “equal” to men.  However, as the result 
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of policy changes and the Navy working environment is much less overtly sexist in 2013 
that it was in 1993.  Navy women today perhaps feel they have less to defy because 
whatever misogyny remains has largely been driven underground.  Male resentment of 
women’s presence still remains among some Sailors but that resentment is most often 
expressed covertly, if at all, to preserve one’s career.  Gender defiance and resistance 
remain alive and well today among Navy women, in their many daily actions and 
interactions with male colleagues.  While progress on women’s full acceptance as 
warriors might be slow, individual efforts are not entirely in vain.  As Brickell (2005) 
points out: 
Fissures within hegemonic patterns do permit acts and cultural forms that leave 
the way open for a reconfiguring of selves and their contexts, initially at the 
micro-level of society.  What we do in our own particular social settings may be 
capable of ultimately picking at loose threads in the tapestry of domination.  
There are varying politics at our disposal here, some of which may said to be 
subversive (p.40.). 
So, do military women constitute “loose threads” in Brickell’s “tapestry of 
domination?”  Possibly.  Hacker (1989) argues military institutions function as the 
central patriarchal institutions of civilized societies, interacting with and strongly 
influencing all other major social institutions.  She further asserts that military institutions 
depend upon the subordination of women (p. 58).  It has become common knowledge 
among the general public that “the Marine Corps builds men”3 and that you join the 
Army to “be a man.”  The military is an important social institution with a gender-defining 
                                            
 
3 As documented by MarineHeritage.org. "The Marine Corps Builds Men" was the theme of a series of 
Marine Corps recruiting posters spanning more than three decades, from the 1950s to the 1980s. See 
http://www.marineheritage.org/6th_MarineCorps_Historic_Recruiting_Exhibit.pdf; accessed August 24, 
2014.  
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tradition precisely because "combat" (the taking of life) is so closely associated with 
masculinity, and "motherhood" (the giving of life) is so closely associated with femininity.   
It is no surprise then that one World War II Navy recruiting poster appealed to 
men directly to prove they were men by joining; and indirectly, to risk being considered 
“less than men” if they did not.  That very poster, one with which the reader is no doubt 
familiar because it has become iconographic in pop culture, appearing on a diverse 
range of merchandise from coffee cups to t-shirts, pictures an attractive young woman 
in a Sailor’s uniform, and features the caption “Gee!! I wish I were a man.  I’d join the 
Navy” and the sub-caption “Be a man and do it.”  Under these circumstances, being a 
woman is antithetical to being a warrior (Segal 1982).  Therefore, the very act of women 
joining the military can be viewed as resistance to traditional gender norms, a 
subversive act, if you will.  It seems clear that if one were interested in unraveling some 
key threads in the tapestry, the military might be the place to begin.  For these reasons, 
I believe that exploring women’s resistance to and agency against traditional gender 
norms within the gender-defining organization and culture of the military can be 
instructive to our understanding of the gendering process in general and in attempts to 
resist or transcend it. 
Scholars (see Enloe 1988; Goldstein 2001; and Burke 2004) have concluded that 
one primary motivation men have for joining the military is to prove their masculinity.  
Goldstein (2001) asserts “men are made, not born,” (p. 264) arguing that across 
cultures, almost universally, men must proactively “take actions, undergo ordeals, or 
pass tests” (p. 264) to prove their manhood, whereas women generally do not.  Men are 
exhorted to “be a man” while women are not similarly exhorted to “be a woman.”  While 
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men might jeopardize their status as men through inaction, women may jeopardize their 
status as respectable, suitably feminine women through action and non-conformist 
behavior.    
Certainly, women do not join the military to disprove they are women, but we do 
not know if some women’s personal decisions to join the military are ultimately 
deliberate, if individual and perhaps even subconscious, political acts of resistance 
against the traditional gendered order (Snyder 1999).  Women may not be able to 
clearly recognize or articulate their decision to join as an act of resistance against 
traditional gender norms, but the “personal” may be “political.”  Perhaps, on some level, 
in their personal choice to enter the military, they are rebelling against social constraints 
on women in larger society and proactively embracing the possibility that their lives can 
be “more” than what the traditional gender order allows.  Most women never even 
consider the possibility of serving in the military, but a small percentage do. Despite the 
relatively open and widely-publicized hostility4 among military men toward women’s 
expanded military presence (see O’Neill 1998 for a detailed and fairly comprehensive 
summary of widely-publicized incidents occurring in the 1990s) women continue to join 
the military.  The logical questions that follow are: Why? What motivates them? and 
Who are these women?  The purpose of this study was to begin to answer these 
questions in part by exploring the possibility that some military women, acting 
individually rather than as part of an organized effort or coordinated movement, are 
                                            
 
4 The Navy’s “Tailhook” Convention sexual harassment and assault scandal (1992); the Army’s 
“Aberdeen Proving Ground” Sexual Harassment and sexual assault scandal (1996); Sexual Harassment 
Scandal involving Sergeant Major of the Army (the Army’s highest-ranking enlisted service member), 
Gene C. McKinney (1996); the Air Force Academy’s Sexual Harassment and sexual assault scandal 
(2003), and ongoing reports of military women forward deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan being raped by 
military men (2003 – present). 
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consciously (or unconsciously) trying to subvert the existing gender order.  More 
specifically, I pursued answers to the following research questions: 
 
• Do heterosexual women who joined the Navy do so in part to resist traditional 
gender norms and challenge orthodox assumptions that the military and 
especially combat are “a man’s job”?  
• What motivates Navy women who actively and overtly resist traditional gender 
norms to do so?   
• What forms does Navy women’s resistance to traditional gender norms taken?   
• Does a woman’s social location and relative power in the Navy hierarchy affect 
her resistance to traditional gender norms?  If so, how? 
• Does a woman’s race and/or class affect her resistance to traditional gender 
norms? If so, how? 
In the following section, I sketch a general overview of the literature relevant to the 
intertwined issues addressed in my project.  I will then explore how these theories and 
issues apply specifically to the U.S. military context.   
I. Overview of Relevant Gender Theory and Issues 
Gender is one of the primary axes around which social life is organized (Kimmel 
1996 and Goldstein 2001).  To study women in the military is to study the impact of the 
gendering process on both men and women, and the complex interplay between 
masculinity and femininity.  As we know, the original concept of “sex roles” was derived 
from biological division of male and female and traditional ideas about what activities 
are naturally compatible with maleness and femaleness (Hochschild 1973  and Lopata 
and Thorne 1978).  But “maleness” and “femaleness” are not simply determined by 
biological sex, nor can these behavioral differences be fully explained by differences in 
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men’s and women’s psychological make-up or development (Chodorow 1978 and 1989, 
and Henley 1985).  Qualities of masculinity and femininity are the result of the 
gendering process, i.e., the ascription of cultural meanings and attributes to sex 
differences.  Increasingly, scholars working within the symbolic interactionist paradigm, 
especially those using a dramaturgical lens to interpret human behavior, view gender as 
a social construction (Lorber 1994), something that men and women “perform” in the 
mundane acts of everyday life (West & Zimmerman 1987).   
Academic engagement with the concept and theories of gender over the past two 
decades is both wide-ranging and extensive.  For the purposes of this study, I will 
necessarily narrow my focus to engage with three seminal and closely inter-related 
theories of gender to explain the gendering process in general, and the process of 
gendering in the military context in particular.    These theories include:  (1) West and 
Zimmerman’s (1987) theory that individuals “do gender;” (2) Connell’s (1987) theory that 
masculinity operates “hegemonically” to influence how gender is “done” and to reinforce 
the existing gendered social order; and (3) Acker’s (1990) theory that organizations can 
be and are gendered.  Additionally, I will pay particular attention to the centrality of 
interaction to the process of “doing gender” (Ridgeway 1997 and 2001; Ridgeway & 
Correll 2000 and 2004; and Ridgeway & Smith-Lovin 1999a and 1999b). 
I conceptualize these three theories as being “nested,” one within the other.  Like 
Russian nesting dolls, they must first be “un-packed” before we can “play” with them.  In 
this Chapter, I will also engage with literature focused on: (1) resistance to social 
constructions of race and gender; (2) the effects of relative power and location in the 
organizational hierarchy on resistance to traditional gender norms; and (3) the influence 
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of social location (race and class) on resistance to traditional gender norms. Having first 
explored these theories in the general context, I will then situate the applicability of 
these theories in the military context. 
Doing Gender 
 The concept of “doing” gender evolved out of the symbolic interaction paradigm.  
Symbolic interactionists view humans as social beings who are influenced by but not 
hostage to their daily and lifelong social interactions with others.  As thinking animals, 
human behavior is not only influenced by their interaction with others, but also by 
interaction with self (self-reflection).  We do not just sense our environment; we actively 
define and construct our present circumstances based on past experiences.  Therefore, 
to understand human action symbolic interactionists focus on: “social interaction, human 
thinking, definition of the situation, the present, and the active nature of human beings” 
(Charon 2007, p. 30).   
Working within the symbolic interactionist paradigm and expanding upon it, 
Erving Goffman elaborated a theoretical perspective that described social life and 
human interaction as being similar to a staged drama and filled with ritual (1959).  
Ceremonies and rituals feature prominently in military life and have particular salience. 
Goffman’s work also gave prominence to “self.”  He argued that humans construct 
specific “socially situated selves” in each unique situation through interaction with 
others, rather than carrying a static self-concept from situation to situation.  In other 
words “the self is ‘something of a collaborative manufacture’ that must be produced 
anew on each and every occasion of social interaction” (Charon 2007).  According to 
 
 
 
 
13 
Goffman’s theories on the production of self, individuals are “performers.”  We make a 
presentation of ourselves to others, and that presentation does not have to be accurate.  
We can attempt to manipulate or influence observers’ impressions of us through our 
performance.  We engage in “impression management” to make it appear as if we are 
“playing by the rules” or “living up to standards” when, in fact, we are not.  Goffman 
contends that humans stage performances and fabricate impressions.  Thus, the core of 
Goffman’s (1959) dramaturgical theory revolves around the themes of drama, ritual, and 
self.  Particularly germaine to my project are Goffman’s foundational work describing 
“total institutions,” i.e. prisons, mental asylums, and the military (1961), gender display 
(1976), and gender construction (1977).   
Doing Gender through Interaction 
Building on Goffman’s (1976 and 1977) work, as well as that of others who 
sought to disentangle the biological sex and “sex roles” from the socially constructed 
gender (Garfinkel 1967; Firestone 1970; Hochschild 1973; Tresemer 1975; Chodorow 
1978; Lopata & Thorne 1978; Thorne 1980; Rossi 1984; Henley 1985; Kessler, et al 
1985; and Stacey & Thorne 1985), West and Zimmerman (1987) theorized “gender” as 
“a routine, methodical, and recurring accomplishment … an achieved property of 
situated conduct.”  For West and Zimmerman, gender is something people “do,” 
behavior they perform according to society’s normative conceptions of what is 
appropriate for their sex.  Gender is a performed act, a daily, social accomplishment, 
conducted at the interactional level of individuals.  Work by social-psychologists 
Ridgeway (1997 and 2001), Ridgeway and Smith-Lovin (1996, 1999a, and 1999b), and 
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Ridgeway and Correll (2000 and 2004) focuses more specifically on the interactional 
aspects of that performance and builds on Goffman’s (1967) work on deference and 
demeanor in interaction rituals.   
For clarity, “interaction” as used here may include face-to-face exchanges, 
written, or electronically-mediated (telephone, face-book, webcam) communication 
between people.  According to Ridgeway, while interaction contributes to all social 
systems of inequality and difference, it is especially important in maintaining the gender 
system because men and women comprise nearly equal segments of the population, 
and because men and women interact nearly daily with the opposite sex, whether in the 
privacy of the home or in public.  The old adage for ensuring women’s success upon 
entering previously all-male preserves was:  “look like a woman; act like a man; work 
like a dog.”  Research on interaction reveals that formula is not entirely correct.  Women 
in positions of power are actually penalized more than their male counterparts by 
colleagues and subordinates when, in their attempts to manage in a direct, assertive, 
autocratic style more commonly associated with men, they “act like a man.”   In fact, 
women can more successfully wield power and assert authority if they “soften” their 
approach (Ridgeway 2000).  Unfortunately, in pursuing this strategy for success women 
managers or leaders unintentionally reinforce some gendered stereotypes of women.   
Research has proven yet another common wisdom in error.  A woman really 
does not have to work twice as hard to be thought half as good as her male 
contemporary – she still has to perform better than he does, just perhaps not twice as 
good (Ridgeway & Correll 2004).  Like a thumb placed subtly on the scales of social 
justice, hegemonic cultural beliefs about gender “modestly but systematically” privilege 
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the actions and performance of men over similarly performing women.  The system of 
gender is both widespread and persistent, and no matter how much social conceptions 
of gender have evolved over time, it remains predicated on a hierarchy that routinely 
and predominantly confers more status and authority upon men.  This positive bias 
toward men accumulates “over careers and lifetimes” resulting in substantially different 
professional and personal outcomes among men and women who are otherwise of 
similar social background (Ridgeway & Correll 2004). 
Humans have a basic need to define “self” and “other” in all social-relational 
contexts.  This need activates automatic sex categorization which then activates 
gender, at a minimum as a background identity, in virtually all human interactions.  
Gender is one of the fundamental elements in organizing all social relations, and “when 
gender is effectively salient, it is usually the hegemonic5 form of gender beliefs that are 
implicitly activated” in interaction (Ridgeway & Correll 2004).  They further explain: 
This is because hegemonic gender beliefs are institutionalized in the norms and 
structures of public settings and established private institutions such as the 
nuclear family.  And hegemonic beliefs are also the ones most likely to be 
enforced by socially advantaged actors and are the default beliefs that individuals 
presume to prevail in any setting in which the precise gender beliefs of relevant 
others are uncertain (p. 517). 
Ridgeway and Lovin-Smith (1999) acknowledge that the high contact rate between men 
and women presently creates experiences that largely confirm traditional gender beliefs, 
but argue this same high contact rate might be key to potentially undermining the 
gender system.  Ridgeway and Correll (2004) assert the existing gender hierarchy can 
                                            
 
5 The concept of hegemonic masculinity will be addressed more fully in the section that follows. 
 
 
 
 
16 
only be undermined “through the long-term persistent accumulation of everyday 
challenges to the system resulting from … individual resistance.”   
Ridgeway’s work including that with her various co-authors is largely based on 
evidence gleaned from experimental research in the field of social psychology and not 
grounded in the data of real-life individual resistance and agency against the traditional 
gender order.  She does not theorize or address the form “interactional agency” might 
take, nor the impact it might have in interactional processes between men and women.  
Most of the limited research grounded in actual interactional experiences between men 
and women that Ridgeway and her colleagues draw upon focuses upon the structure 
and pattern of interaction between men and women.   These structures and patterns 
include women’s:  “verbal stroking” of their partners in conversation to encourage 
communication and disclosure; “tentative, unsure, and deferential patterns of speech;” 
and the use of “questions, hedges, qualifiers, disclaimers, and other linguistic forms 
conveying uncertainty” (Ridgeway & Smith-Lovin 1999a and 1999b).  Conversely, men’s 
conversational patterns tend to reflect a lack of “verbal stroking”; stronger and more 
direct styles of verbal engagement; willingness to dominate the conversation and 
interrupt others; and non-verbal dominance displays such as gesturing, gazing while 
talking and gazing while listening.  But “doing gender” at the interactional level involves 
more than what one says and how one says it.  Doing gender at the interactional level is 
also about how one presents one’s self – verbally and physically.   
My aim with this project is to begin focusing attention more on the content of the 
interaction, i.e. the message of resistance or agency the sender intends to convey 
through their words or action, rather than on the conversational structures and patterns 
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of men and women interacting.  The following section will address how hegemonic 
masculinity influences the gender system and gendered interaction. 
Hegemonic Masculinity 
The concept of “hegemonic masculinity” is based upon a relational model of 
gender; not a categorical model (Connell & Messerschmidt 2005).  This concept is both 
borrowed from and an extension of Gramsci’s original use of “hegemony” in his analysis 
of class relations in Italy.  Gramsci named the process by which social ascendancy is 
achieved in a play of social forces that extends beyond contests of brute power into the 
organization of private life and cultural processes “hegemony.”  In Gramsci’s 
conception, hegemony does not result in total cultural dominance or obliteration of 
alternatives, nor does it depend on brute force.  Rather, hegemony depends upon 
subtle persuasion and influence.  Ascendancy is achieved within a balance of forces – 
other groups and patterns are subordinated rather than eliminated (Connell 1987 and 
1995).  Hegemony is the process of manufacturing consent in society without resorting 
to coercion and raw or brutal domination (Sivaramakrishnan 2005). 
In other words, hegemony is a powerful form of influence that allows those who 
hold particular forms of power (i.e. heterosexuality, “whiteness,” masculinity) to maintain 
their privileged position through the elaboration of a particular world view, an ideology, a 
particular notion of common sense, which is widely infused into everyday cultural 
practices, making existing power structures and relations seem “natural.” Thus, people 
do not submit to power as much as they willingly consent to it, even when doing so may 
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not be in their own best interests.6  In American society, heterosexuality can be said to 
operate hegemonically over all other forms of sexuality, “whiteness” over other forms of 
“race.”   
Building on theories of gender as socially constructed, Carrigan, Connell, and 
Lee (1985) first introduced and Connell (1987) later elaborated upon the concept of 
“hegemonic masculinity” to describe hierarchal power relations among men, and 
between men and women.  Hegemonic masculinity is an ordering of versions of 
masculinity and femininity.  As such, it is always constructed “in relation to various 
subordinated masculinities as well as in relation to women.”  The form of masculinity 
that occupies the hegemonic position in a given pattern of gender relations is always 
contestable. Achieving masculine hegemony, in any particular context, is accomplished 
through leadership and influence, rather than domination or control, and always results 
in subordinated masculinities.  It is achieved via “the colonization of popular 
consciousness or common sense through the articulation of specific social practices 
and positions within ideological codes” (Grossberg 1984, p. 412).  While the hegemonic 
form of masculinity may not actually be the “norm” among men in any particular 
organization or setting, it is normative – embodying “the currently most honored way of 
being a man” and requiring “all other men to position themselves in relation to it” 
(Connell & Messerschmidt, 2005). 
                                            
 
6 In his NY Times best-selling book What’s the Matter With Kansas Thomas Frank essentially argues that 
Republicans in Kansas have successfully espoused a now-hegemonic political ideology centered on 
cultural issues, i.e. “Guns, God, and Gays” to convert a state that was formerly a “hotbed of leftist 
activism” into a solidly conservative Republican state, despite the fact that Republican economic policies 
are actually harmful to many of the state’s residents.  This was all achieved not at the point of a gun or 
with any other force, but through relentless articulation of a particular ideology that ultimately achieved 
ascendance and now continues to operate “hegemonically.” 
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Foucault (1977) argued that power relations are imbedded in processes of 
categorization and differentiation.  In his study of the construction of hegemonic 
masculinity within the organizational context of the U.S. Navy, Barrett (1996) examined 
the experiences of men from three different communities:  Aviation, Surface warfare, 
and Supply, with an eye to the processes of categorization and differentiation.  The first 
two are warfare communities, with Aviation being widely regarded as the most 
prestigious of the two.  Supply is a “staff” community, a non-warfare community.  In the 
Navy context, any warfare community is more prestigious than any staff corps 
community due to their proximity to the organization’s ideological core: combat.  Barrett 
identified the ways in which men from each of these diverse communities construct their 
masculinity.  The aviators in Barrett’s (1996) study tended to build their masculine 
identities on themes of autonomy and risk-taking.  The Surface Warfare Officers built 
theirs on themes of perseverance and endurance.  The Supply Officers built theirs on 
technical rationality.  Drawing on Connell (1995), Barrett (1996, p. 130) concludes “the 
hegemonic ideal of masculinity in current Western culture is a man who is independent, 
risk-taking, aggressive, heterosexual, and rational.”  
Karst (1991) although not specifically attempting to explain how hegemonic 
masculinity operates in day-to-day life, does so none-the-less in his exploration of the 
“ideal of manhood”:   
There was, and still is, an ideal of manhood7… Because it is an abstract ideal, a 
construct of the mind, manhood in the sense of masculinity is in some measure 
unattainable; it can be pursued, but never wholly achieved.  Yet, the achievement 
                                            
 
7 Karst (1991), Kerber (1998), and Snyder (1999) all note that historically and legally for most of our 
nation’s history, manhood and full citizenship have been inextricably linked:  masculinity was a condition 
of full citizenship, and active participation in public life reassured men of their manhood. 
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of manhood is seen by most men as essential to their identities.  In combination, 
these elements are a recipe for anxiety.  So, manhood is not just an ideal; it is 
also a problem…We are all consumers of images of manhood.  According to 
these images a man is supposed to be: active; assertive; confident; decisive; 
ready to lead; strong; courageous; morally capable of violence; independent; 
competitive; practical; successful in achieving goals; emotionally detached; cool 
in the face of danger or crisis; blunt in expression; sexually aggressive and yet 
protective toward women. "Proving yourself" as a man can take many forms, but 
all of them are expressive, and all are variations on the theme of power… we can 
see the subordination of women as part of men's nervous efforts to repress the 
"feminine" in themselves, to  keep their manhood visible to other men. The 
deepest fear of all, embedded in a never-ending drama of male rivalry, is the fear 
of being dominated by other men, humiliated for not measuring up to the manly 
ideal… The heart of the ideology of masculinity is the belief that power rightfully 
belongs to the masculine -- that is, to those who display the traits traditionally 
called masculine. This belief has two corollaries. The first is that the gender line 
must be clearly drawn, and the second is that power is rightfully distributed 
among the masculine in proportion to their masculinity, as determined not merely 
by their physical statute or aggressiveness, but more generally by their ability to 
dominate and to avoid being dominated …The second corollary of the ideology 
highlights the centrality of male rivalry. By making anxiety into an everyday fact of 
life, it leads nervous men to seek reassurances of their masculinity through group 
rituals that express domination over other groups …The importance of gender as 
a marker of individual identity and social status creates powerful incentives for 
keeping the gender line clearly defined -- not just in our individual self-definitions, 
but in our social interactions (pp. 503-508). 
Although Connell concedes that women are central in their traditional roles as 
wives, mothers, sisters, girlfriends, classmates and colleagues in the many processes 
constructing various masculinities, he does not address the impact of women’s 
influence in non-traditional roles within “men only” situations, such as military service.  
Despite initially conceptualizing a “hegemonic femininity” which quickly evolved into 
“emphasized femininity,” in his single-minded focus on masculinity, Connell has until 
recently (with Messerschmidt 2005) overlooked the possibility that some girls and 
women resist traditional definitions femininity in the gender they “do.”  Connell and 
Messerschmidt (2005) did at long last concede that gender hierarchies “are affected by 
new configurations of women’s identity and practice” and that “our understanding of 
hegemonic masculinity needs to incorporate a more holistic understanding of gender 
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hierarchy, recognizing the agency of subordinated groups as much as the power of 
dominant groups” (p. 848).  This project aims to do just that.  In the following section I 
will address the influence of gender in organizational contexts. 
Gendered Organizations 
Just as individuals are gendered, so, too, can the organizations to which 
individuals belong be gendered.  Rosabeth Moss Kanter (1977) first introduced the idea 
that gender could permeate an organization in her seminal work Men and Women of the 
Corporation in which she studies the work relationships of (male) managers and 
(female) clerical workers.  The vast majority of women were confined to low-level, 
poorly-paid positions with little chance for advancement, while a select few who were 
able to advance to upper levels of the organization were stereotyped and viewed as 
“tokens.”  Kanter argued that women’s experience in the working world were more a 
product of their “structural location” than their “personalities or socialization.”  Soon 
there-after, building on the insights of a generation of organizational scholars, Joan 
Acker (1990) formalized a theory of gendered organizations. Since then, organizational 
scholars have been working to fully incorporate gender into organizational analysis 
(Mills and Tancred 1992 and Mills 2002) and further explicate Acker’s theory (Britton 
2000).   Acker (1990, 1992a, 1992b, 1999, and 2006) describes a “gendered” 
organization as one in which widely disseminated cultural images of gender are 
invented and reproduced.  Acker (1999) argues: 
People in organizations create images, symbols, and forms of consciousness 
that justify, legitimate, and even glamorize the persistent gender divisions 
…Images, symbols, and forms of consciousness function ideologically to help 
naturalize relations of power … The image of the organization as a gender-
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neutral, abstract hierarchy of jobs and positions, articulated in organizational 
theory and in management thinking, plays an ideological role in both obscuring 
gender and in embedding an image of a male worker or manager in assumptions 
about how organizations should be put together (p. 182). 
She further explains that while doing the work inherent in any organizations, people 
interact as women and men, supervisors and subordinates, co-workers, employees and 
customers, etc.  While interacting in these routine work roles, people are also “doing 
gender.” It is in these everyday contexts of interaction that people “experience and 
create dominance and submission, create alliances and exclusions, put together and 
implement policies that divide and differentiate between women and men and produce 
and confirm gender images” (Acker 1999, pp. 183-184) that enact different forms of 
organizational and managerial patriarchy.  According to Acker, the form of masculinity 
most often linked to the management of large organizations is that which is hegemonic. 
Acker (1990, 1992a, 1992b, 1999, and 2006) and most of her fellow scholars 
contend all organizations are inherently gendered and most are gendered in favor of 
men. Britton (2000) challenges this conception and suggest alternative definitions of 
what “genders” an organization:  (1) organizations or occupations are gendered to the 
extent that they are dominated by men or women; or (2) organizations or occupations 
are gendered in that “they are symbolically and ideologically described and conceived in 
terms of a discourse that draws on hegemonically defined masculinities and 
femininities” (p. 420).  Furthermore, she cautions that the sex composition (ratio of men 
to women) of an organization should not be mistaken for the gender typing of the work 
the organization does in defining it as “masculine.”  In the case of the military, both sex 
composition and gender-typing make it a masculine institution and regardless of 
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whether you apply Acker’s or Britton’s definition of a gendered organization, it is quite 
clear that the military is organizationally gendered “male.” 
Issues of Gender Resistance 
While theoretical work on gender discusses it as a “a performed act, a daily, 
social accomplishment” (West & Zimmerman 1987), which implies it can be resisted and 
“undone” (Lorber 2000; Butler 2004; Deutsch 2007; and Risman 2009) or at least 
“redone” (West & Zimmerman 2009), existing work has barely scratched the surface in 
empirically investigating theories of gender resistance unrelated to sexuality in those 
daily, performed acts.  Not all women are hyper-feminine, although some are; not all 
men are hyper-masculine, although some are.  There is a spectrum of gender ranging 
from hyper-masculine at one extreme to hyper-feminine at the other.  People occupy 
every point in-between.  There are “masculine” women and “effeminate” men who are 
not homosexual, despite obvious social penalties for resistance to gender norms.  There 
are men and women who are androgynous.8   Theorists must begin to examine the 
reasons for and strategies behind “gender resistant” behavior, to enhance our 
understanding of the power operating in the gender middle-ground, as well as at its 
endpoints.  
Feminist scholars have only recently begun to take up the issue of gender 
resistance.  Most of that work has focused specifically on the LGBT community (see 
Anderson 2002; Carr 1998, 2005, and 2007; Gagne & Tewksbury 1998; Hennen 2004; 
                                            
 
8 I use “androgynous” as it is first defined by Merriam-Webster:  “having the characteristics or nature of 
both male and female” rather than alternative definitions as:  neither specifically feminine nor masculine; 
suitable to or for either sex; or having traditional male and female roles obscured or reversed.   
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and Yeong, Stromler, & Wharton 2006).  But, some focuses on gender in general.  
Lucal (1999) bemoans a narrowly dichotomous gender system which forces her as a 
woman whose  gender display is considered “inappropriate” to live her life on its 
boundaries.  Lorber (2000) has called for a “feminist de-gendering movement” in which 
she proposes that “gender” be used to “undo” gender.  Deutsch (2007) and Butler (1999 
and 2004) have both explored the potential of “undoing” gender.   Deutsch’s (2007) plea 
is that we “shift our inquiry about ongoing social interactions to focus on change” (p. 
114). With the exception of Lucal’s reflections on her lived experience, this work is all 
theoretical however.   
Empirical research on women’s resistance to society’s traditional gender norms 
remains somewhat scarce.  Martin and Meyerson (1998), scholars of organizations, 
investigated what they termed resistance and “disorganized co-action” (individual 
gender agency), among female executives at a high-performance computer products 
firm in Silicon Valley.  Interestingly, Martin and Meyerson’s (1998) work did not build on 
West and Zimmerman (1987) concept of “doing gender” but rather focused on gender 
as a source of power, or powerlessness, extending Foucault’s work, which has been 
criticized by some feminists for overlooking gender as a source of power.  
Carr’s work (1998, 2005, 2007) conflates being a “tomboy” and the resistance to 
gender norms “being a tomboy” entails with being homosexual, foreclosing the 
possibility that a girl or woman does not have to be homosexual to be a tomboy or resist 
traditional gender norms. Collins (2000) theorizes sources of oppression as being 
multiplicative, not additive, and cautions against additive approaches in theorizing any 
aspect of inequality.  Existing theory and research does not investigate the possibility 
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that in some extreme contexts, such as the hyper-masculine, hegemonic, misogynist 
military culture, one form of oppression, in this case gender, can trump others and 
actually provide space for the oppressed to unite in a common cause of resistance, 
without regard to their other usual sources of oppression, i.e., race, class, sexual 
orientation, etc. (Hall, 1999).   
 “Difference” feminists, defined by Tong (1998) as those feminists who embraced 
their differences from men and resisted the right to be “the same as men” pursued by 
liberal feminists, are quick to suggest that women who join the military do so because of 
“false consciousness” or in response to a “poor draft” (Enloe 1988 and Miller, 1998).  
This position robs women of agency and ignores the possibility that some women may 
be drawn to military service because it is a family tradition, or out of a sense of 
patriotism or civic obligation, out of a desire for adventure or to challenge themselves 
(Enloe 1988; Snyder 1999 and 2003), or as deliberate acts of resistance against the 
traditional gendered order (Snyder 1999 and Kronsell 2005).  The sense that the military 
provides a patriotic and moral proving ground for citizenship, and a test of “adulthood” 
and independence does attract some adventurous young women.   
Brickell (2005) explores agency and subversion with respect to the study of 
masculinities.  He proposes taking the best elements of Judith Butler’s (1990; 1993; 
1997; 1999; and 2004) work on gender, performativity,9 and subversion and combining 
them with the best elements of Goffman’s (1959; 1974; 1976; and 1977) work on social 
frames, performance, and interaction.  Butler overlooks the influence of social structure 
                                            
 
9 Brickell (2005) cautions that Butler’s “performativity” should not be confused with Goffman’s 
“performance.”  “Performativity is primarily a constituative process …it does not refer to subjects ‘doing 
gender.’  While the term performance implies enactment or doing; performativity refers to the constitution 
of regulatory notions and their effects” (Brickell 2005, p. 28). 
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but addresses the influence of power, whereas Goffman’s analysis overlooks the 
influence of power and systemic inequality but incorporates the influence of social 
structure.  West (1996) extols the potential of Goffman’s interactional, dramaturgical 
paradigm of “microanalysis” for feminist scholars and their studies of gender.  Ridgeway 
(1997 and 2001), Ridgeway and Smith-Lovin (1996; 1999a; and 1999b) and Ridgeway 
and Correll (2000 and 2004) focus on how interaction between men and women may 
create “experiences that confirm, or potentially could undermine, the beliefs about 
gender difference and inequality that underlie the gender system” (Ridgeway & Smith-
Lovin 1999a, p. 191).  More recently Kronsell (2005) has argued that everyday routines 
and practices that reproduce certain norms can become “the site for challenging 
hegemonic masculinity and encouraging transformation” (p. 286).   
None of this work is exactly on point for my project.  Rather, my project is 
predicated on an amalgamation of these ideas.  For instance, I take Brickell’s (2005) 
advice to use Goffman’s dramaturgical frame, while simultaneously focusing on the 
influence of power as it exists in interaction between Navy women and their male 
colleagues, focusing specifically on resistant aspects of that interaction as they relate to 
presumed gender norms.   I could not pursue this more holistic approach to 
investigating resistance to traditional gender norms if these scholars had not first loosed 
some of the threads in the gender tapestry through their more single-minded focus.   
Thinking of resistance in more general terms brings additional scholars into this 
intellectual mélange.  In a straightforward and engaging way that mesmerizes the 
reader, Hine (1990), Hine, King, and Reed (1995), and Hine and Thompson (1998) 
document a historical pattern of resistance and activism among African American 
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women, beginning with their experiences under slavery.  Based on their specific 
historical location within the matrix of domination, African American women have known 
intrinsically that they labored under multiple and overlapping systems of oppression 
before such a conceptual approach was named “intersectional” by Crenshaw (1989, 
and 1991) and further expanded by Collins (1990).  Placing minority women at the 
center of my research project, privileging their experiences as the “norm” should help 
illuminate the uniqueness of that “norm” relative to the experiences of similarly-situated 
white women. 
Kuumba provides more general work on resistance, focusing on decolonizing 
women’s liberation/oppression theory (1994) and reproductive imperialism (1996) but 
her real substantial contribution to my particular project comes in her collaboration with 
Ajanaku (1998) in their empirical study of the wearing of dreadlocks as one example of 
“culturally contextualized everyday resistance” (p. 227).  The choice to wear dreadlocks 
as an act of symbolic resistance also provides the opportunity for “oppositional 
collective identities that manipulate cultural aesthetics” (p. 227) to develop within a 
specific community of a larger, colonizing population, linking individuals to counter-
hegemonic social movements.  This practice initially reflected one’s membership in an 
organized resistance movement that grew out of Rastafarianism. Ultimately, the wearing 
of dreads was co-opted by wider popular culture (such as in Rap and Hip Hop 
communities and beyond, to predominantly white suburbs) and ceased to serve as the 
politically-symbolic, mobilizing, and empowering act of defiance it once had been.  
Clearly, literature abounds detailing forms of resistance in other social contexts to social 
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issues other than gender.  The following section will explore the influence of gender and 
power. 
Issues of Gender & Power 
As mentioned briefly in the previous section, Martin and Meyerson (1998), 
organizational scholars, investigated what they termed resistance and “disorganized co-
action” (individual gender agency), among seven female executives at a high-
performance computer products firm in Silicon Valley.  They found that high-ranking 
women were often isolated, sharing limited contact with each other.  Each might 
individually be proactively attempting to affect change, but given their isolation, their 
individual rather than collaborative collective actions appeared “fragmented, dispersed, 
and uncoordinated.”  Additionally, women are particularly disadvantaged when the 
medium for competition with (male) co-workers is time.  Women are deeply impacted by 
the double shift, and increasingly by their obligations as members of the “sandwich” 
generation.   Martin and Meyerson (1998) also discovered that both women and 
minorities have difficulties adapting to white male organizational cultures, while 
simultaneously trying to remain authentic to their own personal values. Additional 
difficulties for women mounted when they attempted to behave in a manner considered 
normal for a man.  Women who behaved in the manner of successful men provoked 
very different reactions from male workers.  In fact, the women participants in this study 
exhibited patterns of disempowerment that were directly related to their status as 
women working in a “male-defined” world.  What constituted resistance among these 
women was primarily subjective, as defined by the woman, herself.   
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Ashford, Rothbard, Piderit, and Dutton (1998) explored the factors motivating and 
de-motivating women managers for raising gender equity issues in their organizations.  
While many women indicated in survey research that addressing the issue with higher-
level managers would not adversely impact their public image within the company, 
interviews with many of the participants reflect various anxieties about “rocking the 
boat,” being perceived as a whiner, or becoming the “’women’s issue’ person.”  Two 
main concerns were that attempting to “sell” a gender equity issue would potentially limit 
not just that individual’s promotional opportunities, but also those of all other women in 
the organization.   
Rudman’s (1998) research revealed that a women who was a “self-promoter” 
was seen as a more competent and qualified candidate for a stereotypically-defined 
“man’s job” than a similarly qualified woman who was not a “self-promoter.”  Secondly, a 
self-promoting woman was preferred by both men and women to a self-effacing man.  
Rudman concluded that women are routinely conditioned throughout life to be modest 
and self-effacing.  Women are also expected to look out for others.  This gendered 
conditioning may be so deeply ingrained that they cannot overcome it, thus it may 
adversely affect women’s professional lives and accomplishments.   
Rudman and Glick’s (2001) research revealed that women in leadership 
positions were subject to a double bind.  They could either be liked but not respected, or 
they could be respected but not liked.  In order for women to be seen as competent, 
often they must act like men, but in doing so they violate the prescriptive aspect of 
female gender stereotypes, i.e. they are not “nice” and therefore they are not liked.  
Each of these studies is directly pertinent to my research on resistance to traditional 
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norms among Navy women, who work in a male-dominated, masculine-gendered 
organization, doing work that is culturally defined as male.  
Issues of Intersectionality 
Existing macro theories of gender developed by mainstream (white, middle and 
upper class) feminists have, until relatively recently, tended toward the monolithic, i.e., 
based on a single heterosexual, white, middle-class female norm.  Connell’s (1987) 
theory of hegemonic masculinity, in which multiple, competing forms of masculinity 
(masculinities) are implicit, introduces the possibility of a gender continuum rather than 
the binary location of “masculine” or “feminine.” Following Connell (1995); Kimmel, 
Hearn, and (2004); Brickell (2005); Connell (2005a and 2005b); and Kimmel (2005) 
feminist scholars are beginning to think in terms of “femininities.” Additionally, general 
theories of gender need to be further expanded to incorporate other forms of oppression 
that are both interlocking and simultaneous, i.e. race, class, sexual orientation, religious, 
tribal, etc.  These multiple and interlocking forms of oppression were first identified by 
Lorde in 198010 (1984), further articulated by Davis (1981) and hooks (1984) and later 
termed “intersectionality” by Crenshaw (1989) and further expanded by Collins (1990).  
Zerai (2000) details the history of this approach, which developed through analysis and 
critique of mainstream feminist thought, as well as that of early scholars and activists 
grappling with issues of “race.”   
                                            
 
10 “Age, Race, Class, and Sex: Women Redefining Difference” appears on pages 114-123 of Sister 
Outsider: Essays and Speeches (1984), however before its publication in 1984 this essay was a paper 
delivered at the Copeland Colloquium, Amherst College, April 1980 as noted in Sister Outsider. 
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“Intersectionality” focuses on the way that various forms of social location such 
as race, class, gender, and sexual orientation interact in simultaneous and 
multiplicative, rather than simply additive, ways, operating as “interlocking systems of 
domination” (Zerai, 2000).  As noted by Zerai and Banks (2002) the intersectional 
framework developed by black feminist scholars provides all scholars with a powerful 
tool for developing a “multilayered understanding” of complex issues, such as gender 
construction and resistance.  This epistemology is especially useful to my study of 
gender because it is particularly effective in examining the “dominance, resistance, and 
social transformation” (Zerai & Banks 2002) at the heart of this research project. 
While a considerable amount of research has been conducted on Navy women’s 
military participation, most of that research treats women’s experiences as if they are 
homogenous.  Furthermore, much of the qualitative research on Navy women has been 
conducted with participants who are white officers.  I believe that reflects the unintended 
bias of “easy access to subjects” more than it reflects intentional bias against enlisted 
women of any race or ethnicity, or officers who are women of color.  Most of the 
qualitative research on Navy women has been conducted by Navy women attending 
Navy Post Graduate School in Monterey, CA.  The Navy base in Monterey has very few 
enlisted Sailors assigned.  Women officers (predominantly white) working on their 
Master’s degrees, turn to their fellow students when seeking study participants as a 
matter of convenience.  Very few studies to date specifically explore the experiences of 
women of color.  Fortunately, as the officer corps has grown increasingly diverse, so too 
has the pool of potential research participants.  Hopefully these changes bode well for 
the future of research on women in the Navy. 
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Acker (2006) locates the source of much of the social and economic inequality 
within organizations.  She advocates applying an intersectional lens or what she terms 
“inequality regimes” to organizational contexts.  Particularly on point to studying the 
military and other traditional bureaucracies is her contention that “the steepness of 
hierarchy is one dimension of variation in the shape and degree of inequality” (p. 445).  
According to Acker (2006) “the steepest hierarchies are found in traditional 
bureaucracies” such as that of the U.S. military as compared to “flat” organizations 
organized in teams, in which team members share in most, or at least some, leadership 
responsibilities and decision-making authority.   
So far in this chapter I have laid out the inter-related theories and issues I see as 
particularly relevant to studying Navy women’s resistance to traditional gender norms.  
These theories include:  (1) West and Zimmerman’s (1987) theory that individuals “do 
gender;” (1a) Ridgeway’s (1997 and 2001) work, along and in collaboration (Ridgeway 
& Correll 2000 and 2004; and Ridgeway and Smith-Lovin 1996; 1999a; and 1999b) that 
center interaction in the process of doing gender; (2) Connell’s (1987) theory that 
masculinity operates “hegemonically” to influence how gender is “done” and to reinforce 
the existing gendered social order; (3) Acker’s (1990) theory that organizations can be 
and are gendered, and (4) Lorde’s (1984); Davis’ (1981); hooks’ (1984); Crenshaw’s 
(1989); and Collins’ (1990) work on multiple and simultaneous forms of oppression 
commonly known today as “intersectionality.”  The issues I was most interested in 
exploring are the influence resistance; relative power, and social location have on the 
process of women doing gender within the hyper-masculine, hegemonic organization 
that is the U.S. military.  After exploring each of these theories and issues in a general 
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theoretical context, I situated their relevance specifically within the U.S. military 
experience.   
While most feminists studying gender generally do not conceive that there can be 
or are positive outcomes for women or larger society from women’s participation in 
traditionally male, patriarchal organizations; and most feminists presume male 
hegemony can have only an adverse effect on both men and women; I suggest 
otherwise.  I am not arguing that hegemonic masculinity in the hyper-masculine, often 
misogynist military organizational context does no harm to women.  I am open to the 
possibility and willing to explore, to borrow again from Hemmingway, whether some 
women get strong in the broken places, and in doing so, they resist and possibly 
change the gendered order.  Little, if any, existing empirical research explores the 
possibility that women’s presence in the military can be good for women in general, or 
that military women, in acting out gender scripts previously defined as “male” and 
thereby highlighting the artificiality of normative constructions of gender, are ultimately, 
even if unintentionally, subverting the existing gender order.  I hypothesized this 
experience is likely to make military women more willing to seek and demand, through 
individual or collaborative resistance, a larger definition and broader boundaries of what 
constitutes being a “woman” and being “feminine.” In the following section I elaborate 
my research methodology. 
As Ridgeway and Smith-Lovin (1999a) note, at the macro level, gender involves 
widely shared cultural beliefs and institutions; at the interactional level, gender involves 
behaviors and expectations; and at the individual level, gender involves self-
conceptions and attitudes.  My project focused on gender resistance among officer and 
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enlisted women in the U.S. Navy.  I approached this project informed by:  (1) West and 
Zimmerman’s (1987) concept of gender as a performed act (“display”, role-taking, role-
play, performance), a daily, social accomplishment involving human interaction 
(Ridgeway 1997 and 2001; Ridgeway & Smith-Lovin 1996; 1999a; and 1999b; 
Ridgeway & Correll 2000 and 2004; Brickell 2005;  and Kronsell 2005 refer); (2) Acker’s 
(1990) gendering of the “organization”; and (3) Connell’s (1987 and 2003) concept of 
hegemonic masculinity as the hierarchal power relations among men, and between men 
and women.    
As noted by Zerai (2000) “oppression operates as an integrated system” and 
knowledge of that system is “situated in the experiences of individuals.”  Therefore, in 
order to address my research questions, it was absolutely necessary to conduct 
empirical research at the micro-level.  As the result of watershed events such as:  
1. Tailhook (1991);  
2. the lifting of the combat exclusion law which resulted in the assignment of 
women to combatant ships and aircraft (1993);  
3. the sexual harassment scandal at Aberdeen Proving Grounds (1996);  
4. the U.S. Air Force Academy sexual assault and rape scandal (2003);  
5. instances of sexual assault and rape of female soldiers deployed to Iraq, 
Kuwait, and Afghanistan by their male colleagues (2003 – present);   
6. growing concerns over women’s experiences in war and their resulting unique 
mental health concerns; and 
7. the apparent epidemic of rape and sexual assault of U.S. military women by 
U.S. military men across the Department of Defense on American soil 
to enumerate but a few.   Military women, in general, have been and continue to be 
subject to a vast array of social science surveys.  Department of Defense and 
Congressionally-mandated studies abound.  Many women are weary of being treated 
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like “lab rats.”  Quantitative methodology surveys might allow senior DOD civilian and 
military leaders to return quick answers to Congress on a single, politically volatile issue 
related to military women’s experiences, but they do not begin to explain the complex 
realities of military women’s lives.  If sociologists of the military and other gender 
scholars are ever to fully explore the complex problems related to gender integration 
that military members face every day, in an effort to really advance our understanding of 
the gendering process and gendered power relations, they must start to ask hard 
questions, at the right level, of the right people.  This approach demanded qualitative 
research methods, such as one-on-one interviews or ethnographic research that, as 
Maxwell (2005) suggests, would yield richly detailed data, embedded in context.   
Unless the researcher is presently in the military and can conduct ethnographic 
research unobtrusively, conducting ethnographic research within the military context 
requires the “official” cooperation of the Department of Defense or the individual 
services.  As we can see in the case of “embedded” journalists during the initial phases 
of the war in Iraq, the handling of the friendly fire death of Pat Tillman, the rescue of 
“little girl Rambo”11 Jessica Lynch, and the Abu Ghraib and Walter Reed Army Hospital 
scandals, the Department of Defense is very suspicious of outsiders and very cautious 
in controlling its public image by limiting access to its inner workings to those who are 
known to be sympathetic to the status quo.  As a result, I chose to conduct voluntary, 
one-on-one, in-depth interviews with officer and enlisted military women who are 
considered to be “combatants” based on their occupational specialties and professional 
                                            
 
11 This is how Jessica Lynch described the version of herself created by the Department of Defense 
Public Affairs during Congressional testimony to a House Committee on Oversight and Government 
Reform. 
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warfare qualifications that officially designate them so.   I intentionally chosen not to 
seek the assistance of the official Navy bureaucracy in completing this research project 
because I wanted to ensure participation was voluntary and participants were selected 
as randomly as possible.   
As of January, 2012 the active Navy had a total of 8,648 women officers (15.8% 
of total Navy Officers).  Of these, 2,480 served in the “unrestricted line,”12 of which 620 
were pilots or Naval Flight Officers (the vast majority of the woman pilots, however, do 
not fly combat aircraft); 12 were special operations officers (divers, explosive ordinance 
disposal, etc) and 1,534 were Surface Warfare Officers (SWOs). 13  The Navy had  
45,889 total enlisted women, with 24,622 of them serving in non-traditional ratings, i.e. 
aviation, combat systems, construction, engineering, or operations.  Women comprised 
approximately 23.0% of the Navy's FY12 and FY13 enlisted recruiting goals.  Criteria for 
inclusion in this study were: 
1. Active duty Navy women officers must have achieved qualification as a 
Surface Warfare Officer and have served onboard a combatant ship for at least 3 years 
and have experienced at least one extended operational deployment.  Surface Warfare 
Qualified Officers may have subsequently transitioned to a different (non-warfare) 
                                            
 
12 Unrestricted Line officers are the Navy’s “warriors,” i.e., the aviators, surface warfare officers, 
submariners, and special operations officers.  Other Navy communities include the Restricted Line, those 
specialties that directly support the operational fleet with its warfare mission such as intelligence, 
oceanography, cryptology, and engineering; and the Staff Corps which includes chaplains, civil 
engineers, lawyers, doctors, dentists, nurses, and supply officers.  Only Unrestricted Line officers can 
assume command of ships or aircraft. 
13 Surface Warfare Officers (SWOs – pronounced “swōh” or pl. “swōhs”) specialize in operating ships at 
sea. They are colloquially known as “ship drivers,” i.e., they “con” (control) the ship and in the event of 
enemy attack, those with “Tactical Action Officer” (TAO) qualification “fight” the ship, bringing offensive 
and defensive weapons systems to bear to defeat whatever enemy threat they meet.  Prior to the 1992 
lifting of the combat exclusion law women could qualify as Surface Warfare Officers and serve on non-
combatant ships, but they could not be assigned to combatant ships and consequently did not qualify as 
TAOs.  As such, they were Surface Warfare Officers (ship drivers), but not Surface Warriors (ship 
fighters).  With the combat exclusion lifted, and the advent of the SWO sequencing plan, both men and 
women SWOs serve shorter tours on a variety of ships (amphibious, cruiser/destroyer, logistics/resupply, 
fleet oiler) so, theoretically, a SWO is a SWO regardless of their sex.  
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community (intelligence, supply, human resources, etc) with which they were serving at 
the time of participation;  
2. Active duty Navy enlisted women must have qualified as Enlisted Surface 
Warfare Specialist; preferably be in one of the “non-traditional” ratings (such as 
engineman, boatswain’s mate, machinist’s mate, as opposed to yeoman, 
personnelman, corpsman that are more administrative or health-care oriented); and 
either assigned to a combatant ship or aircraft squadron at the time of participation; or 
previously assigned to a combatant ship as permanent party for a minimum of two 
years; or have embarked aboard a combatant ship as part of a detachment for a 6-
month or longer operational deployment overseas;  
3. Officer participants had to be in pay grades O-2 or higher, i.e. commissioned 
for two or more years (see Appendix D for an elaboration of Navy paygrades and job 
specialties); 
4. Enlisted participants had to be in pay grades of E-4 or higher, i.e. enlisted for 
two or more years; 
 5. Only data from heterosexual participants was analyzed14 and included in this 
study to avoid the possibility of inadvertently introducing intervening variables15 that 
may result from sexual orientation into this study of resistance to gender norms. 
I chose to interview warfare-qualified, Officer and Enlisted active-duty women 
serving in the Navy for this study.  Based on the relatively small number of women that 
qualify for inclusion in this study, I calculated the preliminary target number and 
dispersion of women respondents to be sufficient for a theoretical sample of this unique 
                                            
 
14 When I began interviews for this project, Don’t Ask Don’t Tell (DADT), which prohibited homosexuals 
from serving openly, was still in effect.  DADT was subsequently rescinded and gay and lesbian service 
members were allowed to serve openly beginning September 20, 2011. 
15 There is a growing body of “queer” literature specifically focused on the performance of and resistance 
to gender by LGBT people.  Although LGBT people may share with heterosexual military women many of 
the same reasons for resisting traditional gender norms, at least some of the reasons LGBT people resist 
traditional gender norms may be related to their sexual orientation. To avoid contamination of data by 
unintentionally introducing these kinds of intervening variables into the research and theory equations of 
this particular study, I limited inclusion in this study to heterosexual women.  This choice is not without 
complications which I will address later in this paper. 
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population and of these unique sub-populations (Charmaz 2006).  My target goal 
included 50 total interviewees; 25 officer and 25 enlisted.  I had hoped to oversample 
minority women as they are underrepresented among the population of Navy women.  
My goal was to interview 6 officer and 6 enlisted service members in each of the 
following demographic groups:  African American, Asian/Pacific Islander, 
Latina/Hispanic/Chicana, and 7 officer and 7 enlisted Caucasians.16  To expose 
possible “cohort effects” in women’s military experiences, I also sought participants 
among officers in paygrades from O-2 (Lieutenant Junior Grade, 1-2 years service) thru 
O-5 (Commander, 15-20 years service) and among enlisted personnel from E-4 (Petty 
Officer, 3rd Class, 1-4 years service) through Master Chief (17-26 years service). 
Although enlisted women significantly outnumber women officers, I found it much 
harder to obtain enlisted participants as many felt it was not within their authority to 
speak with me about their military service without first obtaining permission from their 
commands.  Over the past decade, Navy leaders have grown increasingly media wary, 
cautioning all servicemembers against talking to the press about any matters related to 
the Navy.  Among a commander’s greatest nightmares, aside from running a ship 
aground or killing someone in the course of conducting operations, is to awake to find 
an unflattering story about yourself or your unit on the front page of the New York Times 
or the Washington Post.  In my recent experience, enlisted service members are 
cautioned most strenuously against giving interviews (presumably by reporters, not 
                                            
 
16 As of 30 September 2011, Native Americans, including American Eskimos, comprised only .6 percent 
of women Navy officers and 3.9 percent of enlisted Navy women (Manning 2013).  While their 
experiences are of no less interest or value, due to their relatively small number, they are much more 
difficult to find. None of the women who agreed to be interviewed for this study self-identified as Native 
American in heritage.  
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academics) and take those warnings most to heart.  When enlisted Sailors sought 
permission to participate in this research from their Chain of Command, it was denied, 
confirming an old Navy adage that it is easier to get forgiveness than permission.  
Although I also sought contact with enlisted participants through officers I had 
interviewed for this project, I was unsuccessful in enrolling any enlisted participants via 
this means.  Ultimately, I was only able to interview a total of 9 enlisted women ranging 
in seniority from 2nd Class Petty Officer (E-5) through Master Chief (E-9).  Of these, 2 
participants were African American, with the remainder being Caucasian.  I was unable 
to obtain any enlisted participants from other racial/ethnic categories, despite soliciting 
their participation.  Some volunteered to participate but ultimately changed their minds 
before being interviewed.    
Although the Navy officer corps remains overwhelmingly white, I made a special 
effort to include minority participants as outlined above so I could simultaneously 
investigate issues of intersectionality.  Informed by McCall’s (2005) exploration of the 
complexity of such research, I attempted to avoid usual 3rd wave feminist criticisms of 
past feminist research as being by, for, and about middle-class white women.  
Fortunately, I was more successful in recruiting a wider variety of officer participants.  
Ultimately, I was able to interview twenty-three officers, including five African 
Americans, two of Hispanic heritage who self-identified as Caucasian, and 2 Filipinas.  
The remainder of the officer sample was Caucasian.  Officers ranged in rank from 
Captain (O-6) to Lieutenant junior grade (O-2).   
One key component of any social science research is the voluntary participation 
of all subjects.  Because of the hierarchical nature of the military, and the tendency of 
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“orders” to be couched in more polite terms17 I took exceptional care not to divulge or 
invoke my status as a retired officer or rank with lower ranking officer and enlisted 
participants; nor did I invoke the interest of any superiors in this study as a way of 
convincing either officers or enlisted personnel to participate.  As somewhat of an 
“outsider within” (Collins 1986) I invoked my “insider” status with both officer and 
enlisted women by divulging my past active duty and reserve service generically, 
without reference to my status as an officer. This was especially crucial with enlisted 
personnel, given the power differential inherent in the Navy rank structure.  I invoked my 
“outsider” status as not being a Navy SWO to remind my participants that while I have 
been a woman in the military, I was unfamiliar with their unique experiences as 
“combatants” aboard ship and consequently required additional explanation and 
elaboration to understand some things they consider obvious and routine.    
I initially identified myself as “retired” because retired personnel were not bound 
by “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy imperatives.  I intentionally placed the final 
demographic question, regarding the participant’s sexual orientation, at the very end of 
the interview to allow time for the participant to develop trust in me so that I maximized 
the likelihood of their honesty on that sensitive question.  Furthermore, prior to asking 
that question, I reassured participants that in accordance with the ethical requirements 
set forth in their participant consent form which we will both signed, as an academic I 
was morally, ethically, and professionally obligated to protect their confidential 
information (Kvale 1996; Rubin & Rubin 2005; and Seidman 2006).  I provide each 
participant with a duplicate copy of the informed consent form (see Appendix A for 
                                            
 
17 “Please consider participating in this research” when coming from someone senior can be taken as a 
“directive” rather than an actual request which can be declined without adverse consequences. 
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Human Subjects Consent/Ethics Protocol) which I cosigned as a sign of good faith in 
adhering to the requirements of ethical research, in reciprocation for obtaining their 
permission as participants. I was especially vigilant in monitoring both deference effects 
from respondents and my own possible expectancy effects.   
As McCracken (1988) points out, “insider” status can have both positive and 
negative consequences.  Positive consequences include being able to understand the 
culture of the organization and the vernacular, possibly resulting in better probing 
questions, but possibly missing other opportunities to gather data because of 
erroneously assumed knowledge or understanding. Another possible negative 
consequence is lack of critical distance because I was working within a unique culture 
with which I remain intimately familiar.  McCracken (1988) suggests manufacturing 
“distance” by focusing on elements of data that “surprise” or are humorous.  Both may 
violate expectations, and violated expectations may point to otherwise hidden cultural 
categories and assumptions.  I was vigilant against my own “assumed knowledge” but I 
believe the fact that I left active duty in 1997 and only occasionally returned to active 
duty for short stints helps to remind me that I have been wading along the shore of Navy 
waters rather than continuously swimming in its depths and the currents have changed 
dramatically over the last decade our nation has been at war.  Once I received IRB 
approval for my research plan and interview protocol and passed my proposal defense, 
I scheduled clusters of interviews in areas of “fleet concentration” (e.g. Norfolk, VA; San 
Diego, CA; Washington, DC; Monterey, CA) to conduct in-depth, in-person, semi-
structured interviews with both officer and enlisted women.  The interview schedule (see 
Appendix B) allowed for probing and following up questions where necessary.  
 
 
 
 
42 
Interviewees completed a demographics questionnaire (see Appendix C).prior to the 
interview with the goal of gathering needed data while simultaneously shortening the 
actual time participants would have to invest in the interview  
When conducting interviews in person, I recommend a few quiet “neutral 
territory” options (e.g. base library) that were conducive to producing quality tape 
recordings but I also deferred to the participant’s preferred interview location to enhance 
their “comfort” with the process.  Based on my own past experience both in the Navy 
and as an interview researcher of Navy women, when, in my estimation, a participant is 
sufficiently senior to have a private office, is able to schedule her own time, and prefers 
to conduct the interview during working hours, I conducted the interview at her duty 
station at her request.  To ensure maximum confidentiality and freedom to speak on any 
and all topics without inhibition or interruptions, I will strenuously resisted attempts by 
more junior personnel to conduct interviews during normal working hours at their duty 
station (Kvale 1996; Rubin & Rubin 2005; and Seidman 2006).  When interviewing a 
participant in person was not possible, I conducted one-on-one taped interviews via 
telephone, after first obtaining the participant’s consent to tape the phone conversation 
as required by Illinois law.   
I took field notes during the interviews as I was able, but actively worked to keep 
note-taking from interfering with active listening for potential fertile areas for “probing” 
questions (Bernard 2000; Kvale 1996; Rubin & Rubin 2005; and Seidman 2006).  
Immediately following each interview I wrote an analytic memo (Corbin & Strauss 1990; 
and Charmaz 2000 and 2006) and filled out a contact summary form (Miles & 
Huberman 1994).  My past and most recent experience as a researcher of women Navy 
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officers has demonstrated that volunteer participants are generous in sharing their 
experiences, which I attribute, as suggested by Reinharz and Chase (2000), to their 
realization that their experiences are unique and they are still trailblazers for the women 
who follow in their footsteps.  I also believe that since they are seldom really asked 
about their experiences, this type of interview allows participants to mentally survey and 
articulate the broad array of their experiences in a way that is positive both for the 
researcher and the participant. 
I conducted a few initial interviews to test my interview schedules and to “inform” 
any initial changes based on actual preliminary data.  I began transcribing interview 
tapes as soon after the interview as possible, beginning with my pilot interviews, rather 
than waiting to do so until after I have conducted all the interviews.   Due to the sheer 
volume of the work in transcribing I ultimately “outsourced” that function to a 
transcription service in San Diego I was referred to by an experience qualitative 
academic researcher.   Upon receipt of the interview transcripts from the transcription 
service I listened to each of the interview recordings closely to correct any errors in 
transcription, especially those related Navy-specific term.  I then conducted a general 
read through to identify major themes, followed by a closer reading to code and analyze 
them in accordance with the principles of grounded theory methods (Glaser & Strauss 
1967; Corbin & Strauss 1990; Strauss & Corbin 1998; Charmaz 2006; Strauss 1987; 
and Miles & Huberman 1994).  Insights gleaned in the process informed future 
research.  By addressing emerging themes in subsequent interviews, I linked data 
collection and analysis in one continuous effort (Bernard 2000).  As I developed 
hypotheses about relationships among categories, I attempted to verify them during 
 
 
 
 
44 
subsequent interviews.  Verbatim transcripts have the added advantage of allowing for 
subsequent analysis and open, axial, and selective coding (Glaser and Strauss 1967; 
Corbin & Strauss 1990; Strauss & Corbin 1998; and Miles & Huberman 1994).  I 
continuously sought negative cases or those pieces of data that challenged my 
emerging model(s) so that I could further evaluate and adjust my conceptual model of 
what was taking place.  
With respect to the mechanics of data handling and analysis, I initially used 2 
high-quality micro-cassette recorders and a Pearlcorder™ micro-cassette transcription 
machine with headset, foot pedal, and variable tape speed to facilitate transcription.  I 
quickly switched to using a digital micro recorder so that audio files could be transferred 
to a personal computer or jump drive for safe storage or data analysis and for protected 
electronic transfer to and from the transcription service.   
Validity 
 Although I would have liked to validate my research by triangulation, i.e., using 
multiple methods, multiple sources of data, and multiple researchers, I was at a loss as 
to how to accomplish this with this particular project and population, given that my focus 
is on resistance, which is primarily defined by the person doing the resisting. A person 
may define an act as resistance that someone else hardly notices and would not 
classify as an act of resistance even if they did notice it.  Instead, as recommended by 
H. Russell Bernard (2000), I consistently and consciously switched back and forth 
between the emic and etic perspectives so that I sought first to view the data from the 
perspective of my participants and then to view it as a researcher through the lens of 
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social science.  I struggled to check myself from either buying into or rejecting outright 
my participants’ explanations for the behavior and circumstances we discussed without 
first considering their possible validity.  I habitually looked for both consistencies and 
inconsistencies among my knowledgeable participants, and pursued especially 
vigorously why participants disagreed about important things.   
I worked hard to embrace evidence that seemed to run contrary to what existing 
gender theory would predict.  I continuously asked myself whether contrary evidence 
was the result of normal variation, my incomplete understanding of the full range of 
possible appropriate behavior, or something truly unique.  When I thought I understood 
how something worked, I proactively sought out the alternative explanations from 
knowledgeable, introspective, self-aware participants or colleagues and considered 
there may be more than one way to explain how or why the situation developed as it 
did.  For a long time the full range of evidence was contradictory and confusing until I 
realized that the Navy gender system was operating at multiple levels while many 
intervening variables were in play.  Influence on the Navy gender system was and is 
happening both at the level of policy (macro, structural) and daily practice (micro, 
interactional).  Additionally, and for a variety of reasons that will be enumerated in later 
chapters, the experiences and Officers and Enlisted differed in significant, and initially 
confounding, ways.  
I ultimately discovered that while gender relations in the Navy have improved on 
the surface, when measured by self-report of daily instances of gender discrimination 
and harassment, hegemonic masculinity still exerts significant influence on the process.  
Women officers seem to suffer less overtly from this, likely at least partially as the result 
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of their positions of power and authority within the organization.  Enlisted women still 
seem to encounter overt gender harassment and discrimination, but this occurs in 
pockets rather than uniformly.  There also seems to be a cohort effect influencing 
whether and how women resist overt gender harassment and discrimination or the more 
subtle influences of hegemonic masculinity. 
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows:  Chapter 2 explores 
the ways in which the military has in the past celebrated and privileged maleness 
through law, official policy, and unofficial custom and practice, and how it continues to 
do so today, albeit in less overt ways.   Chapter 3 focuses on the influence hegemonic 
masculinity has had on how women in the Navy do gender.  It compares and contrasts 
the experiences of Navy women from twenty years ago with those of today.  Chapter 4 
examines the ways in which Navy women resist male expectations for women’s 
behavior and enact agency in “redoing” gender (West & Zimmerman 2009).  Chapter 5 
explores the influence intersectionality may have on Navy women’s conformance or 
resistance to male expectations for women’s behavior.  Chapter 6 ends the dissertation 
with a discussion of findings, conclusions, and recommendations for future research.   
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CHAPTER 2 
A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE U.S. MILITARY AND THE U.S. NAVY AS 
GENDERED ORGANIZATIONS 
This chapter provides a historical overview of the ways in which women’s 
exclusion from the defense of their country was both a political and social construction.  
In it I trace how the United States military, in general, and the United States Navy, in 
particular, as gendered organizations, have celebrated and privileged maleness, 
increasingly through law and official policy (macro structure) since the turn of the 
twentieth century.  Law and official policies influence unofficial customs and deckplate18 
practices (micro processes).  Having previously “naturalized” the idea that men are 
warriors and women are not, the Department of Defense (DoD) of today is having 
difficulty reversing the gender discrimination it institutionalized.  These difficulties have 
persisted for more than 22 years perhaps because, rather than despite the fact that, 
since the first war with Iraq in 1991 women have moved inexorably towards the 
military’s ideological core, combat.  This has been especially true during the last decade 
of unconventional warfare, when there have been no “front” or “rear” lines and the 
enemy is impossible to identify because they blend seamlessly into the local civilian 
population. 
 
                                            
 
18 Decks (floors) on Navy ships or submarines are made of steel plates commonly known as deckplates. 
“Deckplate” (as in “deckplate leadership”) or “on the deckplates” (as in “what do Sailors on the deckplates 
think about the new liberty policy?”) are Navy vernacular, equivalent to a concept more familiar to 
sociologists: the shop floor (see Lupton (1963); Burawoy (1979, 2003, & 2012); and Collinson (1992)).  
 
 
 
 
48 
The Military as Gendered Organization 
Chapter 1 introduced the idea that organizations are inherently gendered (Acker 
1990, 1992a, 1992b, 1999, and 2006; Britton 2000; Kanter 1977; Mills & Tancred 1992; 
and Mills 2002).  According to Britton (2000) organizations or occupations dominated by 
men are “symbolically and ideologically described and conceived in terms of discourse 
that draws on hegemonically defined masculinities and femininities” (p. 420).  Cynthia 
Enloe (1988) argues the US military, one of the most powerful and symbolic institutions 
in the US, was “founded on ideas and practices that marginalize women for the sake of 
exalting masculinity” (p. xviii). In this chapter I briefly outline the history of women’s 
service in the U.S. Armed Forces and explore the ways in which that service has been 
shaped by federal law and Department of Defense and service-specific policies that 
have been influenced by both military exigencies and national anxieties about the 
demise of masculinity.    
A Brief History of U.S. Women’s Military Service – How Gender Was Made to 
Matter 
 Entire books have been written on the history of American women’s military 
service (Holm 1982, 1992; DePauw 1998; Ebert & Hall 1993, 1999; Godson 2001; 
Sheldon 2008; Iskra 2010; and Monahan & Neidel-Greenlee 2011).  Some have traced 
the general arc and trends of the U.S. Department of Defense as a whole, while others 
have explored the history of specific military branches, and even specific communities 
within a specific branch.  While both informative and illuminating, the history of women’s 
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service is not precisely at the heart of this study.  History does illustrate, however, that 
military service as a purely masculine pursuit has been a social construction.   
Federal laws and policy establishing limits on American women’s military 
participation, initially non-existent, have flourished both during periods of peace, when 
military manpower requirements are low, and periods of cultural anxiety over the future 
of men and masculinity.  Notably, there were no federal laws limiting women’s military 
participation until the Army and Navy Women’s Nurse Auxiliaries were established at 
the beginning of the 20th century, just prior to WW I.  Before this time, limitations on 
women’s participation were more a matter of custom and practice related to traditional 
gender roles, but the exclusion of women was not formalized in federal law or 
Department of Defense policy.  Of course, military service has often be seen as an 
obligation of citizenship and American women did not have full citizenship rights until 
they gained the right to vote with passage of the 19th Amendment to the Constitution in 
August, 1920.  Their lack of full citizenship rights did not prevent them from making 
significant wartime contributions from the revolution through suffrage.  Not surprisingly, 
women gaining the right to vote undoubtedly exacerbated anxieties over the perceived 
decline of masculinity in America, thereby inadvertently contributing to women’s legal 
exclusion from full military service.   
Following WW II, the period in which women’s military participation (both in and 
out of uniform) reached its zenith when measured as a percentage of the population 
and men were most anxious to return to the prewar gender status quo, even more legal 
restrictions were enacted.   Segal (1995) and Iskra, et al (2002) have argued that 
despite federal law and official policy the military has always found ways to admit and 
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incorporate women and other previously excluded minorities to its ranks in times of 
crisis and manpower shortages.  Segal hypothesized that specific factors falling into the 
three broad variable categories (military, social structure, and culture) in interaction with 
each other, helped determine the extent and nature of women’s participation.19 Iskra, et 
al (2002) added “politics” as a fourth variable and recommended changes to the specific 
factors under each.  None-the-less, both authors agree that history, both within the 
United States and in cross-national military examples, shows that once the crisis has 
passed, the military has worked to expunge the otherwise “undesirables” from the 
ranks.  Rather than providing an exhaustive historical account, the review that follows 
covers only the high points salient to this project and illustrative of how, over time, 
warfighting was socially constructed as an exclusively male domain, and how the 
exclusivity of that domain is presently undergoing deconstruction.  Due to space 
limitations, it focuses primarily on women of the line, i.e. women in non-traditional 
occupations, rather than on women of the nurse corps, despite the fact that the 
progress of both groups often followed a parallel trajectory (Godson 2001). 
 
                                            
 
19 The specific factors Segal related to the “military” variable include:   the national security situation; the 
extent of technology employed by the military; the combat-to-support ratio (proportion of combat positions 
to support positions); and the force structure and military accession policies.  Iskra, et al (2002) 
recommended amending these factors to:  purpose/function of the armed force, subculture ideology, 
subculture demographics, military technology, organizational structure, and military accession policies.  
The specific factors Segal related to the “social structure” variable include:  demographic patterns; labor 
force characteristics; economic factors; and family structure.  The specific factors Segal related to the 
“cultural” variable include:  the social construction of gender and family; social values about gender and 
family; public discourse regarding gender; and values regarding ascription and equity.  Iskra, et al (2002) 
recommended adding the following factors to Segal’s:  the social construction of military and social values 
about force, power, & domination. The specific factors Iskra, et al (2002) related to their new “political” 
variable include:  the national security situation, civil–military relations, political ideology, current 
leadership, public policy regarding race, ethnicity, gender, sexuality, etc., and sources of change other 
than armed conflict. 
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American Revolution 
Historians have documented women’s service in every American military conflict 
beginning with the Revolutionary war (Higginbotham 1971; White 1977; De Pauw 1981), 
although it is important to note that women’s participation in warfare on the North 
American continent did not begin with the American Revolution.  Rather, women living 
along the colonial frontier had years of experience defending their homes and families 
against “Indian savages” when conditions required.  These women did not act as part of 
an organized military force, but rather out of the exigency of the moment to defend 
hearth and home.   Their actions drew only praise at the time, perhaps because the 
defensive military role that they served was conflated with their more traditional 
protective roles as wives and mothers (DePauw 1998).  To survive on the frontier, 
women had to be strong and self-sufficient, and capable of defending their own lives 
and those of their children when necessary.  There were no official laws or rules barring 
colonial women from protecting themselves, their families, and homes during periods of 
“primitive, Indian-style” warfare that both characterized the American frontier and 
distinguished it from the European style of “advanced” and ”civilized” warfare. The 
colonists would later use the “unconventional” warfare skills and tactics they learned 
from fighting Native Americans against the British in the War for Independence. 
From the beginning of American War of Independence on April 19, 1775 with the 
Battles of Lexington and Concord, women prepared to fill the gap in local defense 
resulting from the departure of “Minutemen” in response to whatever crisis presented 
itself.  Women of Boston actually formed their own “home guard” companies.  
Recognizing that many of his men might desert if their wives were not allowed to work 
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for the army to support themselves, George Washington adopted a philosophy similar to 
that of his British counterparts:  women were allowed to support the army by providing 
legitimate logistical functions (cooking, nursing, tailoring, and provisioning services, etc).   
Women of the Army who provided such legitimate services were actually supervised by 
a sergeant and were subject to courts-martial for misconduct.  The orderly book of 
General Weedon at Valley Forge documents a case in which one “Mary Johnson” along 
with several other men and women were charged with plotting desertion.  Found guilty, 
she was sentenced to “one hundred lashes and to be drummed out of the division by all 
the drums and fifes of the division” (DePauw 1981, p. 212).  Naturally, other women 
also followed the troops, supporting themselves through prostitution, but these women, 
known as “camp followers,” were not considered part of the army and were actually 
considered a liability by military leadership.  Of primary concern to military leadership 
was the spread of venereal disease and the greater potential for alcohol abuse among 
the troops that accompanied the presence of these camp followers.    
Women also gathered military intelligence and carried messages; some even 
serving as spies (DePauw 1998).  Some women served in the infantry disguised as 
men.  Personal accounts and records of military pensions paid to women serve to 
document these actions.  Of course, no discussion of women’s military service in the 
Revolutionary War could fail to mention “Molly Pitcher.” Based upon the multiple and 
competing accounts of Molly Pitcher, DePauw (1981) argues that “Molly Pitcher” was 
the generic name given to the innumerable women who carted water to cannon 
positions to service the artillery, rather than to comfort parched, war-weary fighters.  
According to DePauw (1981) cannon technology at the time required that the cannon be 
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swabbed out between shots to “extinguish sparks and remove unexploded powder” (p. 
216).  Additionally, following every ten to twelve shots the guns needed to be cooled 
down to keep the barrels from overheating and potentially melting.  DePauw (1981) 
contends that George Washington, faced with a military that was perpetually 
undermanned, organized women to service the cannons in order to “free a man to fight,” 
a justification that has been used again and again throughout American military history 
when employing women in the business of war.  
Adding further credence to her argument that the “Mollys” were carting “pitchers” 
on the battlefield for purposes other than providing refreshment to the troops, DePauw 
documents a major medical fear of the era, “cold water disease,” that would have made 
women reluctant to serve cold water to overheated men.  At the time it was believed 
that overheated men who drank cold water would perish.  In all likelihood, overheated 
men who did perish after drinking cool water most probably succumbed to the effects of 
heat stroke, as the symptoms of “cold water disease” mirror those of heat stroke.  Thus 
it appears the romanticized legend of “Molly Pitcher” we all learned as school children 
very likely exalts a single fictional person at the expense of the many real women who 
proactively helped Americans win their independence from Great Britain. 
Unable to find a contemporary use of the sobriquet despite twenty years of 
research DePauw (1998) ultimately concluded that “Molly Pitcher” per se  “was entirely 
a postwar invention” (p. 127).  According to DePauw (1998), the figure of a woman 
manning a Revolutionary War cannon was not identified with a specific person until 
1876, when a group of citizens from Carlisle, Pennsylvania decided to claim “Molly 
Pitcher” as a local heroine in the weeks leading up to the centennial celebration of 
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Independence Day (p. 127-8).  Furthermore, there are numerous competing accounts of 
who was the “true” Molly Pitcher.  The fact that references to “Molly Pitcher” did not 
appear until 1859, does not render DePauw’s argument about cannon technology moot, 
nor does it negate the likelihood that American women did serve the artillery in the 
capacity she described. 
American Civil War  
In Battle Cries and Lullabies, Women in War from PreHistory to the Present 
Linda Grant DePauw (1998) characterizes the era of the American Civil War as one of 
transition between “the old ways of war that had endured for millennia and the new 
ways which, fueled by developing technologies, have been evolving at an increasingly 
rapid rate ever since” (p. 147).  When the Civil War began men and women of both the 
North and South reacted traditionally:  men enlisted to prove their courage while 
devoted wives, daughters, and sisters followed their men to camp, expecting to provide 
logistic support.  The men failed to realize the killing technology of the day had stripped 
warfare of some of the courage and honor with which it had previously been imbued.  
Most women, failing to realize that the military now hired male laborers to perform the 
logistics and support work women had previously done, simply got in the way.   
Following the example provided by Florence Nightingale in the Crimean War, 
many American women became Army Nurses.  The U.S. Secretary of War appointed 
Dorothea Dix, already well-known for her work in reforming insane asylums, as 
Superintendent of Women Nurses.  Her primary job in this capacity was to organize and 
recruit a corps of nurses for the Union Army (Holm 1992 and DePauw 1998).  This 
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newly professionalized occupation for women required them to be “single, celibate, 
plain-looking, over thirty, and willing to wear plain black or brown dresses” (Holm 1992, 
p. 8; DePauw 1998, p. 158).   Five black women listed as “nurse” on the crew roster of 
the USS RED ROVER served as forerunners of the Navy Nurse Corps.  Additionally, 
four Sisters of the Holy Cross served aboard RED ROVER as nurses, but they were not 
listed as members of the crew (Holm 1992 and Manning 2013).  Both the North and 
South had a very small number of women surgeons.  Dr. Mary Walker, the only woman 
ever to be awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor, also served the Army as a 
contract physician and spent four months as a prisoner of war (Manning 2013).  In 1917 
her Congressional Medal of Honor was revoked when Congress retroactively voted to 
render noncombatants ineligible for the award, but she refused to surrender the medal 
and wore it for the rest of her life (DePauw 1998, p. 159). 
Many women, both black and white, served as “saboteurs, scouts, and couriers.  
They blew up bridges; cut telegraph wires; burned arsenals and warehouses; and 
helped prisoners and slaves escape” (Holm 1992, p. 6).  Among the most famous and 
most effective of these women was former slave, Harriet Ross Tubman.  Her most 
famous mission began on the night of June 1st, 1863 when she commanded three Union 
gunboats up the Combahee River, gathering vital intelligence, destroying a bridge, and 
freeing more than 750 slaves (DePauw 1998).   
Female spies were also common.  Others served in the armies of both sides, 
disguised as men.  As of 1994, the National Archives in Washington D. C. had 
documented more than 126 cases of women who had disguised themselves as men in 
order to fight.  As one historian observed “they were not just ahead of their time; they 
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were ahead of our time” (Meyer 1994). Other women followed their men into the military 
ranks as soldiers and did little to disguise the fact that they were women.  Accounts by 
men of these openly female soldiers were favorable so long as the woman was viewed 
both as a competent soldier and a proper “respectable” woman, rather than a woman of 
“easy virtue.” As in the case of the American Revolution, during the American Civil War 
there were, as yet, no federal laws nor military policies prohibiting women’s service. 
DePauw (1998) reports all-women home guard units were fairly common in the 
south and did not require official sponsorship of any kind.  She cites units independently 
formed in Gainesville, AL; LaGrange and Bascom, GA.  Other women actively sought 
official endorsement, as did students from one finishing school in a letter addressed to 
President Jefferson Davis, in April, 1861: 
If you cannot obtain sufficient gallant men to sustain you in your righteous cause, 
we, a portion of Young Ladies of a Female School in this place, tender our 
services to you.  We have organized a military company and desired, if our 
Fathers and Brothers should not take up arms to pledge ourselves to do all in our 
power to advance you in your cause (DePauw 1998, p. 168-9). 
Sara Morgan Dawson, expressing the sentiments of many women, wrote: 
O! If I was only a man!  Then I could don the breeches, and slay them with a will.  
If some few Southern women were in the ranks, they could set the men an 
example they would not blush to follow.  Pshaw! there are no women here! We 
are all men (DePauw 1998, p. 169). 
In December of 1864 twenty-eight women increasingly skeptical of the Confederate 
force’s ability to protect them wrote to the Confederate Secretary of War requesting 
authorization to raise a regiment: 
We the undersigned true and Loyal citoyennes of the Confederate States 
propose to organize a volunteer regiment for purposes of local defense … [W]e 
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suggest that the right to bear arms in defence of our homes be delegated to 
certain of the fairer portion of this ill starred confederacy.  With the permission of 
the War Department we will raise a full regiment of ladies between the ages of 16 
and 40 armed and equipped to perform regular service … We have been 
subjected to every conceivable outrage and suffering and this we believe is 
owing to the incompetency of the Confederate Army upon which we depend for 
our defense.  Therefore … we propose to leave our hearthstones to endure any 
sacrifice any privation for the ultimate success of Our Holy Cause (DePauw 
1998, p. 169). 
As DePauw (1998) notes, the Secretary of War declined their offer. 
At war’s end, and despite the demonstrated contribution of women nurses in 
improving patient care, Army leaders sent women nurses home, returning to their 
previous practice of using enlisted men as nurses.   Despite her extended service to the 
Union and its corroboration by many high-ranking officials, as well as backing by many 
prominent people, including Lincoln’s Secretary of War, William H. Seward, Harriet 
Tubman was initially unable to obtain a military pension when she applied for one in 
1869.  In 1897 Congress finally granted Tubman a twenty dollar per month pension, 
which she drew for the rest of her life.  As with Tubman’s service, over time recognition 
of all types of service performed by women in the Civil war faded from both memory and 
the national historical narrative (DePauw 1998, p. 172).   
During the period of the Spanish-American War the Army unexpectedly faced a 
typhoid fever epidemic and was unable to recruit the estimated six thousand men 
required to serve as nurses. The Army eventually realized that “women” were the 
answer to its nursing shortage.  However, the Army chose to recruit women nurses not 
as actual members of the Army but rather as civilian contract employees.  Although 
reluctant to have women in the field Army Surgeon General George M. Sternberg came 
to see their value to the Army during the wartime period of 1898-99 and directed 
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subordinates to draft the legislation necessary to give nurses a quasi-military status.  In 
1901 Congress established the Nurse Corps as an auxiliary of the Army.  As members 
of the auxiliary nurses had no military rank, no equality in pay, nor any of the “normal” 
benefits associated with military service such as retirement or veteran’s benefits (Holm 
1992).  In May 1908 the Navy followed suit, establishing its own auxiliary Nurse Corps 
with the FY 1909 Naval Appropriations Act.  
Linda Grant DePauw (1998) insightfully notes that in the late nineteenth century 
attitudes toward war had increasingly become intertwined with three developing 
ideologies:  pacifism, feminism, and compulsory masculinity (p. 208-9).  In the United 
States, as the West was finally “tamed” and Native Americans were at long last confined 
to reservations, a real national anxiety developed over the future of masculinity.  The 
fear was that without the challenges of frontier life, combined with changes in the 
American way of life wrought by industrialization that rendered men less “self-sufficient” 
and more dependent upon waged labor, men and boys would grow soft.  Hantover 
(1978) attributes the growth and popularity of the Boy Scouts of America in the early 
twentieth century to the burgeoning social concern with maintaining traditional concepts 
of masculinity.  He argues that scouting offered adult men the opportunity to validate the 
traditional image of masculinity, both to themselves and their young, male charges. 
Preceding the carnage of WW I, there also seems to have been a real 
enthusiasm for battle at the close of the nineteenth century. War provided the ideal 
means for men to exhibit the qualities they valued most – the ones that most 
distinguished them as different from and superior to women.  In the U.S., Theodore 
Roosevelt was a great proponent of war as an ennobling experience, writing in 1900:  
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If we seek merely swollen, slothful ease and ignoble peace, if we shrink from the 
hard contests where men must win at the hazard of their own lives and at the risk 
of all they hold dear, then bolder and stronger peoples will pass us by, and will 
win for themselves the domination of the world (DePauw 1998, p. 209).   
He described American’s war with Spain as a “splendid little war” and in his estimation 
the result of the enormously costly American civil war was that “We are all, North and 
South, incalculably richer for its memories” (DePauw 1998, p. 209).   
Roosevelt was not alone in his sentiments.  Europe was not immune to fears of a 
crisis of masculinity: 
From Ireland:  ‘Bloodshed is a cleansing and sanctifying rite and the nation which 
regards it as a final horror has lost its manhood.’ From Spain: ‘When a nations 
shows a civilized horror of war, it receives directly the punishment for its mistake.  
God changes its sex, despoils it of its common mark of virility, changes it into a 
feminine nation, and send conquerors to ravish it of its honor.’ From Italy: ‘We 
are out to glorify war, the only health-giver of the world! militarism! patriotism! 
The Destructive Army of the Anarchist! contempt for women (DePauw 1998, p. 
209)! 
DePauw (1998) contends the mythic heroism of warfare was carried to the 
extreme in the literature of the war years, thus affecting how men perceived both war 
and masculinity:  
‘The idea of combat was so infused with sexual energy that it became a romantic 
myth’ (Gerzon 1982). The language of Sir Walter Scott’s medieval fantasies was 
the staple of popular journalism.  Horses were ‘steeds,’ the enemy was ‘the foe.’  
The dead never became corpses or carrion but ‘ashes and dust.’  The dead 
never died: they ‘fell.’ Men also discovered that combat provided the context in 
which they could experience certain feelings that were taboo in ordinary 
circumstances: ‘In the trenches of the First World War, men came to love one 
another decently, without shame or make-believe, under the easy likelihoods of 
their own sudden deaths.  While Europe died meanly in its own wastes, men 
loved’ (Gerzon 1982).  For women to participate in this exalted experience would 
destroy the attraction of the fantasy.  Women were supposed to display their 
courage and heroism by bearing children and then bravely sending the boys off 
to battle (pp. 209-210). 
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Woman activists of this period were prominent in the pacifist movement.  But as 
DePauw observes, although most peace activists were feminists; most feminists were 
not peace activists.  Many American women active in the women’s rights movements 
were also supportive of WW I war efforts, with suffrage marches often turning into war 
bond drives.  Ironically, this combination of women demanding rights while 
simultaneously supporting a war probably contributed to American men’s masculine 
insecurities, thereby inadvertently shaping laws and policies regarding women’s 
participation in the military and war. 
World War I 
In 1917 Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels became convinced U.S. entry 
into the war in Europe was inevitable.  He was also convinced the Navy would 
experience critical manpower shortages, especially among clerical personnel, who 
would be siphoned off to man ships of the growing fleet.  Management of the Navy 
required a staggering amount of paperwork – letters and orders to be written, typed, 
copied, and filed; contracts to be drafted, copied, and filed; hydrographic charts and 
maps to be updated and filed (Ebbert & Hall 1999).  The Navy had already capitalized 
on the movement of substantial numbers of women into secretarial positions at the turn 
of the century, employing a large number as civil servants, but Secretary Daniels had no 
appropriation to pay additional civilians for work that would be required immediately.   
To solve this dilemma he turned to his legal advisor.  Daniels asked if there was 
any law that required a yeoman to actually be a man.  When a review of the Naval Act 
of 1916 (Public Law 241), which authorized a substantial buildup of Naval forces over a 
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three year period, revealed that the 1916 legislation did not specifically state that a 
“yeoman” must, in fact, be a man, Daniels directed his staff to use this technical 
loophole to begin bringing women into the Naval Reserve (DePauw 1998, p.225 and 
Ebbert & Hall 1999, pp. 4-7).  Thus, when the nation entered the war on April 6, 1917 
the Navy was poised to rapidly enlist women to serve not just as clerical workers, but 
also in ratings such as electrician (radio) and other technical ratings considered vital to 
the war effort.   
The announcement that the Navy would enlist women became front page news 
in papers such as the New York Times, The Washington Post, and the Baltimore Sun.  
The first women to show up at recruiting offices were turned away because recruiters 
simply did not take seriously the Navy’s intent to enlist women.  Once Secretary Daniels 
made his intent clear, women flooded in.  Since the Navy had never before needed to 
document whether a Sailor was male or female, it did not take long until errors occurred, 
with some women yeomen receiving orders to ships.  Thus was born the designation 
Yeoman (F) – the “F” designating the Sailor as female.  Also known as “Yeomanettes,” 
women Sailors performed a variety of non-clerical duties including but not limited to 
serving with security patrol boats in Norfolk, with the Naval Intelligence Office, at the 
Cable and Postal Censor’s Office.  They even assembled munitions (Ebbert & Hall 
1999).  The Marine Corps followed suit in 1918, establishing its own women’s Marine 
Auxiliary, known are the Marinettes (Holm 1992).  At this point in U. S. history women 
could not legally vote, but they could serve in the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps. 
 By the end of the war, more than 34,000 women had served in the various 
branches of the U.S. military with 21,000 of those serving as nurses in either the Army 
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or Navy.  The Army Nurse Corps had expanded from 400 to 20,000 during the war, with 
10,000 women serving across Europe in a variety of medical settings, ranging from field 
hospitals to convalescent hospitals.  The Navy had more than 12,000 women serving in 
occupations other than nursing. The Navy Nurse Corps had grown from 460 to 1,400, 
with service overseas limited by the number and location of U.S. Navy bases (Holm 
1992, p. 10).  Army nurses were highly decorated, with three earning the Distinguished 
Service Cross (a combat medal, surpassed only by the Medal of Honor in terms of 
prestige) and twenty-three earning the Distinguished Service Medal, the highest non-
combat award.  Some were wounded and thirty-eight remained in Europe, buried in 
U.S. cemeteries, most victims of the flu rather than enemy action (Holm 1992, pp. 10-
11). 
 When the war ended, Navy women could not immediately go home as their 
enlistment contracts were for four years.  The Navy had plenty of work remaining to 
keep them busy.  When their enlistments did begin to end, the Navy would likely have 
characterized their discharges as “ordinary” or “good” if not for Rear Admiral Charles 
McVay, Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance.  Discharges given to men who were not 
recommended for reenlistment were characterized as “Ordinary” or “good.”  RADM 
McVay thought it was an insult to women’s good service to give their discharges the 
same characterization.  McVay and others persuaded Navy officials to grant deserving 
women honorable discharges, rather than the “ordinary” or “good” characterizations 
which would render them ineligible for certain veteran’s benefits (Ebbert & Hall 1999, 
pp. 16-17).  According to Ebbert and Hall (1999), that these women gained any benefits 
or recognition was more the result of their own efforts than help from the Navy.  Two 
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factors proved particularly helpful.  First, following the war many former Yeomen (F) 
remained in government service, where the link between lobbying and legislation was 
fully appreciated; and second, many joined the powerful veteran’s lobbying 
organization, the American Legion (p. 18). 
 In the Army, despite serious manpower shortages among administrative 
personnel and recommendations from Congress, when pressed by the Army to 
establish a dedicated corps for women, Secretary of War, Newton Baker, rejected the 
idea as “unwise, undesirable, and exceedingly ill-advised” (Holm 1992, p. 14).  Enlisted 
Sailors and Marines left the service at the end of their enlistments while Army and Navy 
nurses, granted the status of officers with “relative rank” from Second Lieutenant 
through Major, but without full military benefits, would remain in the military but were 
reduced to peacetime end strength. 
World War II 
In the years between World Wars I and II, the future Axis powers of Germany, 
Italy, and Japan expanded and modernized their armed forces.  Observing these 
developments and acts of increasing political aggression, American military leaders 
recognized that if U.S. forces were drawn into another major conflict the services would 
experience manpower shortages similar to those they had encountered during World 
War I.  Following his appointment as Army Chief of Staff on September 1, 1939 General 
George C. Marshall directed subordinates to prepare plans for a corps of women to 
serve in Army uniform.  The recommendation resulting from this tasking was “under no 
circumstances were women in any such corps to be given full military status.  They 
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might serve with the Army, but certainly not in the Army” (Ebbert & Hall 1999, p. 29).  
The War Department demonstrated zero interest in this report. 
 But unbeknownst to him, General Marshall had an ally in Representative Edith 
Nourse Rogers of Massachusetts.  She had served in Congress since 1925, and served 
with the Women’s Overseas League in Europe during WW I.  As such, she observed 
the inequalities American military women endured during that war.  Having served 
under both Presidents Harding and Coolidge as their personal representative for 
disabled veterans, she had become a champion of women veterans due to their 
unequal status as compared to their male counterparts.  She was determined that if 
women ever served in the military, they would do so with the same protections as the 
men (Ebbert & Hall 1999, p. 29).   
In early 1941 Rogers notified General Marshall she intended to introduce 
legislation that would allow the Army to accept women under circumstances Rogers 
deemed equitable. Unfortunately, determined opposition both within the War 
Department and Congress delayed passage of Public Law 554, which would establish 
the Women’s Army Auxiliary Corps (WAAC), for more than a year.   The word “auxiliary” 
signaled that WAACs would serve with the Army and not in the Army – a compromise 
Rogers had to accept with the War Department and Congress for the bill to pass. 
Although the bill made it through Senate committee with relative ease, with most 
comments of a joking nature, real vocal opposition materialized when the bill finally 
reached the House floor in March 1942.  During the floor debate over establishing the 
WAAC, congressmen’s comments reflected their discomfort with the blurring of gender  
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lines.  Among the more memorable of these: 
Take the women into the armed service, in any appreciable number, who then 
will maintain the home fires; who will do the cooking, the washing, the mending, 
the humble, homey tasks to which every woman has devoted herself; who, will 
rear and nurture the children; who will teach them patriotism and loyalty; who will 
make men of them, so that, when their day comes, they too, may march away to 
war?  To me this bill seems to strike at and destroy the very foundation - the 
base which supports and maintains our fighting men. This war, as all outside of 
Washington now realize, is not a social event; in it teas, dances, card parties, 
amusements generally play little, if any, part. This war is a dirty, a bloody, a cruel, 
a horrifying business, and the spirit of our fighting men should not be weakened 
by placing at their side women they would unconsciously irresistibly protect and 
defend at the expense of the military objective (Congressman Clare Eugene 
Hoffman, R-MI 4th, Congressional Record v88 (77th Congress, Session 2) part 
2, March 17, 1942, p. 2593). 
 
I take this opportunity to express my definite and sincere opposition to what I 
consider the silliest piece of legislation that has ever come before my notice in 
the years I have served here. A woman's army to defend the United States of 
America. Think of the humiliation.  What has become of the manhood of America, 
that we have to call on our women to do what has ever been the duty of men? 
The thing is so revolting to me, to my sense of Americanism, to my sense of 
decency that I just cannot discuss it in a vein that I think legislation should be 
discussed on the floor of this House (Congressman Andrew Somers, D-NY 6th, 
Congressional Record v88 (77th Congress, Session 2) part 2, March 17, 1942, p. 
2606). 
 
I think it is a reflection upon the courageous manhood of the country to have the 
war-declaring body of the Nation at this hour pass a law inviting the women of 
this country to join the armed forces in order to win a battle. (Congressman Butler 
B. Hare, D-SC 3rd, Congressional Record v88 (77th Congress, Session 2) part 2, 
March 17, 1942 p. 2606). 
Ignoring the reality that members of the WAAC were never intended to be on the 
battlefield, some congressmen worried that rather than pressing on as it was presumed 
they would if a male buddy were wounded, men would be more inclined to stop and 
render first aid if a woman were wounded (see Treadwell 1953; Williams 1989; Holm 
1992; Meyer 1994; Goldstein 2001; and Hampf 2004).  Congressman Hoffman (R-MI  
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4th) explained his reservations to his colleagues thusly: 
Soldiers, whether we like it or not, are killers, that is their profession, that is their 
business.  Women, thank God, are not killers. It is the soldier's business to go 
forward, even though his comrade falls wounded by his side. Heartlessly 
because he must, he leaves that comrade, even though he be his own brother or 
boyhood friend and goes on. His brother may drop and, because of his wound 
being unattended, die. The soldier may know this, nevertheless he presses 
forward. But let an arm or a leg be shot from one of these women, serving with 
the armed force, and who is there in the Army that will leave that woman to die 
because of a lack of a few moments first-aid attention? Where is the man fighting 
in a foreign land with these women in the camps or behind the battle line who will 
not shudder and hesitate if the tide turns against him and he knows that the 
women in the armed force are to become the prisoners, the slaves, or worse …?  
War is a hard, cruel, killing business and until necessity demands, I cannot bring 
myself to believe that the efficiency of the fighting men will be improved by 
women in the fighting force… (Congressional Record v88 (77th Congress, 
Session 2) part 2, March 17, 1942, p. 2592). 
Finally, in May 1942 by a vote of 249-83 (96 absent) in the House and 38-27 (31 
absent) in the Senate, legislation establishing the WAAC passed. Fortunately the 
“auxiliary” concept would prove unsound and in July 1943 the Women’s Army Corps 
(WACs) was established giving women full military status (Ebbert & Hall 1999, p. 29-
30). 
 During all the drama and politics of the Army’s WAAC bill, the Navy was content 
to remain on the sidelines, avoiding the fight while awaiting its outcome.  Following WW 
I, Congress closed “the loophole” in the 1916 legislation on the Navy’s Reserve, 
specifically limiting service eligibility to male citizens.  The Navy establishment, not 
exactly enthusiastic about officially making women part of the organization, took a 
somewhat cowardly way out when the Army tried to convince Navy leadership to 
support a joint bill which would establish women’s auxiliaries for each service 
respectively.  The Navy declined to endorse a joint bill and sat back to await the fate of 
the Army in this endeavor.  
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 In the meantime, with the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941 General 
Marshall’s dire predictions of only a year earlier came true:  with the apparent outbreak 
of global warfare the U.S. armed forces were headed for a manpower crisis of 
“unprecedented proportions” (Holm 1992, p. 23).    In 1942 the U. S. Navy saw 
extensive action throughout the Pacific as it attempted to contain Japanese expansion.  
These operations were costly, both in terms of manpower and equipment.   Given the 
likely need to enlist women, the Bureau of Naval Personnel recommended to the 
Secretary of the Navy that he request Congressional authorization to establish a 
Women’s Navy Reserve organization that would put them in the Navy, in contrast to the 
Army’s desired auxiliary model (Holm 1992, p. 26).  The Senate resisted the draft 
legislation, concerned that military service would destroy women’s futures as “good 
mothers.”  The political jockeying on this bill continued right up to the moment a woman 
thought to write Mrs. Roosevelt a letter, explaining why Navy women needed to be in 
the Reserve rather than an auxiliary.  With Mrs. Roosevelt’s and the President’s 
support, the Navy got the outcome it desired.   
 The Army’s WAAC bill was signed on May 15, 1942 as Public Law 554. Because 
the Army had set a goal of drafting African American men at ten percent of the force, 
the WAAC followed suit, also setting a goal of ten percent African American women.  
Because many of the Army bases were located in the Northeast, the Army chose to 
keep African American women officers and enlisted segregated, just as it did for African 
American men.  African American enlisted women could only be assigned to units 
commanded by African American women officers.  This could sometimes make things 
awkward as African American men were most often commanded by white male officers.  
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White officers might request the assignment of African American WACs to their base or 
station for the “morale” of African American men, their real expectation for the women’s 
“service” thinly veiled.  Due to the Army’s segregation policies and higher quality 
standards for women, it never came close to reaching its ten percent goal.  No more 
than 4000 African American women were recruited into the Army during WW II, 
representing only four percent of the total WAC force (Holm 1992, p. 77-78).   
The Navy bill, authorizing the establishment of a Navy Women’s Reserve, was 
signed two and one half months later on July 30, 1942 as Public Law 689.  While the 
legislation did not specifically preclude African American women from serving, the 
Secretary the Navy did.  Consequently, African American women did not begin serving 
in the Navy until near the end of the war.   The Marine Corps did not accept African 
American women for service until 1949 (Holm 1992, p. 77).  
Mildred McAfee, the first director of Navy women, did not want the Navy 
Women’s Reserve to be given an acronym but one was essentially forced upon her.  
She reluctantly agreed to call her women service members “Women Accepted for 
Volunteer Emergency Service” (WAVES).  She quickly found men had another 
interpretation for that acronym:  Women Are Very Essential – Sometimes (Holm 1992, 
p. 27).  The Marine Corps Women’s Reserve was established under the same 
legislation as the Navy Women’s Reserve.  The Marine Corps Commandant was clear 
there would be no acronyms for Women Marines.  They would simply be “Women 
Marines.”  Four months later, legislation established the Coast Guard Women’s 
Reserve.  They were known as SPARs, an acronym derived from the Coast Guard 
Motto, “Semper Paratus – Always Ready” (Holm 1992, p. 27). 
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As war fighting expanded across the globe and casualties mounted, more men 
were needed for combat, exacerbating existing manpower shortages.  Consequently, 
the demand for women to fill non-traditional roles increased.  In short order, enlisted 
women were serving in nearly every occupation except direct combat.  In addition to 
clerical workers women served as metalsmiths, camera repairmen, printers, machinist’s 
mates, control tower operators, Link-trainer instructors, radio operators and repairmen, 
parachute riggers, gunnery instructors, aviation navigators, engine mechanics, celestial 
navigation instructors, and aerophotographers (Holm 1992, p. 60).  Women officers 
were assigned to civil engineering, communications, intelligence, supply, legal, 
electronics, medical, and dental occupations. 
Of course, moving women into these traditionally masculine occupations and 
roles did not occur without some resistance, both on the part of male service members 
and the American public at large.  As one officer of the Coast Guard Reserve explained, 
“Reception by men ranged from enthusiasm through amused condescension to open 
hostility” (Holm 1992, p. 50).  Although it is a common adage in the Navy that “the 
Commanding Officer sets the tone” for the unit, even in cases were Commanding 
Officers projected positive attitudes about women’s service, many women found that 
they were on their own within their individual workspace among their male colleagues.  
Every time a woman got a new job or a new supervisor, she had to prove her abilities all 
over again.  Holm (1992) explains:   
Whereas a man was accepted immediately at face value and was assumed to be 
competent at his job, a woman was always regarded with suspicion.  Because it 
was considered unnatural for a woman to join the military, she was often 
considered a deviant of some sort.  And although she might have the technical 
skills for the job, there was something inherently and mysteriously different about 
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doing any job the military way that women were supposed not to comprehend, 
whether the job was clerk-typist or gunnery instructor (p.50). 
 No doubt the military, itself, fueled some of the men’s hostility toward women 
through its assumption early in the war that all able-bodied men wanted to be “freed to 
fight.”  Not surprisingly, many men were content to serve stateside, safely outside the 
combat zone.  These men bitterly resented the women who would take their safe jobs 
so they could be sent off to the shooting war overseas (Holm 1992, p. 51).  Even men 
who were less concerned about being sent off to combat still resented being forced to 
work alongside women.  It was commonly believed that women who willingly entered 
military service must be whores (DePauw 1998, p. 275).  There was also a widespread 
assumption among military men that whatever the official pretense was, military women 
had really been recruited to serve as “clean” prostitutes for the men.  These 
assumptions intensified with respect to African American women (DePauw 1998, p. 
256).   
Military men’s attitudes towards their female colleagues were quickly and easily 
transmitted to the general public with the unfortunate result that in 1943 a campaign of 
slander, appalling in both its viciousness and scope, and unanticipated by the military 
establishment, descended upon military women.  Specifically, “unfounded gossip and 
rumors were circulated within the military and the national media.  Dirty jokes, snide 
remarks, obscenities, and cartoons became commonplace” (Holm 1992, p. 52).  To 
widely be presumed to be “loose and immoral” was both humiliating and demoralizing 
for the thousands of women who had responded to what they believed was their 
patriotic duty as citizens to their country in a time of war. 
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The slander campaign reached such extensive proportions that U.S. Army 
intelligence, assisted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, conducted an exhaustive 
investigation to determine if Nazi propaganda was behind the effort.  The investigation 
found Nazis were not behind the effort to “degrade military women and drive them out of 
the ‘man’s world’” (Holm 1992, p. 52 and DePauw 1998, p. 252-255). It did find, in the 
testosterone-laced world of barracks humor, where the topics of women and sex reign 
supreme, among many male American soldiers women soldiers had become “fair 
game.”   These men perceived that women were “asking for it” when they voluntarily 
joined the very masculine, male domain of the U.S. military (Holm 1992).  The 
President, First Lady, and the Service Secretaries personally felt compelled to speak 
out against the smear campaign, reasoning that attempts to undermine women’s 
service actually undermined U.S. combat strength, thus aiding the enemy. 
Although the campaign against military women focused primarily on Army 
women, women of the other services were not immune to similar treatment.  The 
Commandant of the Marine Corps actually sent a letter to all base and post 
commanders reminding them of their responsibility to regulate the behavior of their men 
and to maintain good order and discipline across the ranks (Holm 1992, p. 52-3).  Even 
after the slander campaign had peaked, the attitudes of male service members 
continued to adversely impact both service women’s morale and DoD recruiting efforts.  
Army recruiters reported their number one problem in recruiting Army enlisted women in 
early 1944 was the attitudes expressed by Army enlisted men.  Women of that era were 
constrained by their deference to the opinions of the men in their lives.  As one potential 
recruit explained, “The trouble lies with U.S. men.  The average serviceman forbids his 
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wife, sweetheart, or sister to join a military organization, and nearly all U.S. women are 
in one of these categories” (Holm 1992, p. 53).  Even women without husbands, 
sweethearts, nor brothers still had fathers whose attitudes were shaped by the same 
social conventions.   
Yet another factor further exacerbating servicemen’s feelings of animus  toward 
servicewomen was the degree of public attention women were getting as the result of 
the extensive positive public relations campaign mounted by the Pentagon to build 
public acceptance of and support for women’s military service in the wake of both the 
slander campaign and the disappointing recruiting results.   Some men resented the 
fact that military women seemed to be more celebrated than those actually fighting and 
dying in the war (Holm 1992, p. 53).  While it is true the majority of Americans suffering 
and dying in the war were men, they were not exclusively men. 
During World War II the Army and Navy Nurse Corps expanded from a combined 
peacetime strength of 1370 to more than 14,300 (Holm 1992, p. 45).  Women were 
forward-deployed in direct support of ground combat units for the first time, serving in 
the Philippines, Guam, Bataan, and Corregidor.  A combined total of seventy-seven 
nurses (sixty-six Army, eleven Navy) were captured by the Japanese and held as 
prisoners of war for more than three years at Santo Tomas prison in the Philippines 
(Holm 1992, p. 92).  Another five were imprisoned in Japan but fortunately they were 
repatriated early in the war.   
A total of five hundred and forty-three American service women died in World 
War II, sixteen of them as the result of enemy fire.  Of the 543, more than 200 were 
Army nurses, the greatest loss suffered among all the respective U.S. women’s 
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components (Manning 2013).  Six of those who died did so in the hospital on Anzio 
beach head in the middle of a German counter-offensive when that hospital was 
bombed.  When conditions on the beach were at their worst, Army leadership first 
considered extracting the nurses; but, after careful consideration, they decided the 
message of hopelessness that kind of action would send to American men fighting on 
the beach would devastate morale and risked throwing the outcome of the whole battle 
into jeopardy.  Of the surviving nurses, four were awarded the Silver Star, the first 
women ever to be so decorated (Holm 1992, p. 92).   
The admittance of African American women to naval service was another first 
that did not come about without a fight.  When the Women’s Reserve was established in 
1942 the legislation did not expressly prohibit the enlistment of African American 
women.  However, although several dozen African American women applied to enlist, 
none were accepted for service.  At this time, the Navy had no male African American 
officers and only a handful of African American petty officers.  Moreover, for the 
previous twenty years African American men had only been allowed to serve in the 
Navy as messmen (cooks) and stewards (waiters).  In 1942, responding to public 
pressure, the Navy had finally allowed African American men to serve in construction 
battalions (as Seabees) and as general labor ashore, such as stevedores.  Still, from 
the Navy’s perspective, particularly that of Navy Secretary Frank Cox, the Navy did not 
need to bring African American women in to free African American men to “fight” 
because the men weren’t serving in that capacity (Ebbert & Hall 1999, p. 93-94).  
Throughout 1943 and 1944 Lieutenant Commander Mildred McAfee, Director of the 
WAVES, formerly seventh President of Wellesley and well known for her liberal views, 
 
 
 
 
74 
worked with prominent African Americans to explore possibilities for bringing African 
American women into Navy service (Ebbert & Hall 1999, p. 35-36).   
Finally, through an odd combination of events, both divine and political, she 
achieved her objective.  First, the Secretary of the Navy, Frank Knox, who was so 
personally opposed to African American entering the Navy, conveniently died in April 
1944.  Fortunately, he was replaced by James Forrestal, his undersecretary, who was 
greatly in favor of admitting African American women.  On July 28th Secretary Forrestal 
recommended to President Roosevelt the revolutionary idea that the Navy not only 
admit African American women but also treat them exactly as it did white women.  
Roosevelt, who was in the midst of campaigning for his fourth term and was anxious to 
refute New York Governor Thomas E. Dewey’s (his republican opponent) accusation 
that he was indifferent to the ongoing racial discrimination within the military.  Less than 
a month before the presidential election, on October 19th, the Navy was finally able to 
announce that President Roosevelt had approved plans to commission especially-
qualified African American women.  Additionally, the first African American enlisted 
women would report for training no later than January 1, 1945 (Ebbert & Hall 1999, p. 
93-95).  Thus, Harriet Ida Pickens, ranked 3rd in her class, and Francis Wills became 
the first African American women to be commissioned as Naval officers on December 
22, 1944.  Despite the publicity given to the Navy’s equal acceptance of African 
American women, only seventy-two African American women reported for basic training 
during the 6 month period from January to June 1945 (Ebbert & Hall 1999, p. 96).   
Approximately 400,000 women served in the U.S. military during WW II (Manning 
2013).   More than 1600 of them were awarded decorations including: the Distinguished 
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Service Medal, Silver Star, the Distinguished Flying Cross, Soldier’s Medal, Bronze 
Star, Air Medal, Legion of Merit, Commendation Medal, and Purple Heart in recognition 
of their contributions and sacrifices (Holm 1992, p. 92).   In addition to military women, 
more than one thousand civilian women pilots served the military as members of the 
Women’s Airforce Service Pilots (WASPs) program.  They flew every plane in the U.S. 
inventory, performing missions that included: plane ferrying, target towing, and pilot 
training.  Thirty-eight of these women died in the line of duty before the WASPs were 
disbanded in 1944 (Holm 1992, p. 64).  As the war drew to a close in the summer of 
1945 there were nearly 100,000 WACs, 86,000 WAVES, 18,000 Women Marines, 
11,000 SPARs, and 57,000 Army and 11,000 Navy nurses in uniform (Holm 1992, p. 
98).   
In the immediate aftermath of WW II, the services presumed that following 
immediate postwar needs they would return to smaller, all-male professional forces.  
Although military leaders recognized the advantages of retaining women in the military 
on a permanent basis, they remained uneasy with women’s movement into 
nontraditional fields, formerly populated exclusively by men.  As a consequence, 
women’s future participation was predicated on rolling them back into their more 
traditional, “feminine” administrative roles.  But the cold war unexpectedly intervened.  
Military leaders realized they might once again need women in more than administrative 
roles if another major war broke out.  Thus, they sought congressional legislation that 
would include women in the peacetime armed forces (Ebbert & Hall 1999, p. 125).  In 
1947 Congress passed the Army-Navy Nurse Act, Public Law 36-80C, which 
established the Army Nurse Corps and the Navy Nurse Corps as permanent Staff 
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Corps of the regular Army and Navy and integrated nurses into the officer ranks of the 
regular Army and Navy with Lieutenant Colonel/Commander (O-5) as the highest 
permanent rank. Nurse Corps directors were authorized to hold the temporary rank of 
Colonel (USA)/Captain (USN) (Holm 1992, p. 108 and Manning 2013).   
On June 2, 1948, after a long and heated debate about the role of women in 
society and U.S. national security, by a vote of 206 to 133, Congress finally passed the 
Women’s Armed Services Integration Act, Public Law 625, which gave women 
permanent status in the regular and reserve components of Army, Navy, Marine Corps, 
and Air Force (Morden 1990, p. 55; Holm 1992, p. 113; Ebbert & Hall 1998, p. 123; and 
Manning 2013).  The specific objectives of the law were:   
To assist in filling current personnel requirements  and lessen the need for a 
peacetime draft; to provide a trained nucleus, a basic reservoir for future 
expansion, in time of national emergency; to find out how and where women 
could best be used before an emergency arises – to catalog skill, to develop 
abilities, and to find what types of training were needed for women; and to 
provide for greater economy in the use of all personnel by using women in the 
jobs for which they were better suited than men (Holm 1992, p. 119). 
In hind sight, although it granted women permanent status, the provisions of 
Public Law 625 actually established institutional segregation and inequality based on 
gender that had not previously been legislated.    Furthermore, although this legislation 
allowed the services to enlist women, there was no mandate to do so.  As Ebbert and 
Hall (1993) accurately note about Public Law 625:   
Expressly prohibited from duty in any unit designated as having a combat 
mission, women were effectively incorporated into the services rather than being 
integrated into the heart of the military and naval professions (p. 113).   
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Women were given the right to serve in the regular, active and reserve, peacetime 
forces subject to the following conditions: 
• Women could constitute no more than 2 percent of the total force.  The 
number of women officers could total no more than 10 percent of the 2 
percent (Manning 2013). 
• Promotion of women officers was capped above paygrade O-3 
(Captain/Lieutenant).  Paygrade O-5 (Lieutenant Colonel/Commander) was 
the highest permanent rank women could obtain (Manning 2013).   
• Only one woman per service was allowed to hold the rank of O-6 
(Colonel/Captain) and then only temporarily.  Women serving as directors of 
the WACs, WAVES,  and Women of the Air Force (WAFs), and Women 
Marines are temporarily promoted to paygrade O-6 (Manning 2013). 
• Promotion boards for women officers up to paygrade O-5 (Lieutenant 
Colonel/Commander) of the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps were separate 
from those of men, so women never competed against men for promotion.  
Women Air Force officers, however, were integrated into the male promotion 
process in all paygrades up to O-5 (Lieutenant Colonel) (Holm 1992, p. 119-
20). 
• No more than 10 percent of female officers were allowed for to permanently 
serve in paygrade O-5 (Lieutenant Colonel/Commander).  In the Navy no 
more than 20 percent of female officers could permanently serve in paygrade 
O-4, Lieutenant Commander (Holm 1992, p. 120). 
• Women were barred from serving aboard Navy vessels except hospital ships 
and certain transports not expected to see combat, and from duty in combat 
aircraft engaged in combat missions (Manning 2013).   
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Thus, many ratings/occupational specialties supporting combat ships and aircraft which 
had been open to Navy women during the war were now closed to them.20  The 
restrictions placed on women’s ability to serve on sea duty aboard combat ships also 
served to restrict their overall numbers as well.  The Navy used “sea-shore” rotation21 
as the justification for limiting women’s numbers.  Since women could not serve on 
combatant vessels at sea, the Navy’s primary mission, the Navy argued that women’s 
numbers must be limited so they would not fill all the shore billets, thus stranding men 
on sea duty, with no open shore jobs to which they could rotate.  
• Servicewomen were denied spousal benefits for their husbands unless the 
husbands depended upon their wives for more than 50 percent of their 
support (Manning 2013). 
• By policy, women were precluded from having command authority over men 
(i.e. authority to award Non-Judicial Punishment in accordance with Article 15 
of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) or to refer charges to a Court-
Martial) (Manning 2013). 
                                            
 
20 The statutory exclusion of Navy women from combat was codified in Title 10 of the United States Code 
at Section 6015.  The code stated: 
 
The Secretary of the Navy may prescribe the manner in which women officers, women 
warrant officers, and enlisted women members of the Regular Navy and Regular Marine 
Corps shall be training and qualified for military duty.  The Secretary may prescribe the kind 
of military duty to which such women members may be assigned and the military authority 
which they may exercise.  However, women may not be assigned to duty on vessels or in 
aircraft that are engaged in combat missions nor may they be assigned to other than 
temporary duty on vessels of the Navy except hospital ships, transports, and vessels of 
similar classification not expected to be assigned combat missions. 
 
It is important to note that the limitations on women’s assignment in Section 6015 are not applicable to 
women of the Dental, Nurse, Medical Service, or Medical Corps as women in these occupations are 
needed “at the front,” both to save soldiers’ lives and to free men to fight.  Women were allowed to be 
near combat and be killed so long as they were serving in traditionally “female” roles and not actually 
engaged in “fighting.” One of the chief architects of the “Combat Exclusion Law” was Georgia 
Congressman Carl Vinson, a very influential member of the House Armed Services Committee, whom the 
Navy saw fit to honor in 1975 by naming a nuclear-powered air craft carrier after him.  The USS Carl 
Vinson, CVN 70, was commissioned in 1982 and remains in service today.    
21 The degree to which a sailor’s rating (job specialty) is sea-intensive, i.e. navigator or boatswain’s mate, 
determines his or her “sea-shore” rotation.  Personnel filling sea-intensive ratings might have a sea/shore 
rotation of “6 and 2” – six years at sea for every two ashore.  For ratings that are less sea-intensive, i.e. 
personnelman, yeoman, corpsman, etc., the rotation might be reversed, 2 and 6 – two years at sea for 
every six ashore.   
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• The minimum enlistment age for women was 18 years old, with parental 
consent required if under 21, whereas the age limits for men were 17 and 18 
respectively (Holm 1992, p. 120). 
• The Service Secretaries were authorized to discharge officer and enlisted 
women from the service involuntarily, for unspecified reasons according to 
regulations prescribed by the President, without the normal safeguards 
enjoyed by male Sailors against arbitrary and potentially capricious reasons.  
The purpose of this provision, though not stated directly, was to make it easy 
to discharge women who were pregnant or who had minor children, on the 
presumption that “a woman’s maternal responsibilities were incompatible 
with, and should take precedence over, her military career.  She had no 
choice in the matter” (Holm 1992, p. 125).   
The Coast Guard was not included in this legislation, but few women remained in the 
Coast Guard Reserve.   
 All military branches anticipated a potential buildup as the result of the Cold War 
and growing tensions between the U.S. and U.S.S.R., but from both women veterans 
and new recruits the services experienced a lukewarm response to the opening of both 
active and reserve military service to them during times of peace.  Holm (1992, p. 128-
9) suggests this was, in part, because women’s WW II service was not celebrated in the 
same way that men’s had been.  In fact, women’s service was rarely applauded, and it 
was frequently derided. Furthermore, many organizations such as the Veterans of 
Foreign Wars (VFW) and the American Legion, not to mention the Veteran’s 
Administration (VA), whose very purpose was to assist returning veterans were either 
unsympathetic to the needs of women veterans or were unaware they had earned the 
same benefits as their male counterparts. 
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President Truman signed the legislation establishing Public Law 625 on June 12, 
1948 (Morden 1990, p. 55; and Library of Congress 2010).  Less than two weeks later, 
on June 24th, amid growing tensions over the Russian blockade of Berlin, President 
Truman signed into law the Selective Service Act of 1948, which reinstated the 
peacetime draft.  With the male-only draft re-established, concerns over a potential 
manpower crisis diminished.  Given the strong public stand the Secretary of Defense 
and the individual service chiefs had made in supporting women’s peacetime service, 
the military felt obligated to follow through with employing women in some capacity.  
Minimal recruiting goals were established for enlisted women – no more than a total of 
650 women without prior service experience for all the services combined.  This number 
was barely sufficient to offset normal attrition, despite the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff having directed the services in August 1949 to employ service women to the 
maximum extent possible in support of the Berlin airlift and associated operations.  
When the US airlift ended on September 30, 1949 the issue of military women was 
relegated to the back burner until the next military manpower crisis surfaced in 1950, in 
the form of a “police action” on the Korean Peninsula (Holm 1992). 
194922 
• Congressional legislation established the Air Force Nurse Corps. 
Korea  
                                            
 
22 Except for those items specifically noted within the chronology as coming from another specified source 
the majority of the bulletized chronology of law and policy related to women’s service, as well as that 
pertaining to changes in law and policy regarding sexual harassment and sexual assault, come from the 
Women’s Research and Education Institute publication, Women in the Military – Where They Stand, 8th 
edition (2013), prepared by CAPT Lory Manning, US Navy(ret).  
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 Both Holm (1992) and DePauw (1998) agree, Korea was “a peculiar sort of 
military activity (DePauw 1998, p. 266),” with Congress never actually declaring war and 
no peace ever officially concluded.  To this day there is only an armistice, a cessation of 
fighting, between North and South Korea.  Furthermore, the “police action” in Korea was 
not the war the U.S. anticipated in the nuclear age – with the Soviet Union, over Europe.  
The U.S. had actually withdrawn what forces had been present on the Korean 
Peninsula after WW II in 1948 and 1949, concluding South Korea had no strategic 
value.  Yet, when the Soviet-backed North launched a powerful attack on the South on 
June 25, 1950 President Truman interpreted it as a probe of U.S. and the United 
Nations’ intentions and resolve with respect to the spread of communism (Holm 1992, p. 
149).   
Truman believed a strong response by the U.S. to events in South Korea would 
lessen the likelihood that the Soviet Union would attempt similar expansion in Europe.  
In other words, Truman saw a limited engagement in South Korea as one way to 
diminish the possibility of a World War III.  Consequently, on June 27, 1950 President 
Truman ordered U.S. forces into South Korea.  The first U.S. Army infantry units arrived 
on July 1, 1950 (Holm 1992, p. 148).  The first U.S. Army nurses, fifty-seven of them, 
arrived four days later.  On July 7th, 1950 twelve nurses were deployed to the war zone 
at Taejon with a Mobile Army Surgical Hospital (MASH) (Holm 1992, p. 149 and 
DePauw 1998).  On July 25, 1950 there were almost 11,000 Navy personnel serving in 
the western Pacific.  In less than 6 weeks, with the reactivation of numerous 
“mothballed” ships and a massive shift in personnel from other areas, that number 
nearly tripled.  
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Although the services immediately began mobilization of the reserves and 
increased recruiting of women officer and enlisted personnel, the only women the 
military would send into the combat zone were nurses.  In less than a year the Army 
Nurse Corps grew by slightly more than one-half, to 5,400, approximately 10 percent of 
whom would ultimately serve in the war zone (Holm 1992, p. 149).  Navy women also 
directly supported the war effort, serving in the waters off the Korean coast aboard the 
hospital ships Consolation, Repose, and Haven, which provided 2,500 beds and 
hospital services for wounded American troops from 1950 through 1954 (Ebbert & Hall 
1999). 
When the war in Korea broke out there were only 22,000 active duty women 
throughout the Department of Defense, with roughly one third serving in the health 
professions.  The approximately 15,000 remaining military women of the line (non-
medical), who once again “freed a man to fight” by replacing men in state-side billets so 
they could be deployed overseas, comprised less than 1 percent of the total force, less 
than one-half the number legally authorized (Holm 1992, p. 149).  Although women had 
never comprised more than 2 percent of the force during WW II, and Public Law 625 
specifically limited them to no more than 2 percent of the force in peacetime, at the 
beginning of the war in Korea all the services projected a much higher need for 
women’s service than that.  The Army and Air Force estimated they would need women 
to comprise at least 10 percent of their total force strength; the Navy estimated it would 
need women to comprise up to 15 percent officer and 12 percent enlisted endstrength; 
and the Marine Corps estimated its need for women to be approximately 7 percent of 
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the force (DePauw 1998).  In anticipation of this need, Congress even temporarily lifted 
the 2 percent ceiling on women of the line (Holm 1992, p. 150). 
Women’s response to the well-publicized recruiting campaign for the Korean 
conflict mirrored their less-than-enthusiastic response to women’s regular service in 
peacetime established by the 1948 Women’s Armed Forces Integration Act.  After an 
initial surge, interest waned.  Nearly a year after the war had started the number of 
women of the line components across the Department of Defense had grown to about 
28,000, which remained about 1 percent of the total force.   As fighting dragged on and 
Americans, who could see no vital American interests in Korea, grew weary of mounting 
casualties, approval for the war began to fall and resistance to the draft began to grow.  
The inability of the services to meet their recruiting goals for women significantly 
undermined the idea that women would play a significant role as supplemental military 
‘manpower,’ whether in time of war or peace (Holm 1992, p. 150).  
1950  
• Due to the sudden and unanticipated manpower needs generated by the war in 
Korea the Navy altered its discharge policy for newly married women, who from 
late 1944 through 1950 had been allowed to leave the Navy upon marriage.  The 
change in policy still allowed recently married women to request discharge, but 
the marriage alone was no longer sufficient grounds for a discharge to be 
granted (Ebbert & Hall 1999, p. 141-142).  
Concerned with the services inability to meet it recruiting goals for women, 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Anna Rosenberg, suggested to then-
Secretary of Defense George Marshall that a committee of prominent women be formed 
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to advise and assist in attracting women to the services.  Taking Rosenberg’s advice, 
Marshall formed the Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services 
(DACOWITS) in 1951 (Holm 1992, p. 151 and Ebbert & Hall 1999, p. 143).  The initial 
charter to the DACOWITS Committee sought individual and collective efforts of the 
members to: (1) inform the public of recruiting needs; (2) reassure parents as to the 
administration and supervision of young women in the military services; (3) convey to 
young women the career opportunities associated with military service; and (4) raise the 
prestige of military women in the public mind (Holm 1992, p. 151).    
1951 
• Executive Order 10240, signed by President Truman on 27 April 1951, 
authorized the service secretaries to involuntarily discharge, regardless of rank, 
grade, or length of service, the commission, warrant, or enlistment of any woman 
(Regular or Reserve) if or when it was established that she: 
1. Was the parent, by birth or adoption, of a child under such minimum age23 
as the Secretary concerned shall determine. 
2. Had personal custody of a child under such minimum age. 
3. Was the stepparent of a child under such minimum age and the child was 
within the household of the woman for a period more than thirty days a 
year. 
4. Was pregnant, or  
5. Had, while serving under such commission, warrant, or enlistment, given 
birth to a living child.24 
                                            
 
23 All of the services established eighteen as the minimum. 
24 http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=78393#axzz1nX9ILS00 
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No similar blanket authority for dismissal of men existed, regardless of the reason, nor 
was established by this legislation. 
• Pressure to meet rising manpower needs through women volunteers impelled the 
Navy to lower the minimum age for enlistment from 20 to 18, bringing its policy in 
line with that of the Army and Air Force (Ebbert & Hall 1999). 
1953 
• The Navy changed its assignment policy to allow female corpsmen (enlisted 
medical personnel) to serve aboard transport and hospital ships, alongside 
Nurses (officers) who were the only Navy women to that point allowed to serve 
aboard any ship (Ebbert & Hall 1999). 
Holm (1999, pp. 153-4) identified with the clarity of hindsight why the military’s 
efforts to recruit women fell short.  First, the circumstances of the two wars were entirely 
different, as was the mood of the country.  WW II was a “total” war, with the whole of 
American society effectively mobilized in some way to contribute to the war effort, 
whether in uniform or not.  In contrast, the U.S. intentionally pursued a strategy of 
“limited war” in Korea.  The American people, among whom support for the war quickly 
dropped from 75 percent in August 1950 to 50 percent less than 4 months later, did not 
see much to be gained for the price paid in blood and treasure:  “repelling aggression” 
seemed a nebulous goal (Ebbert & Hall 1999).  While WW II had mobilized Americans, 
it also had made them war weary.  They wanted to get back to their normal lives.  
Without the same level of civic mobilization for the Korean conflict that had been 
expended on WW II, most Americans, except for the service members actually engaged 
in the fight and their families, quickly and simply “lost interest.”  
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Secondly, the military miss-timed its recruiting efforts.  In the summer of 1951, 
just as the Department of Defense had committed to recruiting more women, the pace 
of the war had begun to slow and U.S. objectives in Korea seemed muddled to an 
American public uncomfortable with the concept of limited warfare without clear-cut 
objectives or victory on the battlefield.  A year later, when the women’s recruiting 
campaign should have been in high gear, the American public was beginning to 
demand the troops be brought home “now” and the military was beginning to reduce 
manpower, by both releasing Reserve personnel and lowering draft calls.  
Third, the services simply could not compete economically with civilian 
employers for women’s labor, given their poverty-level pay scales and lower standards 
of living.  The services were also competing with civilian employers over a smaller pool 
of available women.  Lower birth rates produced by the Great Depression resulted in 
fewer unmarried, employable women in their late teens and early twenties in the 1950’s 
than there had been available to meet labor needs for WW II, a decade earlier. 
Furthermore, the attitude among the general population toward the idea of women in the 
armed forces had not mellowed.  The well-publicized and somewhat-frantic-yet-
unsuccessful recruiting campaigns reinvigorated old accusations that the women who 
would join the military were either immoral or unnatural. 
Fourth, women were required to meet significantly higher quality standards than 
their male counterparts.  Women not only had to meet higher educational, mental, and 
physical standards than men, but they also were subjected to additional administrative 
scrutiny, conducted through an investigation of the records of local police, mental 
hospitals, schools, former employers, and personal references.  All this additional 
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scrutiny was intended to root out “personality problems” or other factors that would 
make the potential recruit unsuitable for military life. The additional screening of women 
added to the already heavy administrative burden borne by recruiters, thus 
unintentionally inhibiting the services' ability to meet their own recruiting quotas.   
These last two elements Holm’s identified as contributing to the services’ inability to 
attract sufficient numbers of women recruits reflect the common and pervasive 
perception of the era among military leaders and civilians alike that war is “naturally” 
man’s work and women who aspire to military service are somehow “un-natural” or 
outright perverse. 
Although increasingly unpopular, the draft did ensure there were sufficient men to 
meet endstrength requirements, so the limited success the services experienced in 
recruiting women never turned in to a real labor crisis. The total number of women in the 
Department of Defense reached its peak in October 1952, at 48,700, still less than 1 
percent of the total force.  The Secretary of the Army was so concerned with the Army’s 
inability to attract the needed number of women volunteers that he informed the 
members of the DoD Personnel Policy Board that the Army was drafting legislation 
making selective service applicable to women as well as men.  A bill expanding the draft 
to include women was never put forth by the Army, however.  On July 27, 1953 a 
cease-fire agreement between the United Nations and North Korea marked the end of 
active fighting in the Korean War.   
In the personnel draw-down that followed women left the services in numbers 
sufficient to keep their percentage of the total force at less than 1 percent.  Small 
numbers of women line officers had been commissioned into regular service and 
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turnover among enlisted women was inordinately high.  These factors combined to push 
this small group of women into jobs traditionally coded as “female,” rather than into less 
traditional jobs that might help the military determine what skills, abilities, and types of 
training women might need in the event a mobilization, as envisioned by Public Law 
625, materialized.  Women line officers primarily filled billets in administration, personnel 
management, communications, club management, protocol, etc.  It became routine for 
Admirals and Generals to have young, attractive women junior officers as administrative 
assistants and protocol officers.  Enlisted women were overwhelmingly found in clerk-
typist and other administrative jobs, and within the medical field as corpsmen. 
1955 
• The Army and Air Force Nurse Corps, previously restricted to women, were 
opened to men. 
1956 
• President Eisenhower signed Public Law 585-84, which removed the 20 percent 
limitation on the number of women Lieutenant Commanders in the Navy and 
allowed greater flexibility in distribution of women officers in the grades of 
commander and Lieutenant Commander (Ebbert & Hall 1999).  Many women 
Lieutenants had been forced out of service after 13 years due to their inability to 
promote to O-4 under the Navy’s earlier 20 percent promotion limit.  
Enlisted Navy women experienced inequities in forms other than legislated 
promotion ceilings and stifled promotions.  In 1952, thirty-six, or roughly 60 percent of 
the Navy’s ratings (occupational specialties) were open to women.  By 1956 only 25 
remained open; and by 1962 only 21.  Furthermore, women were not even assigned to 
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all of the limited ratings actually open to them.  The Navy used men to fill technical 
billets and funneled enlisted women into administrative, clerical, and medical or dental 
ratings.  This effectively dampened both women’s recruiting and retention.  Why should 
a woman join the service with all its attendant restrictions and disadvantages only to 
perform work she could easily find in the civilian sector? 
1959 
• Anna Der-Vartanian was promoted to Master Chief Petty Officer, becoming the 
first woman in the military to achieve the highest enlisted rank of E-9.25   
1965 
• The Navy Nurse Corps, previously restricted to women, was opened to men. 
The period from the end of the Korean War in 1953 to the beginning of the 
escalation of American involvement in Vietnam in 1963 has been referred to as the 
period in which women’s military programs “survived the peace” (Ebbert & Hall 1999).  
According to Major General Jeanne Holm, USAF (ret), “That women’s programs 
survived the Cold War … was due more to bureaucratic inertia and political expediency 
than to any conviction on the part of military leaders that women were necessary to the 
national defense” (Ebbert & Hall 1999, p. 149).   
From the mid-1950s through the beginning of the 1960s the military increasingly 
embraced Henry Kissinger’s (1969) arguments set forth in Nuclear Weapons and 
Foreign Policy that the next war would likely be dominated by nuclear warfare and thus:  
                                            
 
25 For more complete information on the life and career of Anna Der-Vartanian see Daniel (2011).   
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carried out by standing forces; over quickly; and without massive, prolonged 
mobilization.  Deterrence of nuclear war became based upon the doctrine and threat of 
“massive retaliation.”  Without the need for a prolonged mobilization, women’s 
peacetime service as the “mobilization nucleus” appeared unnecessary (Holm 1992, p. 
161).   However, with the transition from the Eisenhower administration to the Kennedy 
administration the previous strategy of massive retaliation lost its cachet. Despite 
sharing with his predecessor a nearly identical view of the world and the United States’ 
place in it, President Kennedy and his Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara pursued 
a strategy of “flexible response.”  Such flexibility required more manpower (Holm 1992, 
p. 176).   
Instead of looking toward women as a voluntary source of additional labor, the 
Department of Defense continued to rely upon the Selective Service System (“the draft”) 
to provide the needed manpower.  The Universal Military Service and Training Act, the 
new name given to the old “Selective Service System” when it was amended by 
Congress in 1948, was successfully renewed in 1955, 1959, and 1963 with little to no 
debate in Congress, nor objection from the American people.  A country which had 
prided itself for decades on not maintaining a standing army had, during the cold war, 
come to accept the draft as an acceptable means of meeting military manpower 
requirements.  Women’s numbers across the services continued to decline, both in real 
terms and as a percentage of the whole.  By 1965 there were only 30,600 women of the 
line across all of DoD (Holm 1992, p. 177).   
The cost of maintaining women’s programs became a concern, however, due to 
the high turnover rate among enlisted women resulting from marriage, pregnancy, or 
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“unsuitability.”  Based on a study conducted in 1963, the Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) reported in 1966 that the Department of Defense was spending $12 
million a year to replace enlisted women who failed to complete their initial enlistments.  
The GAO recommended DoD either take steps to substantially reduce the high turnover 
rate, or to replace service women with civil servants.  Although the study was 
insufficiently rigorous and did not thoroughly investigate the implications of the data nor 
offer a comparison against statistics for men, had it been published only a few years 
earlier it would likely have been used successfully to end the women’s programs.  As it 
turned out, by 1966 the Department of Defense was already beginning to ramp up for 
Vietnam.  Voluntary (wo)manpower once again appeared an attractive alternative to 
increasing draft calls (Holm 1992). 
Vietnam  
 As noted by DePauw (1998, p. 267), if the Korean War bore only a superficial 
resemblance to the two World Wars the United States had fought earlier in the century, 
U.S. involvement in Vietnam had an even more surreal quality.  The conflict lasted from 
1958, when the military first engaged in a limited capacity, to 1973 when the last 
American combat troops pulled out.  For young men raised on WW II movies, many 
featuring John Wayne, what constituted “war” in Vietnam was unrecognizable.  Once 
again, Congress did not “declare war” in Vietnam.  As a result, it officially came to be 
known as “the Vietnam Conflict.”   
For Americans, despite its dramatic ending, there was no dramatic beginning to 
the war.  Instead, DePauw (1998) describes the U.S. as “drifting” into Vietnam in the 
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late1950s in its initial capacity as “military advisor.”  By December 1961 approximately 
1,000 U.S. military personnel were serving in Vietnam as advisors.  By December 1962, 
there were more than 10,000 U.S. servicemen in the country; by 1963, 15,000.   It was 
not until 1965 that U.S. involvement really accelerated.  In March 1965 two Marine 
infantry battalions landed in DaNang.  By October nearly 150,000 U.S. service members 
were in country and by March 1966 there were more than 215,000.  A short thirteen 
months later, the total had climbed to 463,000, with more on the way.  By December 
1967 more than one-half million U.S. service members were serving in Vietnam (Holm 
1992, p. 206).   
 Although many women of the line across the services were willing and anxious to 
serve in Vietnam the Department of Defense had no plans to deploy them there, largely 
because the purpose behind the women’s programs was not to send women to war, but 
rather to release men from non-combat jobs so they could be sent to war.  Furthermore, 
women of the line had not been trained, conditioned, or equipped to deploy to a combat 
theater (Holm 1992, p. 211).  Most of the American military women sent to duty in 
Vietnam were nurses, serving in a traditional women’s role.  In that capacity they saw 
more death and grotesquely injured soldiers up close than did most combat troops.  
Exposure to this kind of human trauma has had long-term affects for many veterans, 
nurses not the least among them (Holm 1992, p. 206 and DePauw 1998, p. 268).   
Assuming that Vietnam would be limited in terms of the commitment of U.S. 
servicemen and short in duration, the Department of Defense had established a one-
year rotation policy with the twofold intent of: 1) distributing the hardship of combat 
service over the widest number of soldiers their families possible; and 2) exposing the 
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largest number of service members to combat to enhance combat readiness of U.S. 
troops worldwide.  The Department of Defense devised new monetary and career 
incentives for those personnel serving in Southeast Asia, both to encourage volunteers 
and to compensate combat troops for the dangers they encountered and the hardships 
they and their families endured.  These incentives included: hostile fire pay at a rate of 
$65 per month; cost of living allowances, roughly at the rate of $2.40 per day; and tax 
exemptions on pay (100% for enlisted personnel and up to $500 for officers).  Because 
women were excluded from combat, and thus the one-year rotations, they were also 
excluded from the opportunity to earn more money, which could accumulate to a rather 
substantial amount over the course of a one-year tour in Vietnam.  Most women were 
also ineligible for the follow-on career incentives given for service in Southeast Asia.  
These included:  choice of follow-on assignment, education and training opportunities, 
and accelerated promotion (which meant both more money and more prestige).  These 
types of career differentials made it harder for women to be as competitive as their male 
counterparts for promotion (Holm 1992, p 212-3). 
Moreover, although the Department of Defense willingly dispatched thousands of 
military nurses, women civilian employees, Red Cross workers, and USO employees to 
the combat theater to perform traditionally “female” jobs, it remained reluctant to send 
trained military women of the line.  It became increasingly apparent to anyone paying 
attention that the services were having difficulties defining “combat” and “combat-
support” jobs.  Military women, not immune to the influences of the increasingly 
powerful women’s movement of the mid-1960s, joined their civilian sisters in 
questioning why they were automatically excluded from professional and career 
 
 
 
 
94 
opportunities men simply took for granted (Ebbert & Hall 1999, p. 178).  In response to 
seemingly illogical restrictions on their service, military women became increasingly 
vocal in expressing their dismay at these policies to their commanders.   
 Ultimately, more than 7500 American servicewomen of both the line and medical 
corps served in theater during the Vietnam War and are thus eligible to wear the 
Vietnam Campaign Service Ribbon (DePauw 1998, p. 269 and Manning 2013).  Nearly 
80 percent of the women who served the Southeast Asia theater were nurses or 
medical specialists.  The Marine Corps, which has no nurses, sent 36 women to 
Vietnam (Holm 1992, p. 217 and Ebbert & Hall 1999, p.177), and although the Navy 
sent hundreds of women nurses into Vietnam, only nine women line officers were 
selected for duty in Vietnam from the many who requested assignment there.  No 
enlisted Navy women were ordered to service in Vietnam (Holm 1992, p. 217 and 
Ebbert & Hall 1999, p.176).  Military brass shipped women nurses off to Vietnam without 
hesitation while assignment requests by line servicewomen who wanted to serve there 
were denied for being “inappropriate,” thus providing glaring evidence of the 
inconsistent logic the military used in formulating its assignment policy for women in 
Southeast Asia.   
1967 
• The Women’s Armed Service Integration Act of 1948 was modified by Public 
Law-90-130 which lifted the 2 percent ceiling on women’s numbers; removed the 
caps on officer promotions above paygrade O-3 (Captain/Lieutenant), making 
women became eligible for permanent promotion to O-6; and made women 
eligible for promotion to General Officer/Flag rank. 
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As the Vietnam Conflict dragged on, the public became more and more 
disenchanted with the increasingly obvious inequities of the draft.  On October 17, 1968, 
two weeks before the presidential election and at the height of the war in Vietnam, then-
presidential candidate Richard M. Nixon announced to the American people in a radio 
address on the CBS network that it was time to reconsider the “question of permanent 
conscription in a free society” (Bailey 2007, p. 51).  Not surprisingly, Nixon used Henry 
Kissinger’s earlier argument about the nature of warfare in a nuclear age to justify his 
proposal for meeting peacetime military manpower needs.  More specifically, he argued 
that due to the change in the nature of warfare wrought by the nuclear bomb, large 
ground armies would be particularly vulnerable.  Nixon contended that what the nation 
really needed was “a smaller number of ‘motivated men… [with the] higher level of 
technical and professional skill’ necessary to operate the ‘complex weapons of modern 
war” (Bailey 2007, p. 51). This smaller-but-more-highly-trained force, Nixon argued, 
could be raised through voluntary enlistments rather than the draft.   
Nixon subscribed to a “free-market” libertarian argument, supported by some 
now-famous free-market economists such as Milton Friedman and Alan Greenspan.  
This argument asserted that the military had been protected by the draft from having to 
compete in the job market against civilian employers.  As a result, the military had been 
able to ignore the laws of supply and demand.  Free marketers believed higher military 
pay and increased benefits would allow the military to compete with “the attractions of 
the civilian world,” (Bailey 2007, p. 51) making the prospect of an all-volunteer force a 
real possibility.  In taking this position Nixon was being both politically astute and 
pragmatic:  public dissatisfaction with conscription (the draft) and the seemingly unfair 
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associated system of deferments was spreading so rapidly that it appeared increasingly 
unlikely that the statutory authority for conscription would be renewed before it expired 
in June 1971.  Furthermore, it was almost a certainty that Congress would take up the 
issue of equal rights for women.  If women gained equal rights through an amendment 
to the U.S. Constitution and conscription was still in use by the military, women would 
most likely be eligible for and subject to the draft.  
On January 29, 1969, just 9 days after the Nixons had moved into the White 
House, the President sent his Secretary of Defense, Melvin Laird, a memo requesting 
that he immediately set up a public commission to develop “a detailed plan of action for 
ending the draft” (Bailey 2007, p. 52).  Laird, himself philosophically more committed to 
“shared sacrifice” than to “free market principles,” tried unsuccessfully to convince 
President Nixon to spend a year studying the matter in-house rather than naming a 
public commission to develop a transition plan.  On March 27, 1969 President Nixon 
announced the establishment of The President’s Commission on an All-Volunteer 
Armed Force, chaired by President’s Eisenhower’s former Secretary of Defense, 
Thomas Gates (Bailey 2007, p. 52).  Milton Friedman and Alan Greenspan were among 
those named as members of the Commission.   
1969 
• The Air Force opened ROTC to women. 
• The Joint Armed Forces Staff College opened admission to women. 
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The Gates Report, as it became known, was completed in early 1970.  It 
endorsed conversion from conscription to an All-Volunteer Force commencing mid-
1971.  Specifically, it stated: 
We unanimously believe that the nation’s interests will be better served by an all-
volunteer force. … We have satisfied ourselves that a volunteer force will not 
jeopardize national security, and we believe it will have a beneficial effect on the 
military as well as the rest of society (Holm 1992, p. 247). 
The first chapter of the Gates Report was published in the New York Times on February 
22, 1970 and justified the All-Volunteer Force as “the system for maintaining forces that 
minimizes Government interference with the freedom of the individual to determine his 
own life in accord with his values” (Bailey 2007, p. 53).  The first step in the conversion 
process was to improve military compensation so that it was more in competitive with 
civilian pay and benefits.  The historical link between the “obligations of citizenship” and 
military service was severed with the commission’s conclusion that “conscription 
undermines respect for government by forcing an individual to serve when and in the 
manner the government decides, regardless of his own values and talents” (Bailey 
2007, p. 53). Thus, the report concluded: “a voluntary decision to serve is the best 
answer, morally and practically, to the question of who should serve” (Bailey 2007, p. 
53).   
The report completely ignored military women as a potential resource, not 
addressing the issue of women’s service at all.  This turned out to be somewhat of a 
mistake, considering the commission did reinforce the services’ requirements for 
personnel with more education, higher general intelligence, and greater technical skills 
– of which the first two qualities were found in equal proportions among both men and 
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women of service age.  The Nixon Administration generally accepted the commission’s 
recommendations, but opted to delay full implementation of the All-Volunteer Force 
(AVF) until 1973.  The administration sought and Congress approved a two-year 
extension of the statutory authority for conscription, to July 1, 1973.  Ultimately, the 
Nixon administration was able to end the draft 6 months sooner because of the on-
going drawdown of U.S. troops in Vietnam (Holm 1992, p. 248).  The Department of 
Defense, unconvinced that a strictly-volunteer force would sufficiently meet manpower 
requirements, established the Central All-Volunteer Task Force to study issues related 
to transitioning the force away from conscription. 
1970 
• In December, twenty-three year old 1st Lieutenant Sharron Frontiero, USAF filed 
a class action suit in federal court claiming that the denial of equal benefits to 
military women amounted to unreasonable sex discrimination under the equal 
protection provisions of the United States Constitution.  She was denied on-base 
housing because her civilian husband was not recognized as her dependent.  He 
was a veteran attending college on the G.I. bill, for which he was paid by the 
Veteran’s Administration $250 per month (Holm 1992, p. 290). The case, known 
as Frontiero v. Richardson, was ultimately decided by the U.S. Supreme Court. 
In 1970, encouraged by the recent passage of civil rights legislation and backed 
by numerous women’s organizations, Congresswoman Martha Griffiths (D-MI) 
introduced the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) on the floor of the House.  The House 
of Representatives passed it in October 1971 by a vote of 354 to 23 (Ebbert & Hall 
1999, p. 178).  Near the end of 1971 DoD directed the Central All-Volunteer Task Force 
to study the employment of military women and “provide a contingency option for 
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meeting all-volunteer force objectives by increasing use of women to offset any 
shortage of men,” focusing on the critical transition years 1973-77 (Holm 1992, p. 249).  
The head of the AVF Task Force, in turn, tasked each of the services to develop 
contingency plans to increase the use of women personnel.  He specified that the Army, 
Navy, and Air Force should plan to double their women’s programs by the end of fiscal 
year 1977, while the Marine Corps should plan a 40 percent increase over the same 
period (Holm 1992, p. 250). 
1971 
• The Air Force allowed pregnant women to request a waiver of the automatic 
discharge policy.  The Air Force also changed recruiting rules to allow the 
enlistment of women with children – the first service to do so. 
On March 22, 1972 the Senate passed the Equal Rights Amendment by a vote of 
84 to 8.  It would become part of the Constitution if three-quarters (thirty-eight) of the 
states ratified it within the next ten years.26  Within three months, twenty states had 
ratified it; within a year, ten more had ratified it.  As the military looked on in dismay, it 
appeared the Equal Rights Amendment was destined to become law.  If it did become 
law, it seemed likely that “many service policies and practices regarding women would 
be subject to legal challenge” (Ebbert & Hall 1999, p. 178-179).  DoD began to plan 
accordingly, if not enthusiastically, in the belief that the ERA’s affect on personnel 
                                            
 
26 Senator Sam Ervin, D-NC and Representative Emanuel Celler, D-NY (10th) succeed in setting an 
arbitrary time limit of seven years for ratification. Thus the initial deadline for ratification was March 21, 
1979. On August 15, 1978, after intense lobbying by a united women's rights coalition, the U.S. House of 
Representatives approved by a vote of 233-189 an extension to the ERA deadline. On October 6, 1978, 
the U.S. Senate joined the House in approving the extension by a vote of 60-36. A new deadline of June 
30, 1982 was set for ratification.  See complete chronology of the fight for an equal rights amendment at:  
http://now.org/resource/chronology-of-the-equal-rights-amendment-1923-1996/ 
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policies would be profound.  The earlier “contingency” plans for expanded use of 
women developed by the Central All-Volunteer Task Force quickly became “action” 
plans.27   
Even before the study had been completed, the Navy and Air Force had planned 
to increase end-strength within their women’s programs by more than had been directed 
by the head of the AVF Task Force.  The Army projected it could meet the required 
target by 1978, and the Marine Corps incorrectly predicted that it would not be able to 
meet its established goals in the time allotted.  The services’ plans combined projected 
a total increase in the women’s line officer and enlisted strengths of nearly 170 percent, 
with the Navy and Air Force nearly tripled in size (Holm 1992, p. 250).   
1972 
• Frontiero v. Richardson – This Supreme Court decision based upon “equal 
protection” struck down sex-based differences between military men and women 
with respect to awarding of dependents’ benefits.  As a result women service 
members were able to draw dependents’ benefits for their male spouses 
(Manning 2013). 
• The Army opened ROTC to women (Manning 2013). 
• Chief of Naval Operations, Elmo Zumwalt, issued directive Z-116, which: 
o Suspended restrictions on women succeeding to command ashore; 
o opened all 70 enlisted Navy ratings to women, although in limited 
numbers, including such sea-intensive ratings as boatswain’s mate, hull 
technician, and signalman;  
                                            
 
27 Among the 8 senators who voted against the ERA only two were democrats:  Sam Ervin, NC and John 
C. Stennis, MS (Shanahan 1972).  On December 9, 1995 the U.S. Navy placed into commissioned 
service, CVN-74, a nuclear powered air craft carrier, the USS John C. Stennis, named in the Senator’s 
honor.  
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o opened assignment aboard the hospital ship USS SANCTUARY to a 
limited number of officer and enlisted women under a pilot program;  
o allowed women officers into additional occupational fields such as 
intelligence, cryptology, public affairs, and aircraft maintenance;  
o opened the Chaplain Corps and Civil Engineering Corps to women; 
o opened Navy ROTC to women beginning in FY-74 (October 1, 1973); and 
o allowed women to be selected to study at joint-service colleges, i.e. 
National War College and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces 
(Manning 2013). 
• Assistant Chief of Naval Personnel for Women (more commonly known as the 
WAVES director), CAPT Robin Quigley, issued a memo on 23 FEB 1972 
announcing the Navy had officially ended the WAVES program. She suggested 
that Navy women simply be referred to as women in the Navy.28 
• Secretary of the Navy, John Warner, announced in October 1972 that naval 
aviation would soon be open to women.  The Navy did not expect to have women 
flying combatant aircraft but it did expect to employ women in non-combat 
airframes, including supply and logistics helicopters and search and rescue 
planes and helicopters (Ebbert & Hall 1999, p. 266). 
1973 
• The Selective Service Act expired, ending the draft.  As the era of the All-
Volunteer Force (AVF) started, recruiting goals for women increased (Manning 
2013). 
• Navy women became eligible for aviation duty in noncombat aircraft (Manning 
2013). 
• The Coast Guard began accepting women for regular active duty (Manning 
2013). 
                                            
 
28 http://www.public.navy.mil/bupers-npc/organization/bupers/WomensPolicy/Pages/HistoryFirsts.aspx; 
Accessed 24August2014. 
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1974 
• Army women became eligible for aviation duty in noncombat aircraft (Manning 
2013). 
1975 
• The first women enrolled at the Coast Guard Academy (Manning 2013). 
• Congress opened the remaining service academies (West Point, the Naval 
Academy, and the Air Force Academy) to women, through Public Law -94-106, 
signed by President Gerald Ford on October 7, 1975 (Ebbert & Hall 1999, p. 220 
and Holm 1992, p.305).  
• President Ford ended peacetime registration for Selective Service, the draft 
(Holm 1992, p.305). 
At the time they were developed the contingency plans to expand officer and 
enlisted “womenpower” by a total of 170 percent across the services had seemed quite 
ambitious.  As it turned out, however, those plans actually were fairly conservative.  By 
the June 1977 target date, more than 110,000 women line officers and enlisted were on 
active duty, with more entering the services every day – despite overall force reductions 
as the military continued to downsize for peacetime following U.S. withdrawal from 
Vietnam (Holm 1992).  For comparison, whereas in 1972 one in every thirty enlisted 
recruits was a woman, by 1976 that ratio had grown to one in thirteen.  However, in 
1976 it did appear that the major expansion phase for women was nearing an end.  For 
the second half of the seventies the services had planned to level off the growth rate 
from the approximately 20 percent annual growth rate of the first phase of the buildup to 
about a 5 percent annual growth rate through 1982, when 147,000 officer and enlisted 
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women were expected to be serving in the line, constituting about 7 percent of the total 
military force (Holm 1992, p. 250-1).     
At about the same time, the Brookings Institution, an independent national policy 
research and analysis organization, was putting the finishing touches on a two-year 
study of women in the military that Martin Binkin, a senior fellow at Brookings Institution, 
and LCOL (USAF) Shirley J. Bach (PhD), an executive fellow at Brookings, had 
conducted.  The study attempted to answer two questions:  “What are the relative merits 
of using women and civilians in jobs traditionally filled by military men?” and “To what 
extent can substitution take place?” (Holm 1992, p. 251).  Binkin and Bach estimated 
that without radically departing from policies and practices in force at the time, and 
without disrupting the rotation or career opportunities for men, nearly 600,000 enlisted 
positions, or about 33.3 percent of the total enlisted force, could potentially be filled by 
women.  Although, due to differences in mission and associated “tooth to tail” ratio, the 
estimated percentage by service varied with the Marine Corps at 8.8 percent, the Navy 
at 9.2 percent, the Army at 25.9, and the Air Force at 76.1 percent (Holm 1992, p. 251-
252).   
No doubt concluding that the military was not quite ready for as many as three 
out of four Air Force enlisted positions to be filled by women, Binkin and Bach 
formulated a more realistic, and perhaps palatable, estimate.  They suggested that if the 
services developed sex-neutral standards and did a better job publicizing available 
opportunities for women and encouraging women to enlist, the number of enlisted 
women serving could eventually reach about 400,000, or 22 percent of the force (Holm 
1992, p. 252).   Although not officially published until June 1977 as the Brookings 
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Institution report Women and the Military, the shocking results of Binkin and Bach’s 
study were generally known throughout the Department of Defense as early as 1976.  
Many Pentagon leaders were still uncertain of the long-term viability and effectiveness 
of the All-Volunteer Force.  With the presidential election looming, the services 
concluded that it would be wise to await the outcome of the election before making any 
further changes to women’s policy (Holm 1992, p. 252). 
1976 
• The first women cadets and midshipmen reported to West Point, the Naval 
Academy, and the Air Force Academy, respectively, in July. 
• In Crawford v. Cushman the Second Circuit Court ruled that Marine Corps 
regulations mandating the discharge of women Marines who became pregnant, 
regardless of their marital status, violated the due process clause of the Fifth 
Amendment to the Constitution (Manning 2013). 
• Six Navy women filed suit questioning the constitutionality of the 1948 law which 
restricted the Navy’s assignment of women only to non-combat transport and 
hospital ships, thereby limiting their careers. 
Incoming President Jimmy Carter and his administration appeared to be as 
committed to ensuring the ongoing success of the AVF and as determined to 
demonstrate strong support for women’s issues as had Presidents Nixon and Ford and 
their respective administrations.  Early in 1977, shortly after assuming his office, 
Secretary of Defense Harold Brown requested a “priority” analysis of military manpower, 
to include yet another close look at how the services were employing women service 
members.  Additionally, President Carter appointed a number of women to important 
and sensitive civilian positions within the Department of Defense and the services’ 
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staffs.  Some of the women Carter appointed had been deeply involved in feminist 
activism or litigation.  Brown’s request, together with these appointments, was the 
administration’s warning shot across the Pentagon’s bow that it intended to keep 
pushing women’s issues (Holm 1992, p. 252-3). 
 The purpose of the new women’s study was to be twofold.  It was intended to 
provide: 1) the necessary background data to evaluate the services’ growth plans for 
their women’s programs; and 2) a foundation of knowledge and data upon which to 
base future policy decisions.  CDR (USN) Richard W. Hunter (PhD), a former research 
fellow at the Brookings Institution who had worked with Binkin and Bach, was assigned 
as director of the study.  CDR Hunter focused the study on DoD’s ability to meet the 
enlisted manpower requirements of the AVF, since that was the manpower segment 
upon which the most recruiting money and effort was expended and also that which 
already appeared to be having recruiting difficulties (Holm 1992, p. 253).   
While the services were not having difficulties attracting officer candidates, they 
were having difficulties attracting “highly qualified” (i.e. high school graduates, higher 
intelligence) enlisted men, and according to demographic projections the problem was 
likely to be exacerbated by a declining youth population throughout the 1980s with the 
“Baby Boom” cohort tapering off.  In this context, the planned slower growth of women’s 
numbers within the enlisted ranks programmed for 1979 through 1983 was clearly out of 
synch with actual needs (Holm 1992, p. 253).  With 1.8 million enlisted billets to fill, CDR 
Hunter’s primary question was “How many could or should be filled by women (Holm 
1992, p. 253)?”  He concluded that recruiting more women high school graduates would 
have the benefits both of improving quality and saving money. 
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Contrary to doomsday predictions, the quality of new recruits under the AVF, as 
measured by indicators such as mental aptitude and educational attainment, had 
actually increased after the draft ended.  One significant contributor to this positive trend 
was increased recruiting of women, who were required to meet higher enlistment 
standards than their male contemporaries.  While only 33 percent of male recruits were 
high school graduates, more than 91 percent of the female recruits were.  Furthermore, 
all the women recruits had average or above average intelligence.  CDR Hunter’s study 
turned into an optimization problem.  His analysis revealed that some mix of highly 
qualified-women and less-qualified men were less expensive to recruit than additional 
highly-qualified men.  Hunter concluded that the effort and money expended in 
advertising and recruiting29 the necessary number of highly-qualified men also attracted 
more highly-qualified women and less-qualified men than the services planned to enlist.  
Hunter proposed the services shave the expense and effort of going after a “larger 
share of the cream of the male crop (Holm 1992, p. 253-254)” by enlisting more highly-
qualified women and less-qualified men.  Rather than continuing to pursue the same 
number of highly-qualified men in an era of declining numbers of available men, Hunter 
recommended the services access more women than it had planned.  He estimated by 
doing so the Department of Defense could save more than $1 billion annually by 1982.  
In contrast, Benkin and Bach’s study estimated savings of $6 billion with their more 
                                            
 
29 The services were not equally attractive to the potential pool of recruits, so the cost differentials for 
recruiting varied from service to service, but the pattern among them was similar.  For example, based 
upon its own data, the Army spent approximately $3,700 to recruit a highly-qualified man, whereas it 
spent only about $150 to recruit a woman of comparable quality, or a less-qualified man.  By comparison, 
the Air Force, which had the smallest differential of all services, estimated its costs to be $870 and $150, 
respectively (Holm 1992, p. 254). 
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ambitious numbers for women (Holm 1992, p. 254).  The option Hunter provided proved 
attractive, given the economic circumstances of the time.  
While the decision to expand the use of women in 1972 had been based upon 
the personnel needs of the AVF, the recommendation to expand the use of women in 
1976 was based on economic exigency.  While the draft was in effect, women were 
more expensive to recruit than men were to draft.  Without the draft, the situation 
reversed:  women were less expensive to recruit than men because the supply of 
eligible women hoping to enlist exceeded the demand of the services to enlist them.  
The services actually had no idea what their real potential was for employing women 
service members because they had not anticipated that the extremes of their earlier 
estimates would ever be tested.   
As part of Hunter’s study directed the services to submit data from their own 
manpower programs so that DoD each of the services’ potential for using women could 
be evaluated.  The primary goal of this evaluation was not to determine the cost 
effectiveness of expanding the employment of women but, rather, the combat 
effectiveness of doing so.  Within that context other factors had to be considered; 
among them:  what physical labor women could not perform due to differences in upper 
body strength, etc., and what combat positions or positions requiring combat skills 
women were barred from by law or policy.  These two factors reduced both the services’ 
ability to use women and the flexibility they had in assignment.  Of the other concerns 
voiced, Hunter found most, whether for or against the expansion in women’s numbers, 
were “centered on emotionalism” or “supported by unsubstantiated generalities, or 
isolated examples” (Holm 1992, p. 255).   
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The services’ own manpower data revealed that only 42 percent of the enlisted 
billets (638, 400 out of 1.5 million) and approximately 39 percent of the officer billets 
(95,000 out of 244,500) were designated as combat, or direct combat support.  
Theoretically, this left about 863,000 enlisted and 95,000 officer billets that could 
potentially be filled by women – a staggering thought to most military leaders!  Still, 
these numbers, which were thoroughly consistent with Binkin and Bach’s earlier study, 
made it obvious that the services could use far more women than was planned, without 
endangering combat effectiveness and while simultaneously achieving budgetary 
savings and improving the quality of the force (Holm 1992, p. 255).   
The battle with the services over women’s expanded military service was thereby 
engaged.  The Army urged caution in expanding both the numbers and roles of women, 
preferring to “err on the side of national security” in the face of so many unknowns and 
all of the services immediately began crafting justifications for why the numbers did not 
really apply to them.  The Navy and Marine Corps argued that due to requirements to 
rotate Sailors and Marines from sea to shore duty, somewhere between 55-75 percent 
of the enlisted positions otherwise available to women must be set aside for men.  The 
Air Force claimed “inadequate facilities” limited its ability to increase the number of 
women dramatically.  It argued men and women should not share the same building 
even if they were housed in separate wings or floors.  The Army’s excuse was 
essentially that it had already taken the brunt of the expansion in women’s numbers, 
and it should not be forced to further expand women’s numbers until detailed studies 
were undertaken to prove the merit of doing so.  The Army developed an elaborate and 
arbitrary method of determining by individual units’ proximity to “frontline combat” the 
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percentage of women who might be employed in that unit.  The acceptable percentages 
ranged from zero at the front to up-to-but-not-to-exceed 50 percent in non-combat units 
stateside (Holm 1992, p. 255-256). 
After examining all the available evidence, Hunter concluded: 
   The tradeoff in today’s recruiting market is between a high quality female and a 
low quality male.  The average woman available to be recruited is smaller, 
weighs less, and is physically weaker than the vast majority of male recruits.  
She is also much brighter, better educated (a high school graduate), scores 
much higher on the aptitude tests and is much less likely to become a 
disciplinary problem. 
   To put the question bluntly: Is recruiting a male high school dropout in 
preference to a smaller, weaker, but higher quality female erring on the side of 
national security, in view of the kinds of jobs which must be done in today’s 
military?  The answer to that question is central to the decision on how many 
women should be used in the various Services.  Sometimes the answer will be 
yes, and sometimes it will be no, but the question continues to be relevant (Holm 
1992, p. 258).30 
Hunter made no specific recommendations on exactly what the services’ 
numerical goals should be, but expansion in women’s numbers seemed to be the 
obvious choice.  Despite the services attempts to forestall women’s further expansion 
within the ranks, after review and discussion with senior military leaders, President 
Carter’s Secretary of Defense, Harold Brown, directed that the number of enlisted 
women be doubled by 1983, with their numbers reaching more than a quarter of a 
million, or 12 percent of the force, by 1985.  This plan went forward until challenged by 
the Reagan administration in 1981 (Holm 1992, p. 258). 
In the meantime, with the first women midshipman having reported to the Naval 
Academy in July 1976, the Navy was grappling with the problem of how to provide them 
                                            
 
30 Quoted in Holm 1992 (p. 258) from the original:  Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense 
(Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics) Use of women in the Military: DoD Background Study.  May 
1977.  
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with meaningful summer training cruises.  Male midshipmen trained aboard combat 
ships, but Section 6015 of Title 10 written and passed into law in 1948 at the behest of 
the powerful chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, Carl Vinson, made it 
illegal for women to be assigned to duty on combatants.  The first group of women 
midshipmen was slated to spend summer cruise aboard service craft, such as yard 
patrol boats and tugs that operated within harbors, the crews of which did not live 
aboard ship.  But, this training was not the slightest bit comparable to the training and 
experience male midshipmen were receiving aboard combatant vessels (Holm 1992, p. 
330-1). 
DACOWITS had, on multiple occasions, recommended to the Department of 
Defense that it draft and submit legislation rescinding both Section 6015 (which dealt 
specifically with the assignment of women in the Navy) and Section 8549 (which dealt 
specifically with the assignment of women to combat aircraft regardless of service) so 
the Secretaries of the Navy and Air Force would enjoy the same latitude in personnel 
assignment as did the Secretary of the Army, who had no specific constraints written 
into law.  The Navy had never been interested in pursuing repeal of these laws because 
they saw these laws as preserving the “combat heart” of the military for men.  Yet, the 
Navy increasingly found itself in untenable positions, either due to the law as written or 
due to the Navy Judge Advocate General’s strict interpretation it.  For example: 
• Navy women trained to repair complex shipboard electronic equipment 
could not go onboard the ship to make repairs; yet, similarly trained 
civilian women could, and did. 
• Navy women could not be transported on a Navy ship, while Air Force 
and Army women could be, and indeed, on occasion were. 
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• Navy women pilots could not land on aircraft carriers, or make deliveries 
to ships if such delivery required landing on or hovering over a ship; 
women pilots of the other services and civilian women pilots were not so 
restricted. 
• Women at the Naval Academy were restricted by law from obtaining the 
sea-duty training mandated by another law. 
• Enlisted women in seagoing rates were taking up shore billets with no 
hope of ever using their skills and training at sea (Holm 1992, p. 331). 
While the Navy dithered about how to resolve this conundrum, a group of enlisted 
women took matters into their own hands.  They decided to bring a class-action law suit 
against the Navy.  
 On November 10, 1976, attorneys from the ACLU and the League of Women 
Voters Education Fund representing Interior Communications Petty Officer Yona 
Owens, Yeoman Second Class Suzanne Holtman, Photographer’s Mate Third Class 
Natoka Peden, and Seaman Valerie Sites filed suit in U.S. District court, charging that 
the sex discrimination mandated by Section 6015 Title 10 U.S.C. unconstitutionally 
denied women Sailors equal protection under the law (Anstett 1976 and Odegard 1999).  
In February 1977 three women officers were added to the lawsuit:  General Unrestricted 
Line Officer Kathleen Byerly; Aviator (Helocopter Pilot) Joellen Drag; and Judge 
Advocate General (JAG) Officer Suzanne Rhiddlehoover (Odegard 1999).   
Throughout 1977 and 1978, as Owens v. Brown was wending its way through the 
courts, the Navy went to Congress seeking legislative relief.  But rather than seeking an 
outright repeal of Section 6015, the Navy proposed the requirements be amended to 
allow permanent assignment of women to additional non-combatant auxiliary ships such 
as tenders, repair, research, and rescue ships, and temporary assignment (not to 
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exceed 180 days) of women to any ship during peacetime for training, familiarization, 
repair, etc, thus preserving the exclusion of women from permanent assignment aboard 
combatant ships (Holm 1992, p. 331-2).   
1977 
• Air Force women became eligible for aviation duty in noncombat aircraft 
(Manning 2013). 
• The Coast Guard assigned women to shipboard duty (Manning 2013). 
While Congress was still considering the Navy’s proposed modifications to 
Section 6015 Title 10 U.S.C., on July 27, 1978 U.S. District Court Judge for the District 
of Columbia, John J. Sirica, ruled on Owens v. Brown, finding that it was 
unconstitutional for Congress to prohibit the assignment of women to Navy ships other 
than hospital ships and transports (noncombatants) as it denied women their right to 
equal protection as guaranteed by the 5th Amendment to the Constitution.   Judge 
Sirica, deferring widely to Navy and military leaders, ruled the Navy should instead be 
able to determine when, how, and where to assign both male and female Sailors, based 
on the needs of the Navy and national defense.  In his decision, Sirica observed that the 
legislative background of the law contained in Section 6015 “tends to suggest a 
statutory purpose more related to the traditional way of thinking about women than to 
the demands of military preparedness” (Holm 1992, p. 337). 
Although questions related to drafting women and women in combat have always 
been emotional and political minefields, Congress was especially reluctant to take on 
the debate in an election year.  During the late 1970s and early 1980s Congress was 
frequently drawn into the debates between the military and civilian leadership and found 
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itself split along the same lines as the Pentagon on the issues.  Women service 
members were caught in the middle of these debates and were left “feeling like pawns 
in a political game played by giants, with no say in the outcome” (Holm 1992, p. 383).  
Since women were now fully integrated into the units open to them, they often found 
themselves “isolated in predominantly male organizations, without female friends or role 
models” (Holm 1992, p. 383).  On most bases, networking among women was either 
openly discouraged or ridiculed.  The sense of isolation could be overwhelming, 
especially for first-term enlisted women.  But, women of all ranks often felt frustrated 
and angered by their own powerlessness in influencing the policies and decisions that 
determined their status, as well as the quality of their lives and careers (Holm 1992, p. 
383).   
In 1978, Commander Rebecca Vinson and LT Kay Roberts, both stationed in 
Washington D.C., realizing women in the sea services (Navy and Marine Corps) would 
benefit from a professional network, spearheaded the effort to establish an informal 
organization they named the Women Officer’s Professional Network (WOPN).  After 
compiling a roster of the officers stationed in Washington D.C. they organized a series 
of luncheons at which they invited prominent military leaders to be guest speakers. 
(Ebbert & Hall 1999, p. 230).  The intent behind the group was to allow women officers 
to learn from and share career advice with one another.   In short order independent 
chapters were formed at areas of fleet concentration such as Washington, D.C., Norfolk, 
VA, and San Diego, CA.  Initially there was no over-arching national organization that 
governed the regional chapters.  The chapters formed a loose configuration with similar-
but-uncoordinated goals.  
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1978 
• As required by Public Law-95-79, Sec 303, the Department of Defense (DoD) 
provided a definition of “combat” to Congress31 as it had become clear during the 
debates over women’s enrollment in the service academies that each of the 
services had its own definition of “combat” (Holm 1992, p. 337).  In the same 
document the Department of Defense also described the limiting effects of 
Sections 6015 and 8549 on the Navy and Air Force personnel and suggested 
that those sections be repealed.   
• As part of the FY-79 Defense Authorization Act (Public Law 95-485), 10 USC 
6015 was amended to allow permanent assignment of women to non-combatant 
ships and temporary assignment not to exceed 180 days to any ship not 
expected to have a combat mission (Manning 2013).   
• The Navy introduced its “Women in Ships” program (Godson 2001, p. 231). 
• The Navy opened a few of its VP (anti-submarine patrol) squadrons to enlisted 
women in aviation maintenance ratings on a trial basis (Ebbert & Hall 1999, p. 
278). 
• Congress passed Public Law-95-202, which granted retroactive veteran status to 
Women Air Force Service Pilots (WASPs) who had served during WW II 
(Manning 2013). 
• The Coast Guard removed all assignment restrictions based on gender (Manning 
2013). 
                                            
 
31 The Department of Defense’s Definition of Combat (as submitted to Congress in February 1978):   
“The term ‘combat’ refers to ‘engaging an enemy or being engaged by an enemy in armed 
conflict.’  Under current practices, a person is considered to be ‘in combat’ when he or she is in a 
geographic area designated as a combat/hostile fire zone by the Secretary of Defense.  Members of the 
armed forces, not in a designated combat/hostile fire zone, may be designated as being ‘in combat’ by 
the Secretary of Defense based on specific circumstances and events.  These definitions apply to men 
and women of all the services. 
 A service member in combat is authorized to receive combat/hostile fire pay and earn combat 
awards.  Women have received hostile fire pay and combat awards in past conflicts.  Women have 
served in combat in many skills during WW II, Korea, and Vietnam.  Army nurses have served in combat 
for over a hundred years, although they and other medical personnel are considered noncombatants.  
Since the word ‘combat’ has historically been used to include such a broad range of activities, the 
Department of Defense does not believe that the term provides a useful basis for expanding the 
opportunities for women in the service” (Holm 1992, p. 338). 
 
 
 
 
115 
The Navy had started the decade with 6,633 women of the line on active duty in 
June 1970, representing .95 percent of total personnel.  By September 1979, the 
number of women in the Navy (excluding nurses) had grown to 24,644, representing 
about 4.7 percent of total personnel (Godson 2001, p. 227).  There had been a 
significant change in the ethnic composition of Navy women over the same decade.  
Before 1970, most women serving in the U.S. Navy had been white, but with the focus 
on racial equal opportunity, more minorities entered the service.  By 1979, 91 percent of 
women officers were white, 4 percent were black, and 4.7 percent were either of 
Hispanic heritage or members of other ethnicities, i.e., Asian-Pacific Islander, Native 
American, etc. Within the enlisted ranks, the changes were even more significant.  
Eighty-three percent of enlisted Navy women were white, while 12.8 percent were black, 
and 4 percent were Hispanic or “other” (Godson 2001, p. 227). 
In May 1979 the Department of Defense sent Congress a proposal to repeal 
Sections 6015 and 8549.  The intent was to allow the secretaries of the Navy and Air 
Force to “set policies for, monitor, and review the assignment of women (Holm 1992, p. 
339),” something the Secretary of the Army had always been able to do. The services 
did not unanimously support the repeal for the same reasons or to the same degree.  In 
fact, the Marine Corps actively advocated against the repeal and the Chief of Naval 
Operations made it clear that that he was not personally in favor of assigning women to 
combatant vessels.  Later he told reporters that it was not the Navy’s idea to repeal 
Sections 6015 and 8549.  Rather, it was the Defense Department’s idea (Holm 1992, p. 
340). 
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In November, the Military Personnel Subcommittee of the House Armed Services 
Committee began hearings on that proposal.  Unfortunately, rather than focusing on the 
merits of “secretarial prerogatives” and the need for flexibility in assigning personnel to 
maximize the operational readiness of the force, the 4 days of hearings devolved into 
heated and often emotional debates over women in combat, especially ground combat, 
and the horrors of war in general (Holm 1992, p. 339).  Retired General William 
Westmoreland, directly opposing repeal, set the tone for much of the testimony.  He 
was clearly convinced that the Army, at least, had already gone too far in assigning 
women to units that provided direct support to combat units.  In his opinion “the political 
administration is trying to use the military as a vehicle to further social change in our 
society … in utter disregard for potential fighting effectiveness.” Furthermore, he 
contended that “no man with gumption wants a woman to fight his battles” (Holm 1992, 
p. 341).   
Not unlike their active and retired military counterparts who had testified, civilians 
called to testify were split on the issues as well.  The executive director of the Women’s 
Equity Action League, Carol Parr, testified that there was absolutely no reason women 
could not contribute fully to the nation’s defense, observing that military jobs should be 
assigned on the basis of capabilities not sex.  Diana A. Steele, a lawyer with the 
American Civil Liberties Union, viewed the question of women in combat as an equal 
rights issue.  She argued:    
The exclusion of women from combat causes severe injustice to women who are 
qualified and eager to serve in the military …Men do not have a monopoly on 
patriotism, physical ability, desire for adventure or willingness to risk their lives.  
[Until men and women shared both the obligations and rights of citizenship] 
women will continue to be considered less than full-fledged citizens (Holm 1992, 
p. 342).   
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Conversely, the director of the Moral Majority proclaimed, “Leadership and authority are 
male attributes ordained by God.”  He further asserted that “women in combat roles 
violates the order of creation, the will of God” (Holm 1992, p. 342).  
Upon conclusion of the hearings nothing had been resolved and it was apparent 
that the most senior leaders within the Department of Defense did not all agree, given 
that the various services were not uniformly supportive of the proposal.  Clearly, there 
was a rift between the higher echelon civilian leaders at DoD, and the civilian and 
military leaders of the various branches.  On 11 December 1979 the Chief of Naval 
Operations (CNO), ADM T. B. Hayward, actually sent a memo to the new Navy 
secretary, Edward Hidalgo, pointing out the official position of the Navy had been 
established before he had become CNO; that he had not been consulted on and did not 
agree with that position; and that had he been asked he would certainly have opposed 
the proposed repeal (Holm 1992, p. 343). 
1979  
• The Navy opened the Surface Warfare and Special Operations (diving and 
salvage) communities to women officers.  Enlisted women became eligible for 
many shipboard occupations (Manning 2013). 
• The Naval Flight Officer program was opened to women and the first women 
Naval aviator, LT Lynn Spruill, achieved carrier landing qualification when she 
landed a C-1 (a 9-seat propeller-driven plane) on board the USS 
INDEPENDENCE (Manning 2013). 
• The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics 
directed the military services to incorporate newly issued Office of Personnel 
Management (OPM) guidelines on sexual harassment into (civilian) employee 
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orientation and to provide (civilian) employees with information on how to obtain 
redress from sexual harassment (Manning 2013). 
• The Washingtonian published future Secretary of the Navy, James Webb’s 
(1979), article “Women Can’t Fight” in its November issue. 
Further public hearings on repeal of Sections 6015 and 8549 were held by the 
House Armed Services Committee in January 1980.  The hearings adjourned with no 
decision made and repeal looked increasingly unlikely (Holm 1992, p. 386).  The public 
argument between some women’s rights activists and extremely conservative 
organizations had become so emotionally charged that it appeared unlikely that 
Congress would be able address the issue.  As long as Section 6015 remained in effect 
the Navy would be severely limited in its ability to absorb and meaningfully employ 
talented women.   
On January 23, 1980 President Carter announced to the country, in the State of 
the Union address, his decision to reinstate registration for the draft.  On February 8th, 
consistent with his advocacy for passage of the ERA, he further announced to the 
country his decision to request congressional authority to register women, as well as 
men.  President Carter made clear that he had no intentions of abandoning the AVF 
concept and reinstating the draft.  Resuming registration was simply a time-saving 
mechanism in the event the nation needed to mobilize troops in an emergency.  Taking 
such action appeared prudent given the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan little 
more than a month prior (Holm 1992, pp. 347-350).  
The President’s action came as somewhat of a surprise, given that powerful 
members of both the Senate and House Armed Services Committee had launched a 
serious effort to replace the All-Volunteer Force by reinstating the draft.  The White 
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House and various top level administrative officials were sufficiently persuasive in their 
arguments against reinstating the draft to kill the effort on Capitol Hill only two months 
before.  One particularly influential element in achieving that objective was the 
administration’s insistence that if required by Congress to resume the draft, that women 
be included.  Congress ultimately authorized the funds necessary to resume registration 
of men, but it reinstated the draft registration law as it had previously been practiced.  
Congress did not require nor authorize the registration of women.  This action prompted 
Robert L. Goldberg, along with several others, to challenge the constitutionality of the 
U.S. draft registration law by filing suit against Bernard Rostker, the Director of the 
Selective Service System. The outcome of this lawsuit would play out over the next 18 
months (Holm 1992, pp. 348). 
As the Carter Administration rapidly approached the end of its 4-year term, given 
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on 25 December 1979; the botched attempt to 
rescue the U.S. hostages in Iran in April 1980; and growing public perceptions of 
increasing disparities between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. in defense spending, many 
Americans began to question the U.S. military’s abilities to deter aggression and fight 
wars (Holm 1992, pp. 383-384).  Army Chief of Staff, General Edward C. Meyer, 
introduced the term "hollow Army" during testimony before the House Armed Services 
Committee on 29 May 1980 (Feickert and Daggett 2012, p. 8) at a time when military 
pay and benefits had eroded so dramatically that all four of the services had missed 
their recruiting goals in 1979, the Army most dramatically by 15,000, and the Navy was 
short 20,000 petty officers. Six of 10 Army divisions stateside were deemed "not combat 
ready" (Feickert and Daggett 2012, p. 5).  Subsequently, “hollow force” became the term 
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du jour among military and civilian leaders within DoD and Congress to describe the 
condition of the U.S. military as:   
forces that appeared mission-ready but, upon examination, suffered from 
shortages of personnel, equipment, and maintenance or from deficiencies in 
training.  Although the size and composition of the force appeared adequate on 
paper, shortcomings identified when these forces were subjected to further 
scrutiny raised questions if these forces would be able to accomplish their 
assigned wartime missions” (Feickert and Daggett 2012, p. 1). 
Many defense experts, both military and civilian, believed the solution to this problem 
could be found in increased investment in military manpower and equipment, and 
reestablishment of the draft.  These same experts tended to view the increased number 
of women within the ranks as symptomatic of the services personnel problems rather 
than a means of mitigating them (Holm 1992, p. 384). 
 On Friday, July 18th, 1980 a three-judge panel of the Third U.S. Circuit Court of 
Appeals in Philadelphia ruled that draft registration that excluded women was 
unconstitutional and ordered the government not to begin the registration of nineteen- 
and twenty-year old men that was to commence on Monday, July 21,1980.  On 
Saturday, July 19, Supreme Court Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., temporarily ended the 
ensuing legal confusion by granting a government request to block the lower court ruling 
at least until the Supreme Court had made a final ruling (Holm 1992, p. 348).  
Registration of men could proceed, albeit under a heavy legal cloud, until the Supreme 
Court made a final ruling in the case.  
1980 
• Congress passed the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA) 
which abolished laws requiring separate appointment, promotion, accounting, 
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and separation procedures for women officers in the Army, Navy, and Marine 
Corps; and required that women in the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps be 
selected through competitive screening for (rather than appointed to) 
Flag/General officer rank.  For the first time women had to compete against their 
male contemporaries for promotion (Manning 2013).32 
Military women were simultaneously pleased with and worried by this legislation.  As 
Holm (1992, p. 277) explained, while they wanted the full status that integrated 
promotions offered, they were also apprehensive about whether they would be able to 
successfully compete against their male, warfare-qualified peers.  
• The Subcommittee on Military Personnel of the House Armed Services 
Committee held the first congressional hearings on sexual harassment in the 
military (Manning 2013).  
• The Department of Defense adopted the Equal Opportunity Commission 
guidelines on sexual harassment and established an overall definition of sexual 
harassment (Manning 2013). 
• On May 28th a total of 229 women were commissioned for the first time from the 
nation’s services academies:  the Air Force Academy (98), West Point (62), the 
Naval Academy (55), and the Coast Guard Academy (14).  These women 
represented approximately 8 percent of the total graduates, mirroring the male-
to-female ratio of the total force (Monahan and Neidel-Greenlee 2011, p 316).  
They had a slightly higher attrition rate than their male contemporaries. 
 Within the Department of Defense there were widespread complaints about low 
morale, drug and alcohol abuse, and the quality of male recruits,33 which prompted 
                                            
 
32 In contrast, the Air Force, founded in 1947, operated under laws providing a single personnel system 
from its inception. 
33 Older career soldiers complained of widespread illiteracy among young male recruits (Holm 1992, p. 
385). 
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Congress to set limits on the number of less-qualified male recruits the services could 
accept.  This requirement further aggravated recruiters’ abilities to make their monthly 
quotas.  Yet, even as the AVF appeared to be faltering, and the quality and capability of 
the force seemed to be plummeting, male civilian and military leaders within DoD 
refused to acknowledge the positive contributions women were making and continued to 
resist the Secretary of Defense’s plans to increase their numbers.  In fact, some military 
leaders believed that the Defense Department’s growing dependence upon women had 
gone too far, too fast – “that it was more a product of liberal social experimentation than 
of military need and that it was undermining military readiness” (Holm 1992, p. 385).   
Shortly after the November presidential election, in what can only be described 
as an act of insubordination, the Army and the Air Force secretly submitted to 
President-elect Reagan’s transition team their proposals to pause their efforts to 
achieve the Carter administrations goals for women’s enlisted endstrength until a 
thorough assessment of women’s impact on force readiness could be conducted.  Both 
services sought to hold the numbers of women recruited in 1981 and 1982 to the 
minimum required to meet overall recruiting goals – in other words, if they had to recruit 
women to make up for shortfalls among men, they would.  While there is no evidence 
implicating the Navy or Marine Corps in this scheme, when later responding to press 
inquiries both services acknowledged they shared at least some of the concerns of  
Army and Air Force had relative to women.  As Washington prepared for the transition 
from the Carter to the Reagan administration, the prevailing hope within DoD was that 
expansion of women’s roles that had accelerated under Carter would end, and perhaps 
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even be reversed, given Ronald Reagan’s unabashed support for the conservative 
social agenda (Holm 1992, p. 387).  
President Ronald Reagan entered the White House in January 1981 with plans 
to begin the largest defense buildup since Vietnam, nearly twenty years earlier.  Reagan 
had campaigned on the issue of restoring public confidence in and capabilities of the 
armed forces.  He intended to eliminate the “hollowness” of the force by increasing pay, 
expanding benefits, and enhancing the quality of service life.  He also planned to build 
the Navy to 600 ships and to increase total force strength by 200,000, or about 10 
percent, to help man the new ships (Holm 1992, p. 385).  Throughout the 1970s, as the 
military downsized following the withdrawal from Vietnam, the total number of Navy 
ships had fallen from 743 in June 1970 to 533 only 9 years later; and personnel end 
strength had declined accordingly over the same time period: going from 692,660 to 
about 524,514 (Godson 2001, p. 222). Although the ships remaining in commission 
were newer and more capable than those that had been retired, the Navy was left with 
significantly fewer ships with which to meet peacetime commitments or conduct wartime 
operations at the same time the Soviet Navy was expanding at an alarming rate, 
challenging America’s superiority at sea. 
 Although more conservatively-inclined than the Carter administration, the 
Reagan administration none-the-less had to confront the same daunting manpower 
realities that the Carter, Ford, and Nixon administrations faced.  First, the pool of 
service-eligible men was shrinking and demographic trends predicted it would continue 
to do so through the mid-1990s.  This manpower shortage was further exacerbated by 
congressionally-mandated quality standards for recruits.  Second, although the pool of 
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service-eligible women was shrinking at the same rate of men, the number of young 
women available and interested in military service still far exceeded the services’ 
demand for them, allowing the services to rationalize the continued higher standards 
women were required to meet.  Finally, modern technology was increasingly eliminating 
the need for brawn, replacing it with the need for brains (Holm 1992, pp. 385-386). 
 The manpower challenge of the 1980s was going to be to attract and retain 
sufficient numbers of people with both the education and intellect to operate and 
maintain the high-tech forces of the future, without breaking the bank.  Increasing pay 
and benefits, and improving service quality of life would significantly improve success 
rates for recruiting among young men of higher quality, but the planned increases in 
endstrength that accompanied the force buildup placed an even heavier burden on 
recruiters to make their new, higher numbers.  Expanding the role of service women 
seemed a logical solution to this quandary.  Despite the presence in the White House of 
the more socially conservative Reagan administration, the 1980s proved to no less 
tumultuous for the services with respect to women’s service than had the 1960s and 
1970s. 
Before Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger even had a chance to settle into 
his Pentagon office and before key members of his manpower/personnel team were 
even cleared by Congress for appointment to their DoD positions, in yet another 
insubordinate maneuver that was essentially an end-run power play against elected 
civilian officials,34 the Army forced the administration to act.  On  February 26,1981 
                                            
 
34 The Army had not first cleared this decision with its Immediate Superior in the Chain of Command 
(ISIC), the military and civilian leaders within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD).  Subordinates, 
even at the level of the civilian Service Secretaries (Secretary of the Navy, Secretary of the Army, etc), or 
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while testifying before the Senate Armed Services Manpower Subcommittee, the Army’s 
acting Assistant Secretary for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, William D. Clark, and the 
Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, LTGEN Robert G. Yerks, announced that the Army 
intended to fully evaluate all of the implications of women’s expanded service and that 
the Army would cut back on its recruitment of women until the study was completed 
(Holm 1992, p. 388).    Experienced politicians, military officials, and political journalists 
immediately suspected the Army was acting according to its own “hidden agenda.”  
There were two possible motives:  1) the Army, inherently biased against women, 
wanted to hold the line against any further incursions by women into “male” territory; or 
2) given that women had been instrumental in ensuring the success of the All-Volunteer 
Force, by restricting, reducing, or outright eliminating women’s future military 
involvement, the Army might force a return to the all-male draft, thereby ensuring 
sufficient male endstrength, while simultaneously eliminating the “feminizing” threat 
women posed to the organization (Holm 1992, p. 390).   
Assistant Secretary Clark was careful to explain that the catalyst behind the 
Army’s concerns was not related to women’s performance.  He conceded that women 
were performing quite well.  Nor was it related to their potential exposure to combat and 
possible death.  Clark contended the Army had already acknowledged that women 
would likely be killed, wounded, or captured in the next war.  No, the real issue that 
most concerned the Army was that of the combat effectiveness of units with a high 
number of women assigned, and the impact “women’s issues” (i.e., pregnancy, sole 
                                                                                                                                            
 
at the level of the services most senior uniformed leader  (i.e., Chief of Staff of the Army, Chief of Naval 
Operations (CNO), USMC: Commandant of the Marine Corps, etc.), do not make such policy decisions 
unilaterally, nor without the prior concurrence of their superiors. 
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parenthood, lost time, and physical problems) had on unit “readiness” and “morale.”  He 
admitted these concerns were not based on any actual data.  Rather, these issues had 
surfaced largely on the basis of the “feelings” of Army field commanders (Holm 1992, p. 
388).   
 Caught flat-footed, the Reagan administration had no choice but to respond to 
the resulting flap among members of Congress, within the press, and among outraged 
Army women.  On March 19, 1981 Deputy Defense Secretary Frank C. Carlucci ordered 
Dr. Lawrence Korb, the newly-appointed Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, 
Reserve Affairs, and Logistics, to conduct an assessment of female officer and enlisted 
accession and retention policies in all the services.  The assessment was to focus on 
answering these two questions:   
(1) How is readiness and mission capability affected by existing or proposed 
levels of women in each service? and (2) If the goals are lowered, what will be 
the costs of recruiting additional males to meet the required end strengths” (Holm 
1992, p. 391)?   
Essentially, the Department of Defense was inviting the services to document and voice 
concerns about the impact women had on mission capability and military readiness.  
The services were also asked to make their case for reducing the recruitment of 
women, given the recruiting environment, overall manpower requirements, and budget 
limitations (Holm 1992, p. 391-2).   
Dr. Korb made it clear to military leaders that the final decision would be made at 
the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) level, not at that of the individual services.   
He did clarify that OSD’s position on recruiting women was not to recruit a woman 
simply because she was a woman, to meet numerical goals specifically for women.  
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Rather, OSD expected women to be recruited only in the quality and quantity that they 
could contribute to the overall effectiveness of the force, whatever that number might 
be.  Unfortunately, the services heard in Dr. Korb’s words what they wanted to hear.  
They immediately cut back recruitment and enlistment of women and in their five-year 
budget submission slashed a total of 60,000 from the enlisted women’s endstrength 
goals the Carter administration had set for 1986 (Holm 1992, p. 392). 
On July 8, 1981, before the assessment Defense Secretary Carlucci had ordered 
was complete, President Reagan established a separate Military Manpower Task Force 
for the purpose of evaluating the total manpower situation and making 
recommendations to the President intended to increase the effectiveness of the total 
force, active and reserve.  The Secretary of Defense would chair the Task Force and, 
although a return to the draft was not explicitly ruled out, it was clear that the Task 
Force would focus its efforts on maintaining the “all-volunteer” aspect to military service 
(Holm 1992, p. 395). 
 When finally published in October 1981 the DoD report, Background Review: 
Women in the Military, did not contribute significant new understanding to the issues of 
its focus.  The major conclusions reached in the assessment more or less mirrored what 
the services had hoped would be found.  First, the report concluded that under 
President Carter OSD’s recruiting goals for women were based more on “politically 
correct equal opportunity standards” than on the desire to meet deficiencies in recruiting 
men by simply filling the holes in the ranks with more readily available women. The 
report assessment had it backwards.  The Carter administration’s principal objective in 
increasing women’s numbers was to meet the military’s overall manpower needs in both 
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quality and quantity, without either returning to the draft or sharply increasing personnel 
costs.  The report’s erroneous conclusions neatly and conveniently fit the narrative the 
services wanted the new Reagan administration to buy – namely, that the Democrats 
had used the military to satisfy the liberal political agenda of supporting equal rights for 
women at the expense of military readiness and, ultimately, national security.  The 
services thought the resulting outcome would either be the larger recruiting budgets 
they desired to attract the necessary number of higher-quality men or, failing that, a 
return to the draft (Holm 1992, p. 393). 
Second, the report found that each of the service-specific methodologies for 
determining women’s endstrength and accession programs was reasonable – thus 
conveying the services intended underlying message – that the services could be 
trusted to set their own endstrength and accession goals for women, and that OSD 
really did not need to be involved (Holm 1992, p. 393-4).  The report noted that none of 
the services had documented the effects, positive or negative, military women had on 
unit readiness or mission accomplishment.  The Army argued that no such assessment 
could be made without a thorough policy review.  The report recommended that the 
Army be allowed to hold women’s enlistment at its present level until it was able to 
complete its comprehensive study, with the caveat that if the Army was unable to meet 
its total recruiting, endstrength, or quality goals, it would have to justify why recruitment 
of women should not be increased (Holm 1992, p. 394-5).  
The Army General Staff continued to operate under the misguided assumption 
that it could force a return to the draft if only the Reagan administration could be 
convinced of the wisdom of doing so.  Consequently, when submitting the manpower 
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requirements to meet President Reagan’s new military strategy, the Army General Staff 
requested an additional 96,000 soldiers, presumably all men, by 1987, on the 
presumption that the recruiting challenges inherent in this request would achieve the 
desired end.  The Army acknowledged in its request that its fulfillment would require 
“extraordinary manpower policies to include significant augmentation to the volunteer 
concept” – clearly a euphemism for a return to the draft (Holm 1992, p. 395).  Secretary 
Weinburger and other experienced politicians saw the Army’s proposal as the outcome 
of likely collusion between Army leaders at the highest levels and powerful members of 
the Senate Armed Services Committee who desired a return to the draft.  Secretary 
Weinburger forcefully made clear that no one in the Reagan administration was 
considering a return to the draft (Holm 1992, p. 395).   
1981 
• On  June 25, 1981, in Rostker v. Goldberg, the U.S. Supreme Court, voting six to 
three, overturned the lower court’s ruling, upholding the constitutionality of 
Congress’s exclusion of women from the draft and Selective Service registration 
(Manning 2013). 
In so doing, the Court reaffirmed the presumption that ordinary tests of equality did not 
apply when Congress was making decisions related to national security.  Writing for the 
majority Justice William Rehnquist asserted "[t]he existence of the combat restrictions 
clearly indicates the basis for Congress' decision to exempt women from registration. 
The purpose of registration was to prepare for a draft of combat troops. Since women 
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are excluded from combat, Congress concluded that they would not be needed in the 
event of a draft, and therefore decided not to register them."35   
• The Navy opened its jet training pipeline to women. 
Expectations on the part of the services that the Reagan administration  
would either discontinue further expansion of women in the services, or perhaps even 
reduce the numbers of servicewomen were short-lived.  Determined to prevent any 
further possible misconceptions within senior leadership of the services or among 
presidentially-appointed Pentagon officials, on January 14,1982, in a memorandum to 
the service secretaries, Secretary Weinberger stated the administration’s support for 
military women thusly: 
Military women are a very important part of our total force capability.  Qualified 
women are essential to obtaining the numbers of quality people required to 
maintain the readiness of our forces.  This administration desires to increase the 
role of women in the military, and I expect the Service Secretaries actively to 
support that policy.  While we have made progress, some institutional barriers 
exist.  I ask that you personally review your service policies to ensure that 
women are not subject to discrimination in recruiting or career opportunities.  
This Department must aggressively break down those remaining barriers that 
prevent us from making the fullest use of the capabilities of women in providing 
for our national defense (Holm 1992, p. 396). 
 Deputy Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci followed up Secretary of Defense 
Weinberger’s memo by directing the service secretaries to report on their respective 
service’s actions to remove institutional barriers for women and to assess how women’s 
existing career paths were affected by their exclusion from combat.  Where career paths 
                                            
 
35 In this unique area, unlike all others where the Court has struck down sex-based distinctions, the 
justices ruled Congress may discriminate between men and women.  This decision reaffirmed, in the 
words of Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court’s “healthy deference” to the other branches of 
government and, as it has turned out, particularly in relation to military issues. 
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were limited by the combat exclusion, the service Secretaries were directed to identify 
whether the limitation existed within their respective service as the result of law, policy, 
or the definition of “combat” (Holm 1992, p. 396). This guidance effectively shifted the 
conversation from how many women should serve, to the even more emotionally-laden 
questions of where should they serve and in what capacity?   
To be clear, the Reagan administration was not a proponent of women as 
combatants.  Rather, the administration was attempting to standardize the employment 
of women across individual services whose definitions of combat in the context of their 
particular service mission and organization varied greatly.  The administration wanted to 
capitalize on the quality and capabilities women interested in serving brought with them, 
providing them equity in career opportunities while simultaneously excluding them from 
the “core” of military operations – combat.   
Two years into the Reagan administration, WOPN invited Secretary of the Navy, 
John Lehman, to address their group.  The approximately 250 assembled women 
officers were concerned about recently enacted changes to the Navy promotion system 
which would force non-warfare qualified women to compete against warfare-qualified 
men for the first time.  In the “up or out” system mandated by Congress in the Defense 
Officer Personnel Management Act (DODMA) of 1980 (Punero, et al., 2008), women 
officers knew such a change could be a career-ender for them.  When someone asked 
Secretary Lehman what the implications of these changes would be for women, he 
dismissed out of hand the single most important career concern of his audience as a 
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“non-issue.” Members of the audience were livid.  Members of the press were present.36  
As Katzenstein (1998) reports, recognizing the politicizing potential of a group such as 
WOPN, the Navy wasted little time dispatching Assistant Secretary of Defense 
(manpower, reserve affairs, and logistics), Lawrence Korb, to smooth the troubled 
waters Secretary Lehman had inadvertently churned up, by “clarifying” the Navy’s 
official position on the changes to the promotion process (pp. 66 and 195).   
In March 1982, Assistant Secretary of Defense Korb announced the 
Department’s intentions to continue increasing women’s numbers across the services 
over the next decade (Holm 1992, p. 396-397).  In June 1982 the Commandant of the 
Marine Corps, General Robert H. Barrow, kept the civil-military leadership rift over 
women’s military service in the public eye in an interview discussing the future of the 
Marine Corps conducted by former Naval officer Michael Wright of The New York Times 
Magazine.   During the interview Barrow justified women’s continued exclusion from 
combat roles, despite their successful performance in the support positions that had 
recently been opened to them, voicing a belief commonly held among military men, that: 
War is man’s work.  Biological convergence on the battlefield would not only be 
dissatisfying in terms of what women could do, but it would be an enormous 
psychological distraction for the male who wants to think that he’s fighting for that 
woman somewhere behind, not up there in the same foxhole with him.  It 
tramples the male ego.  When it gets right down to it, you have to protect the 
manliness of war (Wright 1982). 
 
                                            
 
36 By the mid- to late-1970s the commercial service newspapers, i.e. Navy Times, Army Times, Marine 
Corps Times, and Air Force Times had begun to pay increasingly close attention to gender-related issues 
in the services.  By the 1980s, mainstream newspapers such as the Washington Post and New York 
Times had regular correspondents informed about and eager to cover issues of gender inequality in the 
military (Katzenstein 1998, p. 65).  
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1982 
• The Navy selected its first woman for Test Pilot School 
• June 30 1982: ERA is stopped three states short of ratification, eliminating one of 
the strongest original factors motivating increased equal opportunity for women 
within the Department of Defense. 
Throughout the early and mid-1980s, in response to the directives issued by 
Secretary of Defense Weinberger and Assistant Secretary of Defense Carlucci, the 
services worked to creatively define, redefine, or rename mission areas the exclude 
women.  For example, in 1983 the Army deployed an assignment classification system 
known as Direct Combat Probability Coding (DCPC).  The Army claimed to be applying 
the “intent” of the combat exclusion laws Congress  had imposed on the Navy and Air 
Force.  It was presumed that Congress had never intended for women to serve in 
ground combat arms – infantry, armor, and artillery.  Based on a complex system of 
coding applied to all positions and units in relation to their probability of engaging in 
direct combat, DCPC was intended to identify those positions and units least likely to 
experience enemy contact and to assign women into the safest jobs.  To women in the 
military and to wise external observers the DCPC was really an “elaborate ruse,” 
intended to give the appearance of meeting the spirit and intent of the Weinberger and 
Carlucci directives without actually doing so (Holm 1992, pp. 403-404).  The DCPC 
remained in use by the Army through at least June 2007 to identify Army positions 
closed to women (McSally 2007, p. 1025). 
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1983 
• Operation Urgent Fury (the U.S. invades Grenada) – 170 women soldiers 
participated in this operation as military police, stevedores, helicopter pilots, air 
crew, and maintenance personnel, intelligence specialists who conducted 
prisoner interrogations, truck drivers, and medical personnel.  Air Force women 
also participated as members of air transport crews (Holm 1992, p. 404 and 
Manning 2013).  This operation provided the first test of the validity, or lack 
thereof, of the DCPC. 
• Air Force women in KC-135 and KC-10 tanker crews participated in a raid on 
Libya (Manning 2013). 
• Congress passed Public Law 98-160, establishing the Secretary of Veteran’s 
Affairs Advisory Committee on Women Veterans (Manning 2013). 
• The Navy screened its first women Surface Warfare Officer (SWOs) for 
Executive Officer (XO) Afloat37 (Ebbert & Hall 1999, p. 262). 
In the years since it was first established in Washington, D.C. the WOPN had 
gone national with chapters in areas of major fleet concentration.  In January 1984 its 
members incorporated as the Women Officers’ Professional Association (WOPA) 
(Katzenstein 1998, p. 64; and Ebbert & Hall 1999, p. 230).  The WOPN/A luncheons 
had provided women with much-needed career information but they had also, at times, 
“galvanized political consciousness around gender issues” (Katzenstein 1998, p. 193).  
The women of WOPN/A who served in the 1970s through the early 1990s had 
grown up or come of age in the era when the women’s movement was at its pinnacle.  
Katzenstein (1998, p. 19) actually described the cadre of women who worked to 
establish the early independent regional chapters as “feminists.”  They were motivated 
                                            
 
37 2nd in command of a Navy vessel. 
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to advance the cause not just of women officers, but of all Navy women.  Through 
WOPN/A they advocated for broadened career opportunities for women and prompted 
Navy officials to examine and address policies on such diverse issues as women’s 
uniform matters, health care, child care, sexual harassment, and pregnancy – policy 
issues that could not be adequately addressed by isolated individuals via their chain of 
command (Katzenstein 1998, p. 193).   DACOWITS, attempting to prevent any potential 
institutional backlash, asked service leaders to affirm their support for such 
organizations.  Navy officials assured the committee that it did support WOPA, noting 
that the Chief of Naval Personnel, Vice Admiral William Lawrence, had been the guest 
speaker at the first luncheon sponsored by the newly incorporated WOPA (Katzenstein 
1998, p. 65; Ebbert & Hall 1999, p. 230).   
Although women in the other services developed support organizations, the 
Navy’s WOPN/A was clearly the first such organization among the services and the 
most active in advocating for its membership (Katzenstein 1998, p. 193).  Carolyn 
Becraft, former director of the Women in the Military Project of the Women’s Equity 
Action League (WEAL), credited this more to the relative concentration of Navy women 
in areas of fleet concentration than to worse conditions in the Navy or the lack of 
consciousness of gender inequities in the other services (Katzenstein 1998, pp. 193-
194).  Army and Air Force women were much more broadly scattered at bases across 
the nation and around the world.  Put quite simply, in the Navybirds of a feather could 
and did flock together.  Navy women were already informally networking before 
WOPN/A was founded.  The establishment of WOPN/A just broadened and formalized 
the process.  The official establishment of WOPA as a national organization gave its 
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membership more visibility to senior leadership, and along with that came some political 
influence.   
In February 1984, in testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, GEN John Vessey, Jr., described his feeling about 
the increasing number of women in the ranks: 
The greatest change that has come about in the U.S. Armed Forces in the time I 
have been in military service is in the extensive use of women … I am not 
against it.  We have wonderful service women doing extraordinary things and 
doing very well, but we have taken a male institution … and turned it into a coed 
institution, and it has been a traumatic exercise for us (Holm 1992, p. 381). 
Although the growth in the proportions of women entering the military had been 
dramatic over the previous decade, by the early 1980s women still constituted less than 
ten percent of the total force, and they were overwhelmingly concentrated in jobs 
considered traditional for women, such as administration, personnel management, 
education and training, and medical service.  As Major General Jean Holm (1992) 
astutely observed: 
That an institution the size of the U.S. armed forces could be so traumatized by a 
few women speaks volumes about the military mind-set of the time.  General 
Vessey was expressing a widespread apprehension that the military services 
were in the process of being “feminized” for reasons associated more with a 
national liberal agenda than the requirements of national defense.  The services 
were never convinced of the necessity of expanding the utilization of women 
since the advent of the all-volunteer force.  They were especially traumatized by 
the forced integration of women into operational areas and the sacrosanct 
service academies (p. 381). 
While the other services had been making waves with Reagan administration 
officials in the Pentagon, the Navy seemed to be sailing the relatively smooth waters 
provided by section 6015 Title 10 USC, which prevented women from serving aboard 
combat ships.  With Reagan’s intended build-up to 600 ships, Navy leaders soon found 
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themselves at odds with civilian officials about the numbers and roles in which the Navy 
would employ women.   
1984 
• The Navy opened all operational VP (anti-submarine patrol) squadrons to 
enlisted women in aviation maintenance ratings (Ebbert & Hall 1999, p. 278). 
In June 1986 Navy women and administration officials alike were stunned when 
the retiring Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral James D. Watkins, warned in a press 
conference that the Navy might have reached the saturation point with respect to 
women.  Watkins had been perceived as friendly to women as he had frequently 
praised their service and bragged that they performed as well or better than men (Holm 
1992, p. 409).  Navy manpower needs are largely determined by the size of the fleet 
and requirements for personnel rotation from sea duty to shore duty.  The Navy was 
confronting the same demographic realities that the other services were with respect to 
the male youth population, so it would seem logical that the planned 120 new ships be 
designed and configured to accommodate women from the keel up.   
The Navy, however, was allowed to determine on its own which ships, aircraft, 
and missions would be designated as “combat” and to select from among those 
remaining which would have mixed-gender crews.  In December 1986 the Navy 
announced that it was opening 1,000 positions for enlisted women aboard thirty-nine 
ships and the military staffs of two civilian-operated Maritime Prepositioning Squadrons 
while it simultaneously took action to close other sea-going billets to women.  The Navy 
creatively re-designated the Mobile Logistics Support Force (MLSF) the “Combat 
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Logistics Force (CLF),” defining fleet oilers, ammunitions, and supply ships as 
“combatant vessels,” thereby precluding women’s assignment to them (Holm 1992, p. 
410). 
1986 
• The Navy modified its pregnancy policy to allow women to remain aboard ship 
until the 20th week of pregnancy.  Previously women had been transferred off 
ships to shore duty as soon as it was discovered they were pregnant.   
In February 1987 the new Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Carlisle A. H.  
Trost, froze the number of enlisted women recruited into service at the existing strength 
through fiscal year 1991.  Admiral Trost justified this action as necessary to preserve a 
healthy sea/shore rotation ratio for men and because Congress had refused to fund all 
of the manpower the Navy claimed was required to man President Reagan’s planned 
600 ships (Holm 1992, pp. 410-411).  Defense Secretary Weinberger responded the 
very next day by rescinding Trost’s freeze, stating he was comfortable with the 
previously planned goals of increasing women’s numbers by ten percent by 1991 (Holm 
1992, p. 411).   
Any relief women felt with this action by the Secretary of Defense was quickly 
overshadowed by the administration’s announcement in April 1987 that it had selected 
James H. Webb to replace John Lehman as Secretary of the Navy.  Webb, a 1968 
Naval Academy graduate who had been commissioned in the Marines and seen action 
in Vietnam as an infantry platoon commander, had a reputation for being “anti-women,” 
based, in part, upon an opinion article he had authored and which had been published 
in 1979 in the magazine Washingtonian.  In the article, entitled “Women Can’t Fight,” 
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Webb argued against expanded employment of women in the military beyond traditional 
noncombat roles.  He further argued that since the service academies existed to train 
combat leaders, women had no place attending those institutions.  Furthermore, he 
argued the mere presence of women at the service academies was “poisoning” to the 
process of preparing men to lead in combat (Webb, 1979).   
His public statements about women in the military and at the academies came 
back to haunt him in the confirmation process.  While his nomination was never 
seriously in doubt because of his views on women’s service, the questioning he 
received was none-the-less vigorous, although perhaps not quite rigorous enough.  One 
of his first acts in office was to direct changes to the promotion process so that “new 
emphasis” be placed on selecting those officers for promotion who had demonstrated 
outstanding performance in demanding assignments – particularly those related to 
combat.  This action reinforced the perception among both men and women of the Navy 
and Marine Corps that Webb was attempting to force women out by reducing their 
opportunities for promotion.   
The impact of this action was not fully appreciated by the Secretary of Defense 
nor the Secretary of the Navy until the DACOWITS Executive Committee returned from 
an official fact-finding trip to Navy and Marine Corps bases across the Pacific region 
and the Chairwoman, Dr. Jacqueline K. Davis, made her report to Secretaries Weinberg 
and Webb.  She reported that Navy and Marine Corps leaders condoned “overt and 
blatant sexual harassment” of service women (Ebbert & Hall 1999, p. 207).  She further 
reported, in blunt terms, that the impact on morale, which had already been low, was 
devastating.  According to Dr. Davis and her Executive Committee, sexual harassment 
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and job discrimination were rampant, while communication between Navy leaders and 
enlisted women was practically non-existent.  Additionally, there was a widespread 
perception that the chain of command did not actively work to resolve grievances when 
filed and women were actively discouraged from taking their complaints to higher 
authority.  When women did persist in lifting unresolved grievances to the next higher 
authority, they often were ignored, or it was a commander who was the perpetrator of 
the offense (Holm 1992, pp. 412).  This was, perhaps, not surprising in light of the fact 
that as recently as 1985 an official Navy spokesman had acknowledged “punishment for 
sexual harassment is still a relatively new concept in the Navy” (Ebbert & Hall 1999, p. 
207) when asked by the press about low rates of reported sexual harassment and even 
lower rates of conviction for the offense.  
When the New York Times and other national media picked up the substance of 
the DACOWITS report, the Navy and Marine Corps as organizations suffered sufficient 
public embarrassment that Secretary Webb immediately directed the Chief of Naval 
Operations to “convene a study group to conduct a ‘comprehensive examination of the 
current policy on utilization of women’ and its ‘implementation in the Navy’” (Holm 1992, 
pp. 412).  The group was also chartered to make recommendations for change.  The 
study group conducted extensive research, interviewing more than 2,500 Navy 
personnel stationed aboard ships, squadrons, and shore stations at ten different 
locations.   
Within days of the  December 5, 1987 publication of the Navy Study Group’s 
“Report of Progress of Women in the Navy,” Secretary Webb announced several major 
policy initiatives designed to improve the employment, assimilation, and treatment of 
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Navy women.  Among Webb’s initiatives was more clearly defining what constituted a 
“combat mission.”  Additionally, twenty-six of the thirty-seven Combat Logistics Force 
Ships closed to women in 1986 were opened to them, bringing the total number of ships 
to which women could be assigned to ninety-five.  Aircrew billets at shore-based fleet air 
reconnaissance squadrons were also opened to women (Holm 1992, pp. 412-3).  The 
effect of these changes was to open an additional ten thousand sea-going positions to 
women.  Additionally, Secretary Webb directed “vigorous corrective and preventive 
actions in areas of sexual harassment, fraternization, treatment, and morale (Holm 
1992, p. 413)” and approved numerous other recommendations intended to improve 
women’s overall career opportunities.  Within the office of the Chief of Personnel Webb 
also established a full-time “Special Assistant for Women’s Policy” position, to be filled 
by a female Navy Captain (Holm 1992). 
Defense Secretary Weinberger also responded to the results of the DACOWITS 
Executive Committee’s fact-finding trip across the Pacific region in a positive way.  In 
September 1987 Secretary Weinberger established the Department of Defense Task 
Force on Women in the Military, charging it to explore a wide range of issues influencing 
women’s careers, morale, employment, and quality of life.  Among its findings, the Task 
Force concluded that there were significant inconsistencies in the services’ application 
of the combat exclusion statutes.  It recommended the Department of Defense develop 
and adopt a clear standard for evaluating whether specific positions or units be closed 
to women.   
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1987 
• The Navy assigned its first woman Executive Officer Afloat; opened Military 
Sealift Command ships to women; and selected its first woman Naval Aviator for 
squadron command and its first woman Surface Warfare Officer for command at 
sea. 
Recognizing the need for accurate estimates of the prevalence of sexual 
harassment to inform the process of dealing with that problem, the Chief of Naval 
Operations Progress of Women in the Navy Study Group recommended that a survey of 
sexual harassment be developed and administered Navy-wide in conjunction with the 
planned 1989 Navy Equal Opportunity survey.  The purpose of the sexual harassment 
survey was to: (1) establish initial rates of, forms of, and frequency of sexual 
harassment; (2) describe characteristics of victims and perpetrators of sexual 
harassment, and (3) determine the actions and outcomes following experiences of 
sexual harassment (Culbertson, et al., 1992). 
In response to the DoD Task Force on Women in the Military’s recommendation 
for the Defense Department to develop a clear standard for determining which positions 
should be open or closed to women, the DoD Risk Rule was developed and 
promulgated in 1988.  The intent behind the Risk Rule was to narrow the services’ 
interpretations of the statutes, thereby widening women’s opportunities; and to 
standardize interpretations across the services so similar positions or units were not 
opened to women in one service but closed to them in another (Holm 1992, p. 433).  As 
the result of application of the Risk Rule an additional 30,000 positions were opened to 
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women; although units directly supporting ground combat operations remained closed 
to them (Manning 2013). 38  
On July 20, 1988, the Secretary of Defense issued a memorandum defining 
sexual harassment and stating Department policy that "sexual harassment is 
unacceptable conduct and will not be condoned or tolerated in any way." Within that 
memorandum sexual harassment was defined as:   
a form of sex discrimination that involves unwelcome sexual advances, requests 
for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature when: 
(1) submission to or rejection of such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly 
a term or condition of a person's job, pay, or career; or (2) submission to or 
rejection of such conduct by a person is used as a basis for career or 
employment decisions affecting that person; or (3) such conduct interferes with 
an individual's performance or creates an intimidating, hostile, or offensive 
environment. Any person in a supervisory or command position who uses or 
condones implicit or explicit sexual behavior to control, influence, or affect the 
career, pay, or job of a military member or civilian employee is engaging in 
sexual harassment (United States General Accounting Office 1995). 
The Department of Defense also conducted its first service-wide survey on sexual 
harassment in the military, usually referred to as the “1988 Sexual Harassment Survey” 
(Manning 2013). 
 
 
 
                                            
 
38 It would be a mistake to conclude that the DoD Risk Rule was a panacea.  Service policies regarding 
women and combat remained unclear and difficult to apply in a real world context. A host of 
contradictions resulted when the theory met reality, as happened shortly after the introduction of the Risk 
Rule, in U.S. action in Panama in December 1989 (Holm 1992, p. 433).  As Holm observed: 
 
The theory underlying the DoD Risk Rule was based on a faulty premise – that it is possible to 
protect military women from the risks of what is fundamentally a risky profession.  In modern 
warfare, geography and circumstances, not policy, good intentions, or misplaced chivalry, dictate 
who will face hostilities in war (1992, p. 433). 
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1989 
• Operation Just Cause (the invasion of Panama) – 770 women deployed or were 
already there.  A Military Policewoman commanded troops in a ground combat-
like operation.  Women flying Black Hawk helicopters came under fire.  The DoD 
Risk Rule was tested in a real world operation (Manning 2013). 
As noted by Katzenstein (1998, p. 77-8), from the late 1970s and throughout the 
1980’s military feminists found protected and institutionalized spaces from which they 
could mount challenges to policy that maintained male occupational exclusivity and 
question the work-place appropriateness of long-standing, taken-for-granted practices, 
such as gender discrimination and sexual harassment.  Not surprisingly, women’s 
challenges to the prevailing system of gender and power relations in the military were 
often not well-received.  Reflecting back on the turmoil within the military during the 
1980s with respect to women’s service, MGEN Jeanne Holm, former Director of Women 
in the Air Force (WAF) from 1965-73, and Special Assistant for Women to President 
Ford following her military retirement in 1975 through January 1977, assessed the 
situation thusly:    
…the issue of military women continued to generate tensions and open conflict 
between appointed civilian officials and military leaders.  On the one hand, 
civilian officials committed to strengthening the armed forces in a period of 
shrinking resources, sought to expand the utilization of women as a means for 
meeting overall military personnel requirements while resisting pressures to 
restore the peacetime draft. …they felt the necessity for a political mandate to 
ensure fair treatment and equity for women within the constraints of the law and 
the dictates of force readiness. 
The tradition-bound military leadership, on the other hand, mistrusted the 
motives of political appointees, especially in matters of military personnel policy.  
When it came to women, the military instinctively defended the status quo, and 
on numerous occasions even sought to reverse the trends.  The closer women 
got to the services’ primary mission elements, the stiffer the resistance of the 
generals and admirals (Holm 1992, p. 382). 
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Nonetheless, by 1990, as the result of Reagan-era military expansion and 
corresponding manpower policies, the ranks of women had swelled to their highest 
point in history.  223,000 women served on active duty, comprising 12 percent of the 
total active force.  Numbers by service follow:  Army – 83,200 (11.5%); Navy – 57,100 
(10%); Air Force – 73,580 (14%); and Marine Corps – 9,320 (5%).  Additionally, more 
than 151,000 women served in the National Guard and service-specific selected 
reserves, comprising 13 percent of the total reserve force.  Together the total number of 
women in uniform within the Department of Defense exceeded 374,100 (Holm 1992, p. 
397). 
Persian Gulf War  – Desert Shield/Desert Storm (1990-1991) 
• Between August 1990 and March 1991 nearly 41,000 women deployed to the 
Persian Gulf in support of Desert Shield/Desert Storm.  Fifteen of them were 
killed and two were taken prisoner of war (Manning 2013). 
Post-Persian Gulf War (1991-2001) 
1991 
• The Presidential Commission on the Assignment of Women in the Armed Forces 
was formed and convened (Manning 2013). 
• The Department of Defense issued “Strategies to Eradicate Sexual Harassment 
in the Military and Civilian Environment,” a memo signed by Secretary of Defense 
Dick Cheney, on July 12, 1991 directing each DoD component to implement a 
program underscoring zero tolerance for sexual harassment.  The memo detailed 
specific actions that were considered the minimum requirements of the program 
and directed component commanders to provide a written report of its 
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implementation plans to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force 
Management and Personnel within 30 days.39   
• The first direct challenge to the combat exclusion law came on May 8th, 1991 
when the House Armed Services Committee voted by voice vote to adopt an 
amendment to the 1992 defense authorization bill sponsored by Pat Schroeder 
(D-CO) and Beverly Byron (D-MD) that would allow women of the Air Force, 
Navy, and Marines to fly combat missions (Holm 1992, p. 475). 
• The Senate Armed Services Committee scheduled hearings on June 18th to 
address the entire range of issues related to women serving in combat, not just 
the issues raised by the House action related to flying combat missions.  All the 
service chiefs testified and were against any weakening of the combat exclusion 
laws (Holm 1992, p. 479).  None of the witnesses protested more vehemently 
than former Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Robert H. Barrow: 
Exposure to danger is not combat.  Being shot at, even being killed, is 
not combat.  Combat is finding…closing with…and killing or capturing 
the enemy.  It’s KILLING.  And it’s done in an environment that is often 
as difficult as you can possibly imagine.  Extremes of climate.  Brutality.  
Death.  Dying.  It’s …uncivilized! And WOMEN CAN’T DO IT!  Nor 
should they even be thought of as doing it.  The requirements of 
strength and endurance render them UNFIT to do it.  And I may be old-
fashioned, but I think the very nature of women disqualifies them from 
doing it.  Women give life.  Sustain life.  Nurture life.  They don’t TAKE it 
(Holm 1992, p. 483). 
• The Kennedy-Roth Amendment to the FY 1992-93 Defense Authorization Act 
repealed provisions of Title 10 USC 8549 banning women from serving aboard 
combat aircraft engaged in combat missions (Manning 2013). 
• The Navy withdrew sponsorship of The Tailhook Association after allegations of 
alcohol abuse, destruction of private property, and sexual assault at the 
association’s annual convention at the Las Vegas Hilton surfaced (Manning 
2013). 
                                            
 
39 A copy of this memo is available at: http://www.dtic.mil/dtfs/doc_research/p18_2.pdf; accessed Aug 24, 
2014. 
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1992 
• LT Paula Coughlin, dissatisfied with Navy’s handling of her official complaint of 
physical and sexual assault by fellow male Navy and Marine Corps aviators at 
the 1991 Tailhook Convention at the Las Vegas Hilton, goes public with her 
accusations on 60 Minutes.   
The resulting fallout was wide-ranging and many completely innocent male and 
female Naval Officers were adversely affected.40  The Navy Criminal Investigative 
Service bungled the investigation.  Many cases against accused officers were 
immediately dropped and those whose cases went to court were punished lightly.  The 
scandal eventually cost the Secretary of the Navy, H. Lawrence Garrett, III, and the 
Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Frank Kelso, both of whom were present at the 
convention, their jobs.  The entire Navy was ordered to undergo mandatory training 
aimed at preventing sexual harassment, and Navy women experienced a severe 
backlash from their male peers and seniors over the next several years.   It was a rather 
unhappy time for all.41   
During this period in which issues of women’s service and treatment in the Navy 
were routinely making headlines one might logically assume that the women of WOPA 
would mobilize to press the leadership for broader changes and greater accountability.  
That assumption would be wrong, however.  By 1992 the WOPA “footprint” had shrunk 
                                            
 
40 For example, officer promotions, which always involve pay increases, were delayed for many months 
for all officers, not just Naval Aviators or those officers physically present at Tailhook ‘91.  Delay of 
promotions took place several years in a row as each new cohort came in to the promotion window and 
promotion lists had to be scrubbed for potential Tailhook offenders.    
41 For a comprehensive history and analysis of Tailhook and its fallout, see Jean Zimmerman’s (1995) Tail 
Spin – Women at War in the Wake of Tailhook and the Department of Defense, Office of the Inspector 
General’s (1993) The Tailhook Report: The Official Inquiry Into the Events of Tailhook ‘91. 
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to the point where it still actively existed only in Washington, D.C. Throughout the 1990s 
and early 2000s despite multiple attempts to re-establish chapters across the fleet, none 
of these chapters could be sustained once the founding members transferred out of the 
region.42  The organization that had been effective in advocating for Navy women from 
inside the institution for more than a decade was withering on the vine.  Perhaps Navy 
women perceived most of the work surrounding equal opportunity for women had been 
done when women were admitted to service aboard combat ships and aircraft.  Perhaps 
women entering Naval service in the 1990s were more steeped in the beliefs of Rush 
Limbaugh than in those of the women’s movement.43  Most young women entering the 
Navy in the early 1990s were no more than ten years old in 1982.  Despite the open, 
venomous “culture wars” of the 1990s, the women’s movement had lost both 
momentum and its place in the national consciousness with the defeat of the ERA in 
1982.  However, as Rosemary Mariner, the Navy’s first woman commander of a jet 
squadron, reminded the LA Times “It’s very important for professional women to 
                                            
 
42 I was personally involved in a local initiative to get WOPA back up and active in the Norfolk, VA area in 
1996.  Efforts to reinvigorate WOPA in the region were still limping along when I left active duty in March 
1997.  I lost track of the initiative after leaving active duty but was not surprised to learn recently that 
efforts to resuscitate WOPA in the 1990s and 2000s had failed.  
43 Despite years on talk radio, Rush Limbaugh first catapulted to national celebrity during the 1992-1996 
run of his syndicated television program, which was very popular among male military personnel.  
Additionally, he published two New York Times best-selling books during the 1990s:  The Way Things 
Ought to Be (1992) and See, I told You So (1993).  He also coined the term “feminazi” which he has 
subsequently used to describe any woman who holds feminist ideals.  The American Forces Network 
(AFN) still carries the Rush Limbaugh radio show, despite a petition started in March 2012, on the White 
House’s “We the People” site, seeking to get it pulled from programming in the wake of Limbaugh’s 
despicable comments about Georgetown Law student Sandra Fluke.  Despite all the recent rhetoric from 
senior Defense Department officials on how valued women service members are, it is telling that DoD not 
only allows but defends the continuing significant presence of a misogynist on the radio network serving 
military personnel serving overseas (For the official DoD response to the petition “Sec. Panetta, Get Rush 
Limbaugh Off Armed Forces Radio NOW! No tax money for abusive, divisive, insulting language,” see: 
https://petitions.whitehouse.gov/response/rush-limbaugh-and-armed-forces-radio; accessed Aug 24, 
2014).  In marked contrast, the DoD would never grant a radio personality routinely espousing racist or 
white supremacist views air time on AFN.  
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acknowledge that a lot of things would not have changed if not for bra-burners” 
(Katzenstein 1998, p. 80).44 
1993 
• Secretary of Defense Les Aspin ordered all services to open combat aviation to 
women; directed the Navy to draft legislation to repeal the combat ship exclusion, 
Title 10 USC 6015;45 and directed the Army and Marine Corps to study opening 
more assignments to women (Manning 2013). 
• The Combat Exclusion Law was modified to allow women to serve on combat 
aircraft (by repeal of Title 10 USC 8549) and combatant ships (by repeal of Title 
10 USC 6015) by Congress through the FY-94 Defense Authorization Bill, Public 
Law 103-160, which President Clinton signed into law in November 30, 1993.46  
Section 654 also established DoD’s “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell (DADT)” policy, which 
prohibited homosexuals from serving openly in the U.S. military.47 
1994 
• Over 1,000 women participated in humanitarian military operations in Somalia 
between1992 and 1994. 
• Over 1,200 women deployed for peacekeeping duties in Haiti.  
• A Secretary of Defense memo of January 13, 1994 rescinded the 1988 DoD risk 
rule.   
                                            
 
44 As quoted from Zamichow, Nora.  1990. “For Her, Sky’s No Limit.” Los Angeles Times, 25 June: A3. 
45 In 1991 Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA) was a vocal opponent to the repeal of the combat exclusion law 
first championed by his great uncle, Carl Vinson, in 1948. 
46 For a more detailed discussion of the combat exclusion law and risk rule see:  
http://www.4militarywomen.org/Women_in_Combat.htm; accessed Aug 24, 2014 
47 For more details on Congressional action related to DADT, see:  
https://votesmart.org/bill/5455/15573/defense-fy94-authorization-bill#.UxqAls74Lks; accessed Aug 24, 
2014 and https://votesmart.org/bills/NA/1993/76#.VLCsqntkBQI; accessed Aug 24, 2014. 
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As a result, 32,700 Army positions and 48,000 Marine Corps positions were 
opened to women.  The memo, which remained in effect until January 2013 with only 
one modification, announced the following Ground Combat Rule:  “… women shall be 
excluded from assignment to units below the brigade level whose primary mission is to 
engage in direct combat on the ground.”  Additionally, the memo allowed (but did not 
require) the individual services to impose additional restrictions on the assignment of 
women for the following reasons: 
1. “where the Service Secretary attests that the costs of appropriate berthing 
and privacy arrangements are prohibitive.” 
2. “where units and positions are doctrinally  required to physically collocate 
and remain with direct ground combat units that remain closed to women.” 
(This clause was removed in May 2012)  
3. “where units are engaged in long range reconnaissance operations and 
Special Operations Forces missions.” 
4. “where job-related physical requirements  would necessarily  exclude the 
vast majority of women service members” (Manning 2013). 
 
• Through Public Law 103-446 Congress directed the Department of Veterans 
Affairs to establish the “Center for Women Veterans” (Manning 2013). 
1995 
• The Marine Corps selected the first woman for aviation training (Manning 2013). 
• The Department of Defense Task Force on Discrimination and Sexual 
Harassment is formed and convened (Manning 2013). 
• The Department of Defense conducted its second Sexual Harassment Survey 
(Manning 2013). 
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1997 
• Allegations of rape, sexual assault, and sexual harassment of junior enlisted 
women occurring at the Army’s Aberdeen Proving Grounds in Maryland were 
made public. 
Following investigation several male drill sergeants were convicted of rape or 
sexual harassment at courts-martial. In response to the problems found at Aberdeen, 
the Army convened a Senior Review Panel to examine the problems of sexual 
harassment and sexual assault throughout the Army.  Also as a result of the incidents at 
Aberdeen, the Secretary of Defense appointed the Federal Advisory Committee on 
Gender-Integrated Training and Related Issues with former U.S. Senator Nancy 
Kassebaum-Baker as Chair.  The committee issued its report in December (Manning 
2013). 
• The Army’s top enlisted man, the Sergeant Major of the Army (SMA), Gene C. 
McKinney, was accused of and charged with sexual harassment (Manning 2013). 
1998 
• Operation Desert Fox (enforcement of the no-fly zone in Iraq) began.  US women 
aviators flew and crewed combat aircraft on combat missions for the first time 
(Manning 2013). 
• The 10th Sergeant Major of the Army, Gene C. McKinney, was court-martialed on 
five charges resulting from the accusations of sexual harassment lodged against 
him.  He was acquitted of all charges of sexual harassment but convicted on one 
charge of obstruction of justice (Manning 2013). 
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• In response to the situation at Aberdeen, Congress ordered its own commission, 
the Congressional Commission on Military Training and Gender-Related Issues, 
to review matters (Manning 2013). 
1999 
• The Navy opened Coastal Mine Hunters and Mine Counter Measures ships to 
women (Manning 2013). 
• Women aviators participated in combat operations during the air war in Kosovo 
(Manning 2013). 
• Congress released the “Report of the Congressional Commission on Military 
Training and Gender-Related Issues” (Manning 2013). 
• Commander Michelle Howard became the first African American woman to 
command a U.S. Navy ship when she assumed command of USS MOUNT 
RUSHMORE on March 12th.48   
2000 
• Al Qaeda fired its first salvo against a U.S. military target in a terrorist bombing 
attack on the destroyer USS COLE in Yemin’s Aden Harbor.  Two women Sailors 
were killed and several wounded in the bombing.  Chief Engineer Lt. Commander 
Deborah Courtney was given the lion’s share of the credit for making strategic 
decisions related to and leading her crew in executing the damage control 
necessary to keep the ship afloat in the face of catastrophic damage at the 
waterline (Thomas, 2001; Manning 2013). 
• Lieutenant General (3-star) Claudia J. Kennedy, the highest ranking woman in 
the Army, accused Major General (2-star) Larry Smith of sexual harassment after 
he was nominated to the position of Deputy Inspector General (IG) of the Army, a 
senior leadership position in the Army organization responsible for investigating 
                                            
 
48 For the Navy’s official announcement see: http://www.public.navy.mil/bupers-
npc/organization/bupers/WomensPolicy/Pages/HistoryFirsts.aspx; accessed Aug 24, 2014. 
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allegations of misconduct against senior officers, among them claims of sexual 
harassment.   
LtGen Kennedy alleged that in 1996 when they were both 2-stars, Smith sexually 
harassed her verbally and sexually assaulted her by forcefully kissing her.  She 
complained unofficially at the time but was moved to formalize her complaint in 2000 
when he was nominated to the IG position (Myers 2000).  Upon investigation, the Army 
upheld the charges against Smith, withdrew his nomination to Deputy IG of the Army, 
and issued him a Letter of Reprimand, thereby terminating his eligibility for further 
promotion (Marquis 2000a).  Christopher Marquis reported in The New York Times on 
July 8, 2000 (Marquis 2000b) that the Army had no plans to punish Smith further for his 
misconduct by reducing his rank or retirement benefits through a Grade Determination 
Review Board.  
• Nine years after suspending ties with the Tailhook Association over the events at 
the 1991 Tailhook Convention in Las Vegas, the Navy officially renewed ties with 
the organization (Manning 2013). 
Post-9-11 to the Present 
2001 
• Six women service members were among those killed during the September 11th 
attack on the Pentagon. 
• Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) began.  Military women deployed  to the 
Afghan theater as part of Combined Forces Command – Afghanistan.  As of 
January 6, 2014, 49 US servicewomen had died while serving in Afghanistan 
(Fischer 2014, p. 8). 
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2002 
• Under President George W. Bush the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) 
allowed the existing DACOWITS charter to expire.  OSD subsequently issued a 
new charter, reducing the number of committee members by more than half and 
modifying the committee’s missions.  Among the changes instituted was the 
addition of “family matters” to the list of issues within the purview of DACOWITS 
(Manning 2013). 
• The FY 2003 Defense Authorization Act forbade military commanders from 
requiring (or strongly suggesting) the wearing of the abaya by military women 
serving in Saudi Arabia.  This legislation was the direct result of the lawsuit then-
Major Martha McSally filed against the Air Force which was supported by an 
unlikely coalition of liberal feminists and conservative Republicans (Twohey 
2002; Vojdik 2002b).  The circumstances which resulted in the lawsuit were 
briefly described in Chapter 1. 
2003 
• The Air Force convened investigations into allegations of sexual assault of 
women cadets and retaliation against the women cadets who reported being 
assaulted at the U.S. Air Force Academy (Manning 2013). 
• A working group chaired by the General Counsel of the Air Force, the Honorable 
Mary Walker, issued its findings in “The Report of the Working Group Committee 
Concerning Deterrence and Response to Incidents of Sexual Assault at the U.S. 
Air Force Academy” (Manning 2013). 
• Through Title V of the Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act, 
2003 (Public Law 108–11; 117 Stat. 609 Sec 501) the House Armed Services 
Committee (HASC) and the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) direct 
the Secretary of Defense to appoint an independent panel of civilians to 
investigate sexual misconduct allegations at the U.S. Air Force Academy.  The 
committee, chaired by a former congresswoman from Florida who had served as 
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the only woman on the HASC during her time in Congress, the Honorable Tillie 
Fowler, issued a stinging critique of the handling of sexual assault charges at the 
USAF Academy.  In response to the “Report of the Panel to Review Sexual 
Misconduct Allegations at the US Air Force Academy” both the HASC and SASC 
hold hearings on the matter (Manning 2013).49  
• Congress, through Public Law 108–136, the 2004 Defense Authorization Act, 
section 526, directed the Secretary of Defense to establish a Department of 
Defense Task Force to examine matters relating to sexual harassment and 
violence at the United States Military Academy and the United States Naval 
Academy.  Congress further directed that simultaneously with the submission of 
the reports required under subsection (d)(3), the Secretary of Defense, in 
coordination with the Secretary of the Air Force, submit the Secretary’s 
assessment of the effectiveness of corrective actions taken at the United States 
Air Force Academy as a result of the various investigations the DoD Inspector 
General (IG) conducted at that Academy into matters involving sexual assault 
and harassment.50 
• Also through Public Law 108–136, the 2004 Defense Authorization Act, section 
527, Congress directed each of the services to prescribe a policy on sexual 
harassment and violence applicable to the personnel of each of the services 
respective service academies not later than June 1, 2004.  Congress further 
directed each of the services to conduct an annual assessment during each 
academy program year to determine the effectiveness of the academy’s policies, 
training, and procedures to prevent criminal sexual harassment and violence 
involving academy personnel.51 
                                            
 
49 For exact details on the requirements of this act see: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-
108publ11/html/PLAW-108publ11.htm; accessed Aug 24, 2014. 
50 For exact details on the requirements of this act see: 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-108publ136/pdf/PLAW-108publ136.pdf#page=1&zoom=auto,0,792; 
accessed Aug 24, 2014. 
51 For exact details on the requirements of this act see: 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-108publ136/pdf/PLAW-108publ136.pdf#page=1&zoom=auto,0,792; 
accessed Aug 24, 2014. 
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2004 
• Lioness program52 operations began (Iskra 2010, pp. 64-65 and Manning 2013).  
• After reports of sexual assaults perpetrated by US servicemen against US 
servicewomen serving in Iraq became public, Congress holds hearings on the 
problem (Manning 2013). 
• Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfield directed the Under Secretary of Defense 
for Personnel and Readiness to review all sexual assault policies and programs 
among the services and to recommend the changes necessary to increase 
prevention, promote reporting, enhance the quality of support provided to victims, 
and provide increased accountability of sexual offenders (Manning 2013). 
• In response to Secretary Rumsfield’s tasking DoD formed an eight member Task 
Force chaired by Ellen P. Embrey, a former Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Reserve Affairs, which issued its “Task Force Report on Care for Victims of 
Sexual Assault” in April 2004 (Manning 2013). 
• The Department of Defense convened a “Care for Victims of Sexual Assault” 
Conference to address policy on five foundational issues: 
1. the definition of sexual assault; 
2. privacy and confidentiality matters;  
3. transparency; 
4. response capabilities – especially for deployed forces; and 
5. crimes committed by citizens of another country (Manning 2013). 
                                            
 
52 USMC ground combat units began employing Army women on missions to raid locations at which Iraqi 
women and children might be present when they realized the Iraqi women, with whom they are culturally 
prevented from engaging, needed to be searched for weapons and also might prove a source of valuable 
intelligence. This adhoc approach to solving the problem of engaging with the more than one half of the 
Iraqi population the US military combat forces (men) could not interact with due to cultural considerations 
became institutionalized as “the Lioness program” and women Marines and Sailors joined Army women in 
supporting both Marine Corps and Army combat units. Thus, the unique cultural circumstances first of 
Iraq and later of Afghanistan, societies in which men and women are largely kept separate, with the 
women confined to the private world, forced the military to rely on women in combat situations, which they 
would never have otherwise done willingly.  Lioness teams served a “female police” function among Iraqi 
women on military raids.  
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• The Department of Defense established the Joint Task Force on Sexual Assault 
Prevention and Response as the single point of accountability on policy matters 
within DoD related to sexual assault (Manning 2013). 
• As directed by Congress in the 2004 Defense Authorization Bill, the Secretary of 
Defense established a Department of Defense Task Force on Sexual 
Harassment and Violence at the Military Service Academies (Manning 2013). 
• Through language in the FY 2005 Defense Authorization Bill, Congress ordered 
the Department of Defense to review the Uniform Code of Military Justice 
(UCMJ) and the Manual for Courts-Martial (MCM) and propose changes for 
addressing sexual offenses (Manning 2013). 
Also of note in 2004, the last WOPA president, John Dittmer, one of the few male 
General Unrestricted Line/Fleet Support Officers who remained in service for a career, 
was elected to office by a one-vote majority.53  The WOPA board collectively decided 
that the organization would benefit from a name change: enlisted personnel would not 
join because they assumed you had to be an officer to be a member; and men would 
not join because they assumed it was a feminist organization.  The board settled upon 
“Sea Service Leadership Association” (SSLA) as a more inclusive name.  The board 
also took all the legal steps needed to officially execute the name change through the 
Virginia State Corporation Commission (Dittmer 2014).  SSLA describes itself as a 
“national non-profit and non-political” organization dedicated to providing professional 
                                            
 
53 In the past, men who became Naval Officers of the line first had to enter one of the line communities 
(surface, submarines, aviation) and qualify as a warfighter.  The aviation and submarine communities 
were and remain harder to get into and, thus, were more prestigious than surface warfare (ships).  Men 
who failed out of the aviation training pipeline for whatever reason were called “fallen angels” and often 
found themselves involuntarily serving in the surface fleet.  Men who started out in surface warfare but 
failed out for whatever reason did not have many alternatives for remaining in service.  One of their few 
options was to become General Unrestricted Line Officers (GURLs, or later, after women officers pointed 
out how patronizing that acronym was, GenURLs), a community comprised almost exclusively of non-
warfare qualified women.  Most men who ended up in the GenURL community left military service rather 
than do “women’s jobs” and perpetually be thought of as “damaged goods” by their fellow officers.   
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development through networking, education, and mentorship of women from the three 
maritime services:  Navy, Marines, and Coast Guard.54 
2005 
• Public Law 109-163, the 2006 Defense Authorization Act section 541, mandated 
that prior to implementing any change in the ground combat exclusion policy [i.e., 
opening or closing any units and positions to women (as these stood either by 
DoD or individual service policies as of 01 October 1994) or to the opening or 
closing of any military career designator to women (as these stood on 18 May 
2005)], the Secretary of Defense was required to first submit a report to 
Congress providing notice of the proposed change thirty legislative working days 
prior to the effective date of the proposed change.  The notification report was 
required to include:  
1. A description of and justification for the proposed change 
2. A detailed analysis of the impact the proposed change was 
expected to have on the constitutionality of continuing to 
exclude women from the Military Selective Service Act 
(Manning 2013). 
• In January the Department of Defense announced changes to policy regarding 
sexual assault including: 
1. establishment of a department-wide definition of sexual 
assault; 
2. increased support for victims; 
3. establishment of training standards for service members and 
responders; and 
4. establishment of a departmental commitment to develop policy 
to provide for confidential reporting of sexual assaults 
(Manning 2013). 
                                            
 
54 For more information on SSLA please see:  www.sealeader.org; accessed August 24, 2014. 
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• The first “Report on the Service Academy Sexual Assault and Leadership 
Survey” covering academic year 2004 was released.  262 of 1,906 women 
participants reported 302 incidents of sexual assault.  54 of 3,107 male 
participants report 55 sexual assault incidents (Manning 2013).55   
• The Department of Defense established procedures for providing confidentiality 
to victims of sexual assault (Manning 2013). 
• The Task Force on Sexual Assault Prevention and Response transitioned into 
the permanent Sexual Assault and Prevention Response Office within the Office 
of the Secretary of Defense (Manning 2013).  
• The Sea Service Leadership Association, WOPA’s successor organization, was 
officially established via the Virginia State Corporation Commission (Dittmer 
2014). 
2007 
• RAND issued the report Assessing the Assignment Policy for Army Women,56 
which analyzed the Army’s assignment policy for its women serving in Iraq and 
made recommendations for change (Manning 2013). 
• Congress updated UCMJ Article 120, effective 01 October 2007.  Article 120 
previously addressed incidents of “Rape and Carnal Knowledge.”  As amended, 
Article 120 addresses incidents of “Rape, Sexual Assault, and Sexual 
Misconduct.”  Thirty-five separate offenses were included in the updated version 
(Manning 2013). 
2008 
• Ann E. Dunwoody, U.S. Army, was the first woman nominated and confirmed to 
the rank of four-star General (Manning 2013). 
                                            
 
55 See the actual report at: http://www.sapr.mil/public/docs/research/High_GPO_RRC_tx.pdf; accessed 
Aug 24, 2014. 
56 Original available at:  http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2007/RAND_MG590-
1.pdf; accessed Aug 24, 2014.  
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2009 
• Task Force Leatherneck in Afghanistan established the Female Engagement 
Team (FET) Program.   
The principle mission of the FETs was to interact with rural Afghan women in 
their homes or elsewhere.  FET members, all of whom were women, were “attached” to 
small infantry units operating in the field in conformance with policy restrictions 
preventing women from being “assigned” to combat forces.57  Although the Female 
Engagement Team concept started with the Marines in Afghanistan, the Army quickly 
adopted this approach to Afghan women as well.  FET differed from its forerunner, the 
Lioness program, in that FET did more than perform “police” functions among women 
on house raids.  FET teams proactively engaged Afghan women to identify 
development opportunities that would support village stability operations.  
• The Task Force on Sexual Assault in the Military Service issued its report in 
December.  It makes numerous recommendations for changes in the way Sexual 
Assault cases are handled within the military (Manning 2013).58 
Also in 2009, Vice Admiral Harvey, then Chief of Navy Personnel and Director of 
Navy Staff (OPNAV), engaged with the Sea Service Leadership Association Board and 
the Navy Office of Women’s Policy to formalize a relationship between SSLA and the 
                                            
 
57 The linguistic gymnastics of “attaching” rather than “assigning” Female Engagement teams to combat 
units creatively circumvents the law but does nothing to physically protect the women Marines, proving 
that if women are actually needed in or near combat to accomplish the mission, the military is not 
squeamish about employing them in that capacity, despite all past stands and protests to the contrary.   
58 Original report available at:  http://www.ncdsv.org/images/SAPR_DTFSAMS_Report_Dec_2009.pdf; 
accessed Aug 24, 2014 and the associated annex at:   
http://www.sapr.mil/public/docs/research/DTFSAMS-Rept-Annex_Dec09.pdf; accessed Aug 24, 2014. 
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Navy similar to those the Navy already had with the National Naval Officer’s Association 
(NNOA), a predominantly African American professional association, and Association of 
Naval Services Officers (ANSO), a predominantly Hispanic professional association.  
NNOA and ANSO actively support the sea services (Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast 
Guard) in recruiting, retaining, and developing the careers of minority officers. As 
explained by LCDR John Dittmer, U.S. Navy (ret) and first president of SSLA and 
current SSLA Vice President for Administration “essentially, we became a [Navy] 
contractor for the purposes of hosting the Joint Women’s Leadership Symposium 
(JWLS), which traces its lineage back to the WOPA Women’s Leadership Symposiums, 
along with other events.”59  According to its website, SSLA is also a member of the 
Navy and Marine Corps Council which advises the Secretary of the Navy on issues 
affecting Navy and Marine Corps personnel and their families.  
He went on to explain that SSLA now works with all the services to plan and host 
the annual JWLS at which they routinely attract an audience of about 800, with some 
attendees coming from abroad, from nations such as Norway, Australia, Great Britain, 
and India, for the two-day event.  While the first day generally offers a variety of panels 
addressing general concerns of military women, on the second day each of the U. S. 
military branches presents a “service-specific” program that is essentially focused on 
professional development and education.60  He acknowledged that while SSLA currently 
has active chapters at the U.S. Naval Academy; Naval Air Station, Jacksonville, FL; 
                                            
 
59 Information provided in e-mail correspondence between John Dittmer and author on March 26, 2014. 
60 The SSLA website identifies the following corporations and organizations as providing support in 
executing the annual JWLS:  Navy Federal Credit Union, United Services Automobile Association 
(USAA), the Fleet Reserve Association, Military Officer’s Association of America, the Surface Navy 
Association; the Navy League; National Association for Uniformed Services; Huntington-Ingalls 
Industries; American Military University; and Trident University International. 
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U.S. Coast Guard Sector, Key West; Millington, TN; Monterey, CA; and Washington, 
D.C., chapters in both Norfolk and San Diego had folded.  As of April 10, 2014 
according to the SSLA website, dues-paying members totaled 228, despite the relatively 
large numbers of officer and enlisted women in the sea services.   
2010 
• After notifying Congress as required by law: 
o the Navy opened service aboard its Fleet Ballistic Missile Submarines 
(SSBN) and Guided-Missile Attack Submarines (SSGN) to women 
officers.  Attack submarines (SSN) remain closed to women due to privacy 
considerations resulting from space limitations aboard this smaller class of 
submarine (Manning 2013); and  
o the Marine Corps opened two more military occupational specialties 
(MOSs) to women: Counter Intelligence and Human Source Intelligence 
Operations Officer (0210) and Specialist - Enlisted (1211) (Manning 2013) 
• The Secretary of Defense issued a newly-revised DACOWITS charter, thereby 
reversing some of the changes made under the George W. Bush administration.  
Among other things, the new charter re-established military women as the sole 
focus of the DACOWITS and expanded the number of members allowed to be 
appointed to thirty-five (Manning 2013). 
• The Caregivers and Veterans Omnibus Health Services Act of 2010 passed.  
Title II of the legislation was aimed at improving the Department of Veterans 
Affairs’ ability to meet the physical and mental health needs of women veterans 
(Manning 2013). 
• Operation Iraqi Freedom officially ended with the cessation of combat operations 
on 30 August 2010 and was replaced by Operation New Dawn on 1 September 
2010 (Manning 2013). 
• The Department of Defense Annual Report on Sexual Assault in the Military for 
FY-2009 was released in March (Manning 2013) 
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• Legislation repealing the “Don’t Ask; Don’t Tell” provision that barred gay, 
lesbian, and bi-sexual personnel from serving openly in the U.S. military was 
signed into law on 22 December 2010 (Manning 2013). 
The repeal of DADT was driven by a variety of factors.  These included changing 
attitudes about and increasing acceptance of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender 
(LGBT) people, both within larger society and among many younger military members; 
and the growing absurdity of claiming the discharge of LGB61 service members was 
necessary to maintain national security.  The absurdity of that claim reached new 
heights when it was revealed in May 2007 that the military had discharged more than 58 
linguists skilled in Dari and Pashto (Afghanistan) and Arabic (Iraq), already in short-
supply, simply because they were homosexual (Baldor 2007).62    
2011 
• February 15, 2011 fifteen women and two men file suit in U.S. district court for 
Eastern Virginia against current and former Secretaries of Defense Robert Gates 
and Donald Rumsfeld for violating their Constitutional rights in that the 
defendants failed to prevent plaintiffs and others from being raped and sexually 
assaulted. More specifically, the suit alleged that Secretaries of Defense Gates 
and Rumsfeld failed to: investigate rapes and sexual assaults; prosecute 
perpetrators; provide an adequate judicial system as required by the UCMJ: and 
abide by Congressional deadlines to implement Congressionally-ordered 
                                            
 
61 As of August 2014, transgender men and women were still barred from military service on the basis of 
their unique medical needs. 
62 For a complete explication of how the repeal of DADT was orchestrated and achieved, see Aaron 
Belkin’s How We Won: Progressive Lessons from the Repeal of ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell (Amazon Kindle) 
September 20, 2011.  
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institutional reforms to stop rapes and other sexual assaults.  The case is known 
as Cioca, et al. v. Rumsfeld (Maze 2011).63 
• The Department of Defense Annual Report on Sexual Assault in the Military for 
FY-2010 was released in March.   
Despite efforts to reduce the incidence of sexual assault in the ranks, the 
numbers showed that instances of rape and sexual assault had not decreased.  
According to the report, there were 3,158 total reports of sexual assault in the military in 
FY 2010.  The DoD estimated that this number represents only 13.5% of total assaults 
in that year.  By DoD’s own estimation the total number of military rapes and sexual 
assaults exceeded 19,000 for the period. 64 
• 20 September  - Gay and lesbian personnel began serving openly in the military 
(Manning 2013). 
• The Army established all-female Combat Support Teams (CSTs) to support 
Special Forces and Ranger teams in Afghanistan.  FET teams were the likely 
inspiration for the Army Special Forces CSTs. (Manning 2013).65 
• December 9 – U.S. District Court Judge Liam O'Grady ordered dismissal of 
Cioca et al v Rumsfeld, the case filed against then-serving Secretary of Defense 
Gates and former Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld which alleged that as leaders 
of the Defense Department they bore responsibility for rape and sexual assault in 
the ranks by fostering a climate where violence against women was tolerated by 
“failing to investigate the sex crimes, failing to prosecute the perpetrators; and 
                                            
 
63 See original complaint at:  http://mssparky.com/documents/Complaint-111-cv-00151-LO-TCB.pdf; 
accessed Aug 24, 2014 
64 Original report available in its entirety at: 
http://www.sapr.mil/public/docs/reports/DoD_Fiscal_Year_2010_Annual_Report_on_Sexual_Assault_in_t
he_Military.pdf; accessed August 24, 2014.  For a summary of this 622 page report see: 
http://servicewomen.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/SAPRO-2011.pdf; accessed Aug 24, 2014; 
accessed August 24, 2014.   
65 For further information on U. S. military women working with U. S. Special Forces see:  
http://kitup.military.com/2011/06/first-women-deployed-on-spec-ops-teams.html#idc-container; accessed 
Aug 24, 2014.  
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maintaining a weak judicial system” (Maze 2011and Kime 2011).66  Quoting the 
U.S. Supreme Court decision in the case Gilligan v. Morgan, decided in 1973, 
O'Grady wrote "matters of military discipline should be left to the ‘political 
branches directly responsible — as the judicial branch is not — to the electoral 
process’…Not even the egregious allegations within the plaintiff's complaint will 
prevent dismissal" (Kime 2011). 
2012 
• In January, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta announced four initiatives to help 
sexual assault victims and to strengthen prosecutions:  creation of a DoD-wide 
victims’ advocate certification program; expansion of aid to sexual assault victims 
who are spouses or adult dependents of military members;  ensuring that DoD 
civilian employees stationed abroad and DoD contractors in combat areas who 
are sexual assault victims receive emergency care as well as the aid of both a 
victim response coordinator and a victim advocate; and increasing training funds 
for investigators and JAG officers by $9.3 million dollars over five years. 
• February – The Office of Secretary of Defense notified Congress of its intent to 
abolish the collocation clause of the 1994 Memorandum delineating units and 
occupations closed to women (Manning 2013). 
• February – The Office of Secretary of Defense notified Congress of its intent to 
make an exception to the provision of the 1994 Memorandum delineating 
occupations and units closed to women that will allow women to be assigned to 
some battalion-level ground combat unit staffs (Manning 2013). 
• February – DoD Annual Report on Sexual Assault was released, reflecting a 1% 
increase in sexual assaults over the previous year.  Secretary of Defense, Leon 
Panetta, admitted the DoD presumed their own statistics were far too low and 
that rather than 3,191 officially reported sexual assaults, conservative estimates 
placed the number more accurately at approximately 19,000 (Parrish 2012). 
                                            
 
66See also original complaint available at: http://mssparky.com/documents/Complaint-111-cv-00151-LO-
TCB.pdf; accessed Aug 24, 2014.  
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Perhaps even more damaging than the sexual assaults themselves was the 
military’s systematicly poor handling and inadequate response to reported sexual 
assaults.  The military justice system frequently re-victimized sexual assault 
victims, with retaliation against victims, blaming of victims, and counter-charges 
against victims widespread.  Victims of sexual assault were frequently drummed 
out of the service while their attackers were subject to little, if any, punishment 
and were retained in the service (Gould 2011).  
• February – the Defense Department finally submitted its “Report To Congress On 
the Review of Laws, Policies and Regulations Restricting the Service of Female 
Members In The U.S. Armed Forces” (Office of Under Secretary of Defense, 
Personnel and Readiness 2012).67   
Originally due in April 2011 with a Congressional sanctioned extension to 
October 2011, the report essentially concluded that recent experience on the 
asymmetric battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan had negated the notion of a “front line,” 
behind which women can be kept safe.  According to DoD data at the time 144 women 
had been killed in action and 865 injured since the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. 
The report also made clear that old policies excluding women from proximity to combat 
had become irrelevant.  These real-world changes led the DoD to pursue new initiatives 
to open further units and positions to women (Shane 2012 and Sanborn 2012). 
• April 2012 – Secretary of Defense Panetta announced sweeping new rules to 
address the problem of sexual assault in the military:  
o Disposition of all reports of sexual assault must now be handled by at 
least a Colonel or Navy Captain (O-6). 
                                            
 
67 Original report available at: http://www.defense.gov/news/WISR_Report_to_Congress.pdf; accessed 
August 24, 2014.  
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o The Pentagon will establish units within each service with special training 
in gathering evidence and questioning complainants of sexual assault. 
o National Guard members and Reservists who file complaints of sexual 
assault will be allowed to remain on active duty until the completion of the 
investigation into the charges to ensure that complaints are not dropped. 
o New recruits will be briefed on sexual assault policies within 14 days of 
entering the service (Manning 2013). 
• April 2012 – The Marine Corps announced its intention to explore lifting 
restrictions on women in combat (Sanborn 2012).   
Toward that end the Infantry Officer’s Course began enrolling women officers on 
a volunteer basis as part of an experiment.  Additionally, new functional fitness tests 
began being developed to help Marine Corps leaders determine how women and men 
perform in, and cope with, various combat tasks. The goal was to establish “gender-
neutral” physical fitness standards. The Marine Corps defines gender-neutral physical 
standards as being identical for men and women, rather than weighted — or “gender-
normed” — like those applied in the service’s annual Physical Fitness Test (PFT) in 
which women can earn a maximum score with fewer situps and a slower run time than 
their male counterparts.  Furthermore, on the PFT women Marines perform a timed, 
flexed-arm hang to test upper body strength while men Marines must do pull-ups.  This 
indicates that women wanting to serve in ground combat units will be allowed to do so 
only if they can keep pace with their male counterparts. Standards would likely evaluate 
Marines not as women and men, but simply as infantrymen, tank crewmen, or 
artillerymen, for example, on the basis of strength and stamina required to perform 
actual physical activities associated with the position (Sanborn 2012). 
 
 
 
 
168 
• 8 May – Dissatisfied with progress made in reducing sexual assault in the 
military, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Commandant of the Coast Guard issued 
“Strategic Direction to the Joint Force on Sexual Assault Prevention and 
Response,” mandatory reading for all commanders and leaders (Garamone 
2012; Manning 2013; and Dempsey, et al., 2012).68 
• 14 May 2012 – 30 Congressional working days after OSD notified Congress of its 
intentions, the collocation clause was abolished, opening over 13,000 positions 
and six additional Military Occupations Specialties (MOSs) to Army women 
including: 
1. 13M Multi-Launch Rocket System (MLRS)/High-Mobility Artillery Rocket 
System (HIMARS) Crew;  
2. 13P MLRS Operations; 
3. Specialist, 13R Radar Specialist; 
4. 91A M1 Abrams Tank System Repairer; 
5. 91M Bradley Fighting Vehicle System Maintainer; and 
6. 91P Artillery Mechanic (Manning 2013) 
• 14 May 2012 – 30 Congressional working days after OSD notified Congress of its 
intentions to allow women to be assigned to some battalion-level ground combat 
unit staffs an additional 1,186 positions were opened to women of the Army, 
Navy, and Marine Corps (Manning 2013).  As a result, women Marines are 
considered for about 400 positions within six types of battalions: Amphibious 
assault, Artillery, Combat assault, Combat engineer, Low-altitude air defense, 
and Tank (Sanborn 2012). 
• 22 May 2012 – Command Sergeant Major Jane Baldwin and Colonel Ellen 
Haring, both Army reservists, filed suit to end the U.S. military's restrictions on 
women in combat, claiming the policy violated their constitutional rights.  They 
claimed that policies barring them from assignments "solely on the basis of sex" 
violated their right to equal protection under the Fifth Amendment of the 
Constitution.  Although the Pentagon unveiled a new policy in February that 
                                            
 
68 This document can be viewed in its entirety at: 
http://www.sapr.mil/public/docs/directives/Strategic_Direction_on_SAPR.pdf; accessed August 24, 2014.  
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opened up 14,000 more positions to military women, it still barred them from 
serving in infantry, armor and special-operations units whose main job is front-
line combat.  A team from the University of Virginia Law School filed the suit, 
Baldwin et al. v. Panetta et al., on their behalf (Simpson 2012).   
• 22 June 2012 – The Invisible War, a documentary film written and directed by 
Kirby Dick and produced by Amy Ziering and Tanner King Barklow about sexual 
assault in the U.S. military, premiered (Scott 2012).   
This film got the attention of both military and Congressional leaders, leading to 
yet more congressional hearings, another round of changes to military procedures 
surrounding sexual assault allegations, and an ongoing struggle within Congress 
regarding exactly what changes to the military justice system should be legislated to 
adequately address military sexual assault.  Senator Kristin Gillibrand (D-NY) has been 
the major proponent of taking military justice out of the hands of military leaders in 
cases of sexual assault, while Senator Claire McCaskill (D-MO) has led the effort to 
keep justice in the hands of military leaders, only with more oversight (Steinhauer 
2013b).  
• 28 June 2012 – The Air Force investigated sexual assault charges against at 
least 28 instructors at Air Force Basic Training (i.e., boot camp) and follow-on 
Technical Training Schools at Joint Base San Antonio-Lackland, Texas. By 
December, five of these instructors had been convicted at courts-martial. 
Disposition of a number of other cases is pending. More than 54 women, all 
newly enlisted in the Air Force, were the targets of these instructors. The 
Commander of Basic Training, an Air Force Colonel, was relieved of his 
command (Manning 2013). 
• August – As part of the troop drawdown in Afghanistan the Marine Corps ended 
the use of FET teams as the Afghan Army took over more missions of the type in 
which FET Marines formerly had a role (Lamothe, 2012).  
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• October – Vice Admiral Michelle Howard became the first African American 
woman in the U.S. armed forces to reach the rank of a three-star officer (Bunch 
2012).  
• 27 November 2012 – Four women soldiers and the Service Women’s Action 
Network (SWAN), with the assistance of the American Civil Liberties Union, 
announced that they were suing the Department of Defense over its restrictions 
on women serving in front line warfare in Hegar, et al. v. Panetta.69 
• Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta ordered each service to perform a training 
review of policies and procedures at basic training commands to stamp out 
sexual assault. These reports were due in February 2013. 
• November – the Marines announce a change to the Physical Fitness Test for 
women.  During 2013 women Marines would still be tested for upper body 
strength using the Flexed Arm Hang, although they could choose to perform 
pullups instead.  As of 1 January 2014, women Marines would perform pullups as 
the test of upper body strength on the PFT (Wilcox 2012).70  
2013 
• 2 January – The Shaheen Amendment to the 2013 Defense Authorization Act 
became law, permitting servicewomen and military family members who become 
pregnant due to rape or incest to receive abortions through the military medical  
system (Manning 2013).  Prior to this amendment, military women who became  
pregnant due to rape had to obtain for an abortion through civilian medical  
facilities and pay for it themselves.   
• 24 January – The Pentagon announced it was notifying Congress of its intent to 
formally lift its ban on women serving in combat by rescinding the 1994 directive 
that barred women from being assigned to most ground combat units, thereby 
                                            
 
69 Original, amended, and other associated legal documents available at: https://www.aclu.org/womens-
rights/hegar-et-al-v-hagel; accessed August 24, 2014.  
70 Text of official Marine Corps message announcing changes available at:  
http://www.marines.mil/News/Messages/MessagesDisplay/tabid/13286/Article/134672/change-to-the-
physical-fitness-test.aspx; accessed August 24, 2014. 
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eliminating the last barrier to full integration of women into the US military.71  The 
new policy is planned to be phased in over three years with the expectation that it 
will be fully implemented by 1 January 2016. Each service will develop its own 
integration plan. Each service will also be able to apply for a special exemption if 
it is determined that certain occupations or units should be closed to women 
(Manning 2013). 
• 7 May – DoD Annual Report on Sexual Assault for FY-2012 was released.  
Based on a survey of nearly 26,000 active-duty men and women, the report 
reflected yet another increase in the number of sexual assaults on military 
personnel.  
Of those service members responding to the survey, 6.1 percent of women and 
1.2 percent of men said they had experienced sexual assault, which the survey defined 
as everything from rape to “unwanted sexual touching” of genitalia, breasts, buttocks or 
inner thighs, in the past year.  Using the percentages derived from the study, the 
Pentagon extrapolated that 12,100 of the 203,000 women on active duty and 13,90072 
of the 1.2 million men on active duty had experienced some form of sexual assault. By 
comparison, a similar Pentagon survey conducted in 2010 found that 4.4 percent of 
active-duty women and less than 0.9 percent of active-duty men had experienced 
sexual assault during that year (Steinhauer 2013a).  
• 17 May – As a result of a 35% increase in sexual assaults between 2010 and 
2012, Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel ordered that the records of recruiters 
and sexual assault counselors be scrutinized to ensure that those assigned to 
                                            
 
71 See the DoD press release announcing this change in its entirety at: 
http://www.defense.gov/Releases/Release.aspx?ReleaseID=15784 
72 Because of their much higher numbers, even though a smaller percentage of male service members 
experience sexual assault, in real numbers more military men than women experience sexual assault 
each year.  
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such positions of “special trust” be of the highest integrity and behavioral 
standards.   
• 23 July – A three-judge panel of the 4th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals 
unanimously affirmed a lower court's  December 9, 2011 ruling dismissing the 
case of Cioca et al v Rumsfeld (Associated Press 2013). 
• 3 August – As the result of the rescreening of sexual assault counselors, 
recruiters, and drill instructors ordered by SECDEF Hagel, the Army had fired 55 
soldiers to date but the review was ongoing and the Navy fired 3 recruiters, 2 
counselors, and no drill instructors.  The Air Force and Marines reported that 
none of their personnel had been disqualified (Vanden Brook 2013). 
• October – Despite DoD rescinding the 1994 ground combat exclusion, in actual 
practice the services continue to exclude women from applying for or serving in 
many thousands of combat positions solely on the basis of their sex. 
Furthermore, the DoD’s statements on the matter “leave open the possibility that 
some of the closed positions and career fields could remain closed to women 
indefinitely” (ACLU 2014).73 Thus, an amended complaint was filed in the case of 
Hegar et al. v. Hegal (formerly Panetta).  The amended complaint called for the 
federal court to declare the DoD's policies and practices of excluding women 
from combat arms positions and schools unconstitutional and to require the DoD 
to allow qualified servicewomen to be considered for all such positions according 
to their individual merit (ACLU 2014). 
• November – The Veteran’s Legal Services Clinic of Yale Law School published a 
report on discrimination within the Veteran’s Administration against survivors of 
military sexual trauma.  Findings of particular note included:   
o In every year from 2008 and 2012 the VA granted disability benefit claims for 
PTSD related to MST at a significantly lower rate than claims for PTSD unrelated 
to MST.  
o The grant rate for MST-related PTSD claims lagged behind the grant rate for 
other PTSD claims by between 16.5 and 29.6 percentage points every year.  
                                            
 
73 See: https://www.aclu.org/womens-rights/hegar-et-al-v-hagel; accessed August 24, 2014. 
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o For every year between 2008 and 2011, a gap of nearly ten percentage points 
separated the overall grant rate for PTSD claims brought by women and those 
brought by men.   
o Among those who file MST-related PTSD claims, male veterans face particularly 
low grant rates when compared to female veterans who file MST-related PTSD 
claims (Veterans Legal Services Clinic, Yale Law School 2013).74 
• December – the Pentagon filed a motion asking the Court to dismiss Hegar et al. 
v. Hagel, and subsequently asked the Court to limit discovery (ACLU 2014).  
• 20 December – Vice Admiral Michelle Howard, nominated for her fourth star, was 
confirmed by Senate to serve as Vice Chief of Naval Operations, the number two 
position in the Navy.  She is the Navy’s first women 4-star admiral and she is 
also African American (Fellman 2013 and 2014).  
• 26 December – The President signed the FY14 National Defense Authorization 
Act (NDAA) into law.  The FY14 NDAA made significant changes to the services’ 
sexual assault prevention and response programs, the military justice system, and to 
related programs but did not go so far as to remove military justice from the control 
of military commanders in cases of sexual assault.  Some of these changes include: 
o elimination of a 5 year statute of limitations for certain sex-related crimes; 
o limitation of a commander’s authority to grant clemency; 
o establishment of mandatory minimum sentences for conviction by court-
martial of a sex-related crime;  
o requires the mandatory discharge from the armed forces of any member 
convicted of certain sexual assault offenses; 
o provides that people convicted of certain sexual assault offenses may not 
join the armed forces; 
o requires a commanding officer who receives a report of a sexual offense 
involving a member of the armed forces in that officer’s chain of 
command to refer the matter to the appropriate investigation service; 
o establishes the right of a complaining witness to be heard in the 
clemency phase of the proceedings;  
o prohibition of a commander’s consideration of the “character and military 
service” of the accused in deciding whether to prosecute an alleged 
offense;  
o appointment of a Special Victims’ Counsel to provide victims of alleged 
sex-related offenses with independent legal representation, drawn from 
outside the military services;  
                                            
 
74 Complete original report available at: https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/lib13-mst-report-
11062013.pdf; accessed August 24, 2014. 
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o directs the Secretary to promulgate regulations prohibiting retaliation 
against an alleged victim of a crime who reports a criminal offense, 
where retaliation is defined as, among other things, taking or threatening 
to take adverse personnel action or failing to take or threatening not to 
take a favorable personnel action; and 
o requires the review by certain authorities of decisions not to refer cases 
of certain alleged sexual assaults for trial by court martial (Towell and 
Belasco 2014, p. 36; Military Justice Branch, HQMC 2014; and Senate 
Republican Policy Committee 2013). 
2014 
• 24 January – The Marine Corps announces a delay in changing the test of 
women’s upper body strength on the PFT from the flexed arm hang to the pull up 
until June 1, 2014 (Commandant of the Marine Corps 2014 and Sanborn 2014).  
The announcement encourages women Marines to continue training for what 
appears to be the inevitable replacement of the flexed arm hang with the pull up 
(Sanborn 2014).  The conservative press had a field day with the announcement, 
citing it as proof that if women are too wimpy to do three pull ups, they are 
probably too wimpy for ground combat (Agence France Presse 2014). 
• 5 February – The ACLU continues its opposition to the Pentagon’s motion to 
dismiss and to limit discovery in Hegar et al. v. Hegal (ACLU 2014). 
• 19 February – According to the Congressional Research Service, deaths of U.S. 
service members in Iraq and Afghanistan from October 7, 2001 through January 
6, 2014 totaled 6775, with 159 of these casualties being women (Fischer 2014, p. 
8).   
• 26 February – The Pentagon announced that approximately 5,400 instances of 
sexual assault or “unwanted sexual contact” were reported within the U.S. 
military in fiscal year 2013, a 60 percent rise from 2012.  Defense officials claim 
the real rise is in these crimes being reported which they argue reflects more 
trust in the military justice system.  They do not attribute this significant increase 
in reports to an actual increase in sexual assaults (Carroll 2014b).  
• 26 February – After completing review of all recruiters, drill instructors, and 
sexual assault counselors as ordered by SECDEF Hagel in May 2013, the Army 
announced that it had fired an additional 533 soldiers, for a total of 588 soldiers 
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disqualified from these positions.  The Army was taking action to discharge 79 of 
these soldiers (Vanden Brook 2014). 
• 6 March – Senator Kirsten Gillibrand’s (D-NY) bi-partisan, but controversial, bill to 
remove military commanders from decisions over the prosecution of sexual 
assault cases in the armed forces failed to advance to the floor for a yes-or-no 
vote when it received only 55 of the 60 votes needed to do so.  Ironically, another 
democratic woman, Senator Claire McCaskill (D-MO), led the charge to block its 
advancement. After blocking Senator Gillibrand’s bill, the Senate agreed, 100-0, 
to move ahead with a measure sponsored by Senators McCaskill, Kelly Ayotte 
(R-NH), and Deb Fischer (R-NE). That legislation calls for a civilian review if a 
prosecutor and a commander disagree over whether to litigate a sexual assault 
case. A vote on that bill is scheduled for mid-March (Cooper 2014a). 
• 10 March:  The judge in the case of Army Brigadier General Jeffrey Sinclair, who 
is believed to be the highest ranking U.S. military officer ever court-martialed on 
sexual assault charges, dismissed the jury amid evidence that the case had 
proceeded to court-martial, more for political reasons than in pursuit of justice, 
despite potentially fatal flaws with the case.  E-mail had emerged that suggested 
Pentagon influence in the legal process.  The case ultimately fell apart due to 
“undue command influence”75 and the credibility issues of his chief accuser 
(Cooper 2014b; Hlad 2014; and Zucchino 2014a).76 
• 12 March:   The Commandant of the Marine Corps sent his force integration plan 
to top Marine Corps officers and enlisted leaders, revealing that more women 
would be assigned to previously-closed combat arms units but emphasizing he 
                                            
 
75 It is believed that in the current political climate, prosecutors pushed the case to trial despite evidentiary 
issues and a potential plea deal because the military General Court-Martial Authority (GCMA) refused to 
consider a plea deal and insisted the case go to court.  It seems the Army feared that if it accepted a plea 
deal, such an action might force Congress to move forward on removing sexual assault cases from the 
purview of the military chain of command, which the military has strenuously resisted.  Essentially, politics 
surrounding the larger problem of the possible perception that the Army was soft on sexual assault 
influenced the actions of the prosecutor in a way that was harmful to the legal process and the accused.   
76 His accuser was an Army captain who had entered into a consensual sexual relationship with the 
General three years earlier.  She had accused him of sexual assault and of physically threatening her and 
her family at some point in the consensual relationship.  In the course of their two year investigation, 
investigators had discovered that BG Sinclair had inappropriate relationships with two other women 
subordinates as well.  
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was prepared to seek exceptions to the 2013 Defense Department directive that 
opens all combat roles to women by Jan. 1, 2016.   As reported in the Marine 
Corps Times, which obtained a copy of the force integration plan, Gen. Jim Amos 
announced:  
My decision to integrate or recommend an (exception to policy) will be 
based on my foremost guiding principle: fielding a Marine Corps that is 
ready to fight and win on short notice, in the most difficult and uncertain 
circumstances… We will maintain our high standards while ensuring the 
maximum success for every Marine (Matishak 2014).  
At present, only 20 of the Marine Corps’ 335 military occupational specialties remain 
closed to women (Matishak 2014). 
• 17 March:  The judge in the case of Army Brigadier General Jeffrey Sinclair 
accepted a plea deal in the case, approved by the GCMA, Maj. Gen. Clarence 
K.K. Chinn, the senior commander at Fort Bragg (Zucchino 2014a).  
• 20 March:  Army Brigadier General (BG) Jeffrey Sinclair was sentenced to a 
reprimand and a $20,000 fine.  He was not reduced in rank nor was he 
sentenced to any jail time.  He will be forced to retire and during that process he 
will likely be administratively reduced in rank to Lieutenant Colonel.  The 
resultant loss in lifetime retirement pay is calculated to be approximately 
$800,000 (Zucchino 2014b).77  It remains to be seen how this case might 
ultimately effect Congressional action on the military justice system, especially as 
it relates to sexual assault crimes (Cooper 2014b).  
It is this organizational environment and political context in which military women 
serve today, even as the debate continues within the Department of Defense and the 
halls of Congress about what women can do and what they should be allowed to do.  In 
                                            
 
77 This punishment, while disheartening, is not inconsistent with a military justice system in which officers 
in general and very senior officers in particular typically receive much lighter sentences than enlisted 
members for similar crimes.  This frequently occurs, despite the fact that the system proclaims the crimes 
of officers to be more egregious than the crimes of enlisted personnel, due to officers’ filling leadership 
positions of “special trust and confidence” and allegedly being held to a “higher standard.”  
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the following chapter I will explore how Navy women have approached and adapted to 
hegemonic hyper-masculine military environment of the past, and how they are doing so 
today.   
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CHAPTER 3 
SURFACE NAVY WOMEN AND THE INDIVIDUAL  
PERFORMANCE OF GENDER 
This chapter focuses on the influence hegemonic masculinity has had on the 
ways in which women deploy gender performance in the Navy to fit in.  In it I will 
compare and contrast the experiences of Navy women from twenty years ago with 
those of today showing that while women, especially officers, are less likely to 
experience overt sexism in 2014, they still feel pressure to display both their femininity78 
and their competence as Naval Officers/Sailors.79  Enlisted women, especially those 
who are most junior, continue to routinely encounter sexism and gender discrimination, 
albeit often in a more subtle form than in the past.  I will also identify what has changed 
and what has remained the same over the past two decades.   
Doing Gender in the Military Context 
The issue of sex roles and gender is at the heart of every argument on the 
subject of women in the military, at least in the Western world.80  As Enloe (1988) points 
out, the military needs women, behaving as "the gender ‘women,’” acting in ways 
women are supposed to act, in order to provide men with the masculinity-reinforcing 
                                            
 
78 Femininity is considered indicative of heterosexuality – although admittedly less important since DADT 
was rescinded by the military on September 20, 2011. 
79 To be thought competent as warfighters, women frequently feel compelled to downplay characteristics 
associated with femininity and, therefore, “weakness.” 
80 It is important to note at the outset that this discussion of gender in the military reflects Western norms 
and is U.S.-centric.  Gender as performed in the U.S. military may not be applicable in other contexts, i.e. 
see Flame (1996) a feature film based on the accounts of women who participated in the Zimbabwean 
war of liberation as warriors. 
 
 
 
 
179 
incentives to endure the hardships of combat.  Furthermore, militarism presumes a 
concept of “masculinity” that only makes sense if supported by a complementary 
concept of “femininity.”  Each of the services have created and reinforced traditional 
gender ideology through policies and practices that construct Soldiers/Sailors/Marines 
as male and celebrate masculinity as their institutional identity (Vojdik, 2002a).  
Tensions surrounding expectations for gender behavior and sex roles are exacerbated 
in our present All-Volunteer Force.  Compared to the general population, men who self-
select into the military are relatively more socially conservative than the average man in 
the general population, whereas women who self-select into the military are relatively 
more socially liberal, ensuring the chasm between military men and women with respect 
to expected gender norms and sex roles is wider than that found in larger society 
(DeFleur, et al, 1985).   
Before sex-integrated boot camp was instituted in most of the services,81 the 
military openly and officially used misogynistic and homophobic methods to construct 
fraternal bonds among men in boot camp,82 resulting in a particularly unstable 
masculine identity, dependent upon the denigration of femininity and homoeroticism.  
Snyder (1999, 2003) calls this “armed masculinity.”  She contends that armed 
masculinity, which is a particularly precarious form of masculinity because it is always 
threatening to dissolve, results in a fear and hatred of all women and gay men and 
forces soldiers to strongly repress the “feminine” parts of themselves.  Because soldiers 
can never truly secure their “armed masculinity,” they must constantly engage in the 
                                            
 
81 Only the Marine Corps maintains sex-segregated boot camp. 
82 There are ready examples of these processes in pop culture media, including films such as An Officer 
and a Gentleman, Platoon, Full Metal Jacket, and G.I. Jane. 
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practices constitutive of it: they must constantly reestablish their masculinity by 
expressing opposition to femininity and homoeroticism in themselves and others.83  The 
now-politically incorrect misogynistic and homophobic methods are no longer officially 
used in boot camp, yet as an established part of military culture, they continue to be 
used unofficially and covertly in daily interactions among military personnel, making 
them particularly difficult to eradicate and ensuring continued gender policing in the 
ranks (Burke, 2004).  This does not, however, foreclose the possibility that military 
women are expressing some opposition of their own to the hegemony of masculinity, 
however subtle or perhaps even unintentional, in the process of “doing gender.” 
Women in the military have historically had to walk a gender tight-rope – they can 
be neither too feminine nor too masculine.  If they display or perform gender that is “too 
feminine” they risk being marginalized as unprofessional or as incompetent warriors.  If 
they display or perform gender, and by extension sexuality, that is too masculine, they 
risk being marginalized as “sexual suspects,” which many men are quick to conclude in 
the first place, based upon the assumption that any “true” woman would not want to do 
a “man’s” job.  Herbert (1998 and 2002) confirms earlier research by Margosian and 
Vendrzyk (1994) exploring how women in the military actively construct their gender to 
“fit in.”  Herbert (1998 and 2002) concludes that in the military context, gender is 
produced, as posited by West and Zimmerman (1987), at the level of interaction.  Her 
                                            
 
83 See, for example, Carie Little Hersh (2002).  Hersh, a lawyer pursuing her PhD in anthropology, 
conducted a study on the Navy’s “Crossing the Line” Ceremony (a ceremony traditionally conducted 
when a warship crosses the equator).  She was able to access ships’ deck logs and cruise books that 
described and pictured the events, respectively, and conduct informal interviews of “several officers and 
enlisted sailors” via her father, himself a service member in the Navy.  If she had approached the Navy in 
an official capacity as an anthropologist wanting to study a ritual ceremony with homosexual undertones it 
is not likely she would have been granted access to personnel or archival documents. 
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research focused on how the process of doing gender and compulsory heterosexuality 
in the military contribute to the subordination of women by men.   
In contrast, my current research explores whether Navy women have moved 
beyond striving to merely fit in to actively working to resist traditional gender norms.  Are 
Navy women, whether intentionally or subconsciously, actually beginning to subvert the 
gender order?  Might military women’s ever-increasing numbers; their expansion into 
career fields previously closed to them; and ascension to ranks and leaderships 
positions previously held only by men actually be helping to undermine military 
hegemonic masculinity and, by extension, the traditional gender order?  Gordon 
Allport’s contact hypothesis (1954, p. 281) suggests a critical mass of military women, 
especially those who have broken through the “brass ceiling” (Iskra 2007) into senior 
leadership positions, might at long last be loosening threads in the gender tapestry, 
ultimately enlarging the possibilities for what it means to be a woman. On the other 
hand, although women comprise a growing segment of the military population, they may 
still be fighting to overcome confirmation bias (Nickerson 1998) among some of their 
male colleagues who are either socially conservative or insecure in their own 
masculinity.  It is also possible that both these influences are occurring simultaneously 
and are in tension with one another.   
Military Hegemonic Masculinity 
As observed by Barrett (1996), the military is not only a gendered institution; it is 
also a gendering institution.   That is, it helps create gendered identities:  “Its structure, 
practices, values, rites, and rituals reflect accepted notions of masculinity and 
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femininity” (p. 141).  As discussed in Chapter 1, hegemonic masculinity is the form of 
masculinity that is normative, but not necessarily the norm among most men, in a given 
pattern of gender relations.  Hegemonic masculinity is constructed in relation to other 
subordinated forms of masculinity and in opposition to femininity.  Hegemonic 
masculinity pervades American institutions and society.  It exists in law firms (Pierce, 
1996), in sports (Anderson, 2002), in fraternities (Yeong, Stromler, and Wharton, 2006), 
in investment firms (Antilla, 2002), and in virtually any institution one could name.    
According to Hacker (1989) the major difference between the military and other 
social institutions is that military institutions operate as the central patriarchal institutions 
of civilized societies.   Connell (1995) concurs with Hacker’s assessment, arguing the 
military is the social arena most important for the definition of hegemonic masculinity.  
As such, the military version of hegemonic masculinity is especially virulent and visceral 
(Barrett 1996 and Goldstein 2001).  One can think of hegemonic masculinity in the 
military as occurring in its most exaggerated, hypermasculine form, while hegemonic 
masculinity in other institutions occurs in a more diluted form, one wrought by the 
pressures of equal opportunity law from which the military has so often been held 
exempt.   In the past, the Supreme Court has upheld military exemption from some 
portions of equal opportunity law on the justification that equal opportunity for some 
groups, e.g., women, homosexuals, and African Americans, will ultimately undermine 
small unit cohesion, thereby crippling combat effectiveness and endangering national 
security.   
Another distinguishing characteristic of military hegemonic masculinity is 
participation in combat.  “Combat” is the ideological core of both the national defense 
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mission and military masculinity.  What constitutes combat has often been vaguely 
defined and frequently altered.  “Combat” does not mean the same thing in each of the 
services or even the same thing within different combat specialties within the same 
service.  For example, within the Navy, “combat” can mean flying bombing missions or 
conducting airborne dogfights with opposing forces; firing surface to air or subsurface to 
air missiles or theater ballistic missiles from the relative safety of ships or submarines 
hundreds of miles from the actual area of battle; conducting special forces operations 
with the SEALS; or serving as a corpsman with Marine infantry.  Today, piloting 
surveillance and attack drones remotely in complete physical safety thousands of miles 
from the actual battlefield is also considered “combat” (Carroll 2014a).84  While each of 
these is defined as “combat,” each demands very different physical capabilities. Until 
Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta lifted the ban on women in combat on January 24, 
2013, women were excluded from direct ground combat (combat arms), although they 
were able to serve in combat support and combat service support positions85 that put 
                                            
 
84 The Department of Defense recently established a new military combat award for drone pilots and 
cyber warriors.  Lawmakers and veterans groups have expressed outrage that it would outrank traditional 
field combat medals such as the Purple Heart, which is given for wounds sustained in combat, and the 
Bronze Star.  In March 2013 Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel (2013a and 2013b) ordered the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff and the Service Secretaries to review of the proposed “Distinguished Warfare Medal.”  
Following review, it was recommended the medal be replaced by a device that can be affixed to existing 
medals to recognize extraordinary service of drone operators.  That device has not yet been revealed. In 
the meantime, in late January 2014 Secretary of Defense Hagel ordered a review of all medals and 
awards.  For more information on this matter, see Carroll 2014a. 
85 Combat Arms involves direct ground combat.  Elements of combat arms include armor (tanks), artillery, 
and infantry in the Army and Marine Corps, and Special Forces in all the services. Combat support jobs 
directly support combat troops and operations, but the primary function of those serving in combat 
support jobs is not fighting.  Rather, combat support jobs include but are not limited to fields such as 
intelligence, chemical, biological, and radiological support, and civil affairs.  Combat service support is a 
somewhat dated term, replaced in the Army by “sustainment” in 2008.  Combat service support jobs are 
those logistics jobs near the battlefield that directly support combat troops.  The Marine Corps still 
designates jobs in personnel administration, ground supply support and distribution, financial 
management and logistics as combat service support.  Again, the primary purpose of someone serving in 
a combat service support job is not to actually engage in combat, but rather to directly support those who 
do, often in close proximity to the “battlefield.” 
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them within range of enemy fire and subject to attack, making the “front lines” and “rear 
area” hard to define.  In a way, “combat” is as much a cultural construct as gender. 
Ascendancy of one group of men over another (and over women) in the military 
is embedded in custom, tradition, pay and advancement structures, billet assignment 
policies, and proximity to combat, among others.  A man’s sexual orientation is often 
suspect if he does not “do” a sufficiently masculine gender performance.  The contrast 
between an “effeminate” male and a “masculine” male is especially stark when the 
masculine male image held up for comparison is the hyper-masculine military image.  I 
use the term “hyper-masculine” to distinguish the unique exemplary form of masculinity 
the military promotes and reveres from other forms of masculinity that are hegemonic in 
other organizations and contexts, such as those in the medical, academic, or 
investment banking professions where physical dominance and lethality, literally, are 
less important to survival “in the trenches.”   
Military hegemonic hyper-masculinity is characterized by mental toughness, 
superior physical fitness and endurance, professional war fighting competence, 
strength, bravery, aggressiveness, tenacity, and courage – those qualities thought to be 
required for success on an actual battlefield.  Hollywood embraces, glorifies, and 
perpetuates this form of masculinity in the myth of the ultimate male warrior, embodied 
by fictional characters such as Rambo, Major “Dutch” Schaefer, and Colonel John 
Matrix;86 and real-life heroes such as Audie Murphy, the most decorated soldier of WW 
II whose wartime exploits were dramatized in To Hell and Back, and Lt. Col. Hal Moore 
from the Vietnam era, whose story was told in the 2002 movie, We Were Soldiers.  
                                            
 
86 Arnold Schwartzenegger’s characters in Predator and Commando, respectively. 
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These heroes, both fictional and real, mythologized in popular culture, provide the 
standard by which individuals within the military are encouraged to measure themselves 
and others.  In effect, military men cannot be too masculine, but they can be too 
feminine.   
Conversely, military women must not appear to be either too feminine or too 
masculine.  If they are too feminine, they undermine their professional credibility as 
warriors which, by definition, is a “male” occupation or at least requires the “male” 
qualities of rationality, competence, control, strength, and bravery.  A “girly-girl” may 
wear the uniform, but she cannot truly be a warrior.  However, if military women are 
perceived as too masculine, they undermine their credibility as heterosexuals, and risk 
being labeled homosexual -- inadvertently confirming the gender stereotype that only 
defective women want to be Soldiers, Sailors, or Marines.   
In the not-too-distant past, homosexuality was grounds for dismissal from military 
service.  Competent military women were suspected of being lesbians, and during my 
time in the Navy there were several lesbian “witch hunts”87 which demonstrated how 
vulnerable women could be to such accusations.88  In yet another form of gatekeeping 
and gender harassment, it was a common tactic for a man to accuse a woman of being 
                                            
 
87 In late August of 1990, the Commander of the Navy's Surface Fleet, Atlantic (COMNAVSURFLANT), 
sent a message to all his subordinate commands, including nearly 200 ships and 40 shore installations in 
the Eastern half of the country, exhorting commanders to vigorously root out homosexual women and 
purge them from the service, even as he acknowledged lesbian sailors are generally ''hard-working, 
career-oriented, willing to put in long hours on the job, and among the command's top performers.''  The 
message said that rooting out female homosexuals might be particularly difficult because lesbians are 
''more aggressive than their male counterparts'' and thus ''intimidating'' to those who might turn them in 
(Gross, 1990).  I was stationed on the East Coast at the time and, because it was so jaw-droppingly 
shocking, I actually remember reading that very message on the morning message board.  I knew I was 
heterosexual, but I wasn’t dating anyone at the time and I thought I presented myself as sufficiently but 
not “too” feminine.  It had never occurred to me that simply being a good performer might be grounds for 
being suspected of being a lesbian. 
88 See Randy Shilts’ (1994) Conduct Unbecoming for an extensive discussion of the Navy’s lesbian witch 
hunts.   
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a lesbian if she refused to date him. To further illustrate the career danger to military 
women of being perceived as lesbian, the Service members Legal Defense Network 
issued a report in March 2000 claiming that analysis of discharge data revealed that 
while women only comprised 14% of the force in 1999, they accounted for 31% of 
discharges related to homosexuality, the highest percentage of women discharged in 
any year for that reason since 1980 (Sobel et al. 2000, p. 8).     
Although the Don't Ask, Don't Tell (DADT) policy was rescinded on 20 
September 2012, and attitudes both within larger society and the military about 
homosexuality have been moderating, a military woman suspected of being or 
confirmed to be a lesbian may still experience covert prejudice in the form of lower 
performance evaluations and lukewarm endorsements for prestigious positions.89  This 
means that despite the repeal of DADT, military women still have some structural 
incentive to expand their male colleagues’ rather narrow conceptions of what it means 
to be a woman and what kind of behavioral attributes constitute “femininity.”  Thus, 
women still walk a tightrope, even if that tightrope is not quite as narrow as it used to be.  
Women are still often cast by their male colleagues as “office wives, mothers, or 
                                            
 
89 Known as “damning with faint praise” this is a common tactic used by superiors to undermine a 
subordinate’s career, without actually documenting substandard performance or triggering options for 
rebuttal on official annual performance appraisals. “Damning with faint praise” also prevents accusations 
of racism, sexism, or other prejudice.  Actually documenting poor performance in a subordinate’s fitness 
report or evaluation provides the subordinate with the opportunity to rebut the adverse report, wherein 
they might argue that the adverse review is unfair and due to sexism, racism, etc.  Officers and Senior 
Enlisted personnel who have served as members of selection boards for promotion also learn which 
words of praise carry the most weight.  Certain positive adjectives get “unofficially coded” as “good,” 
“better,” or “best.”  Two officers could each walk out of the same Commanding Officer’s (CO’s) office 
following their respective Fitness Report (FITREP) debrief.  Each might think they got a strong write-up.  
However, if they happen to compare their FITREPs, a rare occurrence, one might find that he/she has a 
really strong write-up while the other might discover that the verbiage on the back of the form actually 
makes them an “also ran” rather than a real contender for promotion.  For other documented issues of 
bias in fitness reports, see Shenk 1994; Thomas, Perry, and David 1994; and Thomas, et al. 1998. 
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sisters.”  Alternatively, women themselves may choose to relate to men they work with 
using those personas as an acceptable means to interact with male colleagues in a way 
that acknowledges gender differences while simultaneously attempting to keep 
“sexuality” from the forefront of the relationship.   
Ideological notions about gender operate in the debate about women in combat 
to perpetuate myths about men and women, the military, and the nature of war and 
combat, linking men with war and women with peace, leaving no room for female 
combatants or male noncombatants.90  It was in the face of such ideological gender 
beliefs held widely throughout the ranks and across the services that then-Secretary of 
Defense (SECDEF) Leon Panetta announced on January 23, 2013 that he would 
remove the restriction on women in ground combat.  His decision came in response to a 
letter dated January 9th he received from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
(CJCS), Gen. Martin E. Dempsey (2013).  Within this letter General Dempsey stated in 
strong terms that the armed service chiefs unanimously agreed that “the time has come 
to rescind the direct combat exclusion rule for women and to eliminate all unnecessary 
gender-based barriers to service” (Bumiller and Shanker 2013).   
Despite these seemingly positive developments, the very idea of female 
combatants continues to present a disruption to traditional stereotypes of women’s 
“proper” roles, as well as to the traditional and historical means through which men 
prove their masculinity.   The hegemonic, hyper-masculine military culture, which views 
the integration of women as a fundamental challenge to the identity of the warrior as 
                                            
 
90 While sexism is not entirely dead, there are no similar ideological constructions or actual laws in the 
legal or academic professions, for example, which define lawyers and professors as men and women as 
not lawyers and not professors.   
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male, fosters widespread hostility toward and harassment of women, as we have seen 
demonstrated repeatedly in the Tailhook Scandal (Navy, 1992); the Aberdeen Proving 
Grounds Scandal (Army, 1999); the Air Force Academy Rape Scandal (2003); the rape 
of U.S. women soldiers supporting ongoing military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan 
by their male colleagues;91 the rape of women Air Force recruits by male drill instructors 
at Lackland Air Force Base in San Antonio, Texas;92 and the rape “epidemic” occurring 
across the ranks on a daily basis.  
Among the young, male population which self-selects into the military there is a 
particular segment whose members are ideologically very conservative and hold very 
traditional views on gender roles.   Young men fitting this description are especially 
likely to select into the ground combat elements of the U.S. Army or Marine Corps, from 
which women have traditionally been barred, but they join other military branches as 
well.  They are especially likely to be hostile to women in the military who are serving in 
non-traditional career fields formerly the exclusive realm of men.  Gallagher and Parrott 
(2011) document the link between “adherence to dimensions of hegemonic masculinity” 
and hostility and aggression toward women, which they argue functions to reaffirm 
men’s sense of dominance and power.93  While very senior officers in the Defense 
policy establishment may legitimately see the need to adjust policies related to women’s 
service, their views may not be shared by all service members. Military leaders who 
either promote or acquiesce to plans to open combat to women are frequently derided 
                                            
 
91 See O’Neill (1998) for a detailed and fairly comprehensive summary of these relatively recent and 
widely-publicized incidents. 
92 The rape of women Air Force recruits by their drill instructors is, essentially, a repeat of exactly what 
happened with the Army at Aberdeen Proving Grounds in 1999. 
93 See also Cowen and Mills (2004).   
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by some men in the ranks as political hacks, spineless leaders, and traitors to the cause 
of maintaining U.S. national security.94   
Because the culture of hyper-masculine, hegemonic masculinity makes gender 
practices stand out in sharp relief when compared to the more subtle gendered 
practices operating in civilian and non-military government organizations, the military is 
an exceptionally fruitful place to study how gender, in general, operates in patriarchal 
society.   Furthermore, we only recently disengaged from a long-term asymmetric 
(guerilla) war in Iraq while remaining engaged in the same type of warfare in 
Afghanistan after more than a decade.  These wars required more manpower than the 
Department of Defense had.  As a result, men and women from the Air Force and Navy 
were pressed into jobs that would normally have been filled by Army Soldiers or 
Marines.    
During these wars women in all the services were called upon to support military 
operations in radical new ways.  Due to significant sex- and gender-related cultural 
differences with both our enemies and intended allies, U.S. military women were asked 
to assist combat soldiers in the field by engaging with Iraqi and Afghani women.  When 
the Army and the Marine Corps absolutely needed women on the battlefield to fulfill 
operational mission requirements, they found creative ways to skirt the law to get them 
there -- and justified doing so as a matter of national security.  This operational exigency 
placed women in the exact same danger male combat troops faced in the field.  As a 
                                            
 
94 See the comments section of any story about women in combat posted online for disparaging 
comments about military women and senior military leaders, Democratic presidents, and Congressional 
Democrats.  For example, see Steele (2013a, 2013b, and 2014).  
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result, we have a unique opportunity to explore hegemonic masculinity in a figuratively 
and literally under-“manned” military. 
 In theorizing hegemonic masculinity, R.W. Connell (1987, 1995, 2003) has 
conceded that women, in their traditional roles as wives, mothers, sisters, girlfriends, 
classmates, and colleagues, are central to the many processes constructing various 
masculinities.   However, he has never addressed the influence women that who fill 
non-traditional roles within “men only” social institutions, such as the military, might 
have on hegemonic masculinity.  Until recently, in his theorizing about hegemonic 
masculinity, Connell (1987, 1995, 2003, 2005) overlooked the possibility that some girls 
and women might and actually do resist traditional definitions of femininity in the gender 
they perform.  In fact, Connell’s theorizing (1987, 1995, 2003, 2005) appeared to 
exclude the possibility of resistance by subordinate groups to the hegemonic masculine 
ideal, which in his conceptualization seemed totalizing.  Responding to constructive 
criticism of their work in 2005, Connell and Messerschmidt finally conceded that gender 
hierarchies “are affected by new configurations of women’s identity and practice (p. 
848)” and that any approach to understanding gender hierarchy must take a more 
balanced approach, recognizing not just the power of dominant groups but the agency 
of subordinated groups as well.   
 In 1993, in the immediate aftermath of the Navy Tailhook scandal, scholars at the 
Naval Post Graduate School in Monterey, CA, informed by Connell’s (1987) theories 
regarding hegemonic masculinity, undertook a series of research projects exploring the 
nature and extent of gender harassment and gender discrimination within the U.S. 
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Navy.  In one of several studies95 associated with this larger project, Margosian and 
Vendrzyk (1994) reported that women officers, regardless of their status as Unrestricted 
Line, Restricted Line, or Staff officers:96 
1. experienced overt opposition to their presence; 
2. experienced pervasive sexual and gender harassment; 
3. found their participation limited by traditional feminine stereotypes; 
4. found their bodies and sexuality were used to exclude them; 
5. managed their femininity to fit in; 
6. made decisions to succeed and negate stereotypes; and 
7. interacted with men as “professionals” to avoid the appearance of fraternization 
or impropriety. 
On the basis of my more recent research, initial impressions suggest that the 
Navy has changed dramatically in the intervening years.  That is, few participants in my 
recent study reported overt gender harassment or discrimination.  In fact, because 
women could rarely point to instances in which they had been prevented from obtaining 
a special assignment or specific jobs or training they had sought, they overwhelming 
concluded that that Navy, as an organization, had fully accepted women.  Furthermore, 
many women officers revealed that they thought they might have an advantage over 
their male colleagues because in accordance with Navy diversity initiatives, the Navy 
seems to be working harder to keep women than men.  I refer to this perception that 
being a woman in the Navy today is a career advantage as the “pink escalator.”   
                                            
 
95 See also Borrebach and FitzPatrick (1994), Daniels (1994), and Ernst and Gilbeau (1993). 
96 Those assigned to the “unrestricted line” are widely and colloquially regarded by fellow service 
members as being closest to “the pointy end of the spear” or most near death and destruction. Generally 
speaking, they fly the war planes, drive the war ships, shoot the guns, fire the missiles, etc.  Restricted 
Line functions include such specialties as Public Affairs, Human Resources, Information Professional, 
Engineering Duty, Aviation Maintenance, etc., while Staff functions include such professions as law, 
nursing, medical, dental, chaplain, supply, civil engineering, etc. 
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In the following section, I will compare and contrast the findings reported in 1994 
with my findings in 2014, a full two decades later.  The reader will encounter the voices 
of women officers from a variety of Navy communities from twenty years ago and be 
introduced to two officers (Andrea and Natalie97) and four enlisted women (Amy, Diana, 
Faith, and Nikki) who share their recent experiences in the Navy. To aid readers a 
complete listing of participants, their ranks and ratings, and limited amplifying 
information about them is provided in Appendix E. 
Then versus now 
1. Open Hostility/Overt Opposition to Women’s Presence 
In 1993, all the women Navy officers interviewed provided numerous examples of 
men’s ongoing, direct, and open opposition to their presence and the overall hostile 
work environment that resulted. The women reported that men seemed especially 
embittered over and threatened by what they perceived as women’s invasion of men’s 
exclusive territory. One officer described her experiences with her male peers at the 
U.S. Naval Academy in this way: 
I’m serious when I say every single day for four years some incident or remark 
occurred with every woman in my class.  I know it.  A day-by-day stripping of 
your dignity, integrity, and ego, to the effect that we didn’t belong there, and it 
added up after four years (Margosian & Vendrzyk 1994, p. 62). 
 
                                            
 
97 I have used fictitious names for all participants and limited amplifying information about them to 
maintain their anonymity.  
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Another described how male midshipmen turned an official uniform acronym into the 
worst kind of insult: 
There’s a label they had for women at the Academy – “WUBA,” which is 
supposed to be “Working Uniform Blue, Alpha,” where “alpha” means skirt.  So 
it’s a women’s uniform acronym.  But the men would say it meant “Women Used 
By All,” making it a really derogatory term.  It was used in the meanest sense, 
when you really wanted to get to someone or insult them (Margosian & Vendrzyk 
1994, p. 60). 
Still another officer described the atmosphere among the predominantly male academy 
thusly: 
Discrimination is like wearing a uniform – you just accept it, and if you want to 
stay there and graduate, then you have to live with it (Margosian & Vendrzyk 
1994, p. 64). 
One officer provided an example of how the hostility male midshipmen demonstrated 
toward women at the Academy was not limited to female midshipmen or even women in 
the service: 
One year we had Sandra Day O’Connor as a guest speaker, the only woman 
speaker I had in my four years there, a Justice on the Supreme Court.  And 
because she was a woman these guys got up and asked questions afterward 
that were absolutely degrading and [they] were really rude to her.  It was so bad 
that the Secretary of the Navy put the entire Brigade in hack,98 called the 
Superintendent of the Naval Academy and personally chastised him because of 
the way these guys treated a Supreme Court Justice.  So, you see, the fact that 
she was a Supreme Court Justice was absolutely overridden by the fact that she 
was a woman (Margosian & Vendrzyk 1994, p. 62). 
Once commissioned and in the fleet, little changed.  One Lieutenant Helicopter 
pilot described her experience with the male instructors at flight school: 
                                            
 
98 Restricted to quarters. 
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The only problem with sexism there was that guys would just come right out and 
tell you “I’m going to try to ‘down’ you on this flight99 because I don’t think women 
should be here or flying in any U.S. aircraft and if I had my way you wouldn’t be 
here.” And they’d be telling you this while you were trying to land.  You, of 
course, would be very annoyed, but you would try to land the aircraft and take off 
because you knew they were trying to mess you up (Margosian & Vendrzyk 
1994, p. 64). 
A Lieutenant working at a shore-based unit with a sea-going component described an 
ongoing argument she had with her senior enlisted: 
I had a male BMCS (Senior Chief Boatswain’s Mate) who was my Leading 
Senior Chief Petty Officer.  He told me over and over that he didn’t care what the 
official Navy position was:  he didn’t believe women belonged in the Navy and 
especially not at sea.  But then he wrote me while on deployment, after 104 days 
at sea off the coast of Liberia, that maybe there was a place for women at sea … 
[as sexual release for the men] (Margosian & Vendrzyk 1994, 67)! 
Yet another officer described her boss’s reaction to having to work with women: 
My boss would say, ‘I don’t believe women should be in the Navy,’ and make flat 
statements like that.  And he’d say things to me like, ‘Women shouldn’t be in the 
military because they can’t go into combat and into war!  And how can I depend 
on the woman in the next foxhole if we’re under fire?’ And I thought ‘When was 
the last time this guy was even in or near a foxhole? He is a Naval officer, not a 
Marine or Army officer!  We go on ships, remember? It would be hard to drive 
that frigate up the beach and into that foxhole!’ (Margosian & Vendrzyk 1994, p. 
65). 
A surface warfare qualified Lieutenant Commander (LCDR) who was one of the 
first women to report aboard ship reported that her first CO “was just really together” 
about getting the some of the first women officers and he wanted them treated just like 
any other officers reporting aboard.  While she had no problems on the ship while he 
was CO, she did describe how she was treated on another ship that was relieving her  
                                            
 
99 Essentially find a reason to “fail” her on the flight practical.  
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ship on station near Guam: 
I didn’t encounter any problems on my ship but when I had to go aboard the USS 
PROTEUS to work on turnover, there would be incidents.  Like you’d be walking 
down the weatherdecks100 and, I remember this vividly, there were a couple 
warrant officers101 coming and as they passed me, before they were out of 
earshot, purposely one of them said loud enough for me to hear, “Goddamn 
Split-tails.”102  I’ll remember that as long as I live. That was the first time I had 
heard that term.103 
It speaks volumes about the degree of hostility men felt toward women’s presence that 
two men, junior to this officer, felt completely free to say something so offensive.  The 
officer was in a “no-win” situation.  She could have called them on it and filed charges 
against them for showing disrespect to a superior commissioned officer, but back then 
women had to pick and choose their battles, otherwise their “career” would be very short 
and comprised of nothing but battles against omnipresent sexism.  
In contrast, according to participants in my more recent study, women in the 
Navy today do not experience the same degree of daily opposition and open hostility to 
their mere presence from male colleagues that Navy women did two decades ago.  
Women officers, especially, rarely, if ever, experience such overt opposition to their 
presence.  This is presumably because they have more power to address such behavior 
                                            
 
100 The portion of the main deck, outside the skin of the ship, that is exposed to the elements.  There are 
usually several more decks (the superstructure) above the main (weather) deck, but they are completely 
enclosed. 
101 Warrant Officers are commissioned officers drawn from the ranks of Chief Petty Officers (CPO E7-E9).  
To apply for commissioning as a Warrant Officer, applicants must be a CPO or selected for promotion to 
CPO with not less than 12 and no more than 24 years of service.  Warrant Officers are technical 
specialists who possess the technical knowledge and skills of a specific occupational field at a level 
beyond what is normally expected a Master Chief Petty Officer (E-9).  In other words, Warrant Officers 
tend to have a lot of years and experience in the service.  They are, however, technically junior to any 
regularly commissioned officer, regardless of years of service.   
102 This is a particularly offensive comment, referring crassly to an aspect of female sexual anatomy.  
103 This quote, which was not included in Margosian and Vendrzyk 1994, is from an interview (JMV4) 
conducted by the author as part of that research.  
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and have their concerns taken seriously. Furthermore, as officers their chain of 
command for addressing concerns or complaints is much shorter than that of enlisted 
personnel.104 When asked if they feel accepted by male colleagues at sea, my Navy 
women participants overwhelmingly responded in the affirmative.  Few could recall 
specific instances where subordinates, peers, or superiors have made disparaging 
comments on the basis of gender.  Enlisted women, however, were much more likely to 
report lingering though subtle sexism than their officer contemporaries.  
While positive stories are good news, it is by no means safe to conclude that all 
the Navy’s gender integration problems have been conquered.  Faith, a First Class 
Petty Officer105 who had previously been a Navy linguist, compared the differences she 
saw in the relationships between men and women within intelligence community with 
what she encountered when she reported aboard a surface ship: 
Being a linguist you never really saw that there was a problem with females in 
the military because it wasn’t, I mean, we would be on shore duty just like 
everybody else.  So I never really experienced if that was going to be a problem.  
It seemed like there was just as many female linguists as there were male 
linguists.  I know that there’s just more men that join.  But in the CT (cryptology) 
                                            
 
104 The most junior position a surface warfare officer can hold aboard ship is “division officer.”  A division 
officer reports to a Department Head.  The Department Head reports to the XO on administrative matters 
and to the Commanding Officer on Operational matters.  An Ensign (O-1) may complain to his or her 
Department Head, or if the Department Head is the source of the problem, the junior officer may complain 
directly to the XO or CO.  In contrast, an enlisted service member might simply be a worker assigned to a 
work center.  They may complain to their Work Center Supervisor, who may or may not address their 
concern directly or take it to the division Leading Petty Officer, who may or may not address their concern 
directly or take it to the division Leading Chief Petty Officer, who may or may not address their concern 
directly or take it to either the Department Leading Chief Petty Officer (if they want to keep the problem 
within the enlisted ranks) or the Division Officer (if they want to elevate the problem to the attention of an 
officer).  Either the Department Leading Chief or the Division Officer may or may not address their 
concern directly or take it to the Department Head.  Enlisted personnel, especially junior enlisted 
personnel, have a lot more layers of “leadership” to negotiate in their pursuit of relief from what they 
perceive as an intolerable situation.   
105 Enlisted personnel range in rank from most junior (E-1) to most senior (E-9).  A First Class Petty 
Officer is an E-6.  All enlisted personnel, regardless of their years of experience, are considered junior to 
any officer. Officers range in rank from most junior Ensign (O-1) to most senior, full Admiral (O-10).  For 
further information on ranks and ratings see Appendix D.  
 
 
 
 
197 
community, I never saw the difference.  Now that I’m on a ship, I see a huge 
difference in the way the women act and are perceived because of the living 
accommodations, because they kind of work the system.  A lot of the females on 
the ship since we got back in, and we got back the end of July, and we’ve had 
fourteen people get pregnant since then, just so they could transfer off the 
ship.106 
 This experience suggests that women are more readily accepted by men within 
the Navy in intelligence work that is more cerebral than muscular and is overwhelmingly 
shore-based and run by civilians.  One key to understanding this distinction is 
recognizing that Intelligence work is not considered “tip of the spear” warfighting by 
most men in the operational fleet.  In fact, the intelligence community is officially 
designated as “restricted line,” meaning Intelligence Officers cannot command ships.   
Additionally, men and women who work in the intelligence fields are often both 
smarter107 and more extensively educated than their counterparts in more traditionally 
male, mechanical or technical ratings108 so they may be less inclined to view smart, 
capable women as a threat to their masculinity. 
                                            
 
106 As Command Career Counselor for the ship she would be in a position to know from counseling them 
regarding their career options in light of their pregnancy whether or not they might have intentionally 
gotten pregnant. Once these women were diagnosed as being pregnant she would have to work with 
them to determine if they planned on staying in and transferring to shore duty until after the baby was 
born, or if they were going to apply for early discharge. 
107 As measured by Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) scores.  
108 An enlisted person’s occupational specialty in the Navy is called a “rating.” Ratings considered non-
traditional for women include but are not limited to:  Engineman (EN), Electrician’s Mate (EM), Gunner’s 
Mate (GM), Boatswain’s Mate (BM), Machinist’s Mate (MM), Hull Technician (HT), Machinery Repairman 
(MR), etc.  The primary function of the sailors in these ratings is to operate, repair, and maintain ship’s 
equipment, systems, and spaces. To further clarify, an enlisted person’s paygrade is referred to as their 
“rate.”  Numbers 1-3 coupled with a rating abbreviation indicates a sailor is a first, second, or 3rd class 
petty officer, mid-grade enlisted leaders.  A Third Class Petty Officer is junior to a Second Class Petty 
Officer and a First Class Petty Officer is senior to both 2nd and 3rd Class Petty Officers.  So, an “HT2” is a 
Second Class Petty Officer (E-5) – the rate, and that person’s rating is Hull Technician (See Appendix D 
for additional detailed information on Navy ratings and ranks). 
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 Faith was a First Class Petty Officer109 with approximately ten years of service 
when she converted ratings from intelligence linguist to Navy (Career) Counselor and 
was assigned to sea duty for the first time. As such, she occupied a unique position as 
“an outsider within” when she reported aboard her first ship.  She elaborated on her 
surprise at the extreme differences in the two working environments: 
Linguists, regardless of their service, mostly work under the umbrella of the 
National Security Administration (NSA) [at] NSA sites.  They’re all run by 
civilians.  And they have joint personnel at all of them.110  So it was a joint 
community that I worked with.  I saw all the services, civilians.  The difference 
between that and where I’m at now is that that was more of a business type of 
environment.  You work more like a corporation instead of a military unit.  There 
was a lot more professionalism.  There was a lot more common courtesy just 
because even though you’re an E-4, my boss was like a GS 13 (roughly 
equivalent in job scope to a Lieutenant Commander (O-4)).  And that was my 
direct boss.  We worked in the same office.111  So there was a lot more 
professionalism, I feel, than there is being on the ship, where it’s all Navy.  And 
it’s all about rank and military bearing and respect and that kind of thing…Rank 
matters more than competence …The biggest culture shock also was going from 
the professional Intel community to a down and dirty fleet ship with people who 
aren’t maybe of as high of a caliber [as the] people that I used to work with.  And 
it’s probably terrible to say, and it’s probably a little bit pompous to say, but there 
are different divisions on that ship that it’s so hard to communicate with because 
they just don’t have those skills.  They don’t operate at more of an intellectual 
level, as I was used to.  And that was very hard.  It was very hard to get used to.  
It was also very interesting to see that even as an E-6, I mean I used to be the 
reserve coordinator as an E-4 in Hawaii.  And I was the subject matter expert.  
And they looked at that and they valued that.  Here as an E-6 I was the only 
career counselor.  I am the subject matter expert but because I’m an E-6 the 
chiefs, the officers, they don’t care.  They don’t listen.  And that was shocking to 
me.  It was very shocking to me.112 
                                            
 
109 She had served ten years before being assigned to a Navy ship.  Most people in sea-intensive ratings 
would never spend a decade in the Navy before going to sea.  Most go directly to a ship from their 
technical school, or if they first report to shore duty their next tour will usually be afloat.   
110 “Joint” refers to a command in which personnel from each of the services all work together.   
111 Due to prohibitions on fraternization and “undue familiarity” between officers and enlisted personnel, 
shipboard life is pretty segregated.  Officers and enlisted personnel of the operational fleet usually do not 
share immediate workspaces.  Aboard ship, officers often work out of their staterooms, in the area of the 
ship designated as “Officer Country.” Officers eat their meals in the Ward Room, while sailors eat their 
meals on the mess decks or in the Chiefs’ mess.  
112 She’s explaining that in the intelligence community her rank did not indicate her knowledge, skills, and 
abilities whereas in the operational Navy, it was simply presumed by those higher in rank than she that as 
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Faith went on to describe how men related to women on the ship, which also took her 
by surprise: 
And then the huge thing that I’d never experienced was it’s a huge meat market 
on the ship for a female.  It’s not that I never expected it.  It’s just that nothing 
that I had ever been around in ten years as a linguist, that’s not the environment 
you’re in.  But you go on the ship and there’s only so many females.  And 
everybody else is a guy.  And that’s a huge thing.  And they [the men] look at that 
and they talk about it and that’s a huge topic of conversation.  “Oh, there’s a new 
female on board.”  I guess I never thought about that before.  And then they 
[male Sailors] don’t have a very good image of women in general because like I 
said most of them [women Sailors] get there, don’t do a whole lot of work.  At 
some point they get pregnant and get sent off the ship.  Or they’re not the 
smartest females.  Most of the females work in admin jobs; most of the females 
work as the cooks, do the laundry, that kind of stuff.  There’s not a whole lot of 
females on our ship right now.  I’m having a hard time even thinking of one that’s 
in a technical rate.   We have two that are ET’s, Electronics Technicians.  And 
then we have one that’s a CT, cryptologist.  So she does signals.  And that’s it. 
When I asked her what the ratio of men to women had been when she was working as 
a linguist at NSA sites Faith replied: 
“I would say like probably 65/35, 60/40, around there.  And on the ship now, I 
think we have two hundred and seventy people on board, and [out of that 270] 
we have maybe forty females … 7 officers, which is a lot.  When I first got there 
we had only two or three.”113   
Amy, a Second Class Electronics Technician (ET2) who had previously been 
stationed aboard an East Coast aircraft carrier, described the attitudes of some of the  
 
                                                                                                                                            
 
only an E-6 she couldn’t possibly have more knowledge than they did. In other words, in the surface fleet 
rank trumps actual knowledge and skills.  The intelligence community is more of a “flat” organization 
whereas the Surface Navy is extraordinarily hierarchical.  These distinctions help explain the differences 
in the way they operate and what is valued.  
113 She was serving aboard an Arleigh Burke-class guided missile destroyer.  Manning for this type ship is 
set at 23 Officers and approximately 271 enlisted.  Numbering seven, women officers comprised 
approximately 33% of the wardroom. 
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men aboard her ship: 
Once again we’re back to the intelligence factor.  The smarter the boys are, the 
meaner they are to women.  The super intelligent guys think they are gods.  
Women have no place anywhere around them. 
When I asked her if there were men aboard her ship who still thought women did not 
belong in the ET rating, Amy related a situation that had occurred within her division 
when she was an ET3: 
I actually turned down a Work Center Supervisor position.  I was Work Center 
Sup-qualified but I took assistant [Work Center Sup] and let a male have Work 
Center Sup because I knew that I had a subordinate that would fight me every 
step of the way because I was a female.  He absolutely hates females.  He’s the 
most chauvinistic man I’ve ever met.  But I knew I wouldn’t be able to… if I told 
him, “Hey, I need you to go do this maintenance” he’d look at me and go, “pfew,” 
“go email somebody.”  He’d just sit there.  He fought me every step of the way to 
the point where I actually turned down that job.  It’s like “I can’t fight with him.  I 
can’t do it…”’ He’s fairly new to the boat but just absolutely severely chauvinistic 
and just did not believe that women had any place being in charge of him.  And 
we used to try to tell him, because he was fairly new out of school,  we were like 
“if you plan on staying in [the Navy] you might want to (laughs) change your tune 
a little bit because what’s going to happen to you the first time you end up with a 
female chief or a female officer?” 
When asked in what other ways this man expressed his sexism, Amy elaborated: 
He’s flat out and out.  Now, it wasn’t to me.  He told, actually an ET 2, somebody 
superior to him, he actually told her “why don’t you go back and get in the kitchen 
where you belong.” 
When asked how that ET2 handled the situation Amy explained with a laugh: 
She’s a rare breed.  She’s one of those that … a duck with oil on her back.  She 
just looked at him and she was like, “Uh-huh.  Go do your maintenance.”  I think 
he got around to it eventually but he doesn’t, he wouldn’t allow anybody to see 
that he would accept those orders [from a woman].  Everything had to be on his 
terms. 
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When I asked Amy if anyone had mentioned to the chain of command that the male 
ET3 had a sexist attitude, she explained: 
It was mentioned.  I told them flat out why I had refused [to take the Work Center 
Sup job].  I told them that was part of the reason, which was true.  At the time I 
was having some medical problems and I was kind of concerned about the 
workload because I’d had a lot of appointments.  But [when considering whether 
or not to take the position] I had combined everything and I did tell them.  I was 
like “I can’t.  I don’t feel like I would be able to rope him in and get him to adhere 
to division [and] work center policies because he just refuses.”  
This incident occurred on an aircraft carrier, with a ship’s company of 
approximately 3200.  With an air wing embarked, the carrier’s population soars to more 
than 5600 Sailors.  While the Commanding Officer (CO) is expected to “set the tone” for 
the whole crew, it can be much harder for the CO of an aircraft carrier to be fully aware 
of what is happening at the level of the work center,114 among a crew of more than 
5600, than it would be for the CO of a smaller ship, a DDG-51 class cruiser for example, 
with a crew of 312.  On larger ships and shore-based units, then, the Command Officer 
must rely more heavily on his or her mid-level and junior leaders to actively support and 
enforce equal opportunity standards.  It is tradition in the Navy to handle misconduct at 
the lowest level possible given the nature of the offense and the quality of the Sailor 
involved.  Thus, incidents of misconduct that are minor or are a “first offense” are often 
handled at the level of the chief or the division officer.  Given the tenuous nature of 
                                            
 
114 Smallest organizational unit within a Navy command.  Navy operational commands (as opposed to 
administrative staffs) whether ships or shore-based, are broken into departments, divisions, and 
workcenters.  On a carrier, the Department Head for Reactors Department is usually a Captain (O-6) 
whereas aboard smaller ships, Department Heads might be LCDRs (O-4) or even LTs (O-3), depending 
upon the size and capabilities of the ship.   
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command in the Navy these days,115 it seems likely that if officers were aware of the 
sexist Sailor’s conduct, his behavior would have been formally addressed, and he might 
even have been disciplined at Captain’s Mast if the behavior continued.   
When I asked Amy why no one higher up the chain of command had addressed 
the issue of sexism with this young man after she raised her concerns, she said: 
Possibly because we had a Leading Petty Officer (LPO) that was…, I won’t call 
him chauvinistic.  I will say he was, he felt the women on the ship were more 
there for him to look at and comment about than for him to actually [work with]. I 
mean, we had a couple girls that … okay, they may not have been as 
aesthetically pleasing, [but they were] extremely intelligent, fantastic technicians.  
And they had their plates full.  I mean they were kept working, working, working, 
but if you were in the slightest bit …cute….He wouldn’t make you work.  He 
wouldn’t make you do anything.  He’d flirt.   
I asked Amy if she didn’t consider that sexist. She explained: 
It’s chauvinistic in a whole different way to me.  To me that’s, now I might be 
sending myself back to the ‘60’s, but to me I’m one of those “boys will be boys.”  
Sometimes you just come to expect boys to be, oh, you know.  “There’s a new 
girl.”  “Oh, she’s cute.”  “Is she cute or not?”  That one you hear all the time on 
the ship, they’d be like, “Oh, this division got a new girl.”  “Is she cute?”  Before 
anybody sees her, “is she cute?”  “Well, she’s alright.”  “I’ll have to see her for 
myself.”  And then they decide once they see her whether she’s going to be a 
good technician or “hey, she ought to be fun to hang out with in a port,” that kind 
of stuff.  
This story makes clear that the Navy’s gender integration efforts may not be as 
successful as frequently touted by Navy leaders.  The LPO and the division Chief were 
both satisfied to let a sexist junior Sailor set the tone for the work center and the 
division.  Furthermore, that an E-4 felt he could be openly disrespectful, insubordinate, 
and sexist to a more senior petty officer suggests that this kind of behavior is tolerated 
                                            
 
115 See Appendix F for a listing of the COs, XOs, and Command Master Chiefs that have been fired since 
2009, along with the official explanation for why they were fired. 
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beyond the division, throughout the department, by leaders, most likely men, senior to 
the ET2. That Amy expressed reservations to her chain of command about taking a job 
in which she would daily have to confront an overtly sexist colleague over whom she 
would have positional authority but would not outrank (he was also an ET3), and that 
the chain of command apparently did nothing to address the problem, is indicative of the 
fact that women’s acceptance across the ranks is uneven.  Furthermore, the LPO and 
the Chief were either lax in executing their leadership obligations or they shared the 
junior’s sexist attitudes and were just as happy not to have her as the Work Center 
Supervisor. Either way, they failed both Sailors. It also appears from this example that 
Navy programs aimed at changing deckplate sexist behavior are either inadequate or 
ineffective.  It further suggests that enforcement of equal opportunity standards is 
uneven.  This seems to be especially true the farther down the chain of command a 
Sailor is. None of these conditions bodes well for women’s successful integration into 
non-traditional sea-intensive enlisted ratings where women remain “tokens” because 
they comprise a very small percentage of the crew on any given ship. 
 Additionally, although Amy was assigned to the carrier for twenty-eight and one-
half months, she spent thirteen of them temporarily assigned to security and another 
seven and one-half months temporarily assigned to the mess decks.116  Being assigned 
out of her rating for so long made it difficult for Amy to gain the practical, hands-on 
experience so helpful in passing rating advancement exams and getting promoted. 
                                            
 
116 The “mess decks” is the name given to the spaces where shipboard food is prepared, served, and 
eaten by the enlisted members of the crew.  Most junior sailors can expect to be sent to temporary 
assigned duty (TAD) on the mess decks for 90 days where they may end up performing duties ranging 
from washing dishes, to assisting with food preparations, cleaning the dining area, or serving food on the 
line.  Once their 90 days is complete any entry is made documenting it in their service record to prevent 
them from being re-assigned to this duty outside their rate. 
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Given the accepted sexism within her work center and division, it seems likely that Amy 
was being sent to fill these requirements so men would not have to.  This is yet another 
form of sexism.  Later in the interview we discussed the effectiveness of the Navy’s 
Command Climate Survey, which is intended to identify problem areas in equal 
opportunity such as the one detailed above.  Amy described what she viewed as a flaw 
in this leadership tool and monitoring system: 
I always felt like I was lying on them when I was telling the truth because of the 
way they posed the questions.117  The questions are posed as “Does your direct 
supervisor encourage … Does he do this or that?  Well my direct supervisor was 
fantastic.  He was a great guy.  I didn’t have any problems with him. 118  But 
nobody asked me about three guys up the chain.  They’d ask about the 
command as a whole.  And then they ask about you and your direct supervisor.  
I’m like “that leaves this whole gap in the middle where the problem really lies 
and nobody ever asks.”  I can’t tell you how many command climate surveys I’ve 
done.  And I always felt like I didn’t [get the opportunity to describe the actual 
problem], you know and they give you a space for comments but you can only 
write so much.  And it’s like you don’t want to just come right out and go “hey, 
[so-an-so sucks].”119 
 
                                            
 
117 As the result of the ongoing focus on military sexual assault, all the services except the U.S. Air Force 
now use the Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute (DEOMI) command assessment tool 
DEOCS.  The most recent version released 1January 2014 addresses some of the issues with the 
previous survey that she identified as problematic.  For more information on DEOMI and DEOCS see:  
http://www.public.navy.mil/bupers-
npc/support/21st_Century_Sailor/equal_opportunity/Pages/COMMANDCLIMATEASSESSMENT.aspx; 
accessed August 24, 2014; and http://www.deocs.net/public/index.cfm; and 
http://www.deomi.org/PublicAffairs/ClimateSurvey.cfm; accessed August 24, 2014. 
118 She’s speaking of a different supervisor than the one she described in the incident immediately above 
as “chauvenistic.”  
119 Additionally, sailors serving in divisions or departments with problems are reluctant to provide too 
much specific information for fear that, by doing so, they might inadvertently reveal their own identity.  
Doing so might potentially expose them to retaliation.  In the past, if a participant provided all the 
demographic information required on the Command Climate Survey Form, especially in divisions or 
departments with small numbers of women, it was entirely possible to identify the person completing the 
survey even though that information was supposed to be kept confidential.  Participants always feared 
that being completely honest on a command survey might prove a career hazard. The new survey 
methodology disaggregates data so that individuals cannot be identified.  Handwritten comments are still 
provided to the commands verbatim, however.  So, a participant must still be careful not to accidentally 
reveal who they are in their comments.   
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2. Pervasive Sexual and Gender Harassment  
In 1993, women officers reported gender and sexual harassment was pervasive.  
One officer, whose first name was “Erica,” recounted how her Commanding Officer 
would call her “Erotica” in front of junior and senior personnel.  Another explained how 
her Commanding Officer, at a higher echelon command in Washington D.C., 
“incentivized” women to wear skirts:   
At one of my commands, I was working for an O-6, who was prior-enlisted, who 
thought women should wear skirts to work – period! And then I showed up.  I 
wore slacks.  When men are in an office and it’s air conditioned for their comfort 
zone and not mine in skirts, then I have very little choice but to freeze.  So, I wore 
slacks.  I’m very meticulous with my appearance in uniform.  I don’t think whether 
I wear a skirt or slacks to work should have any impact on my overall work 
performance or production.  He sent out a memo stating if you wore skirts you 
could leave early (Margosian & Vendrzyk 1994, p. 91)! 
Another officer recalled encountering both sexually offensive comments and 
inappropriate physical contact from her aviator peers and a senior officer:  
I had never been around men who felt free to make sexual statements and 
innuendos to women and I didn’t know how to handle them.  They’d talk about 
everything – sex acts, breasts, everything! One CDR would come up to me and 
he would put his arm around my waist and try to feel my breast (Margosian & 
Vendrzyk 1994, p. 72)! 
One Lieutenant, described how she learned as an Ensign at her first duty station that 
women were fair game for harassment by all men, regardless of the men’s rank:  
It was my first watch in the OPCON and all these officers, Lieutenants up to a 
Commander, were joking around, teasing me.  There was a lot of sexual 
innuendo, really razzing me, and this Second Class Petty Officer chimed in too.  I 
turned to him and I said “Petty Officer so-and-so, I have to take this from them,120 
I don’t have to take this from you.” At that point a Commander in the room turned 
                                            
 
120 The other officers were all senior to her, the petty officer was not.  
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to me and said “You don’t understand Ensign, you have to take this kind of stuff 
[harassment] from everybody.”  My rank meant nothing.  I don’t think he ever 
would have done that to a male.  I don’t think it was an officer/enlisted thing.  I 
think it was a man/woman thing.  I think he [the Commander] saw me not as an 
officer, he saw me as a female slamming another male who was getting in on the 
good, friendly banter and he protected the guy (Margosian & Vendrzyk 1994, p. 
73). 
She later described an experience she had as a Lieutenant when she rebuffed a male 
colleague’s sexual advances:  
He had propositioned me a couple of times before and I had always turned him 
down.  He came over and sat down one day and said, “So, what’s it like to be a 
dyke in the Navy?” When I told him to shut up, he said “Oh, come on.  You know 
that’s what everyone says about you.  You don’t have a boyfriend.  You’re single.  
You like women. How do you like it? What kind of women do you like? I’m just 
really curious.  How do you like to do this?  What kind of women are your 
favorites” (Margosian & Vendrzyk 1994, p. 73)? 
Although the Navy had standing policies in 1993 intended to protect victims of sexual 
harassment, many women interviewed back then expressed fear of retribution if they 
used formal grievance procedures.  One Lieutenant explained:  
The system in place did not protect me in any way.  I did not feel that I could do 
what truly is the appropriate thing , which is to say, “Look, no offense.  I’m not 
interested.  Leave me alone.” And then actually have them leave me alone and 
not retaliate.  I felt fearful, I must admit (Margosian & Vendrzyk 1994, pp. 73-4). 
Another officer explained that as she had gotten more senior, things seemed to be 
getting worse – the prejudice against and harassment of women seemed to be growing.  
She had entered the Navy after earning her master’s degree so she was not a typical 
young Ensign.  She wondered if the gender and sexual harassment hadn’t affected how 
she chose to present herself to the men she worked with: 
I don’t know.  I’ve always been the senior woman, the oldest person … plus I’ve 
been married for a long time.  I think it’s harder for younger, single, and, 
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particularly, attractive female officers to get any respect.  And you know, I think 
that’s why I’ve always had a weight problem, because I think subconsciously 
that’s like a safety thing for me.  If I’m not real attractive then I don’t have to worry 
about all that sexual harassment crap.  And I was thinking the other day, 
because I’ve been up and down in my weight and it’s a hard thing for me to take 
off and keep off, and I was thinking “Well, I wonder if there isn’t some 
subconscious thing that I feel safer by being married with a child and being a little 
bit dumpy.  So, I don’t know.  Maybe being in the Navy has made me a “squatty 
body.”121 
In comparison, Navy officers who participated in my recent study did not mention 
a single instance of sexual or gender harassment, either that they personally 
experienced or observed another Navy woman endure. Although a few women alluded 
to feeling tensions with certain male Sailors they suspected were rooted in sexism, none 
of the men involved ever overtly harassed them or discriminated against them on the 
basis of gender. Several of my enlisted participants had far different experiences, 
however. 
Amy, the ET2, described the double standard and two-faced dealings she 
encountered aboard the air craft carrier she was assigned to: 
There were several [guys] in my department, guys that to your face would be 
nice and then they’d get behind your back and not a female around was good 
enough to do anything.  “Oh well, I can’t have her do it because she’s a girl.”  [I’d] 
fight against that concept because I’m like, “you know what?  And it’s not a 
bragging thing.”  That’s what sucks is that if you are proud of yourself and your 
accomplishments as a woman you’re bragging.  As a guy you’re confident.  But 
I can’t go and rub it into some guy’s face, “Hey, I beat your ASVAB score by ten.  
Hey, I beat you on that advancement exam by thirty points. Oh, I beat you out for 
an EP (Early Promote).”  You know we can’t do that because then it makes us 
look bad ….like a male perception of us doing that is “oh, she’s just showing off.  
She’s doing this.  She’s doing that.”  But to guys that’s [bragging about their 
superiority] just every day.  That’s an every day thing. Same thing with sex.  I 
mean, shoot, like that doesn’t happen on the boat, you know.  But if a girl does it, 
she’s a slut.  If a boy does it, good for him, “Oh, he slept with all the girls in one of 
the Air divisions.”  Big wow.  Good for him.  Somebody’s going to buy him a beer 
                                            
 
121 This quote, which was not included in Margosian and Vendrzyk 1994, is from an interview (JMV4) 
conducted by the author as part of that research. 
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in Dubai.  If it’s a girl, she doesn’t stand a chance.  It’s sexism every which way.  
Damned if you do and damned if you don’t. 
She described another instance in which she was relatively new to the ship and 
received what she thought was a casual invitation to “drop by” for a house party.  The 
person who invited her later claimed he had asked her for a date.  She went to the party 
and because she was unaware that she was supposed to be on a date, she spent the 
evening talking to another guy.  Afterwards untrue rumors flew about the ship about her 
alleged exploits.  She related that she felt more betrayed by the men who were 
supposed to be her friends, who were there and knew the real truth but did nothing to 
stop the rumors, than by the guy who started them in the first place.  Overall, she 
assessed the Navy as an organization as accepting of women but conceded that  
individuals within the chain of command did not always follow policy.  It seems the 
larger policy has the potential to get lost as it trickles down the chain of command to the 
point where individuals must enforce it.   
Diana, an ET1, explained how when she had made promotion to E-6 in 2005, the 
more senior male E-6 she worked for put an electronic scrolling screen-saver on the 
office computer that read “E-6 Ain’t What It Used to Be … Now they’ll let anyone in.”  In 
typical Sailor form she described him as “beyond childish” and “a crappy, unhappy, fat 
bastard, who was out of [height/weight] standards and who honestly, because of the 
way he was raised, did not believe that women should be in service or that we can be of 
any benefit.”  When she had arrived on the ship, there had been an immediate conflict 
between them because he assigned all the men to do the technical maintenance and all 
the women to do administrative and cleaning tasks.  
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3. Traditional Feminine Stereotypes Limited Women’s Participation 
 In 1993, women Navy officers complained that their workforce participation was 
often limited by men on the basis of traditional gender stereotypes.  According to Gutek 
and Cohen (1983), when women enter predominantly male work places, their male 
colleagues see them as women first and as workers second.  Therefore, men tend to 
respond to women as if they are filling familiar feminine social roles, e.g., wives, 
daughters, mothers, etc.   For example, one Lieutenant related how when asked to 
wash the coffee cups following a conference she used humor to get the point across to 
her CO that she should not be asked to do something he would not ask her male peers 
to do.  After washing the cups as requested, she placed the following note in her 
Commanding Officer’s coffee cup:  “If I’m going to be employed as a waitress, tips 
would be appreciated” (Margosian & Vendrzyk 1994, p. 79).  Another officer described 
the gendered division of labor in her squadron among enlisted personnel:   
The men created a new job down in the shops called the ‘Paperwork Petty 
Officer.’  Of course, it was not a real job.  They made sure that one woman in 
each shop was in charge of paperwork.  The guys were out on the aircraft getting 
their PQS [qualifications] signed off.  They had other [operational] jobs like 
Safety, or Line Petty Officer [but] these gals were in the shop taking care of all 
this enormous paperwork.  And when the First Class women confronted the 
Chiefs, the Chiefs said, ‘Well, these gals are better typists and they have much 
better handwriting and it only makes sense that we would put them in there.’  I 
[also] found out the First Class women weren’t getting a fair shake at billets with 
the First Class guys.  The First Class guys would always be chosen to be in 
Maintenance Control, which is very prestigious, a Chief’s job.  They wouldn’t let 
women do it, and the women knew the reason they weren’t doing it was because 
they were women (Margosian & Vendrzyk 1994, p. 67). 
Still another speculated on a job she probably wouldn’t have been asked to do had she  
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been a man:   
The Admiral and his wife had to go out of the area and they had an aging mother 
living with them.  And I was approached and asked if I would mind staying at their 
home and ‘babysitting’ this aging mother.  I thought at the time ‘if I [were] a male 
officer would they have asked me?’ (Margosian & Vendrzyk 1994, p. 78). 
Another women officer described what had happened to one of the women Department 
Heads at her squadron: 
My Department Head in Norfolk, a female E-2 pilot, LCDR, a very sharp person, 
went in to meet the [new] Executive Officer (XO) 122 who asked her what she 
wanted to do, and she said “Operations Officer.” It was something [a job] she 
hadn’t done yet.  She’d been a LCDR for a couple of years and she wanted a 
shot at it.  The XO said, “Well, of course you’re going to Admin” (Margosian & 
Vendrzyk 1994, p. 67).123  
Yet another officer described the problems she experienced when she was assigned as 
the Training Officer for a major Naval Station, filling a job that was normally filled by 
men or a warfare specialist, even though the job itself did not require a warfare specialty 
background:    
I was filling an 1110 (Surface Warfare Officer) billet and loved the job.  I 
encountered a few problems with Commanding Officers who, when I tried to set 
up specialized training for their crews, would balk and say “What does an 1100 
female know about ship’s training” (Margosian & Vendrzyk 1994, p. 68)? 
One LCDR helicopter pilot explained the influence gender stereotypes held by male  
 
                                            
 
122 The XO is second in command of the unit. 
123 Operations Officer, or Operations Department Head, was considered a very important and prestigious 
job.  Men fought over the Operations Officer job because it was considered career-enhancing, whereas 
men avoided being assigned to head the Administrative Department like the plague because it wasn’t 
sufficiently “operational” -- no one ever won a war by getting the paperwork right. 
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instructor pilots had on women student pilots: 
Some of them [the male instructors] were very honest, they really did want to run 
you out, but if you flew well then they couldn’t do anything about it.  As a matter 
of fact, most of the guys, the Marine instructors especially, were extremely 
surprised when you flew well.  A lot of the Marine instructors after I was winged 
[qualified as a pilot] or while I was in my last stages [of training] said, “Oh, we just 
can’t believe that women are actually decent pilots (Margosian & Vendrzyk 1994, 
p. 64). 
Still another reported how after completing initial flight training and reporting to her first 
squadron she learned first-hand that members of the aircrew were unwilling to fly with 
her: 
I remember I went out on my first flight and I did really well [but] I remember one 
of the crew, he had to be ordered to fly with me because he had protested to his 
boss that he’d leave the Navy if [staying in] meant putting his life in the hands of 
a woman pilot.  But he went because he was told that he’d be court-martialed if 
he refused a direct order (Margosian & Vendrzyk 1994, p. 69). 
Few of the Navy women who participated in my more recent study complained 
about being sidetracked in their career aspirations by gender stereotypes imposed upon 
them either by official Navy policy or by their superiors in daily practice.  In fact, most 
officer participants especially concluded that they had been afforded equal opportunity 
within the Navy because they had never been denied any request (training, job, etc.) 
based on their sex – at least not as far as they were aware.  Nikki, a nuclear-trained 
First Class Machinist Mate actually related how gender did not seem to come into play 
at all in the assignment of her rating:  
I decided to join the Navy because I had heard that the services would help pay 
for college.  I told the recruiter that I wanted to be paid to use my brain.  He said 
“that sounds like the Nuclear power field.” I got to choose whether or not I wanted 
to be a Nuke.  The Navy got to decide what kind of Nuke I was going to be.  So, I 
ended up being a Machinist’s Mate.  I had no experience doing mechanical kinds 
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of work and the tools that I have to use are often as big as your arm.  When I’m 
standing watch in case of emergencies I might have to close a valve.  To close a 
valve takes 90 turns, but the valve wheel is as big as a car tire and I can only turn 
it a quarter revolution at a time.  And you only have so much time to do those 90 
complete turns, so I always found watch very stressful because I was concerned 
that I might not be physically able to do what I needed to do in the short period of 
time you have to respond to a crisis, but none of the chiefs or officers I worked 
for ever seemed to worry about that. 
Once again, however, perceptions of equal access, experienced mostly by 
officers, do not tell the whole story.   When I asked Amy, the ET2 who had been 
stationed aboard the East Coast aircraft carrier, if she thought Navy men believed Navy 
woman could be both good looking and good technicians, she said “no” and elaborated:   
Because guys, all of them, they don’t think that’s possible.  If you were a cute girl 
and you showed up you got labeled.  You couldn’t have talked to anybody.  You 
were still a slut.  You were a whore.  If you were good looking … yes.  And you 
were in no way ever considered for work.  I have a very good friend who’s an 
IT2124 that when she made third class her first time up and she made second 
class her first time up.  She came to the boat as a seaman and watch her – 
boom!  boom! boom! There she went to second.  And you’d see jaws hit the floor 
when they found out she made second.  She’s an ex-model.  People [didn’t] think 
she was smart.  The girl is a … she’s a genius.  But she’s also an ex-model.  And 
because she’s this big around (forms a circle with thumb and forefinger) and she 
has a lot going on in her head all the time, she wouldn’t sleep a lot.  She had 
problems with sleeping.  And she got accused of being up all night roaming 
around with guys even though sometimes she’d just be sitting up in her rack125 
watching a movie.  She slept in the rack below me.  It’s not like I worried about 
her.  And you’d just hear it constantly.  “Oh, did you hear she was out with the air 
guys last night.  She was in the air berthing.”  I’m like “No, she wasn’t.  She was 
in her rack.”  But because she’s cute she can’t be the smart girl that knows what 
she’s doing. 
Diana, the ET1, complained of the Navy: 
There’s not enough effective leaders that want to keep women.  More of them 
think that a woman is more pain than she’s ever going to be worth, whether it’s 
between babies, boyfriends, husbands, spouses, a commitment to take care of 
her mother or her father or her family.  It’s tolerance on the woman’s part to keep 
                                            
 
124 Interior Communications Second Class Petty Officer (E-5) 
125 A “rack” in the Navy is your “berth,” essentially, your bed.  
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putting up with the boys’ club, to keep fighting for advancement…why do I always 
have to prove that I am so much better than the male counterpart?  Your first 
year at a command you have to prove yourself, when you’re a woman always 
fighting glass ceilings, you’re not just proving that you can do it, but why aren’t 
they doing it.  Some women that I have worked with have been like “why do you 
make me look bad and put me to shame?” because if you have quals,126 you got 
to knock them out.127  When you don’t knock them out you make other people 
think that rules don’t apply to you because you’re a girl or you, yourself, are lazy.  
Which one is it?  Or you’ve got to look at what’s the command’s policy and 
program in regards to training. More times than not if you’re a female… If you’re 
a hard charging individual sometimes you don’t care what people say.  You’re 
going to go through it and you’re just going to get through all these boundaries 
regardless of what they are.  And once you’ve achieved all those you’ll have 
male counterparts come up, “why are you making us look bad?  Because we 
didn’t get our stuff done?” “Well, A: I don’t care how you look; and B: I care about 
my eval.”  
Many women, both officer and enlisted, fear that all their hard work in attempting 
to overcome stereotypes can be wiped out by one woman who confirms them.  
Although this was not a finding in the 1993 study, it probably should have been.  In their 
desire to overcome stereotypes, women can be harder on other women than men are.  
There is evidence of this phenomenon in 1993, and there is evidence of it in 2013, 
despite the fact that the overall percentage of women in the Navy continues to grow.128  
There are still plenty of commands, or pockets within commands (departments or 
                                            
 
126 Qualifications to earn. 
127 When you arrive at a new command you may have multiple qualifications (quals) that you are required 
to attain before you are fully functional aboard the ship.  Some qualification may be related to your full-
time job, while other are related to your watchstanding duties. There is always pressure to achieve 
qualifications as quickly as possible because each duty section must have fully qualified watchstanders in 
all positions.  Duty sections are thus limited in number by the availability of qualified watchstanders.  For 
example, if only three officers on the ship are qualified as Tactical Action Officer (TAO) then officers on 
board the ship are limited to three-section duty.  That is, they stand duty every third day.  If two more 
officers report aboard and quickly qualify as TAO, the Officers can go into five-section duty, meaning they 
stand watch every five days.  Standing duty once every five days is obviously preferable to standing it 
every three days. 
128 Although the overall number of women in the military continues to grow, the vast majority of women 
are still concentrated in more traditional fields, such as nursing, supply, administration, etc.  Women on 
sea duty are limited by available “female berthing,” or the number of racks available for women on any 
particular ship. The difficulty in providing women with their own berthing compartment separate from that 
of the men on some smaller subs has been a primary justification for keeping women out of submarines 
until very recently. 
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divisions) where women, especially those in non-traditional, technical ratings, remain 
distinctly in the minority, and therefore function as tokens. As a result of this token 
status, women wishing to disprove stereotypes are acutely aware of how quickly and 
easily the reputation of women as a group can be damaged.  
In 1993, women complained that some women made it harder on all women to 
succeed.  For example, one LCDR explained that she had come into her command on 
the heels of Ensign who had been fooling around with a Commander in the unit, playing 
sexual politics.  She complained: 
I walked in behind [this] female who was playing these games.  I’m trying to play 
it straight.  Do you see what I’m saying?  So it’s not just the men.  There are 
women out there sabotaging what we’re working for [to be taken as competent 
professionals who advance on their own merit] (Margosian & Vendrzyk 1994, p. 
95). 
Another described the initial fears about her competence that a senior enlisted woman 
had expressed to her: 
I think she was afraid I was going to be an incompetent female and that would 
ruin her credibility and reputation.  It sounds stupid but that is how women think – 
that they have worked too hard to get this far to let some bimbo come in and tear 
down their reputation.  We tend to be grouped so much and we don’t like it if we 
get grouped with the flakes (Margosian & Vendrzyk 1994, p. 96)! 
Another officer explained why women felt they had to excel and outperform their male 
coworkers and why they were so hard on their female peers: 
As we go through our careers, we are trailblazers.  We have to work harder just 
to get the same recognition.  As soon as you get a ditz in who bats her eyes and 
wriggles her hips, then that undoes everything I’ve done and worked for – to 
show them [men] we should be on equal footing – well, then we’re back to 
square one (Margosian & Vendrzyk 1994, p. 98). 
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A Lieutenant Commander described some of the problems associated with women that 
bothered her: 
I think…there’s always that one malingerer that capitalizes on their pregnancy to 
the point where one bad apple spoils the whole bunch.  I know I get annoyed 
when I see a fat women officer because she reflects badly on the rest of us.  I 
just want to go up, smack her and say “Drop some pounds, you cow” (Margosian 
& Vendrzyk 1994, p. 97)! 
One woman officer admitted she was harder on the women who worked for her than 
she was on the men because she knew any one Navy woman’s failure reflected 
negatively on all Navy women.  
  In my more recent study, Faith, the former intelligence analyst turned career 
counselor, discussed how stereotypes seemed to be perpetuated on her ship: 
I think that the preconception is just perpetuated by the females who actually 
prove it to be true.  The ones who are very girly and wussy, who don’t want to do 
anything, are the ones who do get dressed up to come down to engineering 
spaces with their makeup and their nails done and that kind of stuff.  But then, 
also the ones who do, I would say, kind of pull the mommy card either getting 
pregnant or claiming that they always have childcare issues.  They feed that fire 
that the guys already have because the guys are going to see it one time and 
make a snap judgment.  And unless there’s enough people to show that that’s 
not always true they’re going to always think that, but more often than not 
another one just comes along and does the exact same thing. 
Faith provided a further example: 
There’s this one [division] on the ship.  And it’s the Fire Controlmen (FCs).  
They’re in charge of all of our spy radars, the biggest system on our ship for 
radar detection, for anti-attack type things.  And it [FC] is a technical rate.  
They’re all very smart people.  It’s an entire division, probably the biggest division 
on the ship.  It’s all males.  Friends of mine have been there for five years as 
FC’s and some friends that I’ve had that have now transferred -  they’re like, “Oh, 
yeah.  We’ve had a couple girls.  Every single one of them got pregnant.”  One 
girl [who had previously been assigned to the ship but had gotten pregnant and 
transferred off] showed up again [while the ship was] on deployment.  By the end 
of deployment she was pregnant.  She had to be transferred off [again].  That’s 
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their perception of females in these rates.  Obviously there’s not very many of 
them (women).  And the ones that we do get go and get themselves pregnant. 
I asked Faith to clarify what I thought she was saying:  “So, people actually confirm 
stereotypes?  The people that don’t conform to stereotypes or work actively to combat 
those female stereotypes, they’re marginalized, because of the number of stereotype-
confirming women is greater?”  She responded: 
Yes.  That’s what [the men are] used to.  And like I said, I think that me being 
very outspoken and direct in the way that I am conducting myself and the way 
that I’m doing my job definitely sets them back because they’re not used to it.  
But then, also that I’m not conforming to what they’re used to [She’s neither too 
girly nor too masculine] and I’m defying that kind of.  So I am not the norm.  I 
don’t feel that I, I definitely have confirmed that to myself being in the fleet, that 
I’m definitely outside of the box on the way that they expect females to act and 
the way that females tend to have a career in the Navy. 
Faith also spoke about stereotypes of Navy women.  If the first is of women who play 
the gender card or get pregnant to avoid sea duty; the second is of women who go to 
the opposite extreme, becoming too masculine – a strategy she feels they pursue 
because they think it’s the only way to fit into a predominantly male  occupation and 
masculinized work environment.  She eschews both these approaches and pursues a 
third alternative, which she says is rare.  She combines physical strength, technical 
capability, and moderate femininity, striving to strike a balance between them all and 
always to be “professional.”  Although she did not come right out and say it in the crass 
way I was used to hearing military women classified by military men during my time on 
active duty, the old presumption that military women are either “sluts or dykes” seems to 
be alive and well. 
In explaining why it is so important for women to maintain professional distance 
from men while on sea duty, Faith pointed out that life on a ship is different because 
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when it deploys, often for 6-8 months, the crew is stuck together on the ship for the 
duration.  The men and women must work and live together.  They cannot get away 
from one another.  Even when they pull in to port, current Navy regulations require a 
“buddy system” on liberty.   The requirement to go out in town in groups is intended both 
to keep Sailors out of trouble and to serve as a security measure for obviously-
American Sailors wandering strange streets in a foreign port.   A Sailor cannot leave the 
ship by him or herself.  While they might split up once ashore, doing so is against the 
rules and a real risk.  If a Sailor is caught failing to comply with liberty policy they will 
very likely be disciplined and have their future liberty curtailed. Civilians and even 
military people on shore duty are never thrown together to the extent and for the 
duration that crews of Navy warships are. As a result, sea-going Sailors see each other 
at their absolute best and their absolute worst and everything in-between. One is not left 
with many illusions as to who the members of their crew really are.  If a woman acts 
unprofessionally either on the ship or ashore, she has a harder time commanding the 
respect of her peers, especially her male peers.  
4. Women’s Bodies and Sexuality are a Basis for Exclusion 
In 1993 women Navy officers reported that their bodies and sexuality were the 
basis for excluding them from some jobs, or at the very least, causing high anxiety 
among their male colleagues and superiors.  According to Acker (1992b) because 
managers fear that sexuality and reproduction may disrupt the workplace “women’s 
bodies, sexuality, and procreative abilities” are used as grounds to exclude them.  
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Collinson and Collinson (1989) argue that in contrast “men’s sexuality dominates most 
workplaces and reinforces their organizational power.”   
At the Academy women’s weight became the subject of intense scrutiny by male 
midshipmen.  Women, already fighting against the ideal physical image of the lean, 
mean, and muscular male warrior, described working hard to reach maximum physical 
fitness while keeping their weight at or below standards to avoid negative stereotyping 
as soft and out of shape.  As one woman related: 
There was a large push there that the upper classmen would pay a lot of 
attention to what the younger women ate.  In any college it’s normal to see 
women gain 10-15 pounds.  But when you get to the Academy they don’t want 
you to gain even one pound.  Matter of fact, they want you to lose weight – slim 
down, trim up, cut the fat – that’s what they want (Margosian & Vendrzyk 1994, p. 
87). 
She recalled a specific incident when an upper classman specifically commented on her 
eating:   
My boyfriend and I went to the gedunk129 machine.  It had granola bars and 
candy in it, and it happened to be next to an upper classman’s room.  He heard 
the money go in and sort of popped his head out to see what Plebe was getting a 
candy bar and he saw my boyfriend.  “Mr. X – What are you getting there?” My 
boyfriend was getting a candy bar, just laden with calories and the guy said, “You 
gotta keep that strength up.”  We were just getting ready to start study hours and 
he said, “Yah, that’s brain food, you know?  Gotta keep up your strength.” My 
boyfriend was real proud and said, “Oh, yes sir!”  So, now it was my turn, so I 
went to drop my money in and he asked, “And what are you getting Miss X --?”  
And I said, “Well, I haven’t decided yet, sir.” He said, “All of those things have 
calories, lots of empty calories,” and he kept on saying “empty calories, just 
sitting there during study hour, doing nothing…” (Margosian & Vendrzyk 1994, 
pp. 87). 
 
                                            
 
129 “Gedunk” is Navy vernacular for junk food such as candy, chips, etc. – the kind of stuff you would 
typically find in a vending machine.  
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She then described the long-term effect of such focus on women’s eating: 
I remember when I went to graduation I saw many thin, thin women.  Thin, 
unhealthy, thin women who were there.  There were lots of cases of bulimia and 
anorexia.  And no one will admit to it or talk about it because it is considered a 
mental disorder and you can be discharged for it (Margosian & Vendrzyk 1994, p. 
88). 
A Lieutenant Helicopter pilot recounted the “Welcome Aboard” discussion she had 
with the Executive Officer (XO) of her operational unit who was preoccupied with the 
possibility that as a woman she might get pregnant, leaving the unit short-handed: 
He said “We want you to march right down to the flight surgeon because you’re 
not going to get pregnant while you’re here.  I’m going to make you go out to 
sea.” And I said “Look, I’m not married and I don’t plan to start a family.”  And he 
said, “Well, you know the facts of life.”  And I said, “No! You don’t understand.  I 
said ‘I’m not married and I don’t plan to start a family here on Guam” (Margosian 
& Vendrzyk 1994, p. 83). 
Another Lieutenant on shore duty recalled her boss’s reaction to the news that she was 
going to have a baby and the efforts she made to avoid being stereotyped as a 
pregnant Sailor who was “disabled” by her ability to bear a child:  
When I first became pregnant, I told my Department Head, a male aviator.  I had 
planned to go in and tell my CO and XO, but my Department Head’s reaction 
was, “Oh, God, you’re pregnant!” and I just shriveled down in my chair.  He 
asked if I had told the CO and XO so I said “No, but I planned to, after I informed 
[you].” “Well,” he said, “I’ll handle it.” I thought to myself, “I didn’t think this was a 
big problem.” Then his reaction started me thinking.  “What if I get sick, or have 
to go to the bathroom every hour, or something happens and I can’t come to 
work?”  I didn’t want him to think that I’d be unable to work.  So, I decided to work 
a little bit harder to let him know that I wasn’t like those few women who exploit 
their conditions.  I felt that I had to go beyond, go overboard, compared to what I 
usually did, just to prove I wasn’t incapable’ (Margosian & Vendrzyk 1994, p. 83). 
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Another LCDR related that she had caused “quite an uproar” when she reported to 
Surface Warfare Officer Department Head school 5 months pregnant.130 
Department Head school was very arduous.  It’s 6 months long.  [There is] a big 
bunch of Tactical Action Officer (TAO) crap which none of us women will ever 
use.131  There were two of us [women] out of a total of 65 or 70.  There weren’t 
more than two or three women per class because there were a lot fewer billets 
for them to go to.  I was the first pregnant female at Department Head School.  
And I found out since -- I had never really bothered to read up on the regulations 
on pregnant women before -- but you’re not supposed to go to a training 
command while you are pregnant.132  I figured “Well, it was nobody’s business.”  I 
knew what I was doing.  I knew I could handle it.  Oh, it was very arduous 
though.  It was very hard stuff.133 
A Lieutenant Helo pilot also recalled how the officer-in-charge of her Detachment 
explained his misgivings about having women under his command during a Desert 
Storm deployment:   
The CO called him in and asked ‘Why haven’t you listened to what LT X is telling 
you?  She’s trying to help you out here.’ And he responded ‘I can’t.  I’m sexually 
attracted to her.  She’s an attractive woman and I’m a married man.  And I feel 
like I’ve sinned whenever she’s around, she’s going to die and go to hell because 
the Bible says she should be at home.’  So he started talking about how the Bible 
said women should be at home.  And I’m going to be punished because I’m not 
at home having kids, where I belong.  And also that the Bible says that men are 
                                            
 
130 This was actually very smart strategic planning on her part because she would have the baby 4 
months in to a 6-month shore duty school and she would still have two months to spend ashore with the 
baby before reporting to her next sea duty as a Department Head.  Male surface warfare officers do not 
have to worry about career timing when contemplating having children.  Women have to fit pregnancy in 
between sea tours without any assurances Mother Nature will cooperate with the intended timeline.  
131 The TAO on a surface combatant “fights” the ship when it engages in combat or ship’s defense.  At the 
time, women could not be assigned to combatant ships, and there were no offensive or defensive 
weapons systems on non-combatant ships with which to fight.  So, women going through Surface 
Warfare Department Head school spent months learning and memorizing the capabilities of various 
enemy ships, and learning how best to fight various U.S. combatant ships knowing that they would never 
use the knowledge.  Because much of this information is classified, students attend class approximately 8 
hours a day and then must spent two to four or more hours in the evening locked in a Classified Material 
Storage (CMS) vault memorizing classified information because it cannot be taken out of the secure 
storage space.  
132 She had transferred from Hawaii to Newport, RI so her Permanent Change of Station (PCS) move was 
already a sunk cost and they let her attend the school.   
133 This quote, which was not included in Margosian and Vendrzyk 1994, is from an interview (JMV4) 
conducted by the author as part of that research. 
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sexually aroused visually and that he can’t concentrate with these women in the 
wardroom (Margosian & Vendrzyk 1994, pp. 83-4). 
Yet another Lieutenant assigned to an aviation squadron recalled how a senior enlisted 
leader at her command justified his initial failure to integrate a woman into more non-
traditional jobs: 
A female Airman came to see me because she was striking for a rating with the 
Air Frames shop.  She was new and was anxious to get started in the shop, but 
kept being told to just sit in a corner and wait for instructions. We resolved it, but 
not without some heartburn from the supervisor.  One of his comments was, 
“Well, she’s very tiny.  I don’t think she can handle a lot of the stuff we’re doing.” 
She was the only female, and he viewed her as more of an intrusion than an 
asset (Margosian & Vendrzyk 1994, p. 82). 
Today’s Navy women still experience some workplace issues related to their 
bodies and sexuality, however the data seem to indicate that at least for officers, it is 
now more acceptable for women SWOs to get pregnant and be mothers so long as the 
pregnancy is planned and executed in a way that does not negatively impact the 
mission or the ship.  Enlisted women who become pregnant are still often treated as a 
liability or with contempt by enlisted male peers and leaders.  Enlisted women continue 
to find their bodies are used as justification to marginalize or exclude them. Additionally, 
the new unofficial message military women seem to be getting from both male and 
female colleagues and peers is that “it is somewhat more acceptable to be women in 
the military today, but just do not be overtly sexually or biologically female.”   
As to the first admonition against being an overtly sexualized female, most men 
and many women agree that “hyperfeminity” is not appropriate to the professional Navy 
workplace, especially not on the waterfront or aboard ship.  That is, both men and 
women seem to think that it is inappropriate for women’s appearance and form to take 
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precedence over shipboard function.  Women in particular feel that other women 
shouldn’t “cake on the makeup” or bathe in perfume. They aren’t opposed to women 
displaying aspects of femininity, and they are not suggesting women act more 
masculine.  What they do suggest is that women use subtlety and discretion when 
deciding how much makeup or perfume to wear, and they specifically should not appear 
to be nor actually engage actively in “trolling for men” at work.  This thinking appears to 
reflect traditional male bias and hints at the fact that masculinity still operates 
hegemonically in the Navy.  It also hints at the precarious nature of women’s 
acceptance in the ranks, as well as women’s concern that all women suffer the adverse 
consequences when even one or a few of their female shipmates’ conform to negative 
stereotypes.   
As to the second admonition against being “overtly biologically female,” based 
upon women participants’ perceptions in my most recent study, men mostly seem either 
scared by or resentful of pregnant women.  Although women who are pregnant can 
continue to serve aboard ship up to their twentieth week, and even though most ships 
have a hard time “gapping a billet,”134 many Commanding Officers and Executive 
Officers get pregnant women off the ship as soon as possible, most likely because a 
ship is an industrial environment and they may fear that some unforeseen harm may 
come to the woman or her unborn child, for which they will be held accountable.  
Preventable injuries aboard ship can have career-ending consequences for the most 
                                            
 
134 Allowing a job to go vacant for an extended period of time.  If a billet (position) is unexpectedly 
vacated, there is a lag-time in getting that billet filled.  Having an unfilled position on a ship means 
everyone else must do more work to make up for the missing person.  
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senior leadership, and it seems many men simply do not want to take the chance that 
something unforeseen might injure a pregnant woman.   
Unfortunately, by transferring pregnant women off their ship immediately upon 
discovery of the pregnancy, COs and XOs are likely unintentionally fostering resentment 
for women Sailors among male crewmembers.  When anyone is transferred off a ship 
before their planned rotation date, there is always a time lag, perhaps of many months, 
in getting a new person onboard to fill the open billet.  In the meantime, if the ship is 
undermanned, the remaining crew is overworked to compensate for the personnel 
shortage.  This cannot help but to focus hostility and resentment on pregnant Sailors.  If 
the CO and XO kept her on board until her twentieth week, rather than immediately 
transferring the pregnant Sailor, they might be able to arrange for a replacement to 
arrive such that the billet would not be “gapped” for nearly as long, thereby reducing the 
work burden on the remaining crew.   
Women who become pregnant while on sea duty are sent ashore and they must 
work somewhere in the Navy.   As a result some commands have gained reputations as 
“dumping grounds” for those women, especially for enlisted women in non-traditional 
ratings.  One such command is the Regional Maintenance Facility (RMC), which, as its 
name implies, is instrumental in effecting ships’ maintenance and repairs.135  Nikki, the 
nuclear-qualified First Class Machinist Mate, was assigned to a West Coast carrier and 
religiously taking the pill when her birth control method failed and she unexpectedly 
became pregnant.  Despite the fact that she was only four to six weeks pregnant, the 
ship transferred her nearly immediately to the RMC where she observed that command 
                                            
 
135 Regional Maintenance Facilities are located in each area of Navy concentration, so there are RMCs in 
Norfolk, VA; Mayport, FL; San Diego, CA; Bremerton, WA; Pearl Harbor, HI; Atsugi Japan. 
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seemed annoyed to have to deal with pregnant women.  In fact, she noted that when 
women returned to full duty following the birth of the baby and maternity leave, 
managers often seemed determined to “extract their pound of flesh” from the women for 
the period they weren’t able to perform to full capacity.  It is a long-recognized and 
common practice for Navy men to focus on productivity lost to women’s pregnancies 
while completely ignoring the loss of productivity associated with the male Sailor who 
breaks his hand after punching a wall in drunken anger or who breaks a leg sliding in to 
home during command-sponsored intramural baseball.  The Navy conducted research 
on this perceived problem and exploded the myth that pregnant Navy women were a 
greater productivity loss than men.  See Thomas, Thomas, and McClintock (1991) and 
Wiltrout (2007). 
Pregnant women may have medical appointments to attend, which takes them 
away from work.  They may also be restricted from exposure to common industrial 
chemicals or, when their pregnancy is advanced, they may no longer be able to do the 
same type of physical labor they had performed in the past, such as squeezing into a 
small space to do maintenance or moving heavy equipment.  As described by the First 
Class Machinist’s Mate (N) having to employ so many pregnant women, RMC 
managers act as if they get all of the headaches for far less productivity than if a non-
pregnant woman or a man were assigned.  Perceptions of the problem of pregnancy 
differ according to a woman’s status as officer or enlisted, with the enlisted “problem”  
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generally considered far worse.  As Faith, the NC1, explained: 
On our ship specifically with so many pregnancies136 the policy is you can stay 
on board up to twenty weeks before you are transferred off the ship.  And then 
you go to your shore duty command or whatever. But every single one that has 
gotten pregnant on our ship we move them right away. 
When asked why the ship would transfer pregnant women before the twentieth week (5 
months pregnant) Faith responded: 
I don’t know.  It’s the guys making the decision because my guidance is always 
to keep them on board to retain them to continue doing their [career] 
development as they were doing on here.  And not to reward them, especially for 
the ones who did it on purpose, but then also having gone through this I know 
that not all pregnancies are the same.  And some have complications so 
[transferring them early is] understandable.  But some of them might lose the kid 
too.  And we then have lost a Sailor now because [we transferred them early]. 
When I asked Faith if she had discussed these management issues with the CO and XO she 
clarified: 
Oh yes.  It’s the fact I’m an E-6.  I’ll say that.  It has nothing to do with being a 
female at that point.  It’s because I’m a first class and they’re above me and 
they’re going to make the decision regardless of my guidance.  [The policy], It’s 
very reasonable.  When they choose to transfer pregnant Sailors early we’ve now 
lost a Sailor and their billet stays open.  In a sense they are blind to the sense of 
the policy and it comes at the expense of the ship. [And they don’t listen to me] 
on the sole basis of I wear a crow and not an anchor or a bar.137  But I think if you 
dig down into it a little bit more it [is because] when you’re a pregnant female you 
have a medical condition.  You’re not disabled.  You can’t “not function.”  But 
guys, especially maybe guys who aren’t married, who don’t have kids, who are 
making these decisions are so scared something is going to happen that they’re 
not going to be physically capable of doing something so that they kind of coddle 
them.  And they protect them.  And they pretend like they’re now this delicate, 
breakable doll [to the point] that “okay, just get them out of here because if 
something happened I don’t want to be blamed for it,” that kind of thing.  I think 
that mentality is there.  And I know that that’s not true.  I know that there are 
                                            
 
136 Immediately after the ship returned from deployment approximately 14 out of 40 total women onboard 
became pregnant, all of them enlisted.   
137 Petty Officers wear rate insignia that resembles a crow; chiefs wear anchors; and officers wear bars.  
See Appendix D for elaboration on and examples of rank insignia.  
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certain situations where the pregnancy is more difficult.  But I know tons of 
people who function just fine up until nine months, and [the Navy has] a policy 
because of medical research, because of studies, that you can stay on a ship 
and function up till your twentieth week.  Then it becomes more of a hazard than, 
you know, that kind of thing.  So we’ve now made a concession.  This is the 
policy.  Follow the policy.  And our ship, I think they’re just scared.  I think it’s the 
guys are just scared if something happened we don’t want to be held 
accountable for it, so…I have tried to put my two cents in and I feel they don’t 
listen a lot mainly because I’m an E-6. 
5. Women Must Manage their Femininity to Fit In 
In 1993, women Navy officers felt they had to constantly adjust their femininity to 
fit in at their command.  They felt as if they were under pressure to prove that they were 
feminine enough to be heterosexual, since being gay was grounds for separation at the 
time, but not so feminine that they were incapable of being regarded as effective Naval 
officers.  If a new Commanding Officer or Executive Officer reported aboard, a woman 
might find she had to adjust her gender performance to accommodate that person’s 
expectations [which might be, and frequently were, different from their predecessor] for 
how women should act and present themselves.  Often, what was considered 
appropriate gender display for a woman was at odds with expectations for how a Navy 
officer should behave or the qualities they should possess.   One woman provided one 
example of this at the Naval Academy: 
Part of the criteria you were graded on there is your voice projection.  And one 
girl had a real problem when she had to stand and yell out “series.”  It is 
information that is shouted out to the Company 10 and 5 minutes before 
formation.  She would get out there, poor thing, and just start yelling in this voice 
that was really high and kind of squeaky, and didn’t have a lot of gut to it.  It was 
like ants on an anthill.  Upperclassmen would come swarming out or stick their 
heads out of their doors and say “Who is that?!” They would just swarm and 
pounce on this poor girl.  And there wasn’t a lot she could do about it.  She’d try 
to make her voice male and deep, which would sound really ridiculous, but it kept 
people off her back.  So something that became ingrained in her that it’s not okay 
to have a voice that’s soft and a little bit feminine.  The message was to be 
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assertive, talk deeply, husky, that’s the way to be so people will leave you alone 
(Margosian & Vendrzyk 1994, p. 86) 
Another explained the effect the Naval Academy environment had on her friends and 
roommates: 
A good friend of mine was very good at putting her make-up on.  She looked 
great, and always wore perfume.  But you could see as the year wore on – it was 
a very long first year – and most of the male upper class were always harping on 
her and like with all the women, they stop wearing makeup altogether.  They stop 
wearing perfume and slowly the language got worse.  My two roommates who 
never cursed, by the end of the year, after hearing the males in the company, 
would just slip into that kind of language very easily (Margosian & Vendrzyk 
1994, p. 85). 
A Lieutenant Commander described why women tried to adapt to male midshipmen 
standards:  
Women were afraid to complain.  They wanted to fit in and they didn’t want to be 
singled out.  They didn’t want to make waves.  They wanted to be liked.  They 
didn’t want to make trouble.  I think this is a mistake a lot of people made there.  
We didn’t want to be stereotyped.  We didn’t want to be classified.  We wanted to 
retain our identities.  It’s not like we wanted to blend in with the men, we just 
didn’t want to blend in with the women (Margosian & Vendrzyk 1994, p.88). 
Another Lieutenant Commander, reflecting on her time at the Academy with some 
regret recounted how she had responded: 
I think the women that were fat or unattractive probably suffered more by it [the 
masculine environment], but my roommates and I did the best we could to make 
ourselves look good.  I think that messed us up because then it became all about 
what we looked like.   It was like all we wanted to do was be attractive to these 
men, the same pigs who were putting us down at every opportunity.  It was OK to 
be cute, to be fun and giggly, and I tried to fit that mold, like the dumb blond 
syndrome.  I was then “OK” because I was a cute and fun female, not one of 
those ugly, bitchy, fat, radical, feminist Midshipmen.  Which now, looking back, I 
respect them so much more than I do myself … (Margosian & Vendrzyk 1994, 
pp. 89-90). 
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 In contrast, Navy women who participated in my recent study seemed far less 
concerned with broadcasting their femininity as inoculation against suspicions of 
homosexuality.  For one thing, Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell (DADT), which gave homosexuals 
some small measure of protection they had not previously enjoyed, was not instituted 
until 1 October 1993, well after interviews for the 1994 study were concluded.  For 
another, women in the more recent study have served largely in an era when official 
military policy was to not root out homosexuals if they remained closeted or claimed not 
to act on their homosexuality.  While there remains some concern over striking the right 
balance between “woman” and “professional,” Navy women today seem far less 
concerned by male perceptions of their degree of femininity than their predecessors of 
the early 1990s.   
The Navy officers in my recent study uniformly denied feeling any specific 
pressure to manage their femininity.  Certainly they do not experience the same kind of 
pressure to do so that their predecessors did in 1993.  However, upon closer 
examination and analysis, the interview data reveal women nonetheless communicated 
an underlying need to manage their femininity and to be seen as thoroughly 
professional. It is not as though sexism in the Navy no longer exists or that the 
hegemony of masculinity is no longer in play.  It has simply gone underground or is 
more subtle than it used to be.  This makes it harder for Navy women to identify, and 
thus it makes it more difficult for them to fight.  Life for Navy women in 1993 was by no 
means easy, but at least they knew who their enemies were.  In contrast, Navy women 
today may not always be able to discern who among their male peers and superiors is a 
genuine ally and who is a closeted sexist enemy.  In some respects, this outcome 
 
 
 
 
229 
seems to confirm Connell’s (1987, 1995, 2003, 2005a) belief in the persistence of 
hegemonic masculinity.  If one looks neither too long nor too hard the Navy appears to 
have made great strides in policy toward women’s equality.  On the level of day to day 
practice, however, the results are decidedly less than superlative.  Although some old 
issues no longer have the salience they once did, especially for women officers, new 
and somewhat different concerns have emerged. 
 When asked if she ever felt there was a social contradiction between being seen 
as a feminine woman and as a warrior Natalie, an African American LCDR SWO, 
replied: 
All the time, all the time, I mean, truthfully … I probably identify myself more with 
being a Sailor or military, a warrior, in my head than I do with being a woman.  
And that sounds weird but I mean, from the time I was old enough to really 
understand about being a woman and relationships and all that stuff, I was just 
about to be joining the military.  And I’ve been in the military most of the time 
I’ve been old enough to understand the difference of being a young girl and 
being a woman.  And most of my time has been in fatigues and steel toed boots 
and hair pulled back, no makeup, no flirting, none of that, none of that mentality 
in what I have been able to do because if you do that in the workplace you’re 
seen as weak and people won’t take you seriously.  They won’t respect you.  
And so I pushed myself away from it a lot, and when I’m at work, all the time.  
The few times that I’m out of work you just want to relax so the last thing you 
think about is putting on makeup, putting on high heels and feel like a woman.  
And in my later years, when I finally started dating in my thirties and getting 
married, I mean, I relish the times that I actually get to put on real clothes and I 
call them “real clothes,” things like skirts and heels and comb my hair and let it 
down and put make up on, like those are so few and far between that you know 
I… it’s just not what I can relate to being military every day.   
When I asked Natalie more directly if she felt she had to downplay her femininity to be 
seen as an effective Naval Officer, she responded “Absolutely, absolutely.”  But she did 
not stop there.  She went on to explain the link between “feminine camouflage” and  
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warfighting: 
There are little things that you can do to remind yourself that you’re a female, like 
wearing your gold studs (earrings). I know some women who will wear makeup 
and all that kind of stuff.  And when I was younger, I would try those things.  But 
the longer I’ve been in the military, the longer I realize that those types of things 
are … you know, men are human.  We’re all human.  And you’re in close 
proximity with people.  And you develop relationships with people.  Those are the 
little things that can influence somebody for an unhealthy relationship.  And you 
start getting, people start flirting and all that stuff and that is something that you 
have to stay as far away from as possible.  So for my Sailors I prefer them not to 
see me at all in that light because I don’t want them to, you know, to associate 
me with “oh, she’s a beautiful woman” because that won’t help me at all in battle.  
That won’t help me at all at war.  I need them to associate me with I’m your 
leader.  I’m your boss.  And I will follow you wherever you need to go and I’ve got 
your back.  And that’s it.  The other stuff is camouflage.  It’s going to get in the 
way of people making the right decisions, at least in my mindset.  When I go out, 
you know, and I can only say, like I’ve dressed up and I’ve gone out downtown at 
times.  I live in San Diego.  And I don’t, I can’t tell you how uncomfortable I feel if 
one of my young Sailors walks up to me and they’re like, “dang, ma’am.  You are 
gorgeous.”  And I’m like, thank you.  But at the same time I’m like crap, that’s the 
thoughts that’s going through their mind when they see me in the hallway … the 
fact that people are human.  And you’re exposed for long periods of time with the 
same people, everybody looks good.  They do.  It’s just human nature.   
Having never personally been deployed on a ship for 8 months I countered with my 
presumption that rather than looking good, everyone you were stuck on the ship with 
would start to get a little repulsive, since you would have seen them at both their best 
and their worst, and they would probably start getting on your nerves.  Natalie set me 
straight on the realities of life at sea for an extended period: 
There’s a cartoon that they’ll like print in the cartoon strip and it starts out and 
there’s this really, they call it “fugly” young woman.  She looks bad, right?  I mean 
she’s overweight.  Her clothes aren’t clean. She’s got like moles, warts. She’s got 
a unibrow.  She looks bad.   And this is the first day of deployment.  And [the next 
frame is] about three months into the deployment she’s lost a little weight.  Her 
hair looks good.  She’s got two brows.  And by like the sixth month of 
deployment man, she’s looking hot, because you haven’t seen a woman in God 
knows how long.  I mean it’s just the longer you’re around people you start to, 
any of the bad stuff you see just start to not see anymore.  And they’re there and 
they smell good today.  And “Oh, she put on makeup,” you know?  And I’m 
telling you, I’ve seen a lot of marriages ruined.  And it’s not necessarily… It’s 
proximity.  You’re lonely.  You’re not with the people that you want to be with 
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and you’re stuck out in the middle of nowhere and yeah, anything you do can 
push them that way.  But it’s called “the deployment goggles.”  Like beer goggles, 
the more you drink the better people look.  The longer you’re on 
deployment…the better people look. 
In contrast, when I asked a Andrea, a Caucasian LCDR SWO, if she felt like 
there was a contradiction between the way larger society expected a woman to behave 
and the way the Navy expected a warrior to behave, a lengthy pause ensued and she 
finally concluded, “I don’t know.  I don’t know how to answer that.”  Yet, when asked the 
follow-up question of whether or not she felt she had to moderate her femininity aboard 
ship her response was quite different: 
Oh, yeah, yeah, but, you know ship or life I can’t have long fingernails.  I don’t 
ever wear rings, this is just… I just happen to have it on [She was on weekend 
duty aboard ship and happened to actually be wearing a ring.].138  So, yeah, it 
kind of sucks that you can’t really look like a girl on the ship.  When I was on staff 
duty I would wear, you know, the earrings and just little things that made me look 
a little bit more like a girl.139 
When I asked Andrea if she approached the issue of femininity in uniform differently 
now than she had when she was a junior officer, she explained:  
I think that as I’m getting more senior, I’m trying to be more feminine.  When I 
first came in it was like no makeup, just hair up, whatever, nothing else 
(laughing), but I don’t know if this is the Navy or if this is just me getting older, but 
like now I get the $300 haircut, I get the mani’s and pedi’s.  Try to wear like a little 
makeup here and there.  Maybe it’s just that I’m getting older and still single.  Not 
that anyone would ever see [the pedi], … [not that] they would notice me.  Yeah I 
don’t really feel like any outward pressure from my community.  Now, I think I will 
                                            
 
138 The shipboard environment is considered to be an industrial environment and wearing rings while 
onboard is prohibited.  The safety concerns centers around the ease with which a ring might catch on a 
piece of equipment or a ladder and “de-glove” a finger, i.e., removing all the flesh down to the bone.  
139 There is no similar safety prohibition against women wearing regulation Navy earrings aboard ship. 
Earrings approved for wear by women in working uniforms are simply a single small brushed gold ball on 
a post for Officers, silver for Enlisted. 
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start feeling it in about a year because I really want to get like a flag duty EA140 
job, so you have to get your picture taken.  Yeah, because it’s a picture and the 
admiral basically… picks who he wants so… I do feel that kind of pressure 
(laughing) [to appear feminine enough to be an admiral’s aide]. 
Continuing to explore issues in this vein, Andrea discusses what is inappropriate in a 
Navy context: 
I don’t see like an overall problem or conflict between basically like [how your 
present your femininity in] your professional life and then transitioning to your 
personal life, but I do see pockets, like you have a couple DIVOs (Division 
Officers) who on board they just cake on the makeup and then when they go out 
on town they’re a little slutty. 
In a follow-up question to this discussion, Andrea acknowledged that it was still possible 
for a woman in the Navy to be either too feminine or too masculine.  When asked to 
clarify the “happy medium,” she replied, “I think you just got to be good at your job.”  
When the interviewer pointed out that the women who were classified as caking on the 
makeup and dressing and acting “a little slutty” when they left the ship on liberty might 
be perfectly competent at their jobs, she conceded: 
What does impact their job for me is the impression that person doesn’t have a 
lot of self-confidence and to be good at your job you’ve got to be self-confident. 
You’ve got to be able to lead people and (pause) I just see that as kind of 
negatively impacting that, their job.  My one division officer (DIVO) that I have 
issues with is kind of the person that I’m thinking about when I talk about this and 
I just always have talks with her and her problem is that to make up for the lack 
of self-confidence, she kind of over does it in other areas…. The Senior Watch 
Officer and I have had to have the closed door conversation with her that 
perception is reality and you’ve got to kind of walk a thinner line than perhaps 
your counterpart male DIVO has to.  There’s still a double standard.  I don’t know 
what the source is, but I do know that if a male goes out and has [a fling, a one-
night stand] he’s high fived and if a female goes out and does the same thing, 
she’s a slut and that is still how it is like out in the real world, that is exactly how it 
                                            
 
140 “Flag Duty” means working for an Admiral.  EA would be an Executive Assistant to an Admiral.  
Female EA’s, for some unknown reason, tend to be quite “good looking,” as if that were a job 
requirement, or a perk of the job for the (usually) male admiral.   
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is here and because we are a smaller community that spreads like wildfire.  This 
larger social bleed-over [your sexual exploits can damage your professional 
reputation] – that’s the double standard between men and women’s sexuality and 
all that and sexual exploits is operant also in the Navy…there’s that double 
standard and then there’s the emotional double standard about a girl crying.  So 
a girl crying is seen [as] worse than a guy completely losing his temper which are 
just two outbursts of emotion, they just happen to be different kind of outbursts.   
This reflects a common ongoing concern among some Navy women that other 
women will wipe out all their efforts to disconfirm stereotypes.  There’s still an element 
of “token” to being a woman serving aboard a Navy combat vessel.  One example of 
poor behavior on the part of a woman seems to have a negative “halo” effect on all 
women.  Andrea articulates that male opinions still have influence but perhaps she does 
not give them as much weight because gender harassment is no longer overt.    That is, 
she probably has heard guys speak among themselves along these lines, or they speak 
of these things in a “joking” manner, but they do not espouse these beliefs publicly, or 
directly to women as they did in the past.  In fact, she admits she does not know where 
the double standard comes from.  Still, it seem clear that some of the old attitudes men 
have are not gone, so much as they have gone underground.  
When asked if being socially defined as being too masculine works against 
women Andrea explained:  
Then you’re a lesbian (laughing).  Yeah, there is definitely that, I mean, I haven’t 
really had to deal with that on this ship, either in the Chief’s Mess or here 
[officer’s country] or even among the crew, so I don’t really see any problems 
with that.  I see more of the… too feminine. 
6. Women Decided to Succeed and Negate Stereotypes 
As noted in the previous chapter, the Armed Forces Integration Act of 1948 (62 
Stat. 356-75) gave women a permanent place in the military services by authorizing 
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women in the regular Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps.  However, it had limited 
the number of enlisted women to two percent of enlisted strength, and the number of 
women officers (excluding nurses) to ten percent of enlisted female strength.  In 1967, 
partly in response to the women’s movement and partly in response to the growing 
manpower needs of the Vietnam War, P.L. 90-130 repealed the limitation of two percent 
for female enlisted strength (Burelli, 1996).  But as late as 1993, the number of women 
unrestricted line officers was still capped at about ten percent of the total force by Navy 
policy.  That number insured there were just enough women officers sprinkled 
throughout the fleet to make them visible enough to function as tokens (Kanter, 1977; 
Izraeli, 1983).   
According to Kanter (1977) people whose type (e.g., women, blacks, Hispanics, 
LGBT, ethnic minorities, Muslims, etc.) is represented in very small proportion in the 
work force tend to: 
1. be more visible, be “on display”; 
2. feel more pressure to conform, to make fewer mistakes; 
3. try to become “socially invisible,” by not standing out too much; 
4. find it harder to gain “credibility,” particularly in high uncertainty positions 
such as certain management jobs; 
5. be more isolated and peripheral; 
6. be more excluded from informal peer networks, and hence, limited in this 
source of power-through-alliances; 
7. have fewer opportunities to be “sponsored” because of the scarcity of people 
like them working at higher echelons; 
8. face misperceptions of their identity and role in the organization and hence, 
develop a preference for already-established relationships; 
9. be stereotyped, and placed in role traps that limit effectiveness;  
10. and face more personal stress (pp. 248-9). 
Margosian and Vendrzyk (1994) reported that women Navy officers of the time 
were well-aware of their token status, and they were determined to undermine negative 
stereotypes.  Others, realizing that their male colleagues were essentially hazing them 
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in an attempt to drive them out, became even more determined to survive and excel to 
spite these men.  One woman aviator related an interesting insight she gained during 
her Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape (SERE) school: 
I was the only woman officer there.  There were some enlisted women there, Air 
Force women, air crew.  When it was all over, one of the instructors came up to 
me at the bar where we were having our going away party and said ‘What is it 
about you Navy women?’  I asked, ‘What?  What do you mean?’ He said, ‘Well 
we have Colonels and guys who have flown here and there, and the gnarliest 
and hardest PJ’s,141 as the Air Force calls them, ‘and we can reduce them to 
tears.  There’s always something that we can do to absolutely reduce them and 
break them.  But we’ve had Navy women pilots coming in here for years and 
we’ve never been able to break any one of you.  I mean you sit there, like doing 
your nails or something.  It doesn’t bother you.  Why?’  I said, ‘That’s really funny 
that you should mention that.  I don’t know the answer.’ (Margosian & Vendrzyk 
1994, pp. 94). 
Upon further reflection, however, she did provide one possible explanation: 
The best answer I could come up with was I’ve heard that discrimination in the 
Navy is worse than in the Air Force or the Army.  I’ve heard it said that 
discrimination at the Naval Academy is worse than the Air Force and Army.  In 
order to overcome it you have to have something inside yourself that constantly 
says “They’re wrong. They’re just saying that to break you.  You’re better than 
that.  Keep going.  You can succeed.”  There’s something inside you that has to 
overcome that.  By the time you get to SERE school and they try to psych you 
out – because that’s the whole point of torture, is to psych you out, to break you, 
to get the information – that you’re good at saying “You know it’s a ploy, they’re 
wrong, keep going, you can succeed,” that you just do it (Margosian & Vendrzyk 
1994, pp. 94-5). 
 Women in the Navy today acknowledge that there are some women who do live 
up to the worst stereotypes of women Sailors, e.g., getting pregnant to avoid 
deployment; getting pregnant immediately following deployment to get off the ship or out 
of the Navy; dressing like “hoochie-coochie mama’s;” playing the “I’m just a girl, I can’t 
                                            
 
141 Para-jumpers. Air Force special forces who jump in to rescue downed aviators behind enemy lines or 
jump in to enemy territory to secure an air field before the invasion force arrives. 
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do it” card; or falsely reporting being raped.  They are quick to point out that most 
women who report rape are doing so legitimately, but they are concerned that those 
“crying wolf” to get out of other disciplinary problems are doing real harm to the women 
who have actually been raped.  For the most part, women officers who intend to make 
the Navy a career are serious about doing their jobs to the best of their ability and giving 
to and getting the most out of the Navy that they can.  They also realize and readily 
acknowledge that, for the most part, their predecessors did real trailblazing, opening 
doors that had previously been closed to women.  Enlisted women, however, especially 
those who are junior (Seaman Recruit to Second Class Petty Officer – E1-E5), or not 
quite senior enough (First Class Petty Officers and Chief Petty Officers – (E6-E7), are 
still likely to be fighting to overcome stereotypes. 
 Diane, an ET1, discussed how she conveyed that she could be both a woman 
and a capable warrior.   
I am a fifty cal[iber] gun mount on the mount 55-qualified female.  There are more 
men that I have worked with that know and trust if a target was in my area I 
would have no qualms whatsoever with locking and loading and taking 
something out.  My time and my training with force protection for Entry Control 
Point (ECP), if a vehicle is coming towards me, I know it’s my responsibility to 
take control of it, take care of it, any occupant, or container or material.  If I don’t 
inspect it I’m going to get killed or I’m going to send them to kill everyone else I 
work with.  And if you can’t pass Afloat Training Group’s (ATG) inspection criteria 
you don’t get that checkmark in the box certifying you for deployment readiness.  
So I didn’t take that training lightly.  And all of my guys that I worked with knew 
that I would never expect them to do something that I, myself, wasn’t willing to 
do.  And when I show no fear and I show competency and strength and 
assertiveness with my training, nobody’s going to intimidate me.  I have a gun.  I 
have a right to use it.  I have a deadly force continuum that I have to adhere to.  If 
I don’t, I will be standing in front of some man on some carpet explaining my 
actions and potentially going to prison [explaining why someone was killed or the 
ship was damaged because she had failed to act]. 
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 Faith, the NC1, discussed some of the difficulties she encountered when she 
reported aboard her first ship: 
The person who had been doing my job before had done a very, very poor job.  
And people had a very, very negative image.  And she was a female.  They had 
a negative image of her which reflected on her rate (E6) and rating (Navy 
Counselor) which then just crossed over to me.  And so at the very beginning 
people didn’t want to come and see me, didn’t assume I was going to know what 
I was doing, that kind of stuff.  I disproved that pretty quickly.  But because I 
lacked competence in just knowing what to do as a Sailor there was a 
misconception.  “Well, why don’t you know how to do this?  What? You’ve been 
in the Navy for ten years so…. And as an NC a lot of people also assumed, too, 
that “well, you’re just admin.  You don’t really know what’s going on or anything.”  
And my background is a lot different from what they’re used to so.  
7. Maintaining Strict “Professionalism” to Avoid the Appearance of Impropriety 
Women Naval officers in the 1993 study reported using “professionalism” to 
manage their own image as leaders and also to manage their interaction and 
relationships with enlisted personnel.  One woman explained the approach she used 
with her enlisted Sailors: 
I always felt as though they automatically assumed that you were going to be 
weaker or nicer as a woman so I would always compensate by not ever trying to 
come across that way.  So I made a real effort to never be too pal-sy, joking 
around, etc.  I was always on very professional terms with them (Margosian & 
Vendrzyk 1994, p. 90). 
Yet another woman explained how she approached the gender tightrope: 
I try to be totally professional.  I’m asexual, if you will.  And I think males thought I 
came off kind of strong and yet I was neutral.  And the females thought I was 
bossy.  I didn’t go to the extreme.  I didn’t flirt or bat my eyes.  I didn’t speak of 
personal things at work, and I looked at people, not as male and female, but as 
senior and junior personnel.  More a sense of their rank.  If you’re not all prissy 
and fussy, meaning like they think females should be, then that means you’re a 
dyke or a ballbuster (Margosian & Vendrzyk 1994, p. 92). 
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Still another shared her strategy: 
I have taken, because of my experience at the Naval Academy, and I think that’s 
carried over, a very professional, ‘no nonsense’ first approach to anything.  My 
mother did the same thing teaching.  You know, you don’t smile for the first two 
weeks as a teacher.  And when the kids learn to respect you, then you can 
lighten up. If you go in there pals with the students, then they don’t [respect you 
and] they’ll take advantage of you.  So I don’t know [if] that’s covering up my 
being a woman so much as it’s just that I always go in serious and professional, 
right off the bat, and then later, if you want to, you can let your guard down 
(Margosian & Vendrzyk 1994, pp. 91-2). 
 
 
 Women in my recent study repeatedly used “professional” to describe the 
manner in which they tried to come across to male and female colleagues, whether 
peers, superiors, or subordinates.   While not ever using the word “professional” in the 
following description of the behavior she tries to model for her junior officers, Andrea is 
actually describing classic tenants of professionalism among Naval Officers: 
I try to be very knowledgeable in what I do.  I try to have the right answer. I try to 
carry myself in a way that is very respectful.  I try to teach my DIVOs [Division 
Officers] how to interact with the XO and interact with the Captain and to have 
off-ship relationships with your counterparts at… at like ATG [Afloat Training 
Group] or the DESRON [Destroyer Squadron].  I definitely try to hold them to 
standard in message writing and award writing and evaluations and fitness 
reports.  So I try to teach them as much as I can about that kind of stuff and in 
social gatherings I don’t get drunk off my butt so they kind of know that like… well 
tell them basically how to handle yourself in a ward room situation and then in a 
situation where you find yourself at a bar and it’s full of enlisted people.  This is 
more for deployment, but, you know the rule is 10 minutes or one drink, hanging 
out with enlisted people, so try to mentor them [junior officers] like that.  Try to be 
very positive and really when they do something good make sure that the 
Captain knows that it was them that did it and I just happened to be the person 
that gets to “sign the block” so that they feel good about themselves, like if they 
give a good brief.  The one girl, specifically, that has low self esteem – I always 
try to tell her that she did a really good job and stuff like that, I guess. 
Faith had expressed her shock at the perceived lack of professionalism exhibited 
by her shipboard colleagues.  When I asked her if she had changed the way she 
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approached things or how she presented herself as a result of her transition from 
intelligence work into the operational fleet, she explained:   
I think that’s my problem.  I don’t think I did.  I didn’t change.  I didn’t change the 
way that I acted.  My approach is still to use my words and to speak to people.  
But my approach is still … I’m very professional.  Again, if I come to work, I’m 
going to work.  I’m not the one who wants to waste my time and go hang out on 
the smoke deck even if you don’t smoke, or go bullshit in berthing.  I don’t do any 
of that stuff.  I’m very direct, very to the point, very organized about what I’m 
there to do.  So, to me, it’s just being serious about my job.  But a lot of people 
think that it’s just, I think they take it as arrogance that I’m better because I stay 
focused on something.  And also I think that this is twofold.  I’m a little bit 
smarter, but also that I’m a female, so when I speak to some of the [male] Chiefs, 
especially some of the Chiefs and Officers who are in those kinds of jobs that 
aren’t more intellectually driven, they think that I’m being rude.  They think that 
I’m being insubordinate or unprofessional because I’m very direct.  I’m very to the 
point.  Again, my job, I’m the only one doing it on the ship.  I feel that I should 
have that authority.  I feel that I should have that jurisdiction over what I’m putting 
out.  And because I do it in a very direct way and I am serious about work.  I’m 
not joking about it when [it] is my responsibility to take care of all these Sailors 
and their careers.  I don’t think it’s funny.  I don’t think it’s a joke.  And so that, I 
don’t think that that has changed but that [it] has become harder to be accepted 
in the fleet, I think.  When I was an E-4 at an NSA site, when everybody else is 
like that, it was recognized as “she’s going above and beyond.  She’s doing a 
good job and she’s only an E-4.”  Now [on the ship] it’s like “well, she doesn’t 
want to hang out and shoot the shit and go have a beer.  And she’s not going to 
be a team player when she is in the chief’s mess.  She’s going to be all business 
all the time.  And then that’s going to be a problem.”  
Earlier in her interview Faith had expressed her astonishment at what a “meat market” 
her first ship turned out to be.  When I later asked her how she let people know she was 
not a piece of meat for sale.  She explained that professionalism matters: 
Well, I think that comes from your behavior.  And I think that they got that loud 
and clear because there was a difference between me and the other females 
when we were on deployment when we would go out in port or something like 
that.  I mean, you see the girls that are down there in berthing for six hours 
straightening their hair, coating their face, wearing all the slutty clothes.  And I’m 
like “what are you doing?  These are people that you have to work with all the 
time.”  We would look nice.  We would look presentable.  We would go out and 
have a good time.  But there was always still a professionalism there.  The two 
girls that I ended up hanging out with the most, and they’re now my roommates, 
were both people that I never felt that I would have to baby sit.  I would never 
have to worry that they would attract a negative attention.  But then sometimes 
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we would end up in the same places as other girls who were slobbery drunk, 
hanging all over people.  And that was never an image that I was going to have, 
not as a person, but also not as my job on the ship.  I don’t want to be the Navy 
counselor one day and be guiding this guy on their career and, say he’s an E-4, 
and then out in town he sees me on a stripper pole half-dressed, drunk.  How’s 
that perception going to work when he comes back in the office?  He’s going to, 
you know, and it allows them to also then think that they don’t have to have a 
professional relationship with you, that it is very buddy, buddy, that “oh, hey, we 
went out and got drunk this weekend.”  And that’s never going to happen.  I don’t 
act like that.  And my staff, most of the rest of them do. 
After reflecting on how central “professionalism” has been and remains in 
women’s quest to be accepted and taken seriously in the surface Navy, I realized that 
“professionalism” occupies the middle ground between the two oppositional stereotypes 
of military women:  slut and dyke.  Women who strive to maintain “professionalism” 
desire to be seen as Sailors first and proactively avoid being categorized as either of the 
two stereotypes.  Thus, it appears that despite drastic changes to U.S. law and Navy 
policies regarding the assignment of women over the past 70 years, that old attitudes 
remain, largely unchanged yet more subtly expressed than in the past.  As bleak of a 
picture as this revelation paints, there is some small cause for hope.  The Navy may be 
finally reaching a tipping point.  Many women in my most recent study estimated the 
ratio of male Sailors accepting women Sailors to male Sailors rejecting women Sailors 
at approximately eighty percent to twenty percent.   
The Good News – Some Men are Beginning to Function Openly as Allies 
In fact, many women recounted instances in which male colleagues had acted as 
allies.  Diana recounted that as far back as 1993 she had been supported by first class 
men on her ship when she was only a third class petty officer.  Her leading petty officer 
had suggested at morning quarters, in front of her whole division (R5), that she had 
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spent the previous night sleeping with all the members of the ship’s R2 division.  She 
filed a formal complaint but other than being counseled the male Petty Officer was not 
punished for his sexism.  She did note that even though he was not officially punished, 
he lost a lot of professional credibility and respect among the other first class petty 
officers aboard the ship because of the incident.  When I asked Diana to elaborate, she 
explained: 
[My male shipmates] saw how it burned me as a person and they had already 
been working with me by that time, some of the guys, for almost a year.  And 
they knew I was young, but they knew I wasn’t promiscuous. And they knew I 
wasn’t of the mentality to hang out with my own R5 division guys because I 
wasn’t a trekkie or a tron [science fiction geek].  I was hanging out with the guys 
from R1 that night.  They later told me they just thought I was a real sweet, cute 
person.  They said nothing about me in a demeaning way.  They said it was 
refreshing, and it was funny [to have me around].  They said I wasn’t a dirty 
engineer.  I wasn’t all about bathroom jokes and other stuff.  And they said they 
had no idea that girls work[ed] in a nuke support facility.  So they were just 
intrigued.  And one of the First Classes talked with some of the other first classes 
in the first class mess on the ship, and set the tone that this kind of behavior’s 
unacceptable.  Guys can’t talk in quarters like it’s a locker room and especially a 
supervisor, somebody who has impact on young Sailors.  That’s just 
unsat[isfactory] [by all standards].  So that was almost refreshing.  And then it got 
to almost be the joke whenever some of the guys from R1 came down.  They’d 
go up to the first class and go “I am in R1 division not R2, thank you very little.”  
And you know, he got picked on [because] he didn’t even know his divisions on 
the ship, the workers.  So he showed his own ass [through] his own ignorance of 
his own co-workers. 
It’s possible that these men were not entirely progressive in their views and their 
reaction might have actually been somewhat paternal.  That is, they might have cast her 
in the role of “little sister,” protecting her from men who might do her or her career harm.  
Regardless of their motivations, she perceived them as allies and felt supported by their 
actions.   
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Faith recounted an instance more recently when men on her ship with whom she 
had a good relationship were rooting for her and fully expected her to prove that a 
woman could start and operate a damage control dewatering pump142:  
We had training one day and that [learning how to start the Navy P-100 portable 
diesel pump for dewatering] was our duty section training.  There [were] maybe 
six girls in the duty section on watch that day, including our Command Duty 
Officer (CDO),143 who is a female, myself, and maybe three or four other ones, 
and every single [female] person couldn’t get it started.  And they had us all out 
there.  And they were just showing everybody ‘this is how you turn it on.  These 
are all the switches.  Now everybody, rev it up.’  And it’s like a lawnmower.  So 
the guys get up there.  And everybody’s doing it.  Everybody’s trying to, the first 
female gets up there.  She can’t for her life start the thing.  She tried, she tried, 
and it didn’t work.  So one of the guys comes and starts it and then she does the 
rest of it …  So I was taking my sociology class at this point and I started just 
watching.  And the next female gets up there and she can’t do it.  The next 
female gets up there.  She can’t do it.  And these are all the five foot nothing girls 
that weigh a hundred and fifty pounds …or a hundred pounds.  So this guy that’s 
a friend comes up to me. He goes, ‘Come on.  You can go over and do it.  You’re 
a bad ass, go.’  That was his encouragement.  And so I had told the guy who told 
me that, I said ‘okay, well just like everybody else, you come to my rescue, be all 
chivalrous and come and help me when I can’t do it.’  So I go over there.  I can’t 
start that sucker at all.  But the funny part was just because I am a little big bigger 
than the rest of them I could at least get it to where it would shake a little bit and 
then die again.  And afterwards, I’d tried it now like twenty times, I was like “what 
were you doing [Why didn’t you come help me]?”  And he goes “I didn’t want to 
help you because you were so close to starting it.”  I had almost got it so many 
times and nobody else had gotten that far.  So it was just kind of funny…There 
was a little guy but he’s one of the damage control men.  And I think he had done 
                                            
 
142 In instances of fire (in which water is used to extinguish the blaze) or flooding, Navy ships must be 
able to “dewater” the flooded space.  Ships are compartmentalized to minimize flooding and to limit the 
dangerous “free surface effect” of uncontained water sloshing back and forth in a space.  Ships that take 
on too much water can sink.  Compartmentalized spaces are often fairly small.  To address the problem 
of removing a lot of water from small spaces, the Navy uses relatively small yet powerful portable diesel 
pumps that sailors can rush to the place they are most needed.  When there is hull damage or a space 
floods for whatever reason, a portion of the damage control team works to stop the flooding and plug the 
leak, while another portion of the team immediately sets to work removing water from the space to keep 
the ship from sinking or become so unstable as to risk capsize. This is exactly what the crew of the USS 
Cole would have done following its bombing at the waterline while tied to the pier in Aden harbor, Yemen 
on October 12, 2000.  Like lawnmowers or snow blowers, these pumps are started manually by pulling a 
chord.  Starting one of these pumps is a skill requiring technique and torque, best acquired through past 
experience and practice.    
143 The command duty officer is the officer responsible for leading the duty section watch team for any 
given 24 period.  At the end of the work day, when in port, the CDO and the duty section remain on the 
ship when everyone else knocks off work or goes home.  The CDO and the duty section are responsible 
for safeguarding the ship.  They respond to any emergencies, such as fire or flooding, that might occur. 
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it more often.  And he is very small.  And I think he weighs like a hundred and 
twenty pounds because we just did weigh-ins.144  But he was able to do it.  But I 
think it’s because he had done it before.  The guys wanted me to go do it.  That 
was exactly their input.  They’re like “NC 1,145 you can go do it.  Come on,” you 
know, because they see me at Physical Training (PT).  They know that I’m 
physically a little bit more capable…But that was the funny part, too, to me that 
they assumed because of the size difference, because that was going to make 
the difference … and so it was funny.  And it’s just a motion we’re not used to 
doing.  It’s like … if you were doing a fly when you lift weights.  That’s not 
something females normally do.  It’s not, and I was trying to think about that too.  
It’s just we don’t, we’re not usually the ones that go out there and start 
lawnmowers.  We probably never did that as kids.  It’s a weird motion that you do 
have to have.   
In this instance it appears men functioned more as allies than enemies to women.  It 
also seems that because when even the more physically capable woman couldn’t light 
off the pump when a smaller man could, it became more apparent that the problem was 
related to a combination of unique motion and torque, a motion and technique that 
women were unfamiliar with, than a problem most often associated with women – lack 
of size or brute strength.   
Nikki, the nuclear-trained First Class Machinist Mate, related that often aboard 
the aircraft carrier she had a hard time with the physical mechanics of her rating simply 
because of her small stature and the size of the tools and equipment she was expected 
to use.  She was, however, very good at reading and understanding technical 
instructions and schematics.  Her male colleagues had the opposite problem: they were 
good at the mechanics but less cerebral.  Together they made a great team.  Nikki 
helped her the men out in the areas where she excelled and they were less strong, and 
in turn, they helped her out in areas where they excelled and she was less strong.   
                                            
 
144 She was the command’s Physical Readiness Test (PRT) Coordinator, so she would have conducted 
the weigh-in. 
145 Navy Counselor First Class Petty Officer (E-6).  
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Amy, the ET2 who had served aboard the carrier but turned down the Work 
Center Supervisor position due to unwillingness to fight daily with a sexist subordinate, 
spoke in glowing terms of her time TAD to the Security department on the same ship.   
[In] Security, we were like brother[s] and sister[s].  Everybody, race, size, nothing 
mattered. And I mean the second they knew your name you were a family 
member.  I have six, seven, of the members, the original group of security when I 
went down there that are all out of the Navy or transferred that I’m still in touch 
with almost every day.  They’re like another family to me.  And I don’t know why 
we are like that.  Because only half of them were MA’s.  The rest were TAD’s 
(Sailors on Temporary Assigned Duty).  But we just … when you spend day in 
and day out trusting somebody with your life basically because the person next to 
you has a gun, it just kind of, you just kind of adapt that to your family.   
When asked if she’d encountered sexism in the Security Department, given that 
members of Security actually wore guns and might have to use deadly force in the 
course of their jobs, Amy replied:  
Not in the slightest.  I really didn’t.  I mean, you could have big, buff guys that 
spent their time off in the gym.  But they’d be the first ones to ask you.  “Hey, I’m 
going to run up to the gym.  You want to go?” Our [Master-at-Arms Chief] MAC 
used to do what he called “gun shows.”146  But they brought the girls in too.  
They’d bring all the girls out and we’d measure the girls against each other and 
the boys against each other and the girls against the boys.  [The] girls and guys 
sat down and watched football on the big screen down in security on the 
weekends.  And every once in a while they’d use connections and we’d get hot 
wings brought down into the security shack and we all just hung out.  There were 
“girls’ nights” they did one Friday a month during deployment.  [On] that Friday 
night we’d watch a video.  And all the girls from security and the brig, all the girls 
came in and the guys actually let us have that time off.  You’d get four hours 
where none of the females were on shift, nobody.  [Sometimes the guys would] 
walk up to the door and poke their head in, say, “Hey.  What’s up”?  Walk out, 
bring us popcorn sometimes.  I hated leaving security. 
As documented by Miller (1997), gender harassment, whether overt or covert, is 
a form of protest (normally associated with people occupying positions of weakness) 
                                            
 
146 A reference to flexing one’s biceps. 
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Army men have used to express their disapproval of women’s participation in the 
military.  As overt gender harassment and discrimination have become increasingly 
unacceptable, it is likely that men’s protests with respect to women’s participation in the 
military have become more and more covert.  The number of men resentful of women’s 
increasing presence within the ranks may be shrinking, but among those who remain, 
resistance remains strong and is increasingly covert.  This may actually be a more 
treacherous form of discrimination than overt discrimination ever was.  In fact, one 
unintended consequence of forcing overt gender harassment and discrimination 
underground might be seen in an increase in military-on-military rape.  If rape is about 
power, and those men so inclined cannot express their power over women in the 
somewhat more benign form of everyday gender harassment and discrimination, they 
may resort to more physical methods to send the message that women’s presence is 
neither desired nor welcome in the ranks.  Insufficient data exists at this time to explore 
this possibility more fully, however it is certainly an area that merits further research. 
Clearly, the battle is not yet won.   In the past, annual sexual harassment training 
was presented by someone senior to a group of Sailors, and there was usually an 
interactive component, where either scenarios were read or video scenarios were 
played; then the group would discuss what was and was not appropriate, along with 
what options existed for addressing it, reporting procedures, etc.  Given what Amy 
related about apparently unchecked sexism within her division on the aircraft carrier, I 
asked her about mandatory annual sexual harassment training and how that was  
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handled within her division. She responded, laughing initially as if I had made a joke:   
The training?  The training is an NKO course that can be clicked through.147  You 
don’t have to sit around with other people and do it.  And I’m sure they probably 
don’t even read it, click, click, click, get a certificate.  You’re done.   
When I asked Amy if she found incongruity between Navy policy and the experience 
she was actually living, she answered “Always ….”   
It seems intuitively obvious that the farther down the rank structure one is, the 
less relative power one has, the more likely one is to experience harassment or 
discrimination, although these days it seems more likely to occur more on an individual 
rather than systemic or structural level as in the past.  In the following chapter, I will 
explore the possibilities for, likelihood of, and the methods of Navy women’s resistance 
to traditional gender norms in the surface fleet.  
  
                                            
 
147 A Power Point presentation posted on Navy Knowledge Online, the Navy’s web-based training portal. 
Her point is that a sailor can get credit for having completed the training without actually learning 
anything, let alone taking any portion of the equality message to heart.  I know exactly what she is talking 
about.  As a DoD civilian employee I am required to complete “Trafficking in Persons” training annually.  
This training is quite pointless to me as a woman because it is largely aimed at dissuading DoD military 
and civilian men from frequenting brothels overseas where prostitutes are often trafficked women.  Since I 
am already familiar with the evils of trafficking women and children, and have no inclination to patronize a 
brothel, I “click” through the training as fast as possible so I can get my “completed” certificate and a 
check in the box for the year.  
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CHAPTER 4 
THE INFLUENCE OF STEREOTYPE THREAT ON SURFACE NAVY WOMEN’S 
INDIVIDUAL PERFORMANCE OF GENDER 
This chapter examines the ways in which Navy women resist social expectations 
for and limitations on women’s behavior and enact agency in “redoing” gender (West & 
Zimmerman 2009).  In it I will compare and contrast the experiences of Navy women 
from twenty years ago with those of today and attempt to discern what has changed and 
what has not. First, however, I will provide a very brief overview of small portion of the 
vast literature on resistance and agency that is directly relevant to the discussion to 
follow.  When embarking on this project, I had no preconceived idea of what form Navy 
women’s resistance to traditional gender norms might take.  Most academic literature 
focused on the gender performance of women working in non-traditional, i.e. male 
dominated, professions is concerned with how women perform gender to fit in.  In 
contrast, my focus was on how women might work to enlarge the acceptable space that 
inhabited within that world. When one employs a grounded theory approach, one must 
let the data speak.  To aid myself in identifying those behaviors described by my 
participants that might constitute resistance, I reviewed the theoretical literature on 
resistance that seemed most on topic both for my academic discipline (sociology) and 
my topic of interest (women’s resistance to traditional gender norms).  In the process of 
this review, I discovered that there is no real consensus among social scientists about 
what sorts of behaviors constitute women’s resistance to gender norms.  In the following 
section I will briefly sketch the contours of the major theory regarding the concepts of 
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“resistance” and “agency” to introduce the reader to those strands that informed my 
work.  I will only be mapping the intellectual terrain; I will not be taking a particular 
stance or making a particular argument.  
Theorizing Resistance  
Social scientists have difficulty defining the circumstances under which some 
forms of human behavior might qualify as resistance.  Resistance can be an individual 
or collective act.  It can be spontaneous or planned.  It can be intentional or 
unintentional.  Writing from his prison cell in fascist Italy under Mussolini, Antonio 
Gramsci (1971) pondered the nature of the relationship between power and resistance.  
He wondered if power was the result of the tension between domination and resistance.  
He also wondered under what circumstances a ruling power might be vulnerable to 
challenge and under what circumstances subordinates might find their resistance 
neutralized. He contemplated what role culture might play in all this.  
Ultimately, in answer to these questions, Gramsci developed the concept of 
social hegemony, which he defined as the spontaneous consent given by the majority of 
people to the general direction imposed on their social and economic life by the ruling 
class.  In other words, by exercising hegemony the ruling class made the existing 
system of power relations seem so natural and right that most people accepted their 
social and economic position in the hierarchy without question and therefore without 
much resistance.  Those in power “manufactured” consent for the manner in which they 
had constructed the world.  In a patriarchal society, men’s superiority has been 
constructed to seem innate, with women’s historical deference to the traditional 
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gendered order also manufactured consent to male domination. Connell (1987) 
appropriated the concept of hegemony to help explain how gender operates and how 
masculinity is privileged. 
In Foucault’s (1977, 1978, and 1980), conception, power is “diffuse rather than 
concentrated, embodied and enacted rather than possessed, discursive rather than 
purely coercive, and constitutes agents rather than being deployed by them” (Gaventa 
2003). He saw power as ubiquitous rather than something the powerful (individuals, 
groups, classes) have and the powerless lack (Knights & Vurdubakis 1994).  As such, 
power is beyond both agency and structure. Rather than clarify the relationship between 
power and resistance, he muddied the intellectual waters.  He left social scientists with 
two great maxims to ponder:  that wherever there is power, there is resistance; and 
since power is everywhere, power is really nowhere. This conceptualization of power 
rather leaves gender scholars in the lurch.    
While Foucault’s maxims provide for a lively intellectual debate, they are hard to 
operationalize.  How does one apply Foucault’s insights on power and resistance to 
daily life?  In a patriarchal world, where men still wield much of the power, there is 
resistance among some women, of course.  However, since Foucault contends that 
power is both everywhere and nowhere simultaneously, how do women know when, 
where, and how to resist so that their efforts make any real difference? And, for that 
matter, do women consciously and strategically plan their resistance?  Foucault 
suggests that rather than studying power as the key to “understanding and dismantling 
subordinations” scholars would be better served by focusing their attention on 
resistance, struggle, and challenges to power (Faith 1994).  In their examination of 
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Foucault’s beliefs on the nature of power, Knights and Vurdubakis (1994) remind us 
that: 
It is not a matter of some people having power and others lacking it but the ways 
in which acts of resistance are also exercises of power and how the same set of 
agents can be involved in both exercising power and resisting its effects at one 
and the same time (pp. 191-192). 
This observation seems particularly apropos to the military context considering its 
hierarchical organizational structure and women’s place as officers and senior enlisted 
leaders within that structure.  
James Scott’s work (1976, 1977, 1985, 1986, 1987, 1990), focused on the 
peasantry of Southeast Asia, was instrumental in catalyzing the scholarly shift to a focus 
on micropolitics and the actions of individuals rather than mass movements of 
resistance.  Scott was interested in issues of “class” and he was particularly interested 
in the tension between the peasantry and the landlord class.  Scott (1985) drew on 
Gramsci’s notion of hegemony in his attempt to understand how consent could be 
manufactured in society without resorting to “coercion or raw, brutal domination” (p. 
347).  He argued that peasant rebellions, for all their importance when they did occur, 
were relatively rare.  What was not rare was the constant, everyday struggle between 
the oppressed and their oppressors. While he admits that the “weapons of the weak,” 
i.e., “footdragging, dissimulation, false compliance, pilfering, feigned ignorance, slander, 
arson, sabotage, and so on” (p. xvi) may only marginally impact the various forms of 
exploitation peasants normally experience, he concludes the impact of such weapons 
should not be considered trivial.  Sivaramakrishnan (2005) expanded upon Scott’s ideas 
about resistance noting that “specific modes of resistance (especially when they are 
cloaked in the apparent innocuousness of everyday forms) are effective only in relation 
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to particular forms of domination” (p. 351).  He concludes that Scott’s focus on 
“everyday forms of resistance” enlarged the field of vision surrounding protest and 
provided new opportunities to interrogate the relationship between power and 
resistance. 
In opposition to Scott (1985 and 1986), Rubin (1996) argues that everyday 
actions “which bring no discernable change in the structures of domination within which 
people live” (p. 237) should not be classified as resistance.  Furthermore, based on 
existing research he asserts that it is not entirely clear that “polyvalent actions in micro-
situations offer the best hope for challenging power, or even the best place to start” (p. 
256).  In his view, collective action and organized resistance offer the greatest hope for 
bringing about change in the structures of domination, although he does concede that 
forms of everyday resistance have, on occasion, brought about change, or constrained 
the ways in which those in power could operate. 
Rubin (1996) makes a very convincing argument against conceiving of individual 
everyday actions as resistance.  Thus, the question of what constitutes “resistance,” 
collective action or individual, everyday resistant action, is a “chicken or egg” question.  
How do individuals decide to band together to act collectively unless they first become 
aware of their oppression, and perhaps begin to resist (if only in small, covert ways) as 
individuals?  Second Wave feminists were organized and acted collectively to resist 
patriarchal oppression and alter the gender status quo.  While they did accomplish a lot, 
they were ultimately unsuccessful at achieving real equality between men and women.  
The Women’s Movement alone could not dismantle the existing gender order any more 
than the Civil Rights movement could thoroughly eradicate racism.   
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According to West and Zimmerman’s (1987) gender is accomplished in the 
routine everyday interactions between people so, while collective action might be 
helpful, individual resistance is absolutely essential to changing gender norms.  Gender, 
though conceived of as binary, is really more a continuum.  Neither men nor women 
agree completely on the qualities that make someone “masculine” or “feminine.”  
Moreover, Rubin’s (1996) argument that only an organized movement will achieve 
desired changes to structure of domination might be valid within a particular political or 
economic context, but given that gender is constructed through the micro-process of 
individual actions and interactions with others, I cannot agree with his argument in the 
realm of gender. 
Hollander and Einwohner (2004), noting that “resistance” had become a 
fashionable topic within sociology, and further noting that “resistance” was often either 
ill-defined or not defined at all, provide an invaluable review essay on recent work in this 
area. One of their chief complaints, which served as the catalyst for undertaking this 
review in the first place, was their realization that “resistance” remained so loosely 
defined that some scholars could see it almost everywhere while others saw it almost 
nowhere. Hollander and Einwohner (2004) reviewed a sample of academic work 
obtained by searching the Sociological Abstracts database for all articles and books 
published since 1995 for which “resistance” appeared in the title.  They also included in 
their sample several influential works on resistance published prior to 1995.  Ultimately, 
Hollander and Einwohner (2004) identified two core elements of resistance in the 
literature.  The first is “a sense of action, broadly conceived…Authors seem to agree 
that resistance is not a quality of an actor or a state of being, but involves some active 
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behavior, whether verbal, cognitive, or physical” (p. 538).  The second is a sense of 
opposition to someone or something.  They focus on two recurring issues in discussions 
about definitions of resistance: recognition and intent.  
“Recognition” refers to the visibility of the resistant act.  Hollander and Einwohner 
(2004) ask the question “must oppositional action be readily apparent to others, and 
must it in fact be recognized as resistance?” (p. 539).  They conclude that while much 
early work on resistance focused on large-scale, very visible, protest movements other 
scholars have identified less visible “everyday” resistance.  James Scott (1985), noting 
that “powerless people rarely have the resources or opportunity to resist openly against 
their superordinates,” observes “everyday acts of resistance make no headlines” (p. 
539).  Furthermore, as Hollander and Einwohner (2004) note some acts of resistance 
are obviously oppositional, but go unnoticed because they are committed covertly 
whereas other acts committed overtly are not necessarily recognized as resistant by the 
target(s).  Use of humor may be one example of this (see Griffiths 1998 and Watts 
2007).  Slave spirituals may be another (see Sanger 1995).  Hollander and Einwohner 
(2004) contend that recognition of resistance, in part, depends upon the goals of 
resisters:  some resistance is intended to be recognized as such, while some is 
intentionally concealed.  Other scholars, like Rubin (1996), critical of this “minimalist” 
definition, limit “resistance” to only that which provokes recognition and even reaction 
from others” (p. 541).  As noted above, Rubin (1996) argues that use of the term 
“resistance” should be reserved for “visible, collective acts that result in social change, 
and not everyday acts that chip away at power in almost imperceptible ways” (p. 541).  
In the argument over what constitutes “resistance,” additional discussion centers 
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around who recognizes the “resistant” act.  While some people are “targets” (i.e., those 
at whom the act is directed), others may simply be innocent bystanders or disinterested 
observers.  Some scholars take the view that the term “resistance” should be applied 
only to those instances in which both “targets” and “observers” identify the act(s) as 
resistant. Still other scholars believe that “resistance” can still take place even if 
“targets” and “observers” interpret the actions differently. 
“Intent” refers to the consciousness of the act, i.e., it asks the question must a 
resistant actor “be aware that he or she is resisting some exercise of power – and 
intending to do so” (Rubin 1996, p. 542) for the act to qualify as resistance?  According 
to Rubin (1996), scholarship on this aspect of resistance appears to fall in to one of 
three camps: 
1. If an actor intends to resist, then his or her actions qualify as resistance, 
regardless of their scope or outcome (p. 542). 
2. Assessing intent is difficult, if not impossible, therefore scholars are left with 
little choice but to assess the nature of the act itself (p. 542). 
3. Actors’ intentions are not central to understanding something as resistance 
as actors may not even be conscious of his or her actions as resistance (p. 
543). 
Hollander and Einwohner (2004) used the two issues of recognition and intent to 
develop a “typology of resistance,” ultimately identifying seven distinct types of 
resistance:  overt, covert, unwitting, target-defined, externally-defined, missed, and 
attempted.  Overt and Covert resistance are self-explanatory.  Unwitting resistance is 
not intended by the actors as resistance but is recognized by both targets and 
observers as threatening or potentially threatening.  Target-defined resistance refers to 
actions not intended as resistance by the actor nor perceived as resistance by 
observers, but perceived as resistance by the target.  Externally-defined resistance 
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refers to acts which are not defined by either actor or target as resistance, but are 
labeled resistance by third parties.  Missed resistance is perceived as resistance by 
both actor and target, but is not so defined by third parties.  Attempted resistance refers 
to actions by an actor that are not perceived as resistance by either targets or third-
party observers. 
This article points out the fact that even a concept such as “resistance” is socially 
constructed.  One woman’s “resistance” may be another’s “accommodation” or perhaps 
even “oppression.”  Hollander and Einwohner (2004) successfully make the case that 
“resistance” is “a deeply sociological concept … [which] involves issues and debates 
that are at the heart of the sociological perspective, including power and control, 
inequality and difference, and social context and interaction” (p. 551).  The terms 
“resistance” and “agency” are often used interchangeably by social scientists, as if 
these two words were synonyms for a single concept.  In the following section I will 
review theory on agency in an attempt to determine whether these two concepts are 
synonymous or distinct.   
Theorizing Agency  
In his seminal article A Theory of Structure: Duality, Agency, and Transformation 
Sewell (1992) critiqued the existing theory of structure148 as having three problems.  
First, he argued, it assumed “a far too rigid causal determination in social life” such that 
the efficacy of human action, or agency gets lost.  Second, it made dealing with change 
awkward.  Third, different social science disciplines (mainly sociology and anthropology) 
                                            
 
148 Since gender has been conceived of as social structure, Sewell’s argument seems particularly on 
point.  
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used the term differently.  Sociologists believed structure to be “’hard’ or ‘material’ and 
therefore primary and determining” whereas they regarded culture as “’soft’ or ‘mental’ 
and therefore as secondary or derived” (p.3).  In contrast, anthropologists regarded 
culture as “the preeminent site of structure” (p. 3).  Sewell’s goal was to develop a 
theory of structure that overcame these three weaknesses by: recognizing the agency 
of social actors; building the possibility of change into the concept of structure; and 
overcoming the disparate views of structure held by sociologists and anthropologists. 
My concern with Sewell (1992) lies primarily in his thinking on agency.  In this 
article, structure gets a lot of attention, while agency gets significantly less.  He asks 
and answers the question “What is structure?” But, he does not ask “What is agency?”  
In fact, he concludes “a capacity for agency is as much a given for humans as the 
capacity for respiration” (p. 20).  He equates agency with “human action.” Furthermore, 
he argues that to conceive of humans as agents is to assume they are empowered by 
access to some sort of resources, whether those resources are human or non-human 
(pp. 9-10).  In Sewell’s formulation, agency is not limited to the individual – it may also 
be collective.  
He begins the article by critiquing and reformulating Gidden’s (1976, 1979, 1981, 
and 1984) theory of structure.  Sociologists frequently conceive of structure as 
oppositional to agency. According to Giddens (1981), “structure” is a process, not a 
“steady state” and it should be regarded as “dual.”  That is, while structures may shape 
people’s practices, people’s practices also shape and reproduce structures.  
Furthermore, “structures are enacted by ‘knowledgable’ human agents (i.e., people who 
know what they doing and how to do it), and agents act by putting into practice their 
 
 
 
 
257 
necessarily structured knowledge” (Sewell 1992, p. 4).  Hence, structure should not be 
conceptualized as only constraining human agency, but also as enabling it.   
Sewell (1992) believed that in order to build a theory of structure that 
incorporates change we must adopt “a far more multiple, contingent, and fractured 
conception of society – and of structure” (p. 16).  Sewell’s (1992) conceptualization of 
structure includes two important dimensions: Depth (the schema dimension) and power 
(the resource dimension).  According to Sewell (1992), to be an agent means “to be 
capable of exerting some degree of control over the social relations in which one is 
enmeshed, which in turn implies the ability to transform these social relations to some 
degree” (p. 20). People have different abilities and capacities to control and/or transform 
social relations because structures empower them differently.  This also implies 
structures “embody the desires, intentions, and knowledge of agents differentially as 
well.  Structures, and the human agencies they endow, are laden with differences in 
power” (Sewell 1992, p. 21).   
In summary, Sewell’s (1992) version of structure is “dynamic, not static; it is the 
continually evolving outcome and matrix of a process of social interaction” (p. 27).  Even 
structure that is almost perfectly reproduced requires resourceful and innovative human 
conduct.  But the same resourceful agency that sustains the reproduction of structures 
also makes possible their transformation – via the “transpositions of schemas and 
remobilizations of resources that make the new structures recognizable as 
transformations of the old” (p. 27). 
Hays (1994) works to further refine the definitions and theoretical 
conceptualizations of structure and agency, and additionally addresses issues related to 
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the way sociologists conceptualize “culture” and its relationship to both.  She notes that 
as a sociological concept, agency is defined by contrast, meaning agency is what 
structure is not and vice versa. She contends that what results is a dichotomous 
definition of the two.  While structure is regarded as systematic and patterned, agency is 
contingent and random; while structure is constraint, agency is freedom; while structure 
is static, agency is active; and while structure is collective, agency is individual (p. 57).  
Like Sewell, Hays (1994) also acknowledges that structure can be either constraining or 
empowering. She spends a little more time contemplating the nature and effects of 
agency.  According to Hays (1994), “agency always implies that an array of alternative 
forms of behavior are possible, and that people make (conscious or unconscious) 
choices among those alternatives” (p. 62)  Furthermore, she contends that social 
structures exist and are maintained only through the interaction of individuals. 
Hays (1994) argues that culture is, itself, a social structure, with an underlying 
logic of its own.  As she defines it; 
culture is a social, durable, layered pattern of cognitive and normative systems 
that are at once material and ideal, objective and subjective, embodied in 
artifacts and embedded in behavior, passed about in interaction, internalized in 
personalities, and externalized in institutions.  It is both the product of human 
interaction and the producer of certain forms of human interaction … Systems of 
meaning are what is often known as culture, including not only the beliefs and 
values of social groups, but also their language, forms of knowledge, and 
common sense, as well as the material products, interactional practices, rituals, 
and ways of life established by these” (p. 65). 
By defining culture in this way, Hays (1994) is arguing that social structure is comprised 
of two central and interconnected elements:  systems of social relations and systems of 
meanings (culture).     
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Emirbayer and Mische (1998) disaggregate agency into several component parts 
and explore how agency functions with respect to structure. They stress their 
conception of agency is “intrinsically social and relational” (p. 973), which fits West and 
Zimmerman’s (1987) conception that “gender” is not simply a quality one possesses but 
rather something that one accomplishes daily in the course of human interaction.  
Emirbayer and Mische (1998) essentially define “resistance” as the “procedures and 
ruses by which actors can resist and subvert the logics and practices of the established 
order” (p. 1001).  Ultimately Emirbayer and Mische (1998) conceptualize “agency” as 
more than “resistance” only, and resistance as but one potential form of agency.  In 
short, resistance is a form of agency, but agency is embodied in actions other than 
resistance.  This article helped clarify that while resistance and agency are closely 
related, they are not synonymous.  Furthermore, it prompted me to think of “resistance” 
as “reactively preventative” in nature and “agency” as “proactively constructive" in 
nature.  
Campbell (2009) distinguishes between what he terms “Type 1” and “Type 2” 
agency.  Type 1 (agency) refers to an actor’s ability to voluntarily initiate and maintain a 
program of willed action.  Type 2 (agentic power) refers to an actor’s ability to act 
independently of the constraining power of social structure.  He notes that while actors 
may have the ability to initiate and maintain a program of action, they may not be able to 
act independently of the constraining power of social structure.  As a result, he argues it 
is important in discussions of human agency to clearly distinguish between the two.   
Campbell (2009) also cautions that sociologists are especially prone to simply 
take “the ability of individuals to perform self-conscious, willed actions for granted” (p. 
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415).  He stresses that because this ability varies over time, between individuals, and 
according to circumstances, it should not simply be assumed.  He notes that according 
to Weber, issues such as “class” may constrain one’s ability to undertake willed action.  
I reject Campbell’s suggestion that this variation in ability to take willed action might best 
be thought of as “will power” or “strength of character.”  Within the military context, the 
ability to take willed action is strictly curtailed and has nothing to do with one’s will 
power or strength of character.  Midway through the second decade of the 21st century, 
social scientist are still no closer to ending the debate on what actions and behaviors 
constitute resistance and agency. 
In the following section I will explore the structural limitations placed on one’s 
ability to take willed action in the military context.  I will further explore the catalysts for 
and the ways in which resistance has been enacted in both the pre- and post-All-
Volunteer Force.  My review of resistance and the forms it has taken within the military 
will encompass protests against racial discrimination during both WW II and the 
Vietnam War; protests against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, i.e., the 
Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell (DADT) policy; and protests against the lack of critical operational 
safety equipment in Iraq in 2004.  This survey of resistance in the military is important 
because it helps illustrate the ways in which the transition from a conscription military to 
an All-Volunteer Force has subtly, yet overwhelmingly, influenced the behavior of 
servicemembers. 
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Resistance in the Military 
Overt resistance in the military in its most extreme form is an offense commonly 
known as “mutiny.” It is punishable by court-martial under article 94 of the Uniform Code 
of Military Justice (UCMJ), federal law enacted by Congress that forms the foundation of 
military law.  The maximum authorized punishment for mutiny is “death” even when the 
offense is committed in peacetime.  Punishment for this offense has not always been 
meted out by the official military justice system when it occurs on the field of battle.  For 
example, during the Battle of the Bulge in the European Theater in December 1944, 
officers ordered their own troops to shoot fellow soldiers who refused to move forward 
when the order was given.149  Even if an individual is not convicted of the more serious 
violation of article 94 (mutiny or sedition) within the official military justice system, he or 
she is subject to conviction on a string of lesser included offenses.150  Overt, organized 
resistance to established policies or orders within the military is predictably rare. More 
benign forms of individual resistance would most likely also be chargeable offenses 
under the UCMJ Articles 90, 91, 92, and 134.  Acts of resistance by military personnel 
are so rare, in fact, that when they do occur, they frequently make national news – 
especially those committed during times of war.   
 
                                            
 
149 Personal discussion with author’s father, a WW II veteran of the 517th Parachute Infantry Regiment 
who fought in The Battle of the Bulge. 
150 “Lesser Included Offenses” under article 94 include:  Article 90 – willful disobedience of commissioned 
officer; Article 91 – willful disobedience of warrant; noncommissioned, or petty officer; Article 92 – failure 
to obey lawful order; Article 94 – attempted mutiny; and Article 134 – acts prejudicial to good order and 
discipline, etc., that are implied to have occurred in the course of the mutiny, but are otherwise subsumed 
in the more serious charge.  The legal rationale for this is that if you cannot convict on the more serious 
charge, you can always roll up multiple convictions, accreting punishment on these lesser offenses. 
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Resistance Before Establishment of the All-Volunteer Force 
During World War II the Navy experienced at least one major incident of 
resistance that was racially charged.  On the night of July 17, 1944 the Port Chicago 
Naval Magazine,151 located 40 miles east of San Francisco, suffered a massive 
explosion when munitions ships being loaded with ammunition and bombs for 
operations in the Pacific blew up. It was the largest disaster of the war to occur on 
American soil.  Everyone within 1000 feet of the loading dock was killed instantly.  320 
men perished that night, and another 390 were wounded.  Among the dead were 202 
African-American enlisted Sailors working as stevedores in a segregated Navy. They 
had received training in handling cargo but not in handling munitions.  Furthermore, 
competition between stevedore crews working to load different ships was often 
encouraged because it sped loading.  On August 9th, less than a month after the 
explosion, the Cargo Handling Battalion’s white officers ordered the stevedores to 
resume operations at Mare Island Naval Weapons Station.  
Two-hundred and fifty-eight African-American Sailors out of the 328 in the 
ordnance battalion refused, telling their officers they would obey any order but that one. 
Ultimately, 208 faced summary courts-martial and were sentenced to bad conduct 
discharges and the forfeiture of three months pay for disobeying orders. The remaining 
50 were singled out for general courts martial on the grounds of mutiny. Although they 
could have been sentenced to death, they were awarded between eight and fifteen 
years at hard labor. The explosion and the mutiny proceedings that followed helped to 
illustrate the costs associated with and fuel public criticism for racial discrimination.  
                                            
 
151 The Navy refers to its munitions storage facilities as “magazines.” 
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Shortly after the war ended, in January 1946, the Navy granted all the men clemency. A 
1994 review of the court proceedings concluded that they had “strong racial overtones.”  
On 23 December 1999, President William Clinton pardoned Freddie Meeks of Los 
Angeles, CA one of the few surviving Sailors of the original 50 who had been court-
martialed.152 
David Cortwright (2005) did document fairly extensive and organized GI 
resistance to the Vietnam War across the branches among a force that was mostly 
conscripted.  Resistance to the Vietnam War in the US Navy initially involved isolated 
acts and small-scale organization, generally failing to achieve a mass-following until 
1971.  However, in the early part of 1970 the Movement for a Democratic Military 
(MDM) surfaced in San Diego.  MDM operated out of a coffee house and published a 
newspaper.  Additional chapters of MDM operating their own newspapers emerged at 
Naval Station Long Beach, CA; Alameda/San Francisco, CA; and Great Lakes, IL.  
MDM took a military stand against racism and in support of third world struggles and 
enjoyed a substantial following (at least at Great Lakes) among both blacks and whites.  
MDM was primarily a “rank-and-file” enlisted person’s movement.   
Junior Navy Officers working in the office of the Chief of Naval Operations 
formed the Concerned Officers Movement (COM).  COM “shunned the revolutionary 
demands and militant tactics of enlisted organizations such as MDM” (Cortright 2005, p. 
                                            
 
152 The narrative of these events was compiled in May 2013 from information provided on National Park 
Foundation and Navy Historical Center websites. Since then the National Park Foundation has 
considerably reduced the amount of information presented on its website regarding this incident:  
http://www.nationalparks.org/explore-parks/port-chicago-naval-magazine-national-memorial; accessed 
August 24, 2014.  The Navy Historical Center completely renovated its web page devoted to Port 
Chicago, adding more content in the form of historical documents, but reducing some of the narrative 
information previously provided: http://www.history.navy.mil/browse-by-topic/disasters-and-
phenomena/port-chicago-ca-explosion.html; accessed August 24, 2014. 
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109). Despite their moderate approach many COM members were harassed by 
superiors and left Naval service early, not necessarily by choice.  COMs most active 
chapters were in San Diego, CA; Norfolk, VA; and Washington D.C., but a chapter even 
emerged at the US Naval Station in Keflavik, Iceland.   COM was particularly concerned 
with the issue of war crimes and the applicability of the Nuremburg principle to the 
American armed forces and sought only for the right to speak out against military policy.   
When the Pentagon laid sole blame for the My Lai Massacre on Lieutenant 
William Calley, six members of COM held a press conference in Washington DC 
demanding that national policy leaders rather than low-ranking servicemen should be 
held accountable.  As the Army drew down in Vietnam the Pentagon relied more and 
more heavily on Navy carrier-based aviation and the Air Force to subdue the enemy.  
This increased war resistance aboard carriers including the USS CONSTELLATION 
and the USS CORAL SEA and spawned the SOS (Stop Our Ships/Support Our Sailors) 
movement.  Sailors signed petitions to Congress protesting their ship’s deployment in 
support of the war.  One quarter of the Sailors assigned to the USS CORAL SEA signed 
a petition that read “in our opinion there is a silent majority aboard this ship which does 
not believe in the present conflict in Vietnam….As Americans we all have the moral 
obligation to voice our opinions.  We the people must guide the government and not 
allow the government to guide us … (Cortright 2005, p. 112).”  When the USS KITTY 
HAWK left on deployment to South East Asia in late 1971, nine service members took 
refuge in San Diego churches, refusing to sail in support of the war.   Sailors actively 
engaged in resistance activities were removed from ships in an effort to remove the 
dissent.  Additionally, Sailors who refused to deploy or jumped ship in foreign ports 
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added to manpower shortages.  Some Sailors resorted to sabotaging equipment to 
delay deployment, resulting in hundreds of millions of dollars in damages.  Furthermore, 
sabotage onboard the USS RANGER and the USS FORESTAL resulted in an extension 
on deployment for the USS KITTY HAWK 
During this period issues of racism once again surfaced.  Due to its history of 
excluding African-Americans from all but the most menial positions and limiting Filipino 
Sailors to the ratings of “cook” and “steward” the Navy had often been perceived to be 
the most racist branch of the military.  It was the last service to integrate, and in 1971 
less than 5 percent of enlisted Sailors and less than 1 percent of officers were African-
American.  Manpower shortages and new voluntary enlistment policies, however, 
drastically changed the composition of the Navy and by 1972 a record 12 per cent of 
recruits were African-American. 
Unfortunately, rather than acquiring specific rating skills that would help them 
advance in rate, as promised by recruiters, the newly recruited African-American 
enlisted men found themselves, in the words of the House Armed Services Committee, 
“swallowed up in mess cooking for three months, followed by … an endless period of 
compartment cleaning and chipping paint.”  These are all low-skill jobs that are vital to 
the ships functioning and keep a person gainfully employed but which do not provide 
relevant rating experience that would aid these Sailors to advance in rank and pay.  
Naturally, these new recruits, with their strong sense of black pride, found these 
circumstances intolerable.   
The sudden influx of African-American recruits had already caused some friction 
across the wider Navy.  This, coupled with the general pressures of long hours, hard 
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work, and low morale caused by the Vietnam War, led to a “startling series of black 
uprisings” during the last few months of 1972 (Cortright 2005, p. 120).  The first and 
most dramatic of these, and the incident that first thrust the issue of Sailor unrest into 
the broader American public consciousness, began in Subic Bay, Philippines on 
October 10th between the Sailors of the air craft carrier, USS KITTY HAWK.  After eight 
grueling months at sea with round the clock air operations in support of bombing 
missions over Vietnam, the carrier had pulled into port in early October with the 
expectation among the crew that the ship would be headed home shortly thereafter.  
The night before the ship was to put out to sea the crew was informed that due to 
delayed deployments of both the USS RANGER and the USS FORESTAL as the result 
of sabotage, they would not be returning stateside, but would instead be returning to 
combat operations off the coast of Vietnam (Cortright 1992, p. 127).  With tensions 
already running high, a brawl broke out at the enlisted club on base between black and 
white Sailors.  Ultimately Shore Patrol ended the brawl and the Sailors returned to the 
ship, but the underlying racial tensions continued to simmer.   
Upon returning to the Tonkin Gulf, following the first full day of combat on 
October 12th, the ship’s intelligence officer began his investigation of the brawl at Subic 
Bay.  He summoned only African-American Sailors for questioning and possible 
disciplinary action.  The African-Americans saw this as blatant racial discrimination, and 
around 8 p.m. an understandably angry group gathered on the mess decks.  The 
Marine security force was called out, as though that would calm the situation.  After the 
XO and CO independently issued conflicting orders, the group of African-Americans 
unexpectedly encountered the armed Marines on the hangar deck and a mêlée broke 
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out.  The fighting spread rapidly with gangs of African-Americans and whites marauding 
through the ship attacking each other.  Unfortunately, the XO and CO continued working 
at cross purposes, effectively losing control of the ship until approximately 2:30 a.m. 
October 13th when the fighting finally subsided.  In all, forty white and six African-
American Sailors were injured.  Twenty-five Sailors, all of them African-American, were 
arrested as a result of the incident.  
Following the racially-charged riot on the Kitty Hawk, a period ensued during 
which “race riots” became somewhat commonplace in the Navy, with incidents 
occurring in short order aboard the USS HASAYAMPA, the USS INTREPID, and the 
USS CONSTELLATION. On November 10th the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral 
Elmo Zumwalt, called together eighty leading Navy Admirals and Marine Corps 
Generals to demand they pay greater attention to equal-opportunity programs.  Political 
dissent against the Vietnam War and racial unrest were primary drivers behind the 
resistance of Sailors in this era.153  A contributing factor to the resistant spirit of the 
services under conscription was the fact that the draft brought a much wider range of 
Americans with vastly differing attitudes, beliefs, and experiences into the ranks 
involuntarily.  For those who did not want to serve in the first place, resisting military 
actions they did not personally support seemed more like a moral act than a betrayal of 
the organization.  Moreover, draftees were not inhibited in their willingness to complain 
by an economic need to protect a military career.  These circumstances would change 
on July 1, 1973 when the draft was eliminated and the All-Volunteer Force (AVF) was 
established.  In fact, one of the catalysts behind establishing an All-Volunteer Force was 
                                            
 
153 For a much more detailed and expansive account of GI resistance across the services during the 
period of the Vietnam War see David Cortright (2005). 
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the desire by politicians to inoculate the military against wide-spread resistance in the 
ranks, such as that experienced during the Vietnam War within the conscripted force.  
Resistance After Establishment of the All-Volunteer Force 
A recent example of group resistance from the All-Volunteer Force involved 23 
soldiers from the 343rd Quartermaster Company, an Army Reserve unit from Rock Hill, 
S.C., who in October 2004 refused to execute a convoy mission to deliver fuel and 
water from Tallil Air Base, the logistics hub in southern Iraq, to Taji, a base north of 
Baghdad.  According to military and news reports at the time, soldiers refused the 
orders because not all of their vehicles were armored; some vehicles were in poor 
condition; and the route they were to take, known as Main Supply Route Tampa, was 
rife with ambushes, roadside bombs, or both. Their Commanding General immediately 
ordered a stand-down of the unit for a safety and maintenance check. He also asked for 
two investigations: One to determine whether or not the UCMJ had been violated, and 
the second to determine whether or not there was a more systemic problem within the 
unit.  Ultimately, the unit Commanding Officer resigned and the soldiers who refused 
orders were given the option to submit to Article 15 hearings rather than automatically 
being referred to courts-martial.154  This was a controversially light outcome for what is 
                                            
 
154 Article 15 hearings conducted by the unit Commanding Officer are not bound by military rules of 
evidence as are courts-martial.  Moreover, the accused has no right to defense by an attorney at Article 
15 hearings.  Therefore, the servicemember has far fewer protections against being found guilty of the 
charges.  On the other hand, the punishment a Commanding Officer can award for charges handled via 
Article 15 proceedings is limited and significantly less than what could be awarded at court-martial if 
convicted.   If a soldier insists on having the charges adjudicated at court-martial, s/he is taking the 
chance that if found guilty, s/he will incur significantly more punishment, including the possibility of a Bad 
Conduct or Dishonorable discharge, which have lifelong, adverse implications for employment and civic 
rights, such as voting.  Commanding Officers cannot order punitive discharges via Article 15 proceedings.  
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universally regarded among military professionals as the most serious failure of military 
discipline – refusing to obey orders in a time of war.155 
Another more recent example of resistance by military personnel to military 
authority occurred in June 2006 when, in an individual act of resistance, Army 1st 
Lieutenant Ehren Watada refused to deploy to Iraq with his unit on the grounds that the 
war was illegal.  Despite the potential legal validity of his claims, he was promptly 
arrested and court-martialed.  At court-martial he was charged with one count of 
“missing movement”156 and two counts of “conduct unbecoming an officer and 
gentlemen”157 for statements he made criticizing the Bush administration and the Iraq 
war during speeches and interviews. Legal technicalities ultimately prevented his 
conviction and eventually resulted in dismissal of the case against him, much to the 
chagrin of the Department of Defense.   
 Admittedly, these examples are of much more serious nature than the small, 
individual and fleeting acts of resistance illustrated by the vignettes at the beginning of 
Chapter 1, and yet the military sees disobedience and insubordination of any kind as 
indications of discipline problems and the potential seeds of a wider, more threatening 
breakdown of authority that could develop across the institution. This line of reasoning 
and reaction to seemingly small, inconsequential acts of individualism are more 
understandable in light of Goffman’s (1961) theories and explication of “the total 
                                            
 
155Facts related to this incident were obtained from the following website: 
http://www.military.com/NewsContent/0,13319,FL_punish_111704,00.html; accessed August 24, 2014. 
156 Any person subject to the UCMJ who through neglect or design misses the movement of a ship, 
aircraft, or unit with which he or she is required in the course of duty to move shall be punished as a 
court-martial may direct (The Manual for Courts-Martial (MCM) 2012, p. IV-16, para. 11.a.). 
157 MCM (2012) p. IV-99, para. 59.c. (1) explains that as used in this article “gentleman” includes both 
male and female commissioned officers, cadets, and midshipmen. 
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institution,” which he defined as “a place of residence and work where a large number of 
like-situated individuals cut off from the wider society for an appreciable period of time 
together lead an enclosed formally administered round of life” (p. xiii). [Examples of total 
institutions have included mental asylums, prisons, conscription armies, etc.]  According 
to Goffman (1961) the characteristics of a total institution which seem especially 
pertinent to the present forward-deployed, albeit “All-Volunteer” military force, include: 
1. all aspects of life are conducted in the same place and under the same 
central authority;  
2. each phase of the member's daily activity is carried on in the immediate 
company of a large batch of others, all of whom are treated alike and required 
to do the same thing together;  
3. all phases of the day's activities are tightly scheduled, with one activity 
leading at prearranged time into the next, the whole sequence of activities 
being imposed from above by a system of explicit formal rulings and a body 
of officials; and  
4. the various enforced activities are brought together into a single rational plan 
purportedly designed to fulfill the official aims of the institution (p. 6).  
As a result, any threat to or deviation from the institution’s stated needs or objectives is 
viewed as a potential threat and is dealt with accordingly.  Zurcher (1967) adds that 
indoctrination into military life causes recruits to experience challenges to their personal 
autonomy and relative freedom to express themselves and their beliefs that cause them 
to reformulate their concept of “self,” both within and outside the organizational life of 
the military.   
Although the All-Volunteer Force is admittedly less “totalizing” than one resulting 
from conscription, it is still quite rare to find organized, overt protest, feminist or 
otherwise, in the military.  For one thing, today’s service members “self-select” into the 
military. As volunteers, they are much more likely to believe they owe the organization 
their loyalty due both to their political orientation and military socialization.  Moreover, 
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those pursuing a military career are economically incentivized not to complain from a 
desire to protect that career, which translates not only into their level of pay and benefits 
while actively serving, but also into the pay and medical benefits they receive over the 
course of their retirement. Complaints could result in a significant economic penalty (via 
covert retribution in the form of lowered performance appraisals resulting in failure to 
promote) for the person lodging them.  Moreover, the person incurring the penalty would 
likely never be able to prove they had been the victim of retribution. 
When service members complain casually in their day-to-day work lives, the 
response of their peers and colleagues is frequently “Well, you can always get out [at 
the end of your enlistment].”  When service members’ complaints, such as those about 
the length or frequency of deployments or their concerns over the legalities of the wars 
in Iraq or Afghanistan, reach the American public, there seems to be little sympathy.  
The general consensus among citizens these days with regard to soldiers who complain 
about conditions in the ranks seems to be: “Well, they volunteered, didn’t they?  They 
must have known what they were getting themselves into.”  The change in the political 
composition of the force from the days of conscription to the days of the AVF, coupled 
with the change in public support for those who were drafted as compared to those who 
have volunteered have conspired to change the likelihood and nature of protest within 
the ranks.  
  Members of today’s AVF have fewer legal protections than do civilians and far 
fewer options for resistance.  For example, uniform regulations governing dress and 
grooming standards prevent African-American men and women from wearing 
dreadlocks.  In a civilian context as documented by Kuumba and Ajanaku (1998) the 
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wearing of dreadlocks has served not only as a visible example of everyday, embodied 
resistance, but also as a marker that links individuals to counter-hegemonic social 
movements and provides them with oppositional collective identities.  Ironically, in 
March 2014 the U.S. Army inadvertently provided African-American women Soldiers 
with a reason for establishing an oppositional collective identity when it instituted new 
grooming standards that outlawed hairstyles African-American women found easiest to 
maintain, leading to claims of racial bias. While twists and dreadlocks have been 
outlawed since 2005, the new regulation clarifies that multiple braids and cornrows 
cannot be larger than a quarter of an inch in diameter and cornrows must be uniform. 
One outraged member of the Georgia National Guard went so far as to start a petition 
via the White House website seeking Presidential intervention, drawing national 
attention to the matter.  As a result, African-American congressmen appealed to the 
Pentagon for review of the regulation while the House Armed Services Committee 
added language to the FY-15 Defense Authorization bill prohibiting enforcement of the 
new hair standards.  The African-American woman sergeant who started the petition to 
the White House might have felt empowered to do so if her chain of command were 
predominantly African-American and shared her belief that the new regulations were 
racially insensitive.  
Service members who decide to resist military policies or practices generally 
have two choices.  They can try to work within the system, using the established internal 
procedures for lodging grievances or, like Lieutenant Dan Choi, 1st Lieutenant Ehren 
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Watada, or Private First Class (PFC) Bradley (Chelsea) Manning,158 they might make 
their case publicly, essentially lobbing a metaphorical hand grenade at the system.  The 
choice to take resistance public is rare because doing so is perceived by the military 
establishment as a betrayal and as unnecessarily dramatic, if not outright destructive to 
“good order and discipline,” and perhaps even threatening to national security.  The 
military tends to deal with such cases in the harshest manner possible.  The choice to 
work inside the system must also be carefully considered, because doing so may result 
in adverse career consequences. 
Past Gender Resistance and Agency in the Military Context 
Women’s Resistance 
 Katzenstein (1998) classified feminist “protest” within the military as “moderate, 
interest-group, influence-seeking” politics aimed at changing the status quo by 
advocating for military women’s interests and influencing decisions and policy at the 
highest levels.  These internal interest groups, often comprised of or quietly shepherded 
along by some of the most senior women officers, paid close attention to who among 
the military and civilian leadership wielded political influence.  The groups then actively 
worked to build connections and network with those who could make change happen.  
About one half the military women who participated in Katzenstein’s (1998) research 
proudly self-identified as feminists, while the other half avoided the label as “counter-
                                            
 
158 On March 19th 2009, West Point graduate and Iraq War veteran LT Dan Choi announced during an 
appearance on “The Rachel Maddow Show” that he was gay.  He viewed “coming out” as a matter of 
personal integrity and a moral obligation.  DADT was still in effect and as a result of his very public 
statement he was discharged from the Army National Guard.  PFC Manning, a former Army intelligence 
analyst, leaked the largest cache of classified documents in U.S. history with the assistance of WikiLeaks.  
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productive” to their cause.  She stresses, however, that military women worked within 
the system and played by the rules, while mobilizing political clout to their cause.   
 Most sociologists do no view “advocacy” or “influence” as synonyms for “protest.” 
Moreover, as previously noted, this pro-active interest group advocacy proved 
unsustainable in the form Katzenstein (1998) celebrated it, because chapters of 
WOPA/N tended to wither once their founding members had transferred out of the area 
to new duty stations.  Ultimately, the WOPA/N advocacy was co-opted by the Navy 
establishment and reincarnated, with official Navy support, as the Sea Service 
Leadership Association (SSLA).  SSLA provides the medium through which the Navy 
can somewhat informally address women’s issues and career concerns because most 
Navy women do not realize the SSLA effectively functions as an extension of the Navy’s 
Office of Women’s Policy.   
 SSLA conferences have many attendees, but the Association has few actual 
members. This arrangement is not so different from that of the original WOPA/N.  In my 
experience, many women officers attended WOPA/N educational luncheons to hear 
guest speakers address women’s unique concerns.  Many “joined” the group, paying 
nominal dues to be added to be added to and obtain the phone listing because women 
officers at the time were so isolated from one another.  Very few officers were directly, 
politically engaged with the group, however.   
In fact, as Iskra (2007) discovered, many of the most-senior women in the 
military were able to rise to record heights within their respective services, not so much 
by advocating for other women, but by working hard, playing down the fact that they 
were women, and by having a more senior male mentor (or mentors) who aided their 
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rise “through connections that confer status and opportunity” (Ridgeway & Smith-Lovin 
1999a).  Many women who achieved senior rank did so by not rocking the boat.  While 
some did use their positions and more senior contacts to advocate for women, many did 
not.  It is one thing for senior military women to advocate privately, behind the scenes, 
for a few “water-walker” junior officers presumed to have “Flag-potential;” it is an entirely 
different matter to publicly take on the whole establishment.  “Rocking the boat” is not a 
proven strategy for promotion and success in this most traditional of socially-defined 
male professions.  Paradoxically, women who are most career-oriented are least likely 
to challenge the prevailing order which systematically disadvantages them because 
they feel they have the most to lose (Karst 1991).  For women who are not career-
oriented, and therefore have less to gain, challenging the prevailing system simply may 
not be worth their effort.  Regardless, even women who do not to take on the official 
system may be pushed to resist and do resist the sexism of their colleagues at the 
individual level in day to day interaction.   
Military men at the pinnacle of power might let some women into their elite club, 
especially if Congressional oversight requires that they do so, but these same men do 
not want their noses rubbed in the presence of women as women.  In fact, immediately 
upon her selection to 1-Star Admiral, Rear Admiral Loewer assumed the mantle of the 
most senior woman Surface Warfare Officer (SWO), publicly and proactively advocating 
on behalf of more junior women SWOs of all ranks.  She was not selected for promotion 
to 2-Star, and subsequently retired.159  One can only speculate as to the cause for her 
                                            
 
159 This is a particularly astonishing turn of events given that then-Captain Loewer held the “high-visibility” position as 
Director of the White House Situation Room in September 2001.  She was actually traveling with President Bush on 
the morning of Sept 11th when the first plane hit the World Trade Center.  Normally the National Security Advisor 
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being “passed over” for promotion.  However, given her proactive and high-profile 
advocacy for and mentoring of women SWOs, the message of her “failure to select” 
sent a chilling message, intentional or not, to other women Naval officers throughout the 
fleet about their career potential.   
Men’s Resistance to Gender Integration of the Ranks 
In yet another example of past gender resistance in the military, Laura L. Miller 
(1997) documented male Army soldiers’ resistance, in the form of gender harassment, 
to women’s encroachment into military occupational specialties that had formerly been 
exclusively male territory.160  In the study, conducted between 1992 and 1994, she 
discovered that while men occupy the dominant structural position in the military, they 
nonetheless employed modes of resistance more commonly associated with the 
powerless, i.e. weapons of the weak (Scott 1986).  She argues that studies of 
resistance begin by dichotomizing the population of interest into the powerful and the 
powerless without acknowledging that individuals can simultaneously experience both 
privilege and oppression depending upon the relative salience of their social status(es).   
For example, a black, female, senior officer would occupy a different social 
location than would a white, junior, enlisted man, or an Asian, male, junior officer.  Her 
experience of privilege and oppression within the military environment would be 
                                                                                                                                            
 
would have informed President Bush, but since Secretary Rice was not traveling with the President that day, the job 
fell to Captain Loewer.  This information is based on AP and Catholic Telegraph reports at the following websites: 
http://web.archive.org/web/20030208054750/http://www.directsourceradio.com/links/1126200112ON.html; accessed 
August 24, 2014. 
http://web.archive.org/web/20030304200534/http://www.catholiccincinnati.org/tct/Archive/dec0701.htm; accessed 
August 24, 2014.  See also Stout (2001). 
160 According to Miller’s definition “gender harassment” can include:  sabotage, foot-dragging, feigning 
ignorance, constant scrutiny, gossip and rumors, and indirect threats.  This form of harassment targets 
women but is not sexual and often is executed covertly so that it can rarely be traced to its source (p. 33). 
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different from either of the men’s, and the two men’s experiences of privilege and 
oppression would be different from each other.  Since individuals can enjoy privilege at 
the same time they suffer disadvantage on the basis of gender, race, class, age, 
occupation, sexual orientation, religious affiliation, or position within an organization, 
they can be powerful in some things and powerless in others (Miller 1997, p. 32).  
Regardless of whether changes in military policy and both internal (uniformed) and 
external (Congressional) politics actually confer real power on women, some military 
men perceive that women have more power and act as if they actually do. 
Miller (1997) defines gender harassment as “harassment that is not sexual, and 
is used to enforce traditional gender roles, or in response to the violation of those roles” 
(p. 35).  She notes this form of harassment may also be aimed at undermining women’s 
attempts to gain power or in response to women’s power that men view as “illegitimately 
obtained or exercised” (p. 35).  She further notes that Army men do not confine their 
use of gender harassment solely to women.  Men who violate gender norms or fail to 
live up to the hegemonic masculine ideal may also be the targets of gender harassment, 
denigrated by their male colleagues as pussies, fags, or wusses. 
Miller (1997) identifies the following as forms of gender harassment:  resistance 
to (mostly women’s) authority; constant, critical scrutiny; gossip and rumors (often 
untrue, about mostly women’s sex lives); sabotage; and indirect threats. She found that 
white men, especially officers, were most threatened by women’s service and its 
potential expansion (p. 41).  Because gender harassment is more subtle and less visible 
than sexual harassment, its origins are often difficult to trace, and its practitioners 
difficult to identify.  Thus, practicing gender harassment is one means military men have 
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of attempting to: push women back into their more “appropriate” roles, i.e. keeping 
women in their place; restore organizational meritocracy, since women are perceived to 
be unfairly privileged rather than earning their way to whatever position they hold; and  
keep “combat,” however it is defined, an all-male province.  According to Miller (1997) 
Army men often pointed to differential standards for physical fitness to justify their 
perceptions that women receive special treatment relative to men.161  These men also 
viewed pregnancy as an advantage in that pregnancy provided an excuse for a woman 
to get out of work while still earning the same pay as her male counterpart. 
Army men who admitted practicing gender harassment objected to women’s 
increased military participation but feared negative organizational consequences for 
openly expressing their objections (Miller 1997, p. 32-33).  Miller (1997) notes that the 
military context is unique “because multiple hierarchies are also at work, the structure of 
gender interactions is more complex than that presented in the literatures on resistance 
or on women in the military” (p. 33).  Within the military hierarchy some men are less 
powerful than others.  As Miller (1997) reminds us, “the military contains many levels of 
dominance and subordination including those based on rank, job specialty, education, 
race, gender, age, marital and family status, and mission experience” (p. 34). These are 
what Hacker (1989) calls the “systems and subsystems of the military” (p. 12). 
Due to these systems and subsystems of dominance and subordination, junior 
men realize it is often safer to vent their frustrations to peers or subordinates down the 
chain of command.  Even the service chiefs and other military leaders may feel 
powerless against, or at least subordinate to, congressional leaders seeking to change 
                                            
 
161 See also Cohn (2000).   
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military policy to be more inclusive of women (Miller 1997, p. 33).  Miller (1997) 
documents that some policy changes and their associated politics do confer something 
like power on women, even if only because men believe women have been empowered.  
Military policies and rules have been changed to make women less powerless in 
situations involving sexual harassment and/or sexual assault.  I doubt these changes to 
policy confer real power on women.  Rather, the changes give women some means to 
fight back against something they should never have had to experience in the first 
place.  Army men who admitted their animosity toward Army women also believed that 
women illegitimately gained the power they were presumed by men to have (Miller 
1997).  That is, Army men believed women got special treatment or that women in 
prestigious jobs must have slept their way into them rather than being assigned on 
merit.  These beliefs contributed to male Soldiers’ feelings of hostility toward female 
Soldiers (Miller 1997). 
 We see in Miller’s (1997) research the influence of Connell’s (1987) hegemonic 
masculinity.  Connell’s (1987) theory postulates that hegemonic masculinity is 
constructed in relation to other subordinated forms of masculinity and in opposition to 
femininity. Under the pressure exerted by hegemonic masculinity, men who feel their 
masculinity is threatened often react with hostility.  When women engage in activities or 
occupations traditionally defined as “masculine,” they risk incurring the wrath of men 
who are insecure in their own masculinity.  This often provokes a backlash against the 
women who are gender-integrating that occupation.  Lorber (2000) calls for resistance 
to traditional gender norms by both men and women as a means of tearing down 
gender as a social structure.  This approach is unlikely to gain much traction, since most 
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men derive too much privilege from the present system and since hegemonic 
masculinity penalizes men severely for gender transgressions.   
Although Howson (2006) extensively theorized resistance to hegemonic 
masculinity by both men and women, his prescription for change is ultimately unhelpful 
since in his view, “protest femininities” must take a radical approach to change.  That is, 
rather than working to make the existing, flawed gender system more equitable, 
Howson (2006) theorizes protest femininities as those that are creative, aspirational, 
and transcendant.  In his conception, the project of protest femininities is to envision an 
entirely new system of gender from the ground up.  While this approach might be ideal 
as an intellectual exercise, its success in actual practice is highly unlikely.  The number 
of women engaged in protest femininities in the manner Howson (2006) envisions is 
unlikely ever to reach the tipping point necessary to radically transform gender relations.   
Despite obvious surface changes, hegemonic masculinity and the gendered 
power relations that result from its operation have conspired to make traditional gender 
culture remarkably durable.  As Curtis and MacCorquodale (1990) warn us, one of the 
most interesting paradoxes of social life is the fact that structured relationships in 
society may simultaneously exhibit both rapid change and long-term stability (p. 136).  
Margaret Anderson (2005) echoes this sentiment in contemplating the development of 
feminist studies across a quarter century:  “Theoretical arguments emphasizing the 
fluidity and agency of gender, race, class, and sexuality make these social factors seem 
inherently unstable, but they are at the same time remarkably (and frustratingly) stable 
over time” (p. 452). 
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The Struggle to Identify the Behaviors of Navy Women that Constitute Resistance 
to Traditional Gender Norms 
 Consistent with Hollander and Einwohner’s (2004) complaints that “resistance,” 
in general, is often ill-defined or not defined at all, scholars who study gender resistance 
in particular cannot seem to agree on what gender resistance looks like.  Some 
scholars contend that women who engage in gender-transgressive behavior, like joining 
the military (see Herbert 1998, Furia 2009, and Archer 2012) or participating in 
competitive body building (see St. Martin & Gavey 1996), simultaneously conform to 
and resist traditional gender norms through their strategic deployment of femininity.  
Some scholars suggest that intentional deployment of femininity by women in masculine 
work organizations is resistance in response to expectations that only men can perform 
well in those settings (see Dellinger & Williams 1997; and Weitz 2001) or because such 
conformance is rewarded economically (see Tibbals 2007).   
 Rudman and Glick (2001) discovered that women who adopted more 
“masculine” leadership styles were respected but not liked, while those who maintained 
a more “feminine” styles were liked but not respected.  Martin and Meyerson (1998) 
found that women’s choice to conform to male norms was an incomplete solution 
because display of a particular behavior by a man was interpreted differently than the 
same behavior displayed by a woman.  Miller (2004), Pilgeram (2007), and Powell, 
Bagilhole, and Danty (2009) argue that women who adopted a masculine style of 
gender performance upon entering “male” professions ultimately and unintentionally 
reinforce hegemonic masculinity.  These scholars believe that in functioning as if they 
were men, women in gender-non-traditional occupations confirm that only those who 
 
 
 
 
282 
are manly can do the job.  Silva (2008), however, concludes that women who enter the 
military must play up their femininity because their gender is core to their identity and 
they must broadcast that they are women to maintain a coherent sense of self.   
 If all this seems contradictory and confusing, it is.  Just as Hollander and 
Einwohner (2004) charged definitions of “resistance” in general with being so loose that 
some scholars could see it almost everywhere while others saw it almost nowhere, 
definitions of gender resistance suffer from the same problem.  In its present state, 
scholarly treatment of women’s gender resistance is, at best, unhelpful in determining 
what types of gender performance are effective in undermining the traditional gender 
order.  No matter what they do (emphasize masculine or feminine qualities) or their 
intent in doing it, women’s gender behavior in masculine environments is subject to 
scholarly interpretation and is classified as traditional-gender-resistant or -reinforcing 
according to the researcher’s personal orientation.  Scholarly assessments of gender 
resistance should be based upon theory, ideally supported by actual data, rather than 
upon multiple, inconsistent, contradictory, or non-existent definitions.  
Healey (1999) concedes that one of the problems resulting from theorizing about 
power and women’s resistance:  
lies in establishing that the women in question have adopted a set of strategies 
which can be interpreted as resistance.  Who decides what constitutes a strategy 
and that it is a form of resistance? What are the implications of the researcher 
interpreting particular behavior as an act of resistance without the subject 
admitting that it was?  We are on shaky ground here (p. 56).  
Scholarship on gender resistance would greatly benefit from the same kind of analysis 
Hollander and Einwohner (2004) applied to general theories of resistance. Key 
questions gender scholars must address include: Under what circumstances is gender 
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performance really gender resistance?  Do women (or men) challenge the gender order 
by engaging in a gender-atypical occupation? How does the choice of strategy 
(emphasizing femininity or masculinity) one adopts in “doing gender” while engaged in a 
gender-atypical occupation influence whether or not that behavior is resistance? 
 Deutsch (2007) notes that women can transgress gender norms without actually 
transforming them.  She urges scholars to focus on whatever gender behaviors in a 
given context work to transform gender norms.  Shaw (2001) asks more specifically 
“Have new discourses, beliefs, or viewpoints been forged or have dominant ideologies 
been weakened?” (p. 194).  With that guidance in mind, the remainder of this chapter 
will focus on exploring if and how warfare-qualified women in the Navy surface fleet do 
gender in a way that may have “significant transformational consequences” for military 
hegemonic masculinity.  In identifying what behavior constitutes “resistance” I have 
adopted Weitz (2001) definition:  resistant actions are those that “not only reject 
subordination but do so by challenging the ideologies that support that subordination” 
(p. 670).   
 In the following section, I focus on how Navy women past and present have 
challenged dominant gender ideologies in the course of their day-to-day lives.  In it I will 
compare and contrast the conditions Navy women confronted in 1994 and how they 
responded with those in 2014, a full two decades later.  The reader will encounter the 
voices of women officers from a variety of Navy communities from twenty years ago and 
be introduced to one officer (Georgeanne) and five enlisted women (Amy, Diana, Faith, 
Janice, and Nikki) who share their recent experiences in the Navy. As a reminder, 
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readers can refer to Appendix E for a complete listing of participants, their ranks and 
ratings, and limited amplifying information. 
Navy Women and Resistance to Traditional Gender Norms 
Twenty years ago Navy women confronted and resisted individual and 
institutional sexism, open hostility, negative stereotypes, individual and institutional 
gender discrimination, gender harassment, sexual harassment, and sexual assault.  
Deutsch (2007) notes that when gender barriers begin to crumble in particular 
occupations or institutions, a backlash that attempts to re-assert gender difference may 
result (p. 115).  Miller’s (1997) earlier work on men’s resistance to gender integration in 
the Army supports this argument although Deutsch (2007) does not reference Miller 
(1997).   
In the U.S. Navy immediately following the successful conclusion of the first war 
with Iraq; the political fallout from the 1991 TAILHOOK convention; and the opening of 
combatant ships and combat aviation to women, Navy women faced just such a 
backlash.  It was quite severe and throughout the 1990s there remained real 
institutional hostility toward women.  It seemed that every day presented a new struggle, 
a new fight with male colleagues.  Although my 1993 research project was not 
specifically focused on women’s resistance, accounts of their resistance surfaced during 
interviews nonetheless. In 1993, in addition to detailing the sexual harassment and 
sexual discrimination they encountered on a daily basis, Navy officers described the 
ways they fought back against this onslaught of negative experiences.  For example,  
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one Lieutenant describes her first meeting with her Squadron Executive Officer:  
He started in on why [I] had to wear pants and “You can’t make the enlisted 
women jealous, that you’re trying to look pretty.  You’re supposed to be acting 
like a man,” and he said “Ltjg X, you know when you’re walking up a ladder, men 
are going to look up your skirt, and not just enlisted men either.” So I said to him, 
“My father and mother had two sons and I’m not one of them.  I’m a woman and 
I’m going to look like one.  I’m going to wear a skirt, earrings, make-up, do my 
hair, wear hose and heels, sir, and that’s just the way it is, because if I try to be a 
leader who’s pretending to be something she’s not, then I can’t be an effective 
one.  I’m a woman and I’m going to look and act like one” (Margosian & Vendrzyk 
1994, p. 91).   
This particular officer was the only one out of forty-eight Naval officer participants 
in the 1993 study who cited being “authentic” to her sense of self as an important 
consideration in how she managed the gender issues she encountered.  One 
Lieutenant Commander reflecting back on her time at the Naval Academy described 
how she and her roommates reacted to the masculine environment: 
We did the opposite; we were very feminine, or tried to be.  You know, they 
neutered you.  We were eunuchs.  They didn’t even have women’s uniforms 
when I went there.  We wore male uniforms, and they weren’t tailored – so they 
were huge in the neck, tight in the butt, huge in the waist, and we had to cut our 
hair real short.  No one had time for makeup and stuff, so we felt really stripped 
of our femininity and stripped of our identities.  So we went out of our way to fight 
that.  We would wear makeup and we would wear pretty underwear.   We would 
wear perfume and we would be very feminine which I also think was wrong.  If 
you aren’t that way normally, why try to be that just to be the opposite (Margosian 
& Vendrzyk 1994, p. 89)?  
Studies of women’s initial entry into male occupations find them working hard to 
fit in, including downplaying their femininity and/or adopting masculine behaviors.  Often 
women trailblazers emulate male leaders because there are no female leaders to serve 
as their role models. Martin and Meyerson (1998) discovered that executive-level 
women who were trailblazers in the hi-tech industry were socialized to perform as men 
to succeed.  Ultimately many of these women executives concluded that the costs of 
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this type of conformity to a male ideal were so high that they chose to leave.  More 
junior women in these organizations also observe these costs and either demand 
change or leave as well.  
Because military culture is overwhelmingly masculine, Navy women are doubly 
burdened by both the existing gender order (a system of social relations) and the 
military culture of emphasized masculinity (a system of meanings) (Hays 1994). Navy 
women trailblazers of the 1980s and 1990s, no doubt subconsciously, developed 
gender performance strategies that were likely calculated to avoid confirming what the 
individual woman saw as the worst negative stereotype of women held by military men.  
Those who thought the “too feminine” stereotype was most destructive to their goals or 
self-concept worked to minimize their femininity.  Those who thought the “too 
masculine” stereotype was most destructive to their goals or self-concept worked to 
emphasize their femininity.  Unfortunately, in their aversion to these extremes most 
women inadvertently confirmed the negative stereotype they deemed less destructive.  
Many tried to achieve some sort of neutral balance, recognizing there were pitfalls to 
being either too masculine or too feminine.   
Margosian and Vendrzyk (1994) and Herbert (1998) document that military 
women do consciously manage their gender performance.  Often the primary goal of 
military women’s gender performance is to “fit in” with their male colleagues, but 
sometimes military women’s gender performance is calibrated to disprove men’s sexist 
expectations of women’s capabilities. Herbert’s (1998) research across services and 
ranks identified four gender management strategies she believed military women used 
to fit in:  (1) emphasize feminine qualities; (2) emphasize masculine qualities; (3) 
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balance masculine and feminine qualities; and (4) minimize both masculine and 
feminine qualities (neuter).  Carreiras (2008), in studying gender integration of women 
officers of the Portuguese and Dutch militaries, also developed a typology of women’s 
strategies for dealing with issues of gender integration.  Her typology largely mirrors 
Herbert’s although she does not reference Herbert (1998).  Carreiras (2008) identified 
four strategies: (1) Assimilation (masculinization); (2) Complicity (emphasized 
femininity); Conformity (diluted femininity, intended to minimize gender differences 
through “gender neutrality”); and Assertiveness (militant femininity) (pp. 174-5).   She 
associates the “conformity” approach as being consonant with Kanter’s (1977) 
explanation of the attempts “tokens” often make to become socially invisible.  Her final 
category, “assertiveness,” is unique in that women who adopt this approach are willing 
to directly confront sexist attitudes, policies, and behaviors and proactively advocate for 
women’s rights. She admits this is a risky strategy because of its potential to alienate 
men, who numerically and structurally hold positions of power in military organizations.   
Furia (2009), building on Herbert (1998), collapsed two of Herbert’s strategies 
into one, arguing that Army women used one of the following three strategies to fit in: 
(1) emphasizing the feminine; (2) embracing the masculine; or (3) keeping a low profile 
by embracing a “balanced” approach.   Herbert’s (1998) evidence suggests that women 
who adopted a balanced or neuter approach felt like they could not be themselves, or 
that there were penalties to being either too masculine or too feminine.  In contrast, the 
Navy women in my recent study reported using the “doing gender a la carte” strategy to 
be true to themselves. Rather than reporting that they were attempting to keep a low 
profile, many women officers indicated they felt no pressure to conform to any specific 
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gender ideal.  Moreover, they indicated they would not be successful as leaders if they 
tried to be something they were not. 
Over the past twenty years, the Navy environment, as it concerns gender, has 
evolved.   Policy changes (some initiated by the Navy itself, some imposed by 
Congress) have made that environment more receptive to women.  Today, hegemonic 
masculinity must exert its influence in far more subtle ways, making it harder for women 
to detect, and thus harder for them to confront.    Changes in Navy policy regarding the 
employment of women and institutional efforts to retain more women Surface Warfare 
Officers have resulted in a space for women, especially officers, to adjust their approach 
to fitting in.  Many women officers reject the strategies of their predecessors, which no 
doubt resulted from response to stereotype threat (see Archer 2012 and 2009; Hoyt & 
Blascovich 2010; and Yeung & von Hippel 2008; Steele, Reisz, Williams, & Kawakami 
2007; Bosson, Haymovitz,& Pinel 2004; Pronin, Steele, & Ross 2004; Kray, Galinsky, & 
Thompson 2002; Gonzales, Blanton, &  Williams 2002; Steele, Spencer, & Aronson 
2002; Stone, Lynch, Sjomeling, & Darley 1999; Aronson, Lustina, Good, Keough, 
Steele, & Brown 1999; and Steele & Aronson 1995).162    
Some Navy women today still make choices to deploy gender performance in a 
way designed to disprove men’s negative stereotypes.  This is especially true among 
enlisted women.  According to the women officers participating in my study, many of 
them are more focused on being true to their authentic self than avoiding one 
stereotypical extreme or the other.  They are enacting agency in their insistence on 
                                            
 
162 For readers interested in learning more about stereotype threat, www.reducingstereotypethreat.org; 
accessed August 24, 2014, has comprehensive bibliography of peer-reviewed publications exploring 
stereotype threat which can be found at: www.reducingstereotypethreat.org/bibliography.html; accessed 
August 24, 2014. 
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being themselves by doing gender “a la carte,” i.e. picking and choosing the gender 
behaviors they feel comfortable enacting.  Women further challenge the gender order 
when they carve out their own way to manage and lead that incorporates the best 
qualities associated with both male and female leaders, rather than simply emulating 
male leadership styles.  
Contemporary Forms of Navy Women’s Gender Resistance 
Strategic Display of Femininity 
Sometimes Navy women choose to deploy their femininity strategically as a 
means to resist becoming an “institutional male,” or as a specific reminder that women 
are Sailors too.  Diana, the ET1, described how the women on her ship handled 
Mother’s Day while they were deployed: 
On Mother’s Day all services were shut down.  And the women took over the 
barbershop.  The women, ourselves, collectively together, those that were good 
at tweaking eyebrows and those that were good at nails were doing the nails and 
the brows for others.  We did spa day.  It was JO1’s163 idea but it went all the way 
up to the Captain and XO (both male) and they supported it.  They had no 
problems, and the supply officer was female and [she] came down too.  The men 
in the galley gave us a couple trays of fresh fruit and some juices and stuff.  We 
shut down the ship’s barbershop.  And all the girls brought all of our pamper stuff 
out of our racks and were down in the barbershop for the day.  We had PT gear 
authorized that day for males and females.  We kind of rotated in and out 
between watch stations and we were just kind of hanging out together, talking 
about girly stuff.   
When I asked how the men on the ship reacted to this, Diana elaborated: 
Guys stayed the hell away from it.  Now the guys had no problem scoping us out 
when we came out and were in the mess line later in that afternoon and asking 
                                            
 
163 Journalist First Class Petty Officer. 
 
 
 
 
290 
“What was all the fuss about?  Was it really worth it?  Why couldn’t the guys do 
their [normal] Sunday routine of getting their haircuts and watching football 
games” and this, that, and the other thing.  It’s like “we’ll be at home for Father’s 
Day.164  You’ll have your time with your families.  We’re women who can’t be with 
our parents, our children, and such on Mothers’ Day.  Don’t you want a woman to 
be pampered and happy on Mothers’ Day?”   
When I asked Diana how men responded to that, she explained: 
They were like “[we] didn’t really think about it that way.” But it was awesome.  
And the ship had written it into the command calendar for the next year to ensure 
that they did a Mothers’ Day.  And they wrote down the little notes of what we did 
and how we allowed it.  And they asked [if there were] any things that they could 
buy for the barbershop that would help for women to do a more girly pampering?  
And the only thing we asked for the ship to buy [was] a paraffin waxer so that if 
you wanted to wax your hands or brows or wax your feet you could.  I’d never 
had it done.  But they got them to just accept it.  That was about the best girly 
thing.    
I asked Amy, the ET2 who had served on the east coast air craft carrier, if she 
ever felt boxed in by society’s expectations for how a woman should act or how an “at 
sea” warrior should act.  Observing that she was not wearing makeup at the interview, I 
also asked if there were circumstances under which she actively decided to wear or not 
wear makeup in a Navy context: 
It’s awful to say, but they’ve put us in the new uniforms.  And these are wash and 
wear.165  And when I’m in them that’s kind of how I feel.  It’s kind of like “okay, get 
up, wash, put on clothes and leave.”  It’s not that important.  It’s not that big a 
deal.  I’m not here to impress people.  I’m here to work.  That’s my job.  But there 
are times when the job calls for impressing people.  I mean, we had a retirement 
ceremony.  We have a lot of retirement ceremonies here.  If I put on my whites 
you’re darn straight I’ve gotten up two hours early and done my hair, done my 
makeup, made sure my nails were done, made sure everything was just right, my 
shoes were polished because that’s the point of that uniform.  It’s there to 
impress.  We don’t wear that every day, so I don’t know.  I guess it really does 
depend on the circumstance.  For confidence purposes there are times where I’ll 
                                            
 
164 Their deployment was from November through May, so their “Spa Day” occurred near the end of their 
deployment.  
165 She’s referring to the blue digitized camouflage utility uniform, which makes everyone look rather 
frumpy. 
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do my hair, my makeup for an exam or for a board.  Like surface warfare boards 
and air boards, when you’re standing in a room full of people and you have to 
stand up and speak to a panel of three.  It’s “all eyes are on you” for those few 
seconds every time it comes around, so yeah, I had my makeup done.  I had my 
hair done.  I had my nails done.  I had everything in order because I knew it 
made me feel better to know that when people looked at me in the room they 
weren’t going “oh, she doesn’t care too much about herself.”  But in an everyday 
environment I just don’t feel the need to do that.  I mean, if I’m working I could 
impress people with my work.  I don’t need to impress them with how I look. 
Amy further explained that in ET “A” School women emphasized their feminine 
appearance to their male counterparts to demonstrate that the women were more 
professional Sailors: 
When I was in A school,  every morning it was get up, do hair, do makeup, make 
sure uniform is pressed as sharp as could be, and that was a very female thing.  
We were in a mixed gender barracks on one floor, and we only took up half of it.  
There were that few females in all those rates.  It was IC [Interior 
Communications], ET [Electronics Technician], and FC [Fire Controlman].  And I 
think we had seventeen girls and … I think we had about eighty men.  But yeah, 
to us it was “look presentable, make sure your uniform was sharper than the 
boys, make sure your boots were shinier than the boys.  And make sure you 
always look presentable.”  We always wore the earrings.  It wasn’t more to 
impress the guys, it was just to show … we were always out to show that we 
could be better than them. 
Georgeanne, a LCDR who had graduated from the Naval Academy, who had 
qualified as a Surface Warfare Officer but subsequently transferred to the Meteorology 
and Oceanographic (METOC) community, described one Ensign on her ship: 
We have one girl and actually her call sign has become “barracuda” and I can 
see why … she actually made a joke about it one day, but she’s totally that 
manipulator type and she’s going to go far.  She’s kind of cute or whatever, big 
blue eyes, but she’ll be like ha, ha, ha and make jokes and … then throw in the 
zinger or gets what she wants.  Like I started a JO study hour and she’ll be like, 
“oh, I really don’t get that” and then, you know the next time I explain it she gets it 
and she locks it away and she just… she keeps it… I don’t know.  So she was 
the first of this new batch of Ensigns to give the navigation brief for evening 
report.  She was selected to be that first ensign and she gets up and she’s all like 
“te-he” during the practice, but she takes it in, you know.  We had a practice and 
we were there an hour and a half coaching her on what to say and it’s a long 
navigation into Hampton Roads, you know, and she nailed it and she got up and 
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at first she was simpering and everyone smiled and made jokes about her and 
she just blew them away, because she locked on, you know she turned that 
switch. 
When I asked her to clarify if she was saying this Ensign lures her shipmates in with the 
giggly girl routine and then she smacks them dead with competence, Georgeanne 
acknowledged: 
Yeah, if they don’t watch out, she’s going to run all over all the new Ensigns.  
She’s the one to watch and she’ll have… luckily the last group, they’re far 
enough along, they probably don’t have to worry about her as competition, but 
wow… I don’t think I was ever that good. 
Professionalism 
According to Martin and Meyerson (1998), “hierarchies provide arenas for a 
Darwinian struggle for dominance, an overt competition that focuses on actual or 
perceived competence” (p. 318).  This perhaps explains why many Navy women still 
place priority on being perceived by colleagues as “professional.”  They may really be 
talking about displaying technical competence rather than gender neutrality.  Men, 
however, may link technical competence as a warfighter to masculinity.  Navy women 
who pursue an image as competent professionals are not necessarily striving for gender 
neutrality; they may simply not want their gender to matter. They think of themselves as 
Sailors first, and they wish men, in particular, would see them that way too.  In the past, 
military women were negatively categorized as one of two types: “sluts” or “dykes.”  
Today, as documented by Archer (2012), military women are categorized as one of 
three types: “sluts,” “dykes,” or “bitches.”  A woman may think her gender performance 
conveys professional competence, whereas men see a “bitch,” someone who has 
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positional power over them; follows the rules; and demands professional competence 
and conduct from them.  
Faith, the former linguist turned Navy Counselor, believed many of her male 
colleagues and seniors viewed her “professionalism-over-buddies” approach as 
problematic.  She described her plans to not change, to not place more emphasis on 
personal relationships than professionalism: 
I don’t get it.  I still today don’t understand how this is such a difference [in 
approaches to work] but I haven’t changed.  I don’t plan on changing it [her 
direct, professional approach] because I think that that’s the correct way to 
operate.  And I think it’s a stance that females need to take and be that strong 
kind of voice and stand up for yourself and not just conform to being one of the 
guys or to hang out with the guys or to act like that.  I don’t think you have to 
dumb yourself down at all.  And I think that they [Navy men] expect that 
sometimes. 
Faith went on to explain the influence she thinks her professional demeanor exerts on 
junior Sailors: 
I think that they see that you handle yourself with a little bit more, I don’t know, I 
think the grace is missing from females in the Navy.  But I think that I have that at 
work.  I don’t try to play into just being like one of the guys.  And I’ve seen a lot of 
females try to do that, first classes, Chiefs, Senior Chiefs, that are one of the 
good old boys.  And every other word is some curse word.  They’re always at the 
smoke shack.  They smoke and can drink with the guys because they feel that 
that’s the only way that they can interact.  And I’m definitely not going to go down 
there.  I’m going to show that you can still, you can be a female in the Navy with 
intelligence and some grace and some humility and compassion for people that 
guys just naturally lack (chuckle) a lot of the time just because they’re men.  It’s 
not their fault.  That’s just not the way that they’re programmed, so… 
Janice, a Master Chief Electrician’s Mate who completed her service in the Navy 
with back-to-back tours as a Command Master Chief, explained that to be a successful  
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Sailor: 
you don’t have to stop being a woman.  You can be successful and be a 
woman.  Wear the makeup; wear the perfume … but be careful about the 
attitude … if you want to be seen as a professional, what kind of attitude 
are you putting out there?  You get the young women who … go about 
drawing attention to [themselves] in the wrong way. 
The point she was making was that women do not have to play down their femininity to 
succeed in the Navy, but they probably should not play up their sexual availability.  In 
her position as Command Master Chief she tried to counsel both young men and 
women by talking with them, and suggesting “maybe [sexual attention] is not the kind of 
attention that you want because you might get something that you’re not anticipating”  
Janice further explained: 
they’re still kids.  They may be adults, they’re over 18 and everything, but 
again it’s not just the women.  It’s the young men too.  They’re still kids, 
they’re still learning.  It’s a growing experience.  [You’re] kind of teaching 
them, you know, how to act and whatnot, but you don’t want to be the 
hoochie mama.  Don’t do that.  Guys will never respect you. 
She elaborated that in her experience young women who played up their sexual 
availability while in uniform, on the job, did not last very long in the Navy.  They would 
quickly become pregnant, be forced to leave the ship, and their potential Navy career 
never had much chance to get off the ground.  As a Command Master Chief she was 
invested in helping young enlisted men and women make the most of the opportunities 
the Navy presented them.  Getting pregnant early in one’s career was one sure way to 
short-circuit the potential of those opportunities.   
When I asked Janice how she had managed her own gender presentation for  
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success through the course of her career, she explained: 
I was always a Sailor first.  You know, your uniform is always looking a certain 
way.  How you dress when you’re going on liberty.  How you act.  You walk up 
the p[assage]-way, you’re 10 feet tall, you’re bulletproof, and you’re always 
putting out that professionalism, but you’ve still got to pay attention to your folks 
and be there for them and whatnot.  But, it’s trying to walk the walk.  You know, 
I’m not going to have my Sailors do something that I’m not willing to do myself.  
So, you know, setting that example.  I was up there doing UNREPs,166 checking 
the boxes and everything too, you know, working just as hard. I’d always walk the 
ship, make sure everyone was all good to go before I’d rack out myself.  You’ve 
got to set the example.  Got to be professional. 
Doing Gender a la Carte  
Like the lone helicopter pilot from twenty years ago, many of the women 
participants in my recent study seemed less concerned with being too masculine, and 
instead focused on being “true to themselves,” regardless of whether that manifested 
itself in terms of gender performance as more or less feminine.  Women seem to feel 
relatively free to pick and choose the attributes that make up their authentic self – I refer 
to this approach as “doing gender a la carte.”  Along these lines, several of my 
participants self-identified as tomboys. These women claimed to get along better with 
men than women and to enjoy activities deemed “male” more than activities widely 
considered “female” but they presented a feminine appearance. 
Faith, the NC1, had been critical of women whom she perceived as having 
become too masculine in their attempt to fit in.  I asked her how she balanced 
                                            
 
166 UNREP refers to underway replenishment of a ship.  During underway replenishment a fleet supply 
ship steams alongside the receiving vessel and fuel and stores are transferred from the supply ship to the 
receiving ship.  It’s a dangerous evolution because the ships are so close and because precision “driving” 
of both ships is required. If ships have to execute an emergency breakaway, lines and hoses under high 
tension can part and recoil.  A person hit by a line parting under high tension can be cut in two. The 
following web address explains the process, illustrating it with 18 photos:  
http://www.wearethemighty.com/watch-sailors-get-supplies-one-dangerous-parts-job-2015-01; accessed 
January 14, 2015.  
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competence as an Enlisted Surface Warfare Specialist-qualified petty officer against 
being a woman.  She responded: 
I guess it’s physically I’m a larger [taller] person.  But I make sure that I’m still 
physically fit, that I’m capable of handling these things.  There’s a lot of females 
on my ship that are barely five foot tall.  And if you told them, “Hey, you got to go 
carry this” or “You got to go do this,” they can’t do it.  And a lot of the guys then 
just, it just feeds into the “females are incapable of doing this.”  So I make sure 
that I can physically hold my own.  But I’ve also seen women go to the extreme 
where they become gigantic, buff body builders and they kind of emulate a big 
tough guy.  And no, I’m not going to do that (laugh).  I don’t know… As far as the 
way I dress I have to keep my hair up.  But no, I don’t feel that I should wear 
makeup.  But I don’t wear makeup in normal day to day.  So, if I was to do it at 
work it would be for the wrong reason, for me personally.  I’m not saying other 
females do that.  But if I change that about myself it would be for the wrong 
reason, for the attention or the attraction and I don’t need that. 
Earlier in her interview Faith had said she felt “grace” was lacking in Navy women.  
When I asked her if she might share her definition of “grace” she replied: 
I think it goes back to the whole thing you just don’t have to be part of the boys 
club, that you can still be a female and you can still carry yourself in a way that is 
feminine, that you can have that compassion for people, that you can speak 
directly but not in a negative way.  And that people can look at you and see that 
you’re doing something that’s important and [you’re] not doing it just to get ahead 
or [you’re] not doing it just to be like the guys, so I don’t know.  Maybe grace isn’t 
the exact right word…. 
While she did not come out and say directly that women should practice being 
themselves to achieve success in the Navy, I believe that was the ideal she was 
struggling to convey.  She had previously pointed out her aversion to women either 
playing up the femininity in an inappropriately sexualized way (considering the 24/7 
nature of Navy life while on operational deployment) or acting too masculine in their 
attempt to fit in with the boys.   She is striving to find a middle ground for women to 
inhabit that plays to neither stereotype. 
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Nikki, the 1st Class nuclear-trained Machinist Mate, discussed how time-
consuming emphasizing femininity can be and how inappropriate it can be in certain 
jobs on the ship.  She took her job as an engineer seriously and adopted a professional 
approach to it.  She chose not to wear makeup on the ship, both as a matter of 
practicality and due to a shortage of time.  She explained: 
In fact, it was almost like a personal pet peeve when women would come straight 
from training … like this is their first ship.  And they come down to the [nuclear 
power] plant with makeup, mascara on their eyes, I’d kick them out of the plant.  
I’d tell them to go and take it off.  Because it would melt into your eyes, the next 
thing you know you’re in medical because you have mascara melted into your 
eyes.167  Or, you know, have a nail that fell off and landed in some strainer 
somewhere.  And now we have to spend countless man-hours taking it apart 
because of your fake nail.  So I actually was a bitch.  I didn’t think that makeup 
had a place in the engineering plant.  It drove me crazy.  And I thought I had a lot 
more leg to stand on being a woman.  So I had no problem kicking women out 
when they had makeup on their face.   
Her complaints about the inappropriateness of makeup in engineering spaces were 
based on actual experience, not negative stereotypes men had of women: 
I did know two girls who got mascara in their eyes and had to be relieved, so we 
had to rouse somebody out of their rack in the middle of the night to come and 
relieve her.  Or come and stand her watch while she went to medical because 
she had mascara bleeding into her eyes, and it drove me crazy.  It just doesn’t 
make any sense.  I don’t try to impose my beliefs on other people.  But you know, 
you’re one of four women amongst 60 men and makeup isn’t really necessary 
unless you’re trying to impress.  We’re not here to impress.  You know?  This is a 
job where you’re going to get dirty.  Doesn’t matter how much makeup you put 
on, you’re going to get dirty.  Crawling inside a condenser and coming out green 
on the other side.  So, what does it matter how plump your eyelashes are? 
                                            
 
167 Engineering spaces are rarely air conditioned so they can be quite hot, especially depending upon the 
time of year and the ship’s location.  Engineering spaces on a ship in the Persian Gulf in July would be so 
hot as to necessitate heat safety procedures – limiting time in the space to specified intervals, i.e. twenty 
minutes, and allowing Sailors “cool-down” time in more habitable areas of the ship.  
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Nikki went on to explain how working conditions also influenced her choices regarding 
her presentation: 
Like I said, I try to keep my personal feelings, my personal feelings.  But I knew 
that I had six hours of watch, and then the six hours that I didn’t have watch, I 
was going to have training.  Or I was going to have maintenance to do.  I was 
going to have CO’s call or whatever else, quarters … like I said, sometimes it 
boils down to “am I going to take a shower today?  Or am I going to sleep 
today?”  And I can’t … used to make me want to bite my lip, when I’d see women 
with makeup because to me that says “oh, they got to shower” and “they got to 
sleep,” and “they got to spend some time putting on their makeup.”  I don’t have 
that kind of luxury.  I’m lucky if I get to take a shower. 
She explained that Sailors directly involved in maintaining the nuclear reactors always 
seemed to be fewer than required, and overworked as a result.  She pointed out that 
even when the ship pulled in to a liberty port the whole rest of the crew got liberty, but 
the nuclear engineering staff always had maintenance to do or were required to stand 
watch.  There never seemed to be any free time in her schedule.  Nikki admitted that 
she was sort of envious of the women aboard the ship whose ratings allowed the luxury 
of having personal time to primp that she did not have: 
Part of it is envy.  All of the admin girls would have the most beautiful makeup on 
every single day.  And part of me would envy that about them.  Like, “oh look, 
they get to wake up every day at 7:00 and go and put on their makeup, and they 
go sit at the desk” and whatever.  So they get to maintain their looks.  They don’t 
have to worry about the jet exhaust blasting into their face from a vent duct 
somewhere or wet paint getting into their hair.  So you have to sit there with 
orange degreaser for hours trying to get it out.  And, so that was envy.  I’d say it 
was envy.  (Laughing).  But as an engineer, I just couldn’t stand looking at it.  If a 
girl came in front of me with mascara I’d kick her right back out.   
In this example it seems her real objection was to the potential for women’s 
vanity to cause her more work or others lost sleep.  Lack of time or different priorities 
also seemed to exert the most influence on this woman’s choice not to wear makeup.   
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When I asked Nikki if she wore makeup in her civilian life she explained that she did not 
normally wear makeup because as a mom she simply did not have the time for it.  She 
noted she did not even bother to wear makeup when she went to church.  She did 
acknowledge wearing it for special occasions such as “if [she] were to, on the rare off 
chance, go on a date with [her] husband.”  
 Georgeanne, the former SWO turned METOC LCDR, described how she managed 
her femininity on and off the ship. 
I was a bit of a tomboy growing up, Never was very girly, so as far as managing 
femininity… I don’t know.  There’s other girls who wear lots of makeup and they 
wear lots of perfume all the time and they always have their nails done.  I’m not 
that person.  I put on mascara because my hair’s blonde and I… otherwise it 
would look like I didn’t have any eyelashes or… very washed out.  I didn’t like 
wearing dresses when I was little and mom would make me wear stockings and 
I’d pitch a fit and I don’t know, so like this underway, I did a lot of shopping online 
or whatever and I bought myself like a dozen sundresses to wear just because I 
never get to wear those anymore.  It’s kind of like a void.  I’m so tired of wearing 
khakis all the time.  A dress actually is kind of a relief because I don’t have to 
worry about a top and a bottom matching.  It’s already all in one (laughing). 
When asked if she ever felt any contradiction between what society expects of her as a 
woman and what the Navy expects of her as an officer Georgeanne admitted: 
The only weirdness is like we… we’ve been living here so long now, 10 years, 
that we have a lot of local [civilian] friends.  Since last deployment when I was 
leaving for seven months, the guys all usually have some sort of military 
affiliation.  They’re classmates of Kevin from his international relations course 
and a lot of them are contractors to the military or former military and they enjoy 
talking military stuff or talking whatever, you know, boy stuff and I’ve always… 
I’ve felt more comfortable in that world so if we get together at a party the girls, a 
lot of them are teachers, almost all of them are moms, so they’re over here and 
they’re talking their stuff and I just feel more comfortable over there [with the 
guys].  We went out to a dinner and then a picnic, they were having like a festival 
week at Town Point Park and they’re just like “how can you leave him for seven 
months,” you know, like “what’s wrong with you?”  That’s the only time I really 
feel weird when they don’t think I’m being girly enough, I guess. 
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Georgeanne also described the evolution in her leadership style as the result of 
experience and self-reflection: 
I learned a long time ago that I’m not really like the guys, but I also think that my 
leadership style is effective.  I’ve had a lot of good feedback from Sailors who 
have worked with me and I’ve seen them get promoted and I’ve seen them re-
enlist so I think I realize now that I don’t have to be that guy.  It’s a good feeling.  
I probably did not realize this until like the first tour ashore, when you have a little 
bit more time to think … During those first two SWO tours in order to be 
successful I was kind of following sort of the guy model and then when I got into 
METOC and had gotten some of self-esteem back and I felt more confident in 
being me as opposed to trying to be somebody else. 
She described her efforts to impart her hard won insight to more junior women officers: 
That’s one thing that I’ve been trying to teach the other girls that come in, the 
Ensign girls… That you don’t… you can find your own middle ground and it will 
take a little bit, give it time, but you don’t have to be a bitch and you don’t have to 
be an airhead, you can be the professional, you know and still be yourself. 
Still Confronting Stereotypes: 
As we saw in the previous chapter, much of the gender performance of Navy 
women today still revolves around responding to stereotypes.  Diana, now an ET1 (E-6) 
related an incident that happened to her when she was just a Third Class Petty Officer 
(E-4).  She regarded it as the absolute worst experience she had in the Navy.  At 
quarters168 the morning after a port visit the leading first class petty officer of her 
division was going down the ranks asking people what they had done on liberty.  When 
he got to her he said “Oh, we know what you did.  You did all of our R2 [Repair Two] 
                                            
 
168 Navy commands hold “Quarters” at the expiration of liberty every day.  Quarters are intended for 
“muster, instruction, and inspection.”  During Quarters, muster is taken and any unauthorized absences 
noted.  Chiefs may inspect the troops at this time for uniform and grooming violations.  Enlisted personnel 
go directly to Quarters.  Officers first go to “Officer’s Call” (O Call) to get the latest word from the XO and 
any changes to the plan of the day.  Upon completion of O Call, the officers join their enlisted personnel 
at quarters and provide them any relevant information that was just put out at O Call.   
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division.”169  Diana related to me that she was offended, and insulted, and mortified to 
“professionally be in uniform in the presence of about 42 of her co-workers” and to be 
publically accused of such a thing.  It further irked her that she had not even been with 
men from R2 Division, so he was making accusations without actually having any facts.  
After she had “stewed and festered” about it, she finally sought the advice of the ship’s 
female Chaplain, who asked her how far up the chain of command she wanted to push 
it.  As Diana explained: 
The formal complaint was taken.  I still was stuck working for the individual, still 
working in the same department.  And it was just one of those “he’s a first and 
what he says and does he’s not going to be changed or modify his ways by, let 
alone a third class female.”  So the upper chain of command was made aware 
that this kind of shit was happening and it was wrong.  Chaplain filled it out with 
the EEO comment and said “this is one of the things that as a woman it really, 
really sucks.  It’s not right.  But she asked me point blank “What can you do 
about it?  What are you going to do?  Are you going to let it fester and eat you?  
Are you going to be able to come to terms with it and laugh about it?  Or are you 
going to be the better person and make sure that anyone that works for you is 
never treated this way?”  And Chaplain F was an amazing individual because 
that damn sentence -- it’s never gone from me.  I have made sure that I’m the 
better person.  I have worked with and learned and educated women that came 
to work in the division after me. “This has occurred.  It is in the past.  We have a 
strong stance not to allow this to happen again in the future.  But you can’t be 
silent.  You have to be empowered with the power to report it.  Things don’t get 
changed if people don’t get corrected.” 
When asked what had happened to the first class, Diana responded:  
Other than a talking to --- no repercussions.  A page thirteen might have been 
submitted to his record. [I] don’t remember him making chief.  But eventually [he] 
did [his] time and transferred.  I did my time and transferred.  But that’s been my 
bleakest professional moment of my nineteen years.   
When I asked her if it wasn’t more bleak when she found out she could complain and it 
didn’t seem to do much good, Diana replied: 
                                            
 
169 He was accusing her of having had sex with the entire R2 division.   
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No, that wasn’t more bleak; it was more bleak that the event ever occurred.  It 
was a learning experience to figure out the reporting procedures.  It’s 
intimidating.  You have to draw a fine line when situations like that occur.  Are 
you a victim?  But you’re not.  You’re just going against somebody who’s an ass.  
And unfortunately there’s not much you can do to weed out the asses of the 
Navy.  And if they’re not called out on it they don’t know the difference.  They 
don’t know that it is unacceptable. 
She clearly refused to classify herself as a victim.  Rather, she casts herself as 
someone who is standing up for what is right by demanding her leadership address this 
instance of sexism.   
When asked if she had ever filed another EEO complaint, she said she had not, 
but when she was confronted again by sexism she found other ways to address it.  
While her actions may not appear to have been direct gender performance, the fact that 
a junior woman confronted a more senior man over sexist behavior using established 
complaint procedures sent the signal that she was not intimidated by his gender or his 
higher status in the Navy hierarchy and that she would not be bullied. Carreiras (2008) 
explained the reluctance of women in her study to classify men’s behavior as 
discriminatory as consistent with their desires both to avoid painting a negative image of 
the integration process and to avoid being painted as victims (p. 167-8).  Their 
reluctance may also result from fears of being labeled a feminist.     
In a more recent example, when I asked Faith, the NC1, if she thought perhaps 
she had been slated into administrative work that she proved to be very good at 
because she was a woman, she denied that gender was the cause: 
I don’t think it was ever because I was a girl because then when they gave me 
that task170 I was very good at that too.  And I did a fantastic job.  And so I think 
                                            
 
170 She had been assigned to engineer a complete structural overhaul of a work space.  It involved 
“ripping out the floors and inserting new conduit for the computers.  It was with sledgehammers knocking 
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it’s my work ethic.  The work that they always gave me that I excelled at over 
everybody else was because so many people are terrible at admin and terrible at 
paperwork and terrible at people.  So because I always made sure that whatever 
job I was given I did well, they just always were like “well, give her the ones that 
nobody else is good at so she’ll do all that kind of stuff.”  And I think it’s a very 
valuable asset to be good at paperwork and to be good at people because if you 
don’t have those in the military you can’t function.  And it’s funny because my 
boyfriend now is a big, huge fire control man.  He’s stationed up in D.C., [he’s 
trained for] VBSS (Visit, Board, Search & Seizure)171 and he’s loud and 
obnoxious with all the guys.  And he has this friend, who is on [my] ship, only 
ever been on a ship, has been in the Navy nine years, does not think females 
should be on the ship, does not think that we should be out there in his way, 
blah, blah, blah, that kind of thing.  And the first time we ever had this 
conversation I said “you know what though?  I’m not here to drive the ship and to 
fire the weapons.  But I’m here to take care of you while you go do that.  And I’m 
not here to be a bad ass like you are.  That’s what you want to do.  You want to 
make sure you’re blowing stuff up and whatever.”  In the scheme of things he 
hasn’t ever done any of that stuff.  But that’s what he’s preparing for.  I said “but I 
want to be taking care of your pay and your benefits and your paperwork 
because of me as a person.”  I don’t think it’s because I’m a female.  … But I 
don’t feel that they ever gave it [any job] to me just because I was a girl, because 
I’ve seen girls who aren’t good at it [paperwork and organization] either.  I feel 
that it was because I worked hard and because I did a good job.  … And 
fortunately, in the military, I am paid equally for what I do as a first class petty 
officer, for being in eleven and a half years, whether I’m the one doing all of the 
paper work or my boyfriend’s out there firing a Tomahawk to blow something up.  
Yes, somebody might say that’s the more important job.   
When I asked her to speak in more depth about her male friend on the ship, who 
is not thrilled that he now has to compete directly with women for ranking and 
promotion, she observed:   
                                                                                                                                            
 
down a wall that was there, installing modular furniture, doing AutoCAD drawings of it, and this was some 
project that they had given to multiple other guys in this office that just had not come through on it.  They 
gave it to me.  It was something that I excelled at.  I loved doing it.  I came into work every day and 
worked with my hands and fixed stuff.  And I did all this kind of stuff” (VE-11). 
171 VBSS was created in 1990, following the Gulf War, as a way to standardize conduct of maritime 
interception operations enforcing sanctions introduced as a result of UN resolutions.  VBSS is a bit like 
playing policeman on the high seas. The initial training continuum includes three courses lasting a total of 
eight weeks, with some team members receiving additional follow-on training. Skills taught in the VBSS 
courses include tactical movement and shooting, defensive tactics, repelling, searching and other team 
skills.  For more detailed information on VBSS see: 
http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=44692; accessed August 24, 2014 or see Barker 2009. 
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See that’s the weird thing is that he was on an all-male ship.172  And there’s a 
couple destroyers [and frigates] that are still all-male but the thing is, until [we 
had] this conversation he didn’t have anything to prove him otherwise.  In his 
division, in his section he didn’t have any Billy Bad Ass females.  He didn’t have 
that.  So he’s never worked with a female … now he does.  So now I 
wonder…he’s still actually on the ship with me.  But I think his perception of a 
capable female has changed a little bit just because we are friends and because 
he does see the work that I do on the ship and he values that.  And just the other 
day he was in the office and doing paperwork with me.  And that is a guy you 
never expected to do paperwork.  And he just thought everything happens 
because everything happens.  And now with the policies have changed in the 
Navy you do have to be more organized to make sure everybody’s taken care of 
the same or something like that.  But there is another female who works in his 
division who is a married mom, who is very, very competent, who is very smart.  
And she, I’d say she has the grace that I find rare in the Navy.  And so I wonder if 
working with him has opened, if her working with him now has changed that 
perception of his, a little bit.  I don’t doubt that it has so. 
Georgeanne discussed a common problem she encountered when she was 
assigned to a ship as a SWO: 
day-to-day on the ship people knew who you were, they respected you because 
they’ve seen you or whatever. You’d proven yourself  to them, but then you get 
like the SIMA [Shore Intermediate Maintenance Activity] workers coming in or the 
contractors coming in, the old guys that are retired and they didn’t have women 
in their Navy and they see blonde Ensign Whatever, not going to pay her any 
mind, and so you start asking questions and then you have to prove yourself 
again and then you’re okay, you know but it’s… you’ve heard it termed “a dick 
measuring contest?”  
Familiar with the term, I asked Georgeanne what she threw out to be measured instead.  
She replied “I guess [my] knowledge of how the system is supposed to work.” 
Today, many Navy women respond to their male co-workers and their work 
environment in much the same way as their predecessors did – by adopting gender 
behaviors (emphasized femininity or masculinity) designed to disprove men’s negative 
                                            
 
172 Her point is that having previously been only on all-male ships, he has never actually been confronted 
by a woman competing directly with him on a day to day basis.  Of course, men and women in the same 
rate compete Navy-wide for advancement, but he had never actually worked with women before reporting 
aboard this ship.  
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stereotypes of women. Many others respond in ways that look and feel quite different 
than in the past.  As Risman (2009) has urged, we must learn to distinguish between 
gender behavior that does nothing to change the underlying power dynamics of gender 
that privilege masculinity from behavior that does.  It seems to me that when women 
who are gender-integrators react to one of the two extreme negative stereotypes men 
hold of women, either by accentuating their femininity to avoid being thought too 
masculine, or “manning up” to avoid being thought too feminine, they are still playing 
into someone’s negative stereotypes.  In avoiding one negative stereotype, they 
inadvertently confirm another.   
In contrast, I think that women who choose not to react to men’s negative gender 
stereotypes in favor of being true to themselves, who do gender “a la carte” without the 
intention of neutering themselves to the point of invisibility, confound men’s attempts to 
pigeonhole them into the binary of too masculine or too feminine.  Stated more 
colloquially, women who insist on being true to themselves by picking and choosing 
gendered behavior from the full range of masculine and feminine possibilities carve out 
a third area to inhabit.  This challenges the potentially sexist assumptions of men who 
would prefer to classify them as either “sluts” (too feminine) or “dykes” (too masculine).  
By simply being true to their own values and self-concept, Navy women are functioning 
less as obvious protestors or resistors in the classic sense and more as subtle agents of 
change.  That is, women who refuse to react to the worst stereotypes military men hold 
of military women are no doubt performing the most productive form of resistance 
available.  Using Hollander and Einwohner’s (2004) typology of resistance, women’s 
choice to “be true to themselves” would be classified as overt, unwitting resistance. 
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Despite obvious and significant progress in some areas, there remain structural 
and institutional barriers to women’s success in the Navy, including sexism and gender 
bias.  One might wonder, especially in light of the apparent rape epidemic in the ranks, 
why Navy women do not band together as part of a larger social movement within the 
organization. As previously noted, “resistance movements” in the All-Volunteer military 
are exceedingly rare.  The only one that comes to mind is “Outserve,”173 a network of 
actively-serving LGBT military members that functioned “underground” working for 
repeal of the Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell policy (Fulton 2013) in concert with civilian activists 
who also sought its repeal.    
There is no coordinated resistance movement among women in the Navy.  
Rather, acts of resistance are individual, momentary and fleeting, occasionally 
spontaneously collaborative, when a unique opportunity presents itself, but rarely 
systematically coordinated with others in advance.  Many, but not necessarily most or 
all, Navy women reject the dominant culture of masculinity, and they may even feel a 
sense of shared experience, or “sisterhood” as that group of women wearing Navy 
uniforms, but they may never forge “a unique sense of group identity” because of the 
cross-cutting effects of rank, class, warfare community, rating, competing commands, 
etc.  In short, individual experiences, and common elements of what social scientists 
call “intersectionality” may conspire to keep women apart.  Furthermore, Navy women’s 
acts of gender resistance cannot be described as resulting from a “culture of resistance” 
as there is no politically informed “collective identity” and no “coherent set of values, 
                                            
 
173 See Brenda Sue Fulton, 2013. “OutServe: An Underground Network Stands Up.” Journal of 
Homosexuality v60, pp. 219-231 for an insider’s account of how the underground, online, advocacy group 
got started in 2009. 
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beliefs and practices which mitigates the effects of oppression and reaffirms that which 
is distinct from the majority culture” (Kuumba & Ajanaku 1998, pp. 228-9).  In what ways 
might Navy women be resisting traditional gender norms that are not only transgressive 
but also transformative? 
Surface Warfare-Qualified Women as Agents of Change 
 Nearly all the women in my study denied considering the disproportionate sex 
ratio of the Navy or its social definition as a “male” province before joining.  This would 
suggest that their joining was not a consciously political act.  Gherardi and Poggio 
(2001) argue that “Women challenge the symbolic order of gender merely by entering 
these organizations [in which maleness is dominant] and assuming a traditional male 
position” (p.252).  When did joining the military become such a “mainstream” choice for 
women that most participants in my study denied even thinking about the gender 
implications of such a decision?  Or is it more likely that women today, eschewing 
feminism and the label, must deny active intent to challenge the prevailing system of 
gender in the military?  Hollander (2002) defines gender resistance as “acts of 
opposition to conventional gender expectations” (p. 475).  Certainly, women who join 
the military act in opposition to conventional gender expectations, especially when they 
choose to enter traditionally male fields within the military.  A woman can join the 
military as a nurse, a choice that would not necessarily be considered gender-
transgressive.  However, if a woman joins the military intending to become a bomber 
pilot, that choice would very likely be widely considered gender-transgressive.  Men’s 
hostile reaction to most military women suggests they certainly think women are doing 
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something transgressive with respect to the traditional gender order, whether or not 
military women define their actions in that way, act with intent, or acknowledge the 
impact their individual actions are having collectively. According to Hollander and 
Einwohner’s (2004) typology of resistance, women’s non-politically motivated choice to 
join the military and serve in a non-traditional capacity may be classified as “overt, 
unwitting.” Men’s negative perceptions of these choices would result in the classification 
of women’s actions as “target-defined” resistance according to Hollander and 
Einwohner’s (2004) typology. 
 Surely, women’s general naiveté about the gendered nature of the military could 
not last past the first day of ROTC, boot camp, Officer Candidate school, Academy 
Indoctrination, etc.  Women, who are used to being at least 50% of the population, and 
several of my participants who attended elite, all-female prep schools, would notice very 
quickly that they comprised less than 20% of the military ranks.  One would think that if 
women truly did not think about the Navy as being a masculine institution, they would 
certainly have a tale of “shock and dismay” to relate regarding the moment they did 
figure it out.  No such tales surfaced in my interviews.  I suspect women deny knowingly 
entering a “male” dominated and defined occupation to avoid the perception that they 
are “troublemakers,” or “feminists” (Carreiras 2008).   
Women’s denial that gender issues might be of concern may be indicative either 
of the degree to which general society has come to see women’s military service as 
reasonable and acceptable; the degree to which the general public is completely 
disengaged from the All-Volunteer Force; the degree to which the women interviewed 
are disengaged from the politics of gender; or the degree to which women want to 
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distance themselves from acts perceived to be or misconstrued as “feminist.”  In 
contrast, when I decided to join the military in 1983, I was well-aware I was doing 
something unconventional that pushed gender boundaries.  I knew I was committing a 
political act in the form of a personal choice to volunteer for military service.  I felt I was 
entering a male institution and it was my job to fit in to this predominantly male 
organization since I had self-selected into that environment.  When I entered, I did not 
feel that men should have to change for me.    
If men had simply not changed their behavior to accommodate my presence, I do 
not think my military experiences would have turned me into a proud feminist.  However, 
in my naïveté, I never expected my male colleagues would be so bitter, resentful, and 
hostile to my very presence.  Their reaction to women’s presence in general and my 
presence in particular proved to be the catalyst to my own enlightenment and self-
identification as a feminist. My male colleagues either wrongly presumed or just baited 
me with taunts that I must want to be a man.  In fact, I did not want to be a man, I just 
did not want to be limited to the traditional choices available to women.  I simply never 
wanted to be as economically and socially powerless as I perceived most women to be 
in their public or personal relationships with men. 
  With approximately half her study participants self-identifying as feminists, 
Katzenstein’s (1998) research on Navy women’s “moderate, influence-seeking, interest 
group activism” suggests a good percentage of Navy women in the late 1980s through 
the mid-1990s self-identified as feminists.174  In comparison, a majority of participants in 
                                            
 
174 Her study participants were not selected from a randomly-drawn sample, therefore we cannot 
generalize from the incidence of feminist identity in her group of participants to the incidence of feminism 
within the wider Navy. 
 
 
 
 
310 
my recent study denied being feminist and expressed the general belief that being 
feminist meant “women who thought women were or ought to be superior rather than 
equal to men.”  As Katzenstein (1998) explained in the 1990s when nearly half of her 
participants did self-identify as feminists, when there are penalties in many military units 
just for being a woman, there is little reason for women to court more animosity by 
embracing the feminist label or taking a feminist stance (p. 86).  “Feminist” is just one 
more identity that is unhelpful to military women and that feeds the negative stereotypes 
of women in the minds of most military men.  Rush Limbaugh might reasonably be 
given credit for demonizing women who are agentic or have the temerity to distinguish 
themselves from doormats as “Femi-Nazis,” – a term he coined and has used 
relentlessly for more than twenty years.  Unfortunately, Rush Limbaugh enjoys a large 
following among military men and his show is carried on Armed Forces Radio broadcast 
on American bases overseas to this day.   
Although Navy women in 2014 may reject the feminist label, their actual behavior 
suggests otherwise.  While there are not that many trails left for women to blaze in the 
Surface Navy, today’s Navy women continue to push the mundane boundaries of daily 
life aboard a fighting ship at sea, much as their forerunners did before surface 
combatants were opened to women.  Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward in 
Regulating the Poor: The Functions of Public Welfare (1993) identified disruption as a 
defining feature of protest actions.  They argued disruption occurs when people “cease 
to conform to accustomed institutional roles, withhold their accustomed cooperation, 
and by doing so, cause institutional disruptions.”  More directly to the point Faith (1994) 
reminds us: 
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Feminist resistance challenges prevailing discourses and delegitimizes 
presumptions of female inferiority in local and specific ways.  As resistance, 
feminism is the power of women disrupting patriarchal truths – which may both 
loosen some holds and invite re-entrenchment of others.  Feminist disruptions 
produce backlash effects, which in turn, compel new strategies of resistance (p. 
47).  
This description of feminist resistance accurately describes the behavior and 
experiences of Navy women over the past twenty years, whether or not they individually 
considered themselves feminists.    
I believe that women who choose to enter the Navy, or any other non-traditional 
occupation culturally-defined as “male,” have always done so out of resistance of some 
kind, whether or not they are fully conscious of it as intentional resistance; and whether 
or not they view it as an explicitly political act.  Bem (1993) argues: 
Androcentrism, gender polarization, and biological essentialism systematically 
reproduce male power in two ways.  First, the discourses and social institutions 
in which they are embedded automatically channel females and males into 
different and unequal life situations.  Second, during enculturation, the individual 
gradually internalizes the cultural lenses and thereby becomes motivated to 
construct an identity that is consistent with them (p. 3). 
I would argue that some women see how our gendered social structure channels 
women into these “different and unequal life situations” and they decide not to be 
“channeled.”  Most of these women do not see their individual choices to strike out in a 
direction that differs from that of most other women as consciously or intentionally 
striking a blow for the cause of women’s equality.  They simply decide they do not want 
to live by the rules as they have been written by partiarchy.   
As I see it, there are two specific points of potential resistance to traditional 
gender norms resident in a woman’s entry into the military.  The first is why she joins; 
the second is the strategy she employs in trying to succeed once she has joined.  In 
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deciding to join the line Navy, women resist the limitations of the kinds of jobs, careers, 
life experiences, and compensation that are traditionally considered to be acceptably 
“feminine.”  They make a conscious choice to pursue a career that is quite different from 
those chosen by most women.  They actively seek a type of challenge and adventure 
that our society still widely defines as “male.”  According to Hollander and Einwohner’s 
(2004) typology of resistance, choices such as these would be classified as overt 
resistance, and may or may not be classified as unwitting or target-defined resistance, 
depending upon circumstances and intent.  Once women make the choice to join the 
military, they have to figure out how to fit in, in order to succeed.  Some chose to 
emphasize their femininity; others choose to downplay their femininity; still others strive 
to strike the optimal balance:  not too feminine; not too masculine.  But Navy women 
striving to strike a balance, do not do so to keep a low profile as Furia’s (2009) research 
on Army women suggests.  Rather, Navy women, especially the officers most frequently 
cited “doing gender a la carte” as being true to who they are.  Again, using Hollander 
and Einwohner’s (2004) typology, this form of resistance would be classified as overt, 
and either unwitting and/or target-defined. 
One source of this possible difference between Army and Navy women is that 
the Navy was forced to gender-integrate the majority of its combat functions (combat 
ships and combat aviation) more than 20 years ago and has been struggling with it ever 
since.  In contrast, the Army’s largest branch and its ideological core, combat infantry, 
has not yet been integrated; the Secretary of Defense only issued the order to do so in 
January 2013.  The Army has, however, been forced by circumstances beyond its 
control to use women in ground combat situations during its extended engagement in 
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Iraq and Afghanistan.  As a result the Army has only recently begun to experience and 
react to the threat women present to the institution’s definition of combat as a male 
enterprise.  If the Army and the U.S. Marine Corps follow the Navy’s gender integration 
trajectory, then next couple of decades will be a bumpy ride for both men and women in 
those services.  
Disorganized Coaction and the Non-Movement Movement 
Can individual strategies of resistance and agency challenge a system of 
discrimination or a structure of power?  Martin and Meyerson (1998) and Bayat (2009) 
suggest they can.  Martin and Meyerson (1998) argue that microprocesses, such as 
those involved in the construction and maintenance of gender, “reflect and constitute 
power in action” (p. 316).  Moreover, they contend “microprocesses can add up to 
change … slow, subtle, but pervasive change can take place as women act, speak, or 
think in ways that challenge or resist the assumptions of the dominant discourse” (pp. 
316-7).  They describe the “individual, fragmented, dispersed, and uncoordinated” acts 
of high-ranking women in the tech industry as “disorganized coaction” (p. 317).  Bayat 
(2009) points out that social struggles in the Middle East operate under particular and 
unique circumstances that limit public dissent, not the least among them repression by 
authoritarian regimes. He asserts that although protest in the Middle East may not look 
like what we living in Western Democracies have come to expect, resistance is taking 
place in plain sight, in the form of the “non-movement movement.” 
Without intending to equate the U.S. Navy with Middle Eastern authoritarian rule, 
anyone who studies the U.S. military must acknowledge that its unique character and 
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mission produces conditions of constraint for social actors.  After all, the U.S. military is 
not run as a democracy; indeed, military commanders often claim “benevolent 
dictatorship.”175 Although the U.S. military might reasonably be described as exercising 
near-dictatorial rule over the lives of its service members, it is not without a little irony 
that I turn to the work of Asef Bayat (2010) to help explain the possibilities for and 
likelihood of Navy women’s resistance to the hegemonically masculine regime of the 
military.  My project diverges from Bayat’s in that he is concerned with exploring the 
resistance of the people to the politics of the state as a system of power, whereas I am 
concerned with exploring the resistance of women to the traditional gender regime as a 
system of power, operating as an extension of the state via the U.S. military. 
In Life as Politics – How Ordinary People Change the Middle East Bayat (2009) 
built on Scott (1985), to investigate the ways in which ordinary Iranians resist the severe 
restrictions placed upon their everyday lives by their totalitarian government, developing 
the theory of the “non-movement movement.”  He acknowledged that in Western 
conceptions “social movements” are comprised of 3 elements: 
1. an organized and sustained claim making on target authorities; 
2. a repertoire of performances, including associations, public meetings, media 
statements, and street marches;  
3. public representations of the causes worthiness, unity, numbers, and 
commitment (p. 4). 
                                            
 
175 When I was serving it was quite common for more senior leaders (Department Heads, COs, XOs, etc) 
to remind grumbling Sailors that while its primary mission was to defend democracy, the U.S. military 
itself was not a democracy.  The implication of the statement “This isn’t a democracy” was “I am telling 
you what to do and you may not like it, but you do not get a vote.  Now, go do it!” 
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While the movement to repeal DADT could be argued to have had these qualities in that 
it combined public civilian efforts with underground military efforts (Belkin 2011 and 
Fulton 2013), Navy women cannot claim to have a social movement by this definition.  
In contrast, according to Bayat (2009) non-movement movements are 
characterized by:  
1. the collective actions and influence of non-collective actors;  
2. the art & power of presence;  
3. structural encroachment;  
4. stepping-stone strategy;  
5. the politics of practice;  
6. passive networks among atomized individuals; and  
7. the power of big numbers.  
As it turns out, each of the elements of Bayat’s theory of the non-movement movement 
can be used to describe and explain Navy women’s resistance to traditional gender 
norms.    
The Collective Actions and Influence of Non-Collective Actors  
The Politics of Practice 
 Bayat (2009) describes the collective actions of non-collective actors as “the 
shared practices of large numbers of ordinary people whose fragmented but similar 
activities trigger social change” (p. 14).  He further situates non-movement movements 
as grounded in everyday actions rather than legal claims to rights and in practice rather 
than demands.  Bayat (2009) gives as one example of such “disjointed yet parallel 
practices of noncollective actors” (p. 4) Iranian women’s resistance to the 
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fundamentalist authoritarian Islamic regime through the practice of “bad-hijabi.”  Bad-
hijabi was young Iranian women’s practice of intentionally wearing the hijabi improperly, 
i.e. showing inches of hair.  Of course, this provoked a battle between “defiant women 
and the agents of multiple official and semi-official morals-enforcing organizations” (p. 
102).  According to Bayat (2009) during a four-month period in 1990 in Tehran, “607 
women were arrested, 6,589 were forced to submit written affidavits, and 46,000 
received warnings.”  With women comprising at least half the Iranian population, and 
with enough women individually adopting the practice, the morality police could not win 
this battle.  By the late 1990s, the bad hijabi had become common practice.   
Twenty years later the adult daughters of the women who first practiced “bad 
hijabi” probably no longer recognize the practice as a resistant act.  Rather, they are 
likely to see it only as acceptable fashion.  Such a development would not be 
inconsistent with the general lack of feminist consciousness among Navy women of 
Generation X or the Millennials in the United States.  In a military example of the 
collective actions of non-collective actors, women make individual choices to enter the 
military.  It’s not a coordinated assault with a strategic approach to gender integration.  
Each individual views her choice to enter the military as a personal decision, but the 
personal becomes political when the collective sum of these individual choices reach 
critical mass and really begins to challenge the status quo fundamentally.   
The Art & Power of Presence 
As Bayat (2009) has argued, sometimes presence is resistance.  I would argue 
that in the Navy, women’s resistance to hegemonic masculinity may just be expressed 
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as continuing to show up; being true to their authentic selves, in whatever gender 
display form that takes; and doing their best to develop their professional warfighting 
competence, even in the face of determined overt or covert opposition from male 
colleagues.  While these practices may not look like resistance as conceived by 
Western scholars, they none-the-less function as such.  As Chicago Tribune columnist, 
Bill Plaschke (2014), observed in a recent article176 following an interview with Johnny 
Weir, a gay former U.S. national skating champion and NBCSN’s daytime color 
commentator for ice skating at the Winter Olympic games in Sochi, Russia: 
In an Olympics clouded by Russia’s anti-gay laws, Weir has been America’s 
raised fist.  There have been no athletic demonstrations, yet Weir has sent the 
message that one can also fight intolerance simply by putting on a tiara and 
showing up for work. “If me being myself and living my life and wearing a pink 
blazer and tiara on television in anti-gay Russia, if that is helpful in any way, I 
think it’s a huge benefit, but I’m just being me …I am not protesting.  I am not 
making a statement.  I am just being myself.” 
Structural Encroachment 
Bayat (2009) uses the concept of structural encroachment in the context of the 
marginalized populations of the Middle East to describe “the silent, protracted, but 
pervasive advancement of the ordinary people on the propertied, powerful, or public, in 
order to survive and improve their lives” (p. 56).  He is referring to actual physical 
encroachment, i.e. “real estate.”  This concept can be extended to the Navy 
metaphorically as a description of women’s quiet, steady encroachment as exemplified 
by both their growth in numbers as well as by their expanding access to previously all-
male domains. 
                                            
 
176 Chicago Tribune February 19, 2014 Section 3 - Sports, page 10. 
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Stepping-Stone Strategy 
 The quiet encroachment of women in the Navy context has come in the 
instances in which individual women have been offered trailblazing jobs, held previously 
only by men. By taking those jobs and doing well in them, individual women helped 
carve out a space for the other women to follow.  Additionally, one stepping-stone 
strategy for Navy women has come in the form of the “moderate, interest-group, 
influence-seeking” politics aimed at changing the status quo by advocating for military 
women’s interests and influencing decisions and policy at the highest levels as 
described by Katzenstein (1998).  Each small gain resulting in women’s expanded 
service has in turn served as justification for still further expansion.  Some gains came 
as the result of individual or small groups of women demanding equal access by suing.  
Others came through Congressional action prompted either by women’s successful 
military performance during the first war with Iraq or disgust from sexist public scandals 
such as Tailhook.  In each case, the cause of women was slowly and incrementally 
advanced. 
Passive Networks Among Atomized Individuals 
Bayat (2009) defines passive networks as “instantaneous communications 
among atomized individuals that is established by a tacit recognition of their common 
identity, and which is mediated through real and virtual space” (p. 63).  He provides the 
example of a woman entering a party composed almost entirely of male guests. In this 
context she is able to notice instantly what few other women are in the group.  In the 
Navy context, women Sailors, simply seeing other women Sailors on the waterfront, 
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know and recognize their “common predicament” and know what these women 
strangers are enduring or experiencing in life aboard a warship at sea.  Navy women 
are “atomized” by their dispersion throughout the fleet.  Because of their relatively small 
numbers when compared to their presence in the overall civilian population, some Navy 
women might still be functioning as tokens.  This circumstance may make women’s 
patrolling of other women’s behavior less an internalization of hegemonic masculinity 
than an acknowledgement of its negative stereotypes about women and their ongoing 
power to influence.  
The Power of Big Numbers 
Bayat (2009) contends that the success of non-movement movements lies not in 
“small groups of people acting on the political margins” but rather in the daily practices 
of “millions of people who albeit remain fragmented” in their efforts (p. 20).  To illustrate 
this concept he uses the metaphor of the swollen rivers that result from the cumulative 
effects of single raindrops following a downpour.  Admittedly, women choosing to enter 
military service or actually serving in the military at any given time do not number in the 
millions. However, there are more than 1.8 million women military veterans.  These 
women are mothers, sisters, wives, daughters, cousins, friends, teachers, mentors, role 
models.  In other words, as suggested by Deutsch (2007), the choices these women 
made and the example they provided by joining the military may influence other girls or 
women to do the same.  Furthermore, the number of women in military service has 
grown steadily.  Women comprised twenty percent of the students admitted to the Naval 
Academy in 2014.  In the fleet, the 8,944 women officers comprise 17 percent of the 
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officer force, while the 47,176 enlisted women comprise 18 percent of the enlisted 
force.177  While admittedly not large numbers compared to the population of Iran, these 
are large and symbolically significant numbers for the U.S. Navy.  
Although, in general, it seems working conditions for many women in the Navy 
have improved over the past twenty years, it is equally clear that the battle for real 
equity and acceptance has not been completely won. If the Navy really intends for 
gender integration to be successful it must pay particular attention to the experiences of 
junior enlisted women (E-1 to E-6), who generally lack the organizational power 
necessary to confront work-place problems related to gender directly.  Furthermore, 
based on my interview research and Navy data on sexual harassment and sexual 
assault, these women are the most vulnerable to sexism, gender discrimination, gender 
harassment, sexual harassment, and sexual assault at the hands of their male 
colleagues.   
The overall number of women in the Navy is encouraging, however the number 
of women officers and enlisted in the surface Navy remains relatively small.   Women’s 
distribution across the surface fleet is even further diluted when you take into account 
that there are fewer women serving in non-traditional rates aboard ship than those 
serving in more traditional rates  such as (Hospital Corpsman (HM)178, Culinary 
Specialist (CS), Ship’s Serviceman (SH), Legalman (LN), Personnel Specialist (PS), 
                                            
 
177 According to Navy data current as of June 2014. 
178 Dental Technician (DT) and Hospital Corpsman (HM) were merged into the HM rating on 30 August 
2005. For more information on these ratings mergers see: 
http://www.navy.mil/navydata/nav_legacy.asp?id=262; accessed August 24, 2014. 
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Mass Communications Specialist (MC)179, and Yeoman (YN)).  Enlisted women serving 
in non-traditional ratings are especially likely to be isolated within their immediate work 
group and treated as tokens by their male shipmates in their day-to-day work life. They 
are also highly likely to confront men’s negative stereotypes of women and choose the 
gender strategy they believe will disprove the stereotype they judge as “most 
threatening” to their success (see Archer 2012 and 2009; Hoyt & Blascovich 2010; and 
Yeung & von Hippel 2008; Steele, Reisz, Williams, & Kawakami 2007; Bosson, 
Haymovitz,& Pinel 2004; Pronin, Steele, & Ross 2004; Kray, Galinsky, & Thompson 
2002; Gonzales, Blanton, &  Williams 2002; Steele, Spencer, & Aronson 2002; Stone, 
Lynch, Sjomeling, & Darley 1999; Aronson, Lustina, Good, Keough, Steele, & Brown 
1999; and Steele & Aronson 1995).180     
In comparison, being a female Surface Warfare Officer today can be far less 
isolating than being an enlisted woman serving in a technical rating aboard ship.  
Because the wardroom181 on most ships is relatively small (20-30 people) and because 
all officers attend command management meetings together, eat meals together, and 
share Officer’s Country,182 a mere six women officers,183 among a wardroom of 30 
would comprise twenty percent of that elite group.  Carreiras (2008), noting work by 
                                            
 
179 Illustrator Draftsman (DM), Journalist (JO), Lithographer (LI), and Photographer (PH) were merged into 
the MC rating on 1 July 2006. For more information on these ratings mergers see: 
http://www.navy.mil/navydata/nav_legacy.asp?id=262; accessed August 24, 2014. 
180 For readers interested in learning more about stereotype threat, www.reducingstereotypethreat.org 
has comprehensive bibliography of peer-reviewed publications exploring stereotype threat.  It can be 
found at: www. reducingstereotypethreat.org/bibliography.html; accessed August 24, 2014. 
181 All the officers on a ship or at a command. 
182 In Navy jargon, the term "officer's country" refers to those areas of the ship primarily inhabited by 
commissioned officers. On a ship, such places include officer's staterooms (where they work and sleep), 
the wardroom (where they eat meals and gather socially or for meetings), and the Commanding Officer’s 
cabin.  Often the floor tile in officer’s country is blue. Enlisted Sailors are instructed not to enter Officer’s 
Country unless on official business. 
183 Two Department Heads and four Division Officers would be a reasonable distribution of women 
officers within the wardroom. 
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Yoder, Adams, and Prince (1983) and Yoder (1991), makes the important point that 
status as a token may not be determined solely by numbers or percentages.   
Kanter’s (1977) conceptualization of tokenism placed a numerical imbalance at 
the heart of the problem.  Yoder (1991) and Yoder and Aniakudo (1995) argue that the 
issue of tokenism is more complex than that and specifically that a token’s gender 
matters.  In addition to numerical imbalance, Yoder (1991) and Yoder and Aniakudo 
(1995) argued that status variables such as gender, social perceptions of the gender-
inappropriateness of the given occupation for tokens, and the perceived intrusiveness184 
of the token could intervene above and beyond the mere ratio to create even worse 
circumstances for certain people occupying token status.  Additionally, women officers 
increasingly serve in highly visible positions as Department Heads, Executive Officers, 
and Commanding Officers.  Men may think extra-long about openly expressing their 
hostility toward women when the person signing their fitness report or holding Captain’s 
Mast is a woman. 
As discussed earlier, women Navy officers today are not as willing to put 
themselves through the same gender contortions their predecessors had used in their 
attempts to fit in.  At the same time, due to the lack of overt hostility and open sexism, 
especially among officers, many women feel more welcomed and may have less 
motivation to resist.  Moreover, they have a space that did not previously exist in which 
they feel comfortable in rejecting the usual strategies women have individually 
employed when integrating male occupations in favor of being true to self.  Still, women 
officers’ statements especially are contradictory – they deny sexism and gender 
                                            
 
184 Intrusiveness might be measured by how threatening the tokens were perceived to be for the 
occupation’s compensation and prestige.  
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harassment or discrimination in one breath, and go on to describe many of the same old 
rules for success (or failure) that were operant when I was serving between 1985 and 
2007.   
While it is clear that hegemonic masculinity is still influencing how “Navy Sailor” 
is performed, the methods available to many men to express their opposition to the 
perceived encroachment of women into male territory are far more subtle.  Most men 
have realized they can’t be publicly and overtly sexist in the presence of women, 
especially women officers who have more power to enforce rules against sexism than 
enlisted women do.  Changes in Navy policy are not likely to prevent men from 
expressing their sexist attitudes when women are not present.  This is not unlike 
whispered racist comments among whites, military or civilian, when other minorities are 
not present.  Someone will say what others may be thinking and, depending upon the 
circumstances, the comment may go unchallenged.  Even men who are not really 
opposed to women’s presence or who actually support greater roles for women will very 
likely choose to say nothing in the face of publicly expressed sexism because of the 
hegemony of masculinity that requires loyalty to “maleness,” and punishes those 
deemed to be “traitors.”  A man who speaks out against sexism among his male peers 
is very likely to suffer both overt and covert retribution from the “boys’ club” for his 
efforts.  It is far better for one’s career and workplace friendships, however superficial, 
to stay quiet than to do the right thing by vocally expressing opposing beliefs and risk 
being ostracized or incurring covert career penalties as a result.  Men, too, must be 
conscious of the possible influence of stereotype threat within a system of power where 
masculinity operates hegemonically. 
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A work environment that is seemingly more receptive to women can be viewed 
simultaneously as both a positive and negative outcome.  It is positive in the sense that 
women have more space to be themselves.  They also have a broader opportunity to 
demonstrate to male colleagues that women really are not that much different from 
men: they can be just as competent, or incompetent, as their male counterparts.  It is 
negative in the sense that women can no longer always discern who among their male 
colleagues are enemies or allies.  Furthermore, without the daily, overt, in-your-face 
gender discrimination and sexual harassment that was common in the past, women 
may be less aware that they are being discriminated against and therefore they may 
have less incentive to demand change in any organized way.185  Examples of such 
hidden discrimination in the civilian sector include:  Lilly Ledbetter’s lower pay as 
compared to men; red-lining by mortgage lenders with respect to minority home buying; 
and, most recently, charging minority home loan applicants more for credit than 
similarly-situated whites.  Each of these forms of discrimination effectively illustrate that 
one cannot protest or fight discrimination if it happens in secret and one is unaware is 
taking place.   
A recent Navy example that reflects the same problem relates to the lack of 
women pilots on the Blue Angels, the Navy’s elite precision flying team (Steele 2014).186  
An investigation into allegations of “possible violations of the Department of the Navy 
                                            
 
185 The political “demobilization” of Navy women is evidenced by the demise of the WOPA/WOPN and its 
assimilation by the Navy establishment in its new form, SSLA. 
186 Steele, Jeanette (2014) “Why No Female Blue Angels? In “Boys Club” Atmosphere, Pilots Choose 
Who Joins; Navy Now Reviewing the Process” San Diego Union-Tribune June 7 – available online at:  
http://www.utsandiego.com/news/2014/jun/07/blueangels-women-pilots-navy/; accessed August 24, 
2014. 
 
 
 
 
 
325 
Policies on equal opportunity and sexual harassment by the former commanding officer” 
concluded that the pilot selection process is vulnerable to gender discrimination 
because in addition to flying skill, a pilot’s “disposition and personality ‘fit’” are also 
considered.  Nonetheless, and despite firing the Command Officer for allowing a hostile 
command climate and recommending discipline for more junior officers who 
“demonstrably” or “less significantly” contributed to the hostile command climate and 
sexual harassment present at the Blue Angels from 2011 to 2012, the same 
investigation concluded there was “no substantial evidence supporting the 
complainant’s claim that actual gender discrimination existed in selection of Blue Angels 
demonstration pilots” (Harris 2014).  To exonerate themselves from the suspicion of 
sexism the all-male Blue Angels demonstration pilots, who determine who will be 
accepted as new members, had only to claim that gender was not a factor in their 
selection of fellow pilots (all-male) and declare that they really hoped that someday 
there would be a woman demonstration pilot on the Blue Angels team.  Of course, they 
qualified, she would have to be the right woman (Crites 2014).  
Even though Navy women’s gender resistance may not look like what we have 
come to expect “acts of resistance or agency” to look like, it is, nonetheless, resistance. 
As Faith (1994, p. 57) reminds us: 
Resistance, like power, is not static, monolithic or chronological; there is no one 
resistance, but rather infinite multiplicities of strategic resistances …‘Change 
does not occur … by transforming the whole at once but only by resisting 
injustices at the particular point where they manifest themselves’ (Hoy 1986, p. 
143). 
 
 
 
 
326 
In the following chapter I will explore how a woman’s particular location in a system of 
interlocking oppressions might influence both her choice to resist traditional gender 
norms and the manner in which she chooses to do so.  
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CHAPTER 5 
THE INFLUENCE OF INTERSECTIONALITY AND STEREOTYPE THREAT  
ON THE INDIVIDUAL PERFORMANCE OF GENDER  
BY SURFACE NAVY WOMEN OF COLOR 
Issues of Intersectionality in the Military Context 
Not surprisingly, interest in studying the military, spikes during and immediately 
following periods of war.  To date, however, there are few intersectional studies of 
women’s experiences in the U. S. military in general or in the Navy in particular.  In fact, 
most studies on military women are “additive,” i.e.  gender + race (see Moore 1991 and 
2002; Daniels 1994; Moore & Webb 1998; and Segal, Thanner, & Segal 2007).  
Kimberlé Crenshaw (1989 and 1991) is frequently credited (Collins 1990 and 2000; 
McCall 2005; Simien 2007; Walby, Armstrong, & Strid 2012) with coining the term 
“intersectionality,” although Collins had begun writing about “the intersection of multiple 
structures of domination” as early as 1986 (p. S19), and it was widely understood 
among academics that both Collins (1986 and 1990) and Crenshaw (1989 and 1991) 
were merely articulating in a different way concepts previously introduced by earlier 
Black feminist intellectuals (Combahee River Collective 1977;187 Lewis 1977; Davis 
1981; hooks 1981 and 1984; Hull, Scott, & Smith 1982; King 1988; Spelman 1988, etc.).    
                                            
 
187 The Combahee River Collective was formed by a group of black feminists, including Barbara Smith, 
Demita Frasier, and Beverley Smith.   The Collective’s “A Black Feminist Statement” was first published in 
Eisenstein (1978) but has subsequently appeared in other works, including But Some of Us Are Brave 
(1982), Gloria T. Hull, Patricia Bell Scott, and Barbara Smith, eds. Old Westbury, NY: Feminist Press, pp. 
13-22.  See also Holvino (2010). 
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Essentially, the concept of intersectionality originally recognized that Black 
women occupy a unique location in life’s experience at the intersection of two 
exceptionally powerful and prevalent systems of oppression: racism and sexism.  In a 
world that privileges white men, white women are privileged by their race but 
subordinated on the basis of their gender, whereas black men are privileged by their 
gender but subordinated on the basis of their race.  Black women are thoroughly 
“othered” in that they share no affinity with white men along any axis in the “matrix of 
domination” (Collins 1990 and 2000) and are subordinated on the basis of both race 
and gender.  Additionally, intersectionality posits that Black women’s experiences of 
oppression are not the sum of their racialized subordination plus their gendered 
subordination.  Rather, Black women’s unique position within these interlocking systems 
of oppression actually multiplies the impact of their experiences of subordination.  In 
subsequent conceptualizations, intersectionality has grown beyond race and gender to 
encompass additional systems of oppression including: social class, sexuality, ethnicity, 
nation, religion, and age.  Furthermore, just as experiences of racism among Blacks and 
other people of color and sexism among women are not monolithic, neither are the 
experiences of Black women.  Each person has a unique perspective and experiences 
based upon their particular social location within multiple systems of oppression.  
More than a decade and one-half ago Hall (1999) called for the application of 
intersectional analysis to routine Department of Defense research.  She accurately 
pointed out that the Department of Defense neither collected nor collated data along 
intersectional lines.  Under the Navy’s present personnel record keeping and 
demographic analysis, a service member may have only one form of minority status 
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attributed at any given time.  Various demographic data is collected and collated 
according to either race or gender, never according to race and gender.  The Navy acts 
as if all women are white women, and all African Americans are men.  Thus, African 
American women and other women of color are systematically overlooked when the 
Navy tries to evaluate the progress of its integration and diversity efforts.   
This approach probably has logical roots in the military’s historical role and 
Congressional oversight in integrating first, African American men in 1948, and then all 
women from 1976 forward.  Given the ever-increasing diversity of the military, if civilian 
and military leaders truly want to understand the complexity of the force, the time has 
clearly come for the Navy to move beyond simple additive analysis.  According to the 
Director of the Navy’s Office of Women’s Policy that office could only provide total 
numbers of women by paygrade and rank.  It could not provide those numbers broken 
down by race or ethnicity.188  Considering that it took the American Sociological 
Association until 1995 to establish a section on “Race/Class/Gender” due to institutional 
resistance (Zerai 2000), it is hardly surprising that a large, conservative, androcentric 
bureaucratic organization such as the Department of Defense is sluggish in keeping up 
with cutting-edge social science research methods and data analysis techniques, no 
matter how much the organization might ultimately benefit from their application. 
 
 
                                            
 
188 Personal phone conversation between author and Stephanie Miller, Director, Navy Women’s Policy 
Center, 18 November 2008.  She did not clarify if this data was available for internal use.  She simply 
made clear that she was unable to provide it.  Such data is never published.   
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Gender Component of Intersectionality 
 Harris (1996) documents differences in the way “femininity” is viewed and 
constructed within the African American community as compared to the way it is 
constructed among the Anglo-American community.  He argues that African American 
gender identities are more androgynous than those of Anglo-Americans.  Citing 
research by Lewis (1975), Harris (1996) argues that Blacks view traits such as 
aggressiveness, independence, self-confidence, nonconformity, sexual assertiveness, 
nurturance, emotional expressiveness, and focus on personal relationships as common 
to both sexes, whereas whites would consider the first five to be masculine and the last 
three feminine.  This suggests that the way African American women “do” femininity 
may be  different from the way their white counterparts do it.  Norms for African 
American femininity may be more compatible with expectations for how Naval officers 
should comport themselves.   
Peterson (2007) argues that pervasive “devalorization of the feminine” effectively 
reinforces other forms of inequality, i.e. race, class, sexuality, nationality, by essentially 
gendering them as “less masculine” as well.  Navy women face a “double bind” when it 
comes to confronting these problems.  If they fail to stand up for themselves, they are 
victims.  How can “victims” be tough enough to be warriors?  If they do stand up for 
themselves, either they “can’t take a joke,” are “too sensitive,” or just “bitches.”  As 
such, they can never really be “one of the guys,” a member of the team.  These 
problems are only compounded for women of color:  as noted by Martin (1994) “racism 
enlarges cleavages among women” and “sexism divides black women and men” (p. 
383).   
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Hyers (2007) speaks directly to some of the factors that may influence Navy 
women’s choice to “respond assertively” to the interpersonal prejudices they encounter.   
She provides insight into women’s actions with respect to interpersonal prejudice, and 
helps, in part, to explain why some women may choose to respond assertively while still 
others may choose not to do so.  Hyers (2007) provides the results of research into 
women’s189 responses to the various forms of everyday prejudice (including racism, 
sexism, heterosexism, and anti-Semitism) they encountered over a one-week period.  
Her study was designed to explore “how the competing cultural forces of activist norms 
and gender role prescriptions for women to be passive and accommodating may 
contribute to women’s response strategies” (p. 1)  She asserts that in the United States 
activist norms to ‘break the silence’ have replaced older norms not to confront 
perpetrators of prejudice.  Her participants were nearly equally likely to report they were 
motivated by activist goals or gender role consistent goals to avoid conflict when 
deciding how to respond to prejudice.  Not surprisingly, those with gender role 
consistent goals were less likely to confront the perpetrator or otherwise respond 
assertively.  Responses that visibly communicated displeasure to the perpetrator were 
coded “assertive;” responses that did not were coded “non-assertive.”  Hyers (2007) 
notes: 
The circumscribed, face-to-face nature of interpersonal prejudice makes it more 
proximal and salient than systematic, institutionalized forms of prejudice.  The 
interpersonal context provides a readily accessible  forum for women to engage 
in activism and resistance, yet this forum also presents special challenges 
because women are expected to be passive and accommodating” (p. 1).    
                                            
 
189 Hyers had a total of 98 participants:  22 African American women reported on anti-Black racism; 
22 Jewish-American women reported on anti-Semitism; 24 lesbian or bisexual women reported on 
heterosexism; and a general sample of 30 women reported on sexism. 
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Previous research has confirmed that  
for any disadvantaged group member, assertive confrontation risks confirming 
stereotypes that the group is ‘difficult,’ ‘aggressive,’ or ‘oversensitive,’ in 
intergroup relations; however, for women, these labels not only signify intergroup 
tension – they also serve as warnings that women are violating gender role 
prescriptions” (Hyers 2007, p. 2).   
Two gender-related norms emerged from Hyers’ (2007) research: 
(1) Gender role prescriptions for women to be considerate of others 
(including perpetrators) influenced women’s choices to respond 
assertively or not; 
(2) Potential labeling with negative gender stereotypes for responding 
assertively influenced women’s decisions to or not to confront 
perpetrators. 
Class Component of Intersectionality 
“Class” is built into the organizational structure of the Navy. The rank structure of 
the U.S. military, with its division into officers and enlisted and the resultant segregation 
imposed on members of those categories, has its roots in the 18th century British 
military.  Officers in the British military may not all have come from the peerage, but they 
did come from the ranks of the wealthy due to the requirement for officers to purchase 
their commissions, and buy their promotions, neither of which were cheap.  In contrast, 
common soldiers or Sailors were often impressed or given into military service as 
clemency for a crime committed.  A harsh disciplinary system was designed to keep 
both the unwilling and the criminal in line.  Before the American Revolution, British 
subjects in the colonies of the New World participated in their local militias, which used 
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the same rank structure and organization as the regular British forces.  Thus, when the 
colonists declared independence, it was only natural that they should establish their 
own military services modeled on the form with which they were already familiar. 
Of course, the modern American military system’s division into officers and 
enlisted does not always accurately reflect one’s socio-economic circumstances upon 
entry.  College-educated, middle class men and women may choose to enlist rather 
than enter service as commissioned officers.  Furthermore, in the course of their 
service, enlisted men and women may ascend to officer ranks through enlisted 
commissioning programs.190  Intellectually gifted but economically disadvantaged men 
and women may have their college education paid for by military scholarship in return 
for their service as officers. In the vast majority of cases, however, it is safe to assume 
that enlisted service members have come from less affluent families than their officer 
counterparts. Officers are paid more than enlisted service members, so the military 
reinforces an imposed “class” status through its compensation system.         
It seems logical that the women who would be most likely to “resist” are the ones 
who experience the most day-to-day sexism.  Navy statistics show that junior enlisted 
women are most likely to experience both sexual harassment and military sexual 
assault.191  Given that junior enlisted women experience the most severe expressions of 
                                            
 
190 In the past there were more than a dozen different paths for enlisted Sailors to earn their officer’s 
commission.  Three such programs in the Navy have been Broadened Opportunity for Officer Selection 
and Training (BOOST), the Enlisted Commissioning Program (ECP), and Seaman to Admiral. In 2002 the 
Navy consolidated all the different commissioning programs for enlisted Sailors into the Seaman to 
Admiral for the 21st Century (SAT-21) program.  
191 See the Department of Defense FY 2013 Report on Substantiated Incidents of Sexual Harassment in 
the Armed Forces dated 7May2014, available at: 
http://www.stripes.com/polopoly_fs/1.283319.1400187510!/menu/standard/file/DOD%20FINAL%20REPO
RT-FY%2013%20Incidents%20of%20Sexual%20Harassment%20Report_15May14.pdf; accessed 
August 24, 2014.  
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male hostility at the highest rates, there is little doubt they also continue to experience 
gender discrimination and harassment, as was demonstrated in previous chapters.  This 
comes as no surprise, given their position at the bottom (or at least the lower end) of the 
Navy’s rank and power structure.  Their relative lack of power and experience within the 
organization, combined with the fact that many are young, naïve, and away from home 
for the first time, minimizes the likelihood that they will resist or lodge official complains. 
However, some enlisted women might feel they have less to lose in complaining 
depending upon where they are in their enlistment and what their intentions are for 
making the Navy a career.  The issue of “power,” or relative lack thereof in the context 
of the formal Navy hierarchy, is an important component in trying to figure out who 
resists and why.  Anyone who is determined to make the Navy a career must carefully 
consider the possible negative implications of complaining against someone higher up 
the chain of command.  Ideally the Navy justice system should be fair and impartial; in 
actuality, it remains highly suspicious of those who complain, even as it is highly 
punitive to the accused.  
Unfortunately, as described in the introductory chapter, despite striving to engage  
many, many junior enlisted participants in my study, I was ultimately able to gain the 
participation of only a few, none of whom were women of color.  Junior enlisted women 
were especially reluctant to participate.  This is likely due to Navy socialization that 
requires them to seek permission from their chain of command to grant interviews.  That 
same socialization also strikes fear in their hearts at the prospect of exercising their 
First Amendment right to speak freely about their own personal experiences, especially 
when those comments might be published somewhere, however obscure.  While the 
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military has probably always been a bit paranoid over the possibility of potential 
negative media exposure, that paranoia seems to have grown exponentially even in the 
past five to six years.   Navy training on “giving interviews” apparently does not clearly 
distinguish between the popular media and academic researchers.  Women officers and 
senior enlisted personnel could distinguish the two and clearly felt the decision to 
participate was a matter solely under their personal purview.  The lack of junior enlisted 
participants, especially the complete lack of junior enlisted who were also women of 
color, makes the results of my study less comprehensive than I had hoped.  
Sexuality Component of Intersectionality 
Normally, “intersectional” approaches to studying and analyzing inequality would 
include sexual orientation.  However, in the context of the military organization, where 
until September 20, 2012 homosexuals were required by law to remain “in the closet” or 
be discharged from the service, I concluded studying sexuality in conjunction with 
studying gender construction or resistance could prove more confounding than 
illuminating.  Therefore, this study does not address the “sexuality” component of one’s 
unique social location.  One of the hopes I harbor for my study is that it will ultimately 
serve as a source of comparison for future research on gender resistance and agency 
within the military context by LGBT military members.  
Race/Ethnicity Component of Intersectionality: 
Findings of three studies of the experiences of African American women 
integrating occupations and organizations gendered “male” provide a potential baseline 
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for what we are likely to find in the military context with respect to race.  Focusing on 
Black women’s experiences as “the outsider within” (Collins 1986 and 1990), Martin 
(1994) explored Black women’s experiences of race and gender within police 
departments,192 and Yoder and Aniakudo (1997) explored Black women’s experiences 
of race and gender within fire departments and (1995) how Black women firefighters 
responded to gender harassment.193  Yoder and Berendsen (2001) investigated the 
differences in white and black women firefighters experiences.   
Both police and fire departments are organized hierarchically and built on a 
system of rank and obedience to authority and the chain of command that mirrors the 
military.  Also like the military, both professions potentially involve life and death 
situations.  Moreover, many police and firefighters are military veterans.  Male police 
and firefighters are likely to share the more traditional gender ideology commonly found 
among military men.  Although these studies may seem a bit dated, they were 
conducted approximately 20 years after the Equal Employment Opportunity Act 
outlawed discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, by all 
                                            
 
192 After being asked to relate their history of assignments and experiences during initial training, 
respondents were asked directly "Have you experienced discrimination on the basis of race or sex as 
members of the police department?" No definition of discrimination was provided but all positive 
responses were probed. Even before getting to this question, however, many of the women described 
treatment by training officers, supervisors, and fellow officers that was subsequently described as 
discrimination or as sexual harassment. A separate question regarding both their definition and 
experience of sexual harassment was included late in the interview schedule (if the subject had not 
already been explored). Respondents also were asked whether they had benefited or been favored 
because of their race or sex. (Martin 1994, p. 387-8). 
193 Participants who returned a twenty-page mail survey that measured job satisfaction and job-related 
self-esteem were then interviewed by telephone.  The interview schedule for both studies consisted of 
three questions that were provided to participants in advance of the phone interview: (1) What influenced 
you to become a firefighter? (2) Have you ever been treated differently because you are Black or a 
woman? (3) Do you know of any rumors that have circulated about you as a firefighter?  Question 3 was 
included because prior research on firefighters had identified rumor as one means to embellish or 
diminish a firefighter’s reputation on a team. The bulk of each interview focused on the second question 
which subtly elicited stories about gender harassment and their responses to it (Yoder & Aniakudo 1995, 
p. 129 and Yoder & Aniakudo 1997, p. 328).  
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public employers (with the exception of the U.S. military) which forced changes in 
existing discriminatory selection criteria for police and firefighters (Martin 1994).  
Today’s surface Navy is only twenty years into its own gender integration, making the 
results of these studies still relevant despite the passage of time.  
Martin (1994) found that on street patrol there seemed to be different 
expectations for and treatment of women based on their race.  She attributes these 
differences to traditional conceptualizations of black femininity and white femininity in 
which African American women were assumed to be “beasts of burden” (Dill 1979) 
while white women were idealized as frail and unsuited for physical labor.  She found 
that white women who were either physically attractive or attached to more powerful 
white men were more likely to be “protected” from street assignment than their Black 
counterparts. White women were frequently assigned to the relative safety of the station 
house or to administrative duties that took them off the street.  Black women also 
experienced uncertainty about the level of backup they would receive from colleagues 
as well as unpredictability in the responses of citizens to their exercise of authority.   
Martin noted that Black women’s relationships with their black male colleagues 
were often problematic as some black men aligned with white male officers in opposing 
their presence.  Moreover, since openly-expressed hostility toward white women was 
more likely to carry penalties, black men often displayed more hostility toward black 
women than white women.  One of Martin’s (1994) participants related a situation in 
which she experienced sexual harassment from a Black male Lieutenant.  Ultimately, 
she chose not to file a complaint against him because she felt a need to preserve “racial 
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solidarity” and she feared filing a complaint would draw negative press that would reflect 
badly on her race.   
In Martin’s research, we see some of the same problems reflected in the station 
house that we saw in the Navy of the past.  There was little unity among white and black 
police women.  She attributes this to white men’s success at deploying a “divide and 
conquer” strategy, simultaneously mobilizing the racism of white women and the sexism 
of black men.  Some women worked to fit in by playing up their masculine qualities 
while others played up their femininity.  Still others tried to strike a balance between 
masculine and feminine attributes that allowed them to create the new identity “woman-
cop.”  Many women police were critical of women using strategies different from their 
own.  Women police criticized others for being “too mannish,” too helpless,” or “like 
sluts.”  Similar to Navy women, police women were concerned with the adverse 
consequences to themselves of some women’s confirmation of negative male 
stereotypes.  Ultimately, Black women had no experience of “us,” among either women 
officers or Black officers.  
 Yoder and Anaikudo’s (1997) research found that black women firefighters 
experienced subordination through exclusion in the form of: insufficient instruction, 
coworker hostility, the silent treatment, close supervision, lack of support from 
colleagues, and stereotyping and differential treatment. Only one of 24 firefighters 
participating in their research worked directly with a white woman firefighter, although 
the Black women did encounter white women in positions directly connected with 
firefighting, such as dispatchers and paramedics.  Participants reported a lack of unity 
among the women, which they attributed to racism or the “tendency for white women 
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…to trade on their racial solidarity with higher-status white men” (p. 334).   One 
firefighter reported that a white woman paramedic who had previously been ostracized 
by her male colleagues was suddenly embraced when the African American woman 
reported to the firehouse.  
 African American women firefighters reported that their relationships with their 
black male colleagues was generally of two types:  one in which black men served as 
allies and functioned as intermediaries between black women and white men; and the 
other in which black men achieved greater unity with their white male colleagues at the 
expense of black women.  Overall, Yoder and Anaikudo (1997) reported that from the 
perspective of African American women firefighters “relations of Black women with 
Black men reflected their relative positions within a race-gender power hierarchy” (p. 
334).  As one woman explained, the presence of black women in the firehouse suddenly 
provided black men, who had themselves been picked-on underdogs for so long, an 
opportunity to pick on someone else.   Yoder and Anaikudo (1997) described racism 
and sexism in constructing the forms of Black women firefighters’ exclusion and token 
difference as omnirelevant and inseparable in their interactions with male colleagues.  
Yoder and Anaikudo (1997) asked their participants if they thought the incidents of 
differential treatment they had described were attributable to their race or their gender.  
The women responded almost universally that their differential treatment resulted from 
the confluence of race and gender, which they viewed as inseparable. Having 
discussed the varying components of intersectionality with which we are concerned in 
this dissertation, we can move now to a consideration of the actual experiences of Navy 
women of color.  
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Past Gendered Experiences of Navy Women of Color 
As previously noted, there are few intersectional studies of women’s experiences 
within the military in general or the Navy in particular.  Ware-Ashbury’s (1997) study 
appears to be the first attempt to apply intersectional analysis to the experiences of 
Navy women.  Her particular focus was “Africana” Naval Officers.  Although her project 
was primarily dedicated to writing a history of black women’s participation in the Navy, a 
portion of her study was also grounded in the lived experiences of African American 
Navy women.  Her goal was to identify systemic obstacles that historically affected the 
professional attainment of African American women Navy officers and the means they 
employed to contend with those obstacles.  
To accomplish these goals, she interviewed 15 current and former African 
American Naval Officers, ranging in age from 30 to 80 at the time of her study.  Six of 
her participants were classified as General Unrestricted Line Officers (GURLs), a now-
defunct community that was composed primarily of non-warfare-qualified women Line 
Officers. The remainder of her participants were from the Restricted Line,194 including 
two each from the Dental Corps, the Nurse Corps, the Medical Service Corps, the 
Judge Advocate General’s Corps (attorneys), and a single Navy Chaplain.  There were 
no African American Surface Warfare Officers within her sample.  Unfortunately, 
                                            
 
194 The “Restricted Line” is so-named because those so designated belong to specifically non-warfighting professions 
such as those listed above.  Furthermore, they are “Restricted” from commanding regular “Line” officers.  A Navy 
Captain dentist, assigned to the medical department of a ship, cannot assume command of that ship in the event the 
Surface Line Officer Commanding Officer is killed – even if the dentist is the senior officer aboard.  Conversely, a 
non-warfare qualified General Unrestricted Line Officer (most often a women before that community was slowly 
phased out with the lifting of the combat exclusion law) on board a warship when its Commanding Officer was killed 
or incapacitated, could assume command if she were the most senior officer present. 
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omission of this unique group and the predominance of participants from the Staff Corps 
make her study less directly comparable to mine.   
An additional problem with her study is that, in order to capture “history,” the 
service of her participants spanned the 52-year period from 1944 through 1996 and 
ranged in duration from 31.9 years to 1.5 years.  A great deal of change with respect to 
both women’s employment and civil rights had occurred in the Navy over the course of 
this period, including changes in racial integration.  Moreover, eight of her respondents 
were serving on active duty at the time of their interviews, five were retired, and two had 
previously served.  They ranged in age from 30 to 80 years.  Although she conducted 
in-depth interviews, she subjected the data to content analysis, providing the reader 
with a numerical accounting of these women’s experiences, rather than allowing the 
participants own voices to speak to their experiences.  As a result, it is impossible to tell 
which officers, of which communities, serving in which particular eras, had which 
experiences.   
Ware-Ashbury (1997) explored her participants’ military experiences along 
thirteen major themes:  
1. knowledge of African American women’s Naval history;  
2. motivation for joining the Navy;  
3. billet (job) assignments;  
4. extent and nature of command support and mentoring;  
5. fitness reports;  
6. promotions;  
7. training provided;  
8. education levels at entry and education attained while on active duty;  
9. trust shown by seniors, peers, and juniors;  
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10. respect shown by seniors, peers, and juniors;  
11. public appreciation in the form of awards or praise bestowed;  
12. overall historical progress of African American women in the Navy; and 
13. perceptions of professional competence by the Navy as compared to 
European (white) American male and female officers and Africana male 
officers.  
Not surprisingly, she discovered perceptions of racism and sexism, with several 
participants evaluating the racism as being a more daunting form of oppression than 
sexism.   
 A slightly earlier study by Daniels (1994), undertaken at the Naval Postgraduate 
school, although not explicitly intersectional in that it referenced neither Crenshaw (1989 
and 1991) nor Collins (1990), nonetheless explored the social construction of race and 
gender among active duty black women Naval officers.  Most of the respondents in this 
study were General Unrestricted Line Officers (GenURL).  The combat exclusion law 
pertaining to women serving aboard combatant ships had only been rescinded the year 
prior, and there were still relatively few women Surface Warfare Officers at that time, 
and even fewer who were African American.  Specific to their military service, one of the 
themes that emerged from this research was Black women officers’ impressions that 
they experienced racial prejudice and when they achieved success or recognition for 
outstanding performance they felt they were targets of resentment, due to both their 
race and their gender.  For example, one former Naval Academy midshipman recounted 
the reaction of her fellow male classmates shortly after a male African American  
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became their company officer and she was awarded a leadership position: 
My grades and my QPR [Quality Performance Review] were just as good as 
anybody else’s and I was sort of near the top of our company.  I was selected to 
be company sub-commander.  All those guys that I hung out with and I thought 
we were really close … we had gone through hard times and I listened to their 
stories when they came in on Saturday night at 2:00 in the morning, they were 
going to sit down and tell me everything that happened to them with their 
girlfriends, half-drunk and so forth.  They raised so much hell about that.  It was, 
‘the only reason you got picked was because you’re black, Jane’.  They said it 
was because the company officer was black.  I’m just as good as anybody else 
that’s here.  I felt betrayed by all those guys.  I don’t think I ever felt about them in 
the same way as I had before this incident” (Daniels 1994, p. 42) 
Another Naval Academy graduate, a LT GenURL officer, recounted an experience she 
had with two more senior white male midshipman during her first year at the Academy: 
I remember they pulled me out of formation and brought me to this dead-end 
hallway—I wasn’t sure what was going to happen, all I knew was that I had 
screwed up somehow.  Those guys asked me what I was there for, what did I 
want to do in the Navy.  I told them I wasn’t sure, I mean it was only my first year, 
but I was leaning toward the Supply Corps.  They said you are supposed to be 
here (Naval Academy) to become a warrior and you’re here taking the seat of 
some deserving guy who would really be a decent warrior…and you’re just here 
to fill quota, and in your case Midshipman Smith, you are filling two.  I don’t get it 
just because I was a black female, I was not looked as a woman who worked as 
hard as they did to get in.  As far as they were concerned I was only there to fill 
two congressional quotas (Daniels 1994, p. 43). 
Another LT GenURL officer related the hurtful words of her male colleagues when she 
received an award for sustained superior performance: 
I had been working my butt off for six months—doing the job of three junior 
officers, because they were away and there wasn’t going to be a replacement.  I 
never complained and actually I think I thrived on the busy schedule—it made the 
days go by quicker.  Anyway, during quarters I was called up to be presented the 
Navy Achievement Medal and it was a surprise because I had no idea I was 
getting it.  I was so happy and I know the Skipper was proud of me also.  Well, 
the next day I think I had at least three different officers in the command come up 
to me and say—“Well, how did you get this award?” and then the kicker “It’s too 
bad everyone else has to pull a miracle and you get this award because you are 
a Black woman—you know it’s the end of the fiscal year and the Skipper just 
needed to fill his minority award quota.”  I was pissed at first and then I just felt 
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like shit.  How could these guys, who knew how hard I’d been working just put 
me down like that.  It’s an awful feeling (Daniels 1994, p. 44).   
 Jones (1999), in a follow-on study also undertaken at Naval Postgraduate 
School, did not specifically use the analytical lenses of race and gender to explore the 
perspectives and experiences of Black women Naval Officers.  The majority of her 
participants were from the Fleet Support Community (formerly the GenURL 
Community).195  Among the findings that emerged from this work were:  participants 
experienced discrimination in the Navy; participants felt they had to work harder than 
their white and male counterparts to be successful; participants felt pressured to 
“represent” their race; and most participants felt undervalued in their chosen profession.  
As one officer commented: 
I don’t feel that I have been hurt by my minority status but I have been 
disappointed.  I feel that I work harder than they have … and I don’t feel like I’ve 
been rewarded for my work (Jones 1999, p. 42). 
Another noted: 
Most of the time, I don’t even think about it, to be honest with you … but then a 
lot of times, when you walk in the door, you’re a double minority, so you have the 
racial things that people have to get over, and you have the female biases that 
you have to get over … A lot of times, the first—when you’re first starting a job, 
it’s about proving that you’re supposed to be where you are and being 
uncomfortable.  After awhile, after you prove yourself basically, it’s a non-issue.  I 
don’t feel Black female, I just feel like I’m a Naval Officer, after a while.  But then 
there [are] always a few people that will remind you in subtle ways. (Jones 1999, 
p. 43). 
 
                                            
 
195 For a thorough discussion on the transition of the General Unrestricted Line Community to the 
restricted line Fleet Support Community, please see Murdy (1999). 
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Yet another woman officer spoke to the combined effect of being both black and female: 
I have run into problems with being, at every job it seems like, in being a woman 
and also problems with being a Black. And most of the time, you can’t distinguish 
when one of those problems starts and the other one ends.  And I find that being 
a female, being a Black that I’m not given the benefit of the doubt.  If I were a 
white male, I would be given the benefit of the doubt but as a Black female, I find 
that every command that I go to I have to prove that I’m okay, that I can lead, that 
I know what I’m doing.  And so it’s a struggle to gear up faster, to prove that I 
know what I’m doing.  And that happens, like I said, at every command. I run into 
some blatant racism (Jones 1999, p. 44). 
One more senior participant expressed her frustration at being called upon to be “the 
authority on Black Sailors:” 
I don’t mind getting involved and I will help people who need help but as far as 
I’m concerned, the fact that I’m Black has nothing to do with that.  I mean, if 
there’s an officer out there who is having a problem or an enlisted person who’s 
having a problem and it has something to do with race, I’m not the race expert 
and I hate it when people think that I’m an expert on Black people….I’m an 
expert on myself.  That’s it. And I hate it when people try to put you into a billet 
that’s designated as a minority billet … It drives me nuts.196  (Jones 1999, p. 62). 
 In the sections that immediately follow, I focus first on the racialized gender 
ideologies Navy women of color today confront and secondly on the ways in which they 
have challenged those ideologies in the course of their day-to-day lives.  The 
reader will be introduced to five officers (Felicia, Leigh, Quanesha, Natalie, and Xenia) 
and two enlisted women (Breanna and Marion) who will share their recent experiences 
in the Navy. As a reminder, readers can refer to Appendix E for a complete listing of 
participants, their ranks and ratings, and limited amplifying information. 
                                            
 
196 To my knowledge there were no billets designated as “minority” billets.  Participants in the Ware-
Ashbury study also seemed to think there were billets that were considered “Black” billets, but I knew a lot 
of white women who filled the exact same jobs her participants mentioned as “Black” billets.  I do not 
know how this perception came into being.   
 
 
 
 
346 
Current Gendered Experiences of Navy Women of Color 
While the 21st century Navy is generally credited with being an exemplar of racial 
equality, it would be naïve to conclude that racism, whether structural or everyday, has 
been entirely eliminated in the 20 years since Daniels (1994) conducted the first study 
on the experiences of African American women Naval officers.  Not unlike everyday 
sexism, lingering everyday racism is often subtle or subterranean, but the Navy 
experience is not monolithic.  One person might have the incredibly good fortune to 
encounter a series of exceptional leaders and good commands, resulting in a uniformly 
positive experience.  Another might have the incredibly bad fortune to encounter a 
series of bad leaders and poor commands, resulting in a uniformly negative and 
disheartening experience.  The more common experience by far is for one to alternate 
between good and bad experiences; and good and bad leaders – even on the same 
ship.   
For example, some respondents described being at a command and having a 
good relationship with their senior leadership until that leadership changed and then the 
experience would sour.  Or an officer might describe having a terrific Department Head, 
but difficult CO or XO.  In the Navy, the personalities and qualities of your leadership 
really matter, and often determine whether or not a Sailor has a good or bad 
experience.  Navy officers and enlisted personnel are always rotating jobs, going back 
and forth from sea to shore duty, and rotating between various commands.  As a result, 
there is a certain element of luck involved with the kind of experience one has. One is 
always subject to leadership that can change from good to bad or vice versa with 
someone’s transfer.   
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Because the voices of Navy women of color are so very seldom heard, in the 
section below in which I explore their more recent experiences, I quote them extensively 
to allow the reader to feel the full impact of those experiences.  Surprisingly, the Navy 
women of color who participated in my study voiced few of the concerns voiced by 
Black women police officers (Martin 1994) or firefighters (Yoder & Anaikudo 1997) of 
two decades earlier. When asked if her race and gender had shaped her Navy career, 
Breanna, a Surface Warfare and Air Warfare-qualified African American Senior Chief  
Legalman acknowledged: 
I personally think my race has… when I walk into a place as a chief or a  Leading 
Petty Officer (LPO) or whatever, I think that I have always had to prove that I was 
that smart person, whereas someone who may have been white did not and for 
example, there was a time when I was an LPO and the person that left was just a 
rock.  Everyone knew that this guy was a rock, just dumb as a doorknob and had 
screwed up a lot of things. He was a white guy and he didn’t know much, didn’t 
have hardly any education and I don’t know how he became a legalman, but he 
retired as a first class.  When he first checked on board… because we checked 
on board kind of at the same time.  He walked into the office and the CO and XO 
were like, “oh, great, that’s our LPO, he’s going to be a great guy.”  So after he 
was fired, I was called in after someone else had screwed up.  So, I’m the third 
choice, you know because the first two guys had messed up pretty bad.  I was 
the most junior person so I could see why I was not their first choice.  And so I 
was called into the office and they said, “you know I’m going to question 
everything that you do and you’re going to have to prove that you’re better than 
these other two that have come through here and better than the other first 
classes that I have served with.  This is from the CO and XO.  And I thought to 
myself, “God are they saying that to me because I’m a black female?” Because 
often when I would give advice on whatever, whether it was a personnel issues, 
they would ask me and then go to another person to confirm whether the 
information I gave them was accurate and I just thought that was like a slap in 
the face.  Same thing happened when I was on the LHD [amphibious ship].  I’m 
there independently197 … I’m you’re legalman and I haven’t given you any bad 
advice and the Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG) [higher echelon command] 
legalman said that your CO and XO call here all the time to make sure that the 
information that you give them is correct. 
                                            
 
197 Servicemembers assigned to “independent” duty, such as corpsmen or legalmen, are specifically 
screened for their knowledge and suitability to serve in such important capacities.  So, she had been 
specifically screened and placed, not assigned by some random process.  
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Felicia, a LCDR Surface Warfare-qualified supply officer who had been assigned 
to four ships and had served six years as an enlisted Electronics Technician before 
earning her commission, discussed the influence she felt race and gender had on her 
Navy experiences: 
If the first thing you want people to see is race, they will.  If the first thing you 
want people to see is how professional you are, and how competent you are, 
they will see that.  That’s what I found.  If the first thing you want people to see is 
you’re a female, they will.  If the first thing you want them to see again, that 
you’re a consummate professional and you know what the hell you’re doing, they 
will. 
Felicia went on to describe her philosophy of engaging with everybody aboard the ship: 
That’s always been …I guess you could say my M.O.  I speak to everybody, 
period.  I ask them how their day is.  And I seriously want to know; I don’t just ask 
to ask.  If I see someone looking a little down, I don’t care if they don’t work for 
me; I go “Hey, what’s up?  You look a little bothered there, what’s going on?”   
When I asked Felicia how that erased gender and race, she elaborated:   
I think that most kids, young people today, are so accustomed of being ignored, 
that it’s not this black, white, Hispanic female talking to me.  It’s Lieutenant 
Commander XXXX.  “Hey Commander, how you doing?”  “I’m good, how are 
you?”  Even in the senior enlisted community, I guess if somebody said, “Hey 
can you describe Commander XXXX?  Her name is XXXX, is she Spanish?  No.  
That’s always kind of entertaining too.  Is she Dominican?  Is she Puerto Rican?  
I think race is something you introduce them to it.  You choose to introduce 
someone to that, and that’s what you want them to see about you first, then 
absolutely that’s what they’ll see about you first.  But you want them to see that 
there’s more depth, there’s more breadth, there’s so much more to that, to use in 
that, then they will see that as well.   
Felicia believed that she had the respect of the crew because she treated all of them 
with respect, regardless of rank. She went on to explain why she didn’t find gender and  
race to be very meaningful categories: 
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We, me and my friends, are probably the poster children for international 
relations.  I mean, my best friend is Korean.  My other best friend is Jamaican, 
and nobody is married to anyone who looks like them.  So, I think that because 
that’s our circle and it’s been our circle for so long… We don’t see that, we don’t 
see any of that. All our kids are freaking look-alike.  They’re all mixed up.  I don’t 
think we have one set of friends that they’re both married to the same race. And 
we don’t even notice that. The thing is that I had friends who were, who didn’t 
look like me for so many years, for at least 25 years.  Most of my life my friends 
have not looked like me.  And if they did, they looked like me, and everybody 
else was different.  Oh, my mom would just look at me, because I’d bring home 
everybody.  “Hey mommy, this is so and so and so.”  “Oh, how are you doing?”  I 
always had friends from different places you know?  Trinidad, who was Indian, 
just all kinds of friends, and what was really funny, though, is like my mom 
always liked my friends.  Although she was always amazed at the fact that I was 
bringing the spectrum with me…And that has been in me from like kindergarten.  
So, so that’s I guess that’s why it’s so easy for me to not really spend a lot of time 
there you know? 
Felicia acknowledged that she had occasionally encountered men who were not 
enthused to work with women but she overwhelmingly rejected the idea that issues of 
race and/or gender remained significant in the Navy:   
I hear about all the issues of racial differences and that whole bunch of crap that 
we tend to have.  And every other country does too.  But I watch all of that go 
completely out the door when I see kids from different backgrounds, different 
nationalities, all go out together, all have fun together, all taking care of each 
other regardless, it’s got nothing to do with that.  They’re common thread is the 
fact that they’re doing something.  They value what they’re doing….I love my job.  
I say that because the Navy and the people in the Navy break all molds you 
know?  Every stereotype you thought you had, guess what?  The Navy has found 
a way to break it.  Your whole [notion] about where military people are from and 
how they think and what they do, it even breaks that too.  You know?  So I just, 
18 years and I’ve seen that and I see that over and over again, and that is I love 
what I do.  I am a hard person to impress.  But the young people that I work with 
impress me consistently over and over and over again. 
Quanesha, another LCDR Surface Warfare officer, offered a markedly different 
perspective on the influence she felt race and gender had on her Navy experiences: 
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My name is Quanesha.198  And me and my boyfriend we talked about it before 
too.  It’s like people see your orders before they see you.  And so the biggest 
thing for me is like I know when they see my name they’re expecting a black 
woman.  And then it’s like, well if I show up with my short afro and I’m very 
aggressive, then they have this certain perception of me that may not really be 
who I am.  And so, you know I felt like over the course of my time in the military 
that I’ve often had to try to overcome those certain perceptions or prejudices that 
people may have of me simply based on my name.  My name is Quanesha, but 
my sister’s name is Karen.  And so I’ve always talked to my mom about that.  I 
was like “mom, how could you have made me Quanesha?  And you named my 
sister, Karen?”  And so you know it’s very difficult.  And I think that for the older 
people in the military I think race plays a bigger part.  Because they’re not so 
used to dealing with us African Americans being officers. They’re used to us 
being enlisted and not expecting us to be as bright as we may be.  And so yes, I 
do think race plays a part.  But it’s mostly for the older people …I just think that 
those in more senior positions, they’re not used to dealing with females.  They’re 
not used to dealing with African Americans that are officers.  They’re not.  
They’re just not used to having to interact on a professional level, in a 
professional setting with people that may challenge them, or may not tell them 
what they always want to hear.  [People who] may offer a different perspective on 
how to accomplish a certain task.  You know, they’re not used to that yet.  And so 
sometimes you can feel the tension, when you interact with those people and 
often times, I just feel that the senior people should set the tone.  But I often feel 
like I have to kind of set the tone because you can tell that sometimes they’re 
uneasy.  Or they feel like they have to overcompensate and puff out their chest 
and wear their rank, and show you who they are.  But it’s like I kind of have to 
help them to feel a little bit more at ease with me because I’m just here to do a 
job.  And I feel like sometimes they let their prejudices about me cloud the fact 
that I can actually do the work.  I can actually accomplish a task.  And so it’s just, 
the role that we play and how deeply in those roles you want to get without losing 
your sense of self -- at times.  You know? 
I asked Quanesha how her experiences might have different if her name had been 
Karen.  She explained: 
It is interesting, I think it would be different because people wouldn’t probably 
have the prejudice about me and thinking that I was ghetto or morally loose or I 
think they wouldn’t be curious as to where I come from too.  Because with me 
being named Quanesha, it’s like “oh where did she come from?”  And then when 
they hear that I’m from Miami, it’s like “oh you know those loose girls down in 
Miami, they shake their booties, and you know, do this and that.”  And so I just, 
for me and my personal experiences, especially dealing with white people…like 
                                            
 
198 To maintain her anonymity I have substituted her real name with one from a list of popular names for 
African American girls (see www.top-100-baby-names-search.com/black-girls-names.html; accessed 
August 24, 2014). 
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there’s this white guy that I met when I was onboard the Cleveland.  I actually 
kind of liked him but the thing that put me off about him was that, and it 
happened with a lot of other white people, when they would interact with me, they 
would put on this blackness about them.  Like ”yo, Quanesha, what’s up?  What’s 
up?”  And it’s like, “I don’t even really talk like that.  But you feel like you have to 
talk like that in order to interact with me.”  And so that makes me feel like you’re 
not really being your true self.  And so for me, it’s just that people, white people 
sometimes they don’t really know how to interact with me because I guess they 
didn’t really grow up with black people.  But maybe if my name was Karen, they 
would figure “oh, she can’t be ghetto.”  Or maybe “She’s not as ghetto as 
Quanesha would be?”  So it’s kind of weird.  It’s just, actually onboard the LPD 
[amphibious ship] because the white people couldn’t really say 
Quanesha…couldn’t get their tongues around the name.  Couldn’t figure out the 
phonetic way to say it.  I actually made them just call me “Smitty,”199 my last 
name shortened. I’d say “Just call me Smitty.”  And the guys, the white guys 
seemed more comfortable saying “Hey Smitty?”  You know?  Instead of trying to 
say “Quanesha.”  I think that made them a little bit more comfortable and seeing 
me more so as just an officer as opposed to this African American female officer.  
It made them a little bit more comfortable.  And with them being a little bit more 
comfortable, it made me a little bit more comfortable, because I wasn’t irritated 
because you didn’t know how to say my name.   
Quanesha often changed her hair style so she also spoke of the impact men’s 
obsession with her physical appearance had on her: 
I remember actually telling my boyfriend in 2008 “I’m tired of people looking at 
me and saying I’m just another pretty black girl who’s probably getting by 
because she’s black.”  And you know, I was really upset, and I was just like I 
want people to see me for the professional that I am.  But I wasn’t confident at 
that point because I still felt like my training and SWO knowledge and my 
foundation wasn’t strong enough.  So sometimes I would think “Oh, the only 
reason people are being nice to me is because they don’t want to seem racist, or 
they don’t want to see sexist.  Or because they’re just trying to get in my pants.”  
And so it was just a broad spectrum of how I try to process my interactions with 
people on a daily basis.  You know?  Why are you really being nice to me?  
Especially in the Navy, “why are you being so nice to me?  Is it because now the 
CNO (Chief of Naval Operations) has this diversity initiative?  And you want to be 
nice to me and you want to show that you’re not racist?”  And so it’s just, and I’m 
still growing.  I think that’s why I’m so passionate and nervous and suspect of 
people now as “why are you being nice?  What is your agenda?  What do you 
really want to teach me or get from me?” 
                                            
 
199 I have also changed her last name to maintain her anonymity.  
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Quanesha described the surprise she felt at the source of her mentoring as a junior 
officer in search of a career field after she was dropped from flight school: 
After I attrited out of flight school, they send you general aviation and I got to go 
all over that ship [air craft carrier] in terms of the different departments because I 
went there to do General Aviation.  I worked in Combat Systems, but I got to 
drive the ship.  Now, when I first got there, I was like “I’m not coming to SWO, 
those people are crazy.”  And everybody was like “you should be a SWO, you 
should be a SWO.”  I was like, “No.  Those people are crazy.”  Because I heard 
the horror stories.  And even my mentors at the time, they even told some of the 
horror stories.  And what I actually found interesting was that me being a black 
woman it was mostly white men that mentored me and encouraged me to step 
out of my comfort zone and do something different.  Whereas the black people, 
the males and the females, they wanted me to do something that’s a little bit 
more easy and not necessarily jump out of the comfort zone because they were 
fearful that you know, I was too nice and I was taken advantage of, and stuff like 
that.  And so onboard the carrier I went around to like all the different 
departments trying to think of what [career field] I could re-designate to…But I 
found that I really loved driving the ship.  I loved driving that big old ship.  It was 
like so awesome to me because the way that I was taught to drive the ship, I was 
taught by like Warrant Officers and LDO’s you know?  Old senior people…salty 
people.200  And they knew how to feel the ship. They knew how to you know, you 
look outside and you can see where you were during UNREP [underway 
replenishment] and figure out how to line up with the [oiler or supply] ship.  They 
taught [me] the craft.  They did.  They really did.  And I think that’s where not that 
I got suckered into it but…I got seduced … And so my combat systems officer 
had just sent me to school so I could do something in combat systems and I 
came back from that school, I said “Sir, I’m ready to be a Surface Warfare 
Officer.”  He was like “Oh, okay.”  I know he was thinking “we just sent you to 
school to be an ISSM [Information System Security Manager] and you want to be 
a Surface Warfare Officer?”  But he was happy, he was a white guy, and he was 
very, very happy that I had chosen something else to do.  And to stay in the 
Navy. 
Quanesha then described what it was actually like for her to be an African American 
woman SWO: 
I personally feel like I [have] had to live in two different worlds.  There’s my 
professional world and then there’s my personal world.  And I feel like I have to 
overcome the stereotypes of people of African American women in 
particular…So, it’s a double whammy.  I have to overcome the issues that my 
fellow African Americans either male or female bring to the Navy, you know?  
                                            
 
200 In the Navy, being “salty” means you have spent a lot of time at sea and therefore you have a lot of 
experience.  
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Whether it’s their moral issues, or their professional issues, or their lack of 
professionalism, their lack of morals.  I feel like when I walk on a ship, I have to 
do my best in order to be the best African American role model because I feel 
like people are already having these opinions and prejudices about me before 
they even meet me.  And so I feel like I have to overcome that, and play a certain 
role in order to get them to see that I’m not like those people.  I’m not like the 
African American woman that sleeps with everybody or the…the African 
American man that has to be angry and you know, just different things that I feel 
like I have to overcome.  And it’s hard.   
Quanesha also discussed her experiences with race and sexual harassment: 
I think that I’ve experienced sexual harassment but not to the extent where it’s so 
blatant.  I’ll interact with say a Black chief.  Like when I was getting my PQS 
[Personal Qualification Standards] signed off for my SWO pin.  I remember, in 
particular, he was very nice to me.   And he helped me, he gave me the 
signatures but at the end of our conversation, he asked me out on a date.  Like it 
was just like he had just met me out on the street, like not even knowing I was an 
officer.  So I think for me, especially interacting with African Americans be they 
enlisted or an officer, there seems to be this sense that “oh, I can talk to this 
sister, she a sister.  I get ask her if she wants to go to dinner.  I can ask her if she 
wants to go on a date, it doesn’t matter. I don’t have to respect the fact that she’s 
an officer.”  It’s almost that kind of expectation from some African Americans that 
they think they can approach you, and it won’t be such a big deal.  For them, my 
blackness trumps my status as an officer -- especially with a name like 
Quanesha.  “I know I can talk to her.”  And it’s like they don’t separate the two.  
They don’t separate the fact that “hey, one, this is a professional setting.  And 
two, she’s an officer and I’m enlisted.”  And there are boundaries that need to be 
respected here.  And so you know, sometimes I get people that don’t care that 
I’m an officer.  Or I’ll get people that will, they’ll make comments just to see how 
far they can go with you.  And there was this one [African American] warrant 
officer you know, sometimes he would take his, his flattery, I guess, is it flattery?  
The way he would comment -- compliment you.  Sometimes he would take it a 
little too far.  And he would say things like “oh I saw your underwear in the 
washer the other day.  Oh, you wear a nice size.  And your underwear are real 
cute.”  And so it’s kind of like that old creepy, old man nastiness.  And it’s like, 
what do you do with that?  A lot of times I just found myself just kind of laughing 
him off, or just walking away or you know, just like “oh, nasty old man.”  You 
know?  It’s like what do you really do with that?  How can you bring that up to the 
Captain or to your Department Head that this Warrant Officer or this LDO or this 
other officer is talking to you that way?  Because for them it’s just funny, you 
know?   
Although she experienced similar sexual harassment from a white Limited Duty 
Officer (LDO) Quanesha noted that he was just a creepy white guy, whereas with the 
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African American Warrant Officer that harassed her was more problematic for her 
because she was aware of the potential “race betrayal” she might commit if she officially 
lodged a complaint against him.  Ultimately, she chose not to complain about the 
behavior of either.  Quanesha’s decision resulted in part because she was junior, 
inexperienced, and lacked confidence to confront men who while technically junior to 
her in rank, had significantly more Navy experience than she.  With greater seniority, 
experience, and the confidence those produce, she explained how she would likely 
handle these matters differently today: 
I think I would be more [inclined] to address it, to nip it in the bud.  And say “hey, I 
don’t like the way you’re talking to me like that.  Can you stop it?”  Or I think I 
would be more confident in my ability to approach this individual and tell them to 
stop.  Because now that I understand that there are different roles, I know that 
my role as a professional officer, as a lieutenant, as an African American woman, 
is to not teach you how to interact with me.  But to get you to understand that 
“Hey, this is not the atmosphere for you to be doing that.”  And so I think I would 
be a little bit more confident in trying to get [them] to stop.   
During the course of the interview Quanesha had mentioned that she and her 
boyfriend (also an African American Navy SWO) spent a lot of time comparing notes on 
how she came off as a woman to peers and subordinates.  When I asked her to 
elaborate on this she responded:   
I think that there’s a race and a gender component to it, because, for instance, I 
told him the other day, “sometimes I get really mad at myself because when I 
interact with my Captain I feel like I have to be this ditzy, girly, girl.  And be 
submissive to him and non-threatening.”  And it’s a mixture of being submissive 
and non-threatening as a woman, and being submissive and non-threatening as 
a black woman.  Because a lot of people again, they think that you’re this angry, 
aggressive, B-I-T-C-H, Black woman with an afro, with an attitude.  And so I feel 
like a lot of times when I interact with my Captain, because he’s still trying to get 
to know me just as much as I’m trying to get to know him, that I have to play the 
submissive, ditzy role in order to make him feel comfortable.  And so I feel like 
I’m not really not being true to myself, but it’s almost like if he’s not going to take 
the initiative, to really try to make us both feel comfortable, then it’s my 
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responsibility to try to set the tone and kind of set the expectations of who I am 
as a person, even though in the beginning I come off as being this submissive, 
ditzy, girly girl.  Even though internally I hate it.  I can’t stand that I do that 
sometimes.  And I catch myself.   
Quanesha explained that she had also learned to monitor her own approach in 
dealing with subordinates:   
I have to catch myself sometimes, in that I kind of come off being overly 
protective or overly interested in their personal and professional development.  
Or trying to be the sister and the mother, and the friend, and I catch myself 
because sometimes I’ve learned that those subordinates, they don’t know how to 
really take it.  Some of them, especially enlisted, they only listen when they’re 
being screamed at.  Or for officers, with their experiences, they don’t really know 
how to take it, or they don’t really know how to appreciate it.  And so, I’ve learned 
that I have to just try to be more, more neutral and more just strictly professional 
in my interactions with them, because if I try to be nice or I try to be sensitive to 
what they need, when I’m asking them to do what I need them to do, they may 
take it the wrong way and try to manipulate it more in their favor.   
She feared that displaying genuine compassion and concern for subordinates might 
signal to them that she was somehow weak and they might try to take advantage of that 
perceived weakness. Quanesha explained: 
Actually I had that interaction with one of my Ensigns.  I have a white, female 
Ensign that works for me, and I have a Black, male Ensign that works for me.  
And the Black male ensign he’s been sort of a challenge.  I mean trying to get 
him to be motivated.  And try to get him to, because he’s in a limited duty 
situation too.  I thought I was crazy just to overly think about this stuff, but I do, I 
do overly think it sometimes.  But, the Black male ensign, I felt like when I first 
met him, I had to be his mentor.  I had to be his role model … As an African 
American, yes.  Because in that environment [SWO community] it’s mostly a 
white, male environment.  And so with his situation he can no longer be a part of 
the Surface Warfare Community.  So when I first met him, I was under the 
impression that he needed to re-designate [into a new career field].  And that he 
wanted to stay in the Navy.  So I was pushing you, encouraging him to get his 
package together to lateral transfer, and I was introducing him to all sorts of 
people because my mentors taught me to use your resources.  Don’t be afraid to 
network.  And I knew it was difficult for me, so I figured it was difficult for him too.  
But I’ve just come to realize that some people may not be as motivated as you 
would like for them to be.  Some people may have a different agenda than what 
they present to you.  And as much as you try to help people, they just, either they 
just don’t get it, or they just don’t want it, or you know, all sorts of things kind of 
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go into why people say they want your help.  But really they don’t take it.  And 
they don’t stick to the plan that they’ve presented to you.  And so for me dealing 
with this African American male when I first met him I was very nice to him.  I was 
very nurturing and encouraging to him and trying to get him to stay Navy.  
Because of the female, white Ensign, from my understanding, she was going to 
be getting out no matter what.  There was no way to influence her.  So my focus 
was on keeping this Black Ensign in.  But he had some issues and trying to get 
him to do the jobs and stick to the job and stick to the plan was kind of difficult.  
So I found myself counseling him.  Something that my white male supervisor 
attempted to do it in the beginning but he never did do it because the Ensign 
pulled the race card on him in front of me, and so this is when I first met him.  
Race is not an issue but the more I get to understand Commander X [her boss], 
the more I see that race is, because I don’t think he’s been exposed to people 
unlike himself as much as he puts on to be.  And so for him the Ensign … “you 
can still save him.”  He says, “you can still save him.”  But when I got to the point 
where I counseled the Ensign, I was like “we can’t save this one.  There is no 
way to save him because he doesn’t want to be saved.  He’s just riding out his 
time, getting his paycheck, and he’s basically just lost.  We can’t save him.”  And 
so, when I counseled the Ensign I said to myself “okay, I have to approach him 
differently because obviously he’s not respecting the way that I’m approaching 
him and I’m interacting with him.  He’s not appreciating it.  He’s not using it to his 
advantage in order to continue on in a successful way.”  And so I decided from 
that day on to be strictly neutral and professional with him.  No more, “how you 
doing, how’s your life?  How’s the family?  How is your package coming along?”  
Strictly professional.  When you come in, I give you your taskers and you go do 
your taskers.  You report to me when they’re done.  And that’s it.  And I 
remember him actually asking me one day, he was like “What’s wrong with you?  
Why, why are you acting like this?”  And I said, “What do you mean?”  And he 
couldn’t really explain it.  And I said, “For me, if you say there’s a problem and 
you can’t explain it to me, then there’s no problem.”  And he couldn’t explain it.  
He couldn’t, he couldn’t explain why I seemed to be so, so mean to him.  I guess 
for him he felt I was being mean.  So I was like, “As long as you can’t explain it, 
there’s no problem.  I just need you to do what I need you to do.  Or I assign you 
to do, and that’s, that.”  And so for me, it was a way for me to, I guess, maintain 
my sense of self, and better understand my role in this environment because I’ve 
learned “you can’t save everybody.”  You can’t.  You can’t try to help everybody 
because like I said, their agenda may be totally different than what you might 
expect.   
 When I asked her if there was still an inherent social contradiction between being 
a woman and being a warrior that Navy women had to negotiate, Quanesha observed: 
I think we still have to negotiate.  I don’t think we’re at that point yet.  I think we’re 
getting there.  But, like I said, with the senior leadership coming from a different 
era, I think that they haven’t really accepted that yet.  And that affects the way 
that they train us.  That affects the way that they interact with us.  Whereas my 
peers, my boyfriend, and my fellow department heads -- they’re more open to it.  
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But there is still that subconscious prejudice against it.  Because, whether it’s 
gender or race, they have their own ideas of why it is that you’re in the position 
that you’re in.  “How’d you get there?  Were you selected because of your job 
experiences or background?  Or were you selected just as a token? 
Natalie, another LCDR who had endured a rockier career path than most of my 
participants, offered her perspective on what it was like to be an African American 
woman SWO in the Navy today: 
Sometimes it kind of sucks.  And it’s great because you’re one of few that people 
ever see in this community.  But there’s a lot of pressure that falls to it as well.  
People always expect for you to be that role model, for you to be that one person 
that everybody can go to.  And sometimes you just want to be you, you know? … 
You’re carrying the weight of the world behind you.  If you fell, you fell for all of 
black women.  Yeah, I’m not going to lie about it.  I do feel that pressure to 
succeed.  Like right now there’s this huge push for me to want to be an XO/CO 
SWO.  Everybody’s like “Oh, but this is great.  This is what you need.  This is 
what you want.”  And that’s not the truth.  That is not what I need and it’s not 
what I want.  And no matter how I try to say that, people don’t want to hear it 
because if I say it out loud then it’s like “I’m failing the black female race because 
I don’t want to be CO SWO.”  But I’ve seen how they treat me as a department 
head.  It only takes a couple of voices whether their accusations are true or false, 
for your career to be over.  And truthfully it’s not worth it.  It’s not worth my sanity.  
It’s not worth my family.  I don’t want to be away from the people I love for 
something that if somebody decides they’re against me that’s it’s over.  I don’t 
know.  That’s probably a pissy thing to say but, to tell you the truth, I’m more 
afraid of somebody who just doesn’t like me could ruin my life with the matter of a 
few comments than failing to stand up for all the black females, being a SWO 
CO. 
When asked to make a general assessment of how Navy men and women get along 
today, Natalie responded: 
I think for the most part people get along pretty well.  It’s just those few 
exceptions that make life so miserable.  And when they’re a person of power they 
can just can destroy the morale of the crew.  But, overall, I think people’s 
perspective and their respect just for human people has gotten so much better.  I 
mean from the time I was an Ensign when I first came into the military to right 
now it is by far, changed.  I would say at least a hundred and twenty degrees.  
We’re not all the way there but it’s almost a hundred and eighty degrees to the 
opposite direction.  And part of the reason why I stayed in as long as I did is 
because things began to change the longer I was in.  I started to see more 
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people being a little bit more open and more honest and more real, and it was 
balanced. 
When I asked her what else her Navy experiences had taught her, she explained 
that she could see racism more obviously.  Since Natalie had described growing up in 
the South I asked her to elaborate.  She explained: 
I have people kind of come up to me and well, they’re making fun of you because 
[black people] have Ebonics and black people are talking Ebonics.  And I was 
like “I’ve never talked Ebonics.  I grew up in Oklahoma.”  I’m a white speaking, 
white-speaking-as-a-black-girl-can-get, you know, so that wasn’t what set this 
person off.  So if they treated me differently it was strictly because I was a black 
female and nothing else because I grew up surrounded by white people.  I spoke 
like a white person.  And it was kind of flooring because somebody asked me like 
“hey, did you ever feel like you were mistreated?” [because she was Black like, 
“yes…. I did.”  And so normal, questions like “did you wear your hair in those 
braids? did you speak like ebonics?”  And I’m like “no.  I didn’t do any of that stuff 
because I wasn’t raised with that mentality or that stuff wasn’t even an option for 
me because it wasn’t how I grew up.  The people I was surrounded by didn’t do 
those things so.  I didn’t have those influences.  And yet those situations still 
occurred.   
Because some people in the Navy have had little to no exposure to people of color prior 
to entering the service, it is likely that what she was describing resulted from insensitive 
whites asking her to speak as the authority for all Black women, or all Blacks, as a 
participant in Jones’ (1999) study had complained of having to do.   
 Xenia, another prior-enlisted LCDR SWO, who had perhaps the most positive 
experience among all my participants, described her impressions of what it was like to 
be an African American woman Surface Warfare Officer in today’s Navy: 
I’ve gotten accustomed, unfortunately, of going to SWO conferences, leadership 
conferences, and whatever and looking around the room and not seeing many 
people that look like me.  And whether it be a female symposium or just a straight 
SWO, and I’ve gone to the Surface Navy Association (SNA) conference in DC 
and being the only one.  Well, I know there are more Black females in the SWO 
community but maybe just not here. But what happens is that little pyramid starts 
to get more and more narrow.  You learn who the others are…women, and 
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minority women.  So for female SWO officers I probably know all their names.  If 
they’re a Captain, Admiral, O-5, whatever, in command – Just do.  You get to 
know them. And for minority female officers you definitely know them because 
there’s so few of you.  And so I know Commander XXXX XXXX, who will be 
turning over command next month of the USS XXXXX.  She’s a Black female.  
She’s the first CO of a guided missile destroyer that’s a Black female. And the 
next lady who will fall in behind her if all the stars align is a lady named XXXX 
XXXXX, who I know, a Caribbean lady, awesome, super-duper nice, got to know 
her.  And she has CRUDES [Cruiser/Destroyer – “sexy” ships that bristle with 
weapons] background and she’ll be the second.  I met, on a couple of occasions, 
Admiral Howard. Actually, before I went to Afghanistan we had a little SWO join-
up – female – get together in Norfolk and she was there, and Admiral Ann 
Phillips was there, and Admiral-select Thebaud and a lot of the Captains and 
stuff, which was just awesome.  It was just females – get together and just chat 
and whatever.  And that’s kind of cool in that they absolutely do care enough to 
want to get together and just impart knowledge, talk, mentor, whatever.  It’s 
different.  It’s different when you’re a female.  I don’t care what no one says, it’s 
different. There’s different expectations placed on you.  They’re looking at you 
different.  They’re looking at you, period!   All the time. 
When I asked her to clarify who it was that was watching, Xenia clarified: 
I say the SWO community.  You step into certain jobs and certain positions and 
people know your name and they know of you.  Your reputation will either 
precede you or not, if you have a good one, that’s great, if not, that’s not great 
because if you don’t, that just kind of hangs out with you.  Even if, as a female, 
you’re now a Captain and you’re post-command and you did something silly as a 
freakin’ Department Head you will hear men, when they mention and speak of 
this Captain, of something she did when she was junior.  Seriously, if we did that 
with all the men, it would be endless. 
I asked Xenia to describe what impact she felt these senior women SWO leaders were 
having on her and other women Surface Warfare Officers. 
Now you have these senior SWO women who are also moms and before that it 
was freakin’ unheard of.  They were single, they looked like dudes, and they 
probably weren’t married.  Michelle Howard201 is married.  Her husband’s a 
retired Marine.  Admiral Phillips is married.  And Admiral Thebaud is married.  
And Captain Mary Jackson, she has kids. These women now are married.  
These women now have kids.  And I think they’re more open and willing to share 
their experiences and challenges and talk to you about things than I think the 
regime before…I remember seeing the pictures of women SWOs and they 
                                            
 
201 The Navy’s first woman 4-star admiral.  She also happens to be African American. 
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looked like men. Now it’s OK – I remember Admiral Phillips “I’m going to wear my 
mascara, yes I am.” And I’m not saying it’s just the whole feminine thing, I’m just 
saying to be a woman, to be a mom, to have the career, it’s OK.  I think they’re 
willing to say now “it’s OK to have all those things, and by the way, it’s different 
for than it is for Bob, and Jim, and David because you’re still managing a 
household and all that and then you’re still coming to work and managing your 
department or your ship or whatever. It is different.  They’re more willing today 
to recognize and speak to the differences than I think before.  And unfortunately, 
which is good for the young junior women coming in now because they can hear 
this conversation and this dialogue throughout their careers.  I didn’t hear none of 
that crap!  [But] as much as I like to boast, and because I’ve been in various 
venues where I’ve had the opportunities to meet these ladies and to talk with 
them and so forth, there’s still many, many who have not seen a female Captain 
or even known of a female that was CO of a ship.   
Xenia then proceeded to share a sadly comical story:   
I’ll tell you a funny… Commander XXXXXX [CO of a Guided Missile destroyer] 
was sharing this with me once.  She said “You know, the Commodore…” 
because the Commodore has 8 or 9 ships, “everytime there is an issue with a 
female Sailor or whatever, they’re contacting me, it doesn’t matter what ship.  It’s 
just like I’m just Mother Hen of the freakin’ squadron or something.” So, you 
know, in true form, men not knowing what to do with said issue – “Let’s give it to 
the female CO.”  So, you become the keeper of all, the fixer of all things female, 
which is stupid. 
I asked Xenia if given the growing number of omen at sea if the men she worked with 
aboard ship were getting more used to serving with women and seeing them as 
competent.   She explained: 
I think there’s an element of them being used to it.  More than 1 in a class, more 
than 1 in a wardroom, 1 on a ship.  I think if someone does harbor those sorts of 
feelings, I’m gonna tell you one thing, they’re not going to freakin’ express it.   
Okay?  There is truly a fear of that, saying the wrong thing, behaving in the 
wrong manner because people are being held accountable more so today than 
ever. So, if they feel that way, they’re not going to tell you.  But I do think, though, 
at least from the ladies that I know that are SWOs now, they don’t feel this need 
to be one of the boys.  They can be whoever the hell they are.  They can be 
themselves.  Be a mom.  Be whatever and still do the daggone job.  You know, 
it’s not like we, women, have been running around trying to prove something.  
We just want to do the job. Qualify as we’re required to qualify and do the job. No 
special considerations or nothing along those lines. 
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In the following section I explore how Navy women of color have responded to the 
challenges they encounter.  
Gender Resistance and Agency Among Navy Women of Color 
Participants in my current research included two senior enlisted and five mid-
grade officer African Americans; two junior officers of Hispanic heritage; and two officers 
of Pacific Island heritage, one junior, one mid-grade.  Neither officer of Hispanic 
heritage self-identified as women of color; both identified as Caucasian.  One was fluent 
in Italian and her olive skin was frequently mistaken as Italian, even though her mom 
was actually from Nicaragua.  The other officer of Hispanic heritage could trace her 
family to Texas when it was still a territory, and their origins before that to Spain.  Both 
officers of Pacific Islander heritage were half Filipina and were often seen by colleagues 
as “unidentifiably exotic.”  That is, they were both frequently asked about their heritage 
but those asking the questions were surprised to find they were of Filipino heritage.  
Both were stationed on the West Coast where Filipinos serving in the Navy are 
prevalent.   
Four out of the five African American officers had begun their Navy careers by 
enlisting.  They became officers using one of the Navy’s many programs for enlisted 
members to earn their commission.  The fact that these women entered the Navy as 
enlisted service members, worked to earn their commissions, and stayed for a career, 
may have influenced the manner in which they chose to address “challenges” related to 
race and gender.  Furthermore, all my African American participants had entered the 
Navy in the late 1980s or early 1990s, which essentially places them all in the same 
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“cohort” of experience with respect to the Navy’s changing policies for women service 
as combatants.  As a result, their early Navy experiences probably mirror some of those 
already documented by Daniels (1994) and Jones (1999) earlier studies as their service 
overlapped with the period in which those studies were conducted.   
Ideally, in addition to including junior enlisted women my participants would have 
come from more than one cohort to capture different experiences and perspectives.  
Hopefully, future research will be able to address this shortcoming in my present data. 
As noted in Chapter 4, I have come to conceptualize resistance as “reactively 
preventative” in nature, consistent with the Miriam-Webster definition; and “agency” as 
“proactively constructive" in nature.  My research, with this admittedly small and 
somewhat homogenous sample, suggests that my African American participants were 
much more likely to deploy strategies of agency rather than resistance as compared to 
their white women shipmates.  I recognize my results may be skewed by my sample 
and by their determination to have successful Navy careers.  
Resistance 
Perhaps due to their encounters with both everyday racism and sexism before 
entering the Navy, women of color were less likely to use resistance as a strategy for 
dealing with perceived unequal treatment.  The decisions of my African American 
participants for when and how to respond to racism and sexism they encountered may 
be influenced by their desire to avoid negative stereotypes of Black women as 
suggested by Hyers (2007).  Most of my participants described acting agentically, but a 
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few described actions that I would classify as reactively preventative in nature.  
Nonetheless, some women did choose to resist, if tactfully.   
Breanna, Surface and Air Warfare-qualified Senior Chief Legalman, explained 
how she handled the CO and XO of her ship checking the quality of her work with 
higher echelon legal personnel when she was a junior petty officer: 
In a nice way, I was talking to my XO about a situation one time and so I said, 
“Are you going to call the ESG to verify what I’ve told you is correct?”  And he 
was like, “What are you talking about?”  I said, “Well, you know LN1 so-and-so 
tells me that you call over there quite often, not for sure why you all call over 
there. You know I’m talking with them, you know I would never give you bad 
information, not knowingly and I said I’m pretty savvy…”  So that particular LN1 
[at the ESG] says later, “Oh, I notice they don’t call quite as often, in fact they’ve 
pretty much stopped.”  
She attributed this particular surveillance to her race rather than the combination of her 
race and gender because she observed that white women who had previously held this 
position had not been subject to similar scrutiny.  This assessment may not be entirely 
accurate however, due to the possibility that the white women she knew of had been 
working for a different CO and/or XO as tours in those positions are relatively short (as 
few as 18 months) compared to enlisted tours aboard ship (up to 4 or 5 years). 
Regardless, it was her impression that her race made a difference.  
 Breanna described how she comported herself in a way that was generally at 
odd with the expectations of male Sailors and how she insisted they change their 
behavior in her presence: 
A warfare qualified chief is supposed to be tough, you know as far as female.  
She’s supposed to be tough, no nonsense. She’s a person who will get in your 
face and she’s the curser, she’s the drinker.  I don’t curse, I don’t drink and so I 
often have had junior people come when it’s time for me to discipline or [counsel] 
them and they’ll say, “Oh, I really thought you were just going to curse me out, I 
didn’t expect you to be so calm.” And I said, “Why?”  “Well, all the other female 
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chiefs that are wearing pins are screaming and hollering and smoking and 
drinking and going off” and I said “I just don’t think that you can get far doing that.  
That’s not me.  Out here at 32nd Street (the main base for ships in San Diego) 
every other word that came out their mouth was a curse word.  They would come 
in my office, my Leading Petty Officers (LPOs) and I’m the chief (she was more 
senior) and they’d come in “blankety” blank isn’t here, but they’re “blankety”blank, 
blah, blah, blah” and I would just look at them and say, “You know what? You 
need to come up with some new language because I find that very offensive and 
if you’re saying that to me, I could just imaging how your junior folks are taking it.  
There’s no way they can think that you approachable, not talking like that, not in 
today’s Navy.  Maybe in 1988’s Navy, but in today’s Navy that is not appreciated 
at all and I don’t think that you’re a big tough guy because you know how to 
curse and scream and this chief doesn’t appreciate it and they would just go, 
“hmm…” They changed, slowly changed and I even said it to a couple of the 
younger guys… well, the cursing, unpolished guys, “I don’t appreciate that talk” 
and they would go “well, you’re different than any chief I’ve ever had before” and 
I would go, “how so?” and they were just like ”well…” and I’d say “is it because 
I’m a female, is it because I’m a girl?” because these were the machinist mates 
and I knew that that was one of the reasons…I had two of them say, well, yeah, 
I’ve never had a female supervisor, never, ever and I definitely haven’t had 
anyone that’s going to… that doesn’t scream and holler and curse and 
understand that ever other word that comes out of my mouth…, you know this 
cursing is just part of our environment.  I said, “it’s not part of my work 
environment and then since I’m the chief, you need to conform to my work 
environment, you know and so slowly they would come around, slowly and those 
same guys [when they were ready to transfer], they would say, “you know what, 
you were the best freaking chief I’ve ever had and I have learned how to be a 
person, not just a machinist mate, but I’ve learned how to be a professional and, 
you know they would say how their wives or their girlfriends appreciated it. 
Early in her career, Breanna confronted her male shipmates over their sexist behavior:   
Just the same as I tell guys now, “don’t say or do anything that you wouldn’t say 
or do in front of your mom.”  I would tell the guys, “I wonder what your wife would 
say if she knew you were sitting up here with these kind of pictures, I wonder 
what your mom would say … I would say that kind of stuff.  I’d get cursed out, but 
trust me that behavior that they had in the shop…they would stop it.  They would 
take down pictures and they were straight up naked pictures. 
I asked her if the guys to whom she directed these comments perceived them as a 
threat to inform their wives.  She admitted she thought they did, but she denied that was 
her intention.  Rather, Breanna said, she was just “being their conscience.”   
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Some women of color reacted to negative gender stereotypes using the same 
“be true to yourself” philosophy discussed in Chapter Four, but women of color 
employed a different strategy.  Rather than staying true to self by doing gender “a la 
carte,” African American women deployed subtle femininity.  For example, when I asked 
Felicia, the LCDR who had served six years as an enlisted Electronics Technician, how 
she balanced femininity against her reputation as a warfighter, she described how she 
presented herself in uniform: 
I put my hair up.  I wear makeup.  Usually I do my nails but my nails are really 
short so I don’t want to draw attention to them so I keep them short.  My toes are 
done.  My legs are shaved.  When I go out on liberty, I dress like a girl, my hair is 
down.  I’m wearing a dress or a skirt or sandals, absolutely.  I’m a very girly girl.  I 
love clothes; I have a ridiculously large closet.  And about 100 pair of shoes. My 
parents raised me that way.  It [was] always “be comfortable in your own skin,” 
basically.  
Moreover, Felicia described her overall philosophy for success in the Navy as: 
Just being true to yourself.  As cliché as that sounds.  Always be true to yourself.  
Because that’s the person you have to live with.  No matter how senior you are, 
no matter how much you’ve accomplished or not, the person who knows you, is 
you.  That’s it.  And if you can’t live with you, then you failed.  The things that I’ve 
done and been true to myself, I never remember them, not the details.  So be 
true to yourself and you find peace.  And you can sleep at night.  And you’re true 
to yourself and you do the right things, if that’s what being true to yourself is.  
And if being true to yourself is doing horrible things to people then, I guess, you 
go ahead and do that.  And if you can sleep at night then “hey, you’ve been true 
to yourself.”  But me, being true to myself is doing the right thing.  And that, to 
me, will do a couple of things.  It allows me to sleep at night.  It allows me to 
always look forward, not backwards.  And when I’m looking backwards, I’m 
looking backwards with a smile not with this “Crap, I really screwed that one up.”  
And it will allow you to usually gain a high degree of respect from your folks.  
Because people know instinctively when you’re doing the wrong, making the 
wrong decision they know.  They just know.  And most people can see when 
that’s about to blow up in your face.  Especially because our world is very open 
… Just from my upbringing in general, my world is about integrity.  My world is 
about being fair. 
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Leigh, a LDCR SWO with prior-enlisted in another service, when asked how she 
negotiated society’s requirements for being a woman, with those required of a warrior, 
echoed the philosophy of being true to self:   
Well I think with anything, those stereotypes, they’re just stereotypes, I mean 
because I’ve faced stereotypes my whole life, so that part of it really didn’t bother 
me because I didn’t really falling into either one of those categories, so I just was 
myself and I didn’t have any issues, you know?  I didn’t have any issues.  I think 
it’s all about how you carry yourself.  If you are respectful of others, you respect 
yourself, and you abide by the guidelines, you do the best that you can and if you 
have issues, you get help.  I just was myself.  I did my job.  I studied hard.  I 
worked hard.  I gave 110 percent. 
Speaking specifically about her feminine practices, Leigh elaborated:  
Some women would spray down [with perfume] and you can smell them down 
the p[assage]-way and around the hall and I personally do not do that.  I use 
pretty lotion because it helped me keep in touch, I guess, with the feminine 
quality and because I like Bath & Body Works, but if they had something else at 
the ship store, and I ran out, I would use whatever they had.  So there’s not 
anything really I guess to say that as a woman you can’t wear makeup or use 
perfume, that kind of thing. 
Natalie, the LCDR SWO who had formerly been nuclear qualified, explained how 
she ultimately dealt with disrespect borne of sexism and racism from her first division 
Master Chief: 
I remember because I was pretty quiet when I first joined the military.  I wasn’t … 
I’ve never been a big alpha personality.  And being a reactor officer with our job 
being so critical and the lives of the people around you being, literally, in your 
hands at times, I kind of came to a point where I realized that that was 
unacceptable in this field.  And I had to change it in order for people to give me 
the respect I both needed and deserved for my position.  And you know, usually 
what comes of that is you get labeled.  And to give you an example, I apologize 
for my cursing, is you get labeled, like ‘bitch in a box’, because we have a control 
space that we call ‘the box.’  And that’s what they would call me because I just 
wouldn’t take crap anymore.  I wouldn’t let people walk over me.  I wouldn’t let 
the Master Chief do stuff [be openly contemptuous] like that to me, especially in 
front of my guys, anymore.  I just was like this is unacceptable and so be it.  And 
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so unfortunately, at least that’s what I learned from the first tour, from my first 
tour.  And I carried that knowledge with me.   
After several challenging tours, a shortened period of short duty, and under pressure 
from her detailer202 to become a highly visible African American SWO XO/CO, Natalie is 
eager to start her family.  In contrast to the system described by white women SWOs 
that is accommodating of women’s need for “work/life balance,” she cannot seem to get 
anyone in the Navy establishment to take seriously her desire to have children even as 
her biological window for doing so is getting smaller.  She is being sent back to sea 
soon.  When I asked Natalie if she ever felt the need to push back against the 
establishment, she confessed: 
Well I haven’t done anything outrageous to push back but I want to.  I mean I’m 
thirty five.  I have put, really, my life on hold, my family on hold because of the 
Navy’s expectations.  And I’m supposed to get 4 years straight of shore duty.  I 
got three years and sent back to sea.  And I wish I could put having babies on 
hold.  I wish my body is going to be capable of having babies for the next 20 
years, but that’s not realistic.  And so there’s going to be a point soon here in the 
next few years that I will say “I know I’m on sea duty.  I know about the rules but 
I’m pregnant.  I can’t do anything about it and I’m not going to fight with you over 
it because Mother Nature, you know, I’m running out of time.”  If I don’t do it now 
I won’t have kids and that’s not an acceptable loss for me, it’s not an acceptable 
loss.  If the Navy’s not willing to work with that then it’s not.  I told my boss just a 
little while ago.  He said “Well, what about the sabbatical program?”  And I’m like, 
you know, “What?”  That’s BS.  They say that there is no career impact, but I 
don’t believe it.  I don’t know a single SWO woman who has gotten that, and not 
been negatively impacted.  So there’s going to be a point, I’ve never said that 
before in the last thirteen years but there’s going to be a point in the next five 
years where I just say my family’s coming first.  And if I find that we’re pregnant, 
                                            
 
202 Navy detailers help officer and enlisted personnel find their next job and give career advice regarding 
assignments.  When retention is low, Sailors have more bargaining power and detailers have to work 
harder to please their constituents in terms of where and what the Sailor’s next job will be.  For example, 
a Surface Warfare Officer stationed in Norfolk, VA might tell the detailer that unless his/her next job is in 
Hawaii he/she will submit his/her resignation letter.  If the Navy needs to keep that Sailor, the detailer will 
do their best to get that Sailor to Hawaii.  If retention rates are high, a Sailor who wants to stay in the 
Navy has less bargaining power with the detailer.  A Sailor who wants his/her next assignment to be in 
Hawaii but is unwilling to resign if he/she does not get that, may find the detailer only offers him/her three 
bad jobs or bad locations because no one will willingly take those assignments.  The Sailor will then be 
forced to select the one they decide is the least bad among several poor alternatives. 
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we’re pregnant then I don’t care what my orders say, so.  It’s no longer me 
picking the next job so that I can actually plan.  It’s the navy picking my job so 
that they can do what they think is best for my career (and for the Navy).  And 
that’s not my priority.  My priority is I want to have kids and I wanted to do it when 
I was on shore duty.  But if they’re going to force me to go back out to sea early 
and force me to go in an XO job at sea then I’m just going to get pregnant when it 
happens and then we’ll deal with it then. 
For a woman SWO, adopting this attitude is somewhat akin to mutiny because of 
the pressure women officers are under both to set the example for juniors and to not 
adversely impact their ships with unplanned, inconvenient (to the ship) pregnancies. For 
a woman SWO, letting the pregnancy chips fall where they may is the ultimate act of 
gender resistance.  Fortunately, they cannot kick her out for getting pregnant and she 
will be very close to qualifying for retirement with twenty years of service.  She clearly 
sees that she holds some of the power in this situation. 
 Xenia, another LCDR SWO, described how resistance to her presence made her 
more resilient and determined to succeed to prove her male shipmates wrong: 
I worked with my share of dinosaurs, don’t get me wrong, particularly back then 
when I was enlisted.  I remember this old, crusty chief who was like “you’re not 
working on that ESWS [Enlisted Surface Warfare Specialty] stuff on MY time.  
You do that on your own freakin’ time.” Because he didn’t have it and it wasn’t 
required then and it wasn’t all that popular to go do, so I’d get up at 1, 2 in the 
morning and go down and do the thing on my own. And he was adamant about 
that.  But, I guess if every single time someone snarled or said something nasty 
or something that they at least saw as degrading or whatever, if I took hold of 
that and owned it, I would have never have made freakin’ two steps forward. So, 
to me, it was just a motivator to say “up yours, I’m going to be the only freakin’ 
DP [data processing technician] in this division to have my ESWS pin. So there.”  
Because I did, I worked for a fair number of those dinosaurs – they didn’t want to 
have nothing to do with no freakin’ females doing anything.  It was a motivator, 
quite honestly.  It was an absolute motivator because, I’m gonna tell ya, when I 
decided to put in, number 1, the package I had a chief tell me “why the hell do 
you want to do that?  Why do you want to be a damn officer?  Oh, so you don’t 
want to be a chief?  You don’t think you’re good enough to be a chief? Oh, so 
you think you’re going to be an officer.  Yeah, that’s a waste of time.”  “Yeah!  
Absolutely.  OK, Roger that.  Thank you for sharing.”  But I can’t say enough 
about just having the sense of mind, because I was a little bit older, to kinda have 
my own mind and make up my own mind.  I think if I was anyone else and maybe 
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you didn’t have a personality that would say “Hey, up yours.  I’m going to do what 
I need to do.”  You could have been defeated.  And I mean I think about the 
number of people, or women, that probably were defeated because someone 
told them they couldn’t do something or someone told them they suck at it. Or 
“Hey, you got to find another field. SWO ain’t it: you can’t drive a ship.” You 
know?  
When asked if she felt that she had truly experienced equal opportunity in the 
Navy, Xenia responded: 
I do actually.  I do actually. I would be hard-pressed to say no because 
everything that I have pushed for or worked for I’ve been able to achieve. And 
there has not been, since I’ve been in the Navy, and I’m not talking the whole 
ROTC scholarship thing, any barriers or anything that has prohibited me from 
moving forward that I could not influence change in.  I mean, it’s as simple as 
that. I’ve taken advantage of the opportunities that are there, whether they be 
programs, mentoring, networking, reaching out to folks, and I’m not just saying 
mentoring in the Navy, but in other services as well, but just kind of using the 
entire network if you would, but I believe that I have been justly treated since I’ve 
been in the Navy. I really do. 
It was obvious she loved being a Surface Warfare Officer, and I asked Xenia why she 
did love it and why she wanted to stay after describing the Surface Navy in a way that 
made it sound like it’s not the greatest place to be.  She explained:  
Because I can, and because maybe, maybe, maybe I’ll influence someone else 
to come along and stay because … I mean, just because men have decided that 
our community is the “hardest, most gut-wrenching, that there’s nothing harder 
than being a SWO and serving at sea” and all this kind of stuff.  Just because 
they have decided all this, does that mean we have to buy into all that?  I mean if 
you keep it that way, just like SPEC WARFARE, they said the same thing about 
women on submarines, “Women can’t do it!”  Wow, women are nuclear trained 
too and they’re doing it now.  So [guys have built up this big myth] to keep it 
exclusive. And having a few [women and minorities] out there, it’s still exclusive. 
It’s their club.  It’s their thing.  
Because her response did not quite square with her claims of having experienced equal  
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opportunity, I challenged her again on that issue.  She explained: 
I have [experienced equal opportunity]!  I have!  It’s just, I mean I say all that but 
I’m sure there are other people that look like me that haven’t.  
Xenia also discussed how she intentionally chose to present herself as feminine 
in uniform: 
In uniform, you know, I’m always under this thing where #1, you should be within 
standards, and I know people are always paying attention to you because they 
are, so I always make sure I’m within standards.  But I have a feminine 
approach, a feminine look to myself. Always.  Hair nice. Nails manicured.  Always 
wear my earrings always, always.  I wore my earrings non-stop and I still got 
called “Sir” on the carrier at least once a day. I do that intentionally.  I do that 
intentionally.  I do NOT want to be called “sir,” okay?  And I don’t think I look like 
a man.  So, because I think they’re so used to seeing men and they move quickly 
by, it’s just like “Good Morning, Sir.”  Holy Crap!  [I present myself as feminine] to 
remind them that I am a woman, and that I am a feminine woman. I’m not a 
manly woman.  And just because I’m in the military and I wear these daggone 
boots and this ugly uniform does not mean that I’m not a woman. Because you 
can be the complete opposite.  That’s just me because I like being a woman. I 
want to be clear that I can be a woman and I can have mascara on and my 
freakin’ nails done and I want to be taken as seriously as the next person. Period!  
I don’t change that up for nobody!  And I love dressing up, so when it’s time to do 
like wardroom functions and we can wear civilian clothes, Oh my goodness!  I’m 
not talking about wearing a freakin’ ball gown, but you know what I’m sayin’.  I 
like to look nice.  It cracks me up when they see you when you’re a little fixed up. 
“Wow, I didn’t recognize you with your hair down!”  Like, “Yeah, I’m a woman.  I 
have a husband.  There’s some normal things that we do.”  Yeah, women 
typically look very different.  I absolutely, I just do, because I’ve been wearing the 
uniform for so long and what not, but I always make sure that it’s pristine, that it 
looks sharp, and I love wearing khakis because they tend to make you look like 
you have a freakin’ shape.  Bless my friend, Jeanne-Marie who was integral in 
having that new shirt added – the poly-wool khaki top that we do not have to 
tuck.  I hate to tuck.  I don’t think women look good tucking.  It’s [a fitted 
overblouse uniform shirt] like all the other services. The Navy was the only 
service where the women still had to tuck. OK?  All women don’t look good 
tuckin.’  Unless you’re like a size 2, it’s horrid.  When that top came out, I went 
out and bought 5. I’m tall and slim and I don’t have a lot of hips and stuff, but it 
kind of gives you a little shape.  And I’m like “yeah, I’m a woman!”  Hey, wow!  
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Agency 
 The African American women who participated in my study clearly had made the 
decision to have successful Navy careers.  Because of the negative stereotypes of the 
“angry” or “militant” Black woman, I believe the women in my study decided to 
disconfirm that stereotype by focusing instead on bringing about change through 
proactive, productive means.   
Persistence in the Face of Isolation and Adversity 
Marion, an African American Command Master Chief (CMC), related the 
circumstances surrounding her first tour as a CMC:  
My first tour as command master chief was aboard a cruiser.  Well, I’m going on 
this ship where I knew nothing about combat systems.  That’s not my world.  And 
all these smart people, FC’s, ET’s and so forth like that and the true surface 
warfare world that as a supply type person I had no idea about.  But here I am:  a 
female, the only female in this chief’s mess of thirty men who, they’re going to 
have to believe in me and respect me enough so that when I tell them this is 
what you need to carry out and so on and so forth that they do it and they want to 
do it and they want to do a good job for me and the CO.  And I was afraid, of 
course, you could imagine, because here I am African American and a female 
going to this cruiser.  And they send CO’s to cruisers who they have plans that 
[they’re] going to be an admiral some day.   At least that’s the plan.  So my fear 
was this.  Okay I’m a female.  I have no combat systems and all that background.  
Then I’m African American.  He’s white.  He’s affluent.  He’s been a White House 
Fellow.  He went from the Naval Academy.  I mean, he just had all of this…  And 
I’m like, “Oh, my, God.  He’s not going to like me.  This is going to be hard and 
it’s very important that [we] have a great relationship and he believes in me so 
that I can get there.  And it turns out [that] he and I and his wife are friends to this 
day.  Because he was one of those people that despite the fact that he had so 
much to be stuck up about, he wasn’t.  He was one of those, and his wife, were 
those people who loved a success story.  And at his change of command he 
talked about me: “Hey, look at two people from two different worlds, me from this 
background, and Command Master Chief from a background where she was 
born of a sixteen year old mother, a nineteen year old father, welfare, drugs, 
coming up in the Bronx, poor, this, that and the other and all this kind of stuff.  
And look what we did together.  Don’t give up on people and there’s no excuses 
for any of you,” so that kind of thing.  It was just a great relationship and he never 
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butted in my business as to how I was running the [Chiefs’] mess.  He just kind of 
just let me go.  And it just worked out beautifully. 
Marion discussed the approach she took to fitting in so that she could be effective at her 
job, especially when she began serving in more operational commands as Command 
Master Chief: 
One of the things I learned is that you have to have confidence in yourself and 
really, really believe that “hey, I do belong here.” Self worth and self esteem go a 
long way.  Because when you believe in yourself and you have love for yourself, 
then you can feel that way about other people.  The other biggest thing I think too 
that worked with me is to make people immediately comfortable around me.  
Because I know you’ve heard about the [stereotype of the] angry black women.  
So I want to make sure that [others know] that that’s not me.  She can come out 
when she needs to, but that’s not how I operate.  That’s not my SOP [standard 
operating procedure].  I think that’s why all these middle aged white males and all 
that kind of stuff have been able to work with me well and they like me and I’m 
one of them and all that and just like put their guard down and are really, really 
comfortable.  
Although in the course of the interview Marion had earlier described some of the 
challenges of working in a rating dominated by Filipino men as a Black woman, when 
asked if race had shaped her Navy experience she denied that it had, explaining: 
I didn’t allow it.  I could have let it affect me, but I didn’t because I always came 
into something that “I’m as good as you.”  I didn’t come into it like “oh, I’m 
black.”… I always came into it like “Diversity is everything.  It’s great,” and with 
the confidence that I belong here just like you do.   
Although Marion did allow that while the Navy had made progress, it still had a ways to 
go: 
I’ll give you an example.  There’s about seven hundred and fifty, eight hundred 
Command Master Chiefs throughout the whole Navy, male and female.  And of 
that number when I left maybe only sixty or seventy were female.  And of those 
fifty or seventy female command master chiefs out of the eight hundred only six 
were black, and I was one of them. 
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But, she was quick to attribute the low numbers of African American women and other 
minorities in this group to issues other than opportunity: 
The numbers [for other minorities] are low too but, yeah, like really, really low for 
the African American female.  And I’m not saying it’s because they’re not given 
an opportunity.  You [have to] apply to be a Command Master Chief but a lot of 
them don’t want to.  Yeah, I think that’s the main reason why there isn’t [more 
minorities].  Just like, male or female, you hardly ever see a Filipino Command 
Master Chief. 
 Natalie, the formerly nuclear-qualified LCDR SWO, described some of the 
challenges she has encountered in the Navy: 
I went through pretty awful jobs.  And the first one was that tour on board the 
carrier when I was a reactor person.  Unfortunately that job was the first time I 
really felt racism and sexism.  It was pretty blatant.  And that was so rare for me 
because I just didn’t live in an area where that was predominant, that what 
happened I wasn’t really sure that that’s what was going on.  But it made it very 
hard for me to do my job because I wasn’t getting a lot of support with my chain 
of command.  On that ship, that first ship that I had, my chief, because normally 
in a department you’ll have your Department Head, your Division Officer, and 
your Chief.  My chief was very senior.  He was actually a master chief.  And 
there were times when he wouldn’t speak to me at all or when I would go up to 
him and say “Hey.  Can I talk to you for a second?”  He would push the first 
classes in front of me and say “Go talk to the DIVO.”  And this was my first ship.  
This is the first time I’ve experienced the Navy in real life and that was it.  And so 
let’s just say it turned me off quite a bit to what my expectations were of both the 
chief’s mess and what I should expect as an officer.  And at the same time I had 
a department head that was what we call a screamer.  A screamer is one of 
those people that if something doesn’t go the way they want it to go their 
immediate reaction is like murder, like earthquake just happened, top of the 
lungs. And there was no in-between.  There was no balance.  And it was really 
hard to make mistakes and then learn from them and move on because when 
you’re a junior you just don’t know a lot of answers from that, and so it really put 
a bad taste of the military in my mouth what I should expect as being a female.  
But anyway so that was my first, worst experience.  I was very much ready to 
leave that ship.  And my last one was actually pretty recent.  It was only a few 
years ago on one of the destroyers I was on board.  I really kind of felt like it was 
a ‘good old boys’ system even though I was one of the most  senior people on 
board.  I was being ostracized.  I mean I wasn’t allowed to do things that even 
junior people were doing.  And I had to do two and three times more and explain 
more just to get the same level of credit, which I never got.  It was very frustrating 
because I know my capabilities.  I know what I’m capable of and capable of 
bringing to the fold and that’s a lot.  I would like to do more if I could see that 
there were benefits to me doing it for the ship.  And being shut out of all of that 
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was pretty painful.  And I was, truthfully, I was ready to leave that’s just how I 
walked away from it.  It was a very frustrating experience as a leadership 
because I was shut out of that inner circle.   
Natalie had confidently attributed her troubles with her Division Master Chief onboard a 
carrier earlier in her career to both racism and sexism.  When I asked her if she thought 
they were both in play aboard the Destroyer, on which she felt ostracized, she 
responded: 
I do.  I mean, I definitely think that was a perspective.  I think that was one of the 
reasons.  I hate to label it that because there are just ignorant people in the 
world.  And there’s some ignorant people with a lot of power that have the ability 
to persuade others to do things they probably wouldn’t always have done.  And 
on a smaller ship, it’s a pretty tight-knit community and you don’t want to be on 
the outer circle because life can get pretty miserable if you’re out there.  So if 
there’s only five department heads, and you’re out to sea, then literally you don’t 
want to be the odd man out.  And it’s that way with the smaller ships.  They have 
such smaller wardrooms that if somebody has a beef with somebody and they 
happen to be in that inner circle they can make somebody’s life miserable.  And 
in a big deck you can have that but there are so many people that you can 
usually find some kind of solace.  You really can.  You can get out and you get 
away from them, far enough that you can have some down time, some de-stress 
time.  And, it’s not the same on a small boy.  On a small boy you’re surrounded 
by it day in, day out.  You eat, sleep, breathe … whatever stress you’re in, that’s 
what you’re in.  [And if it’s a good environment, it’s a good environment.  And if 
it’s a bad environment, it’s a terrible environment.]  It’s toxic.  It’s toxic.  I’ve seen 
a lot of people who are in those kinds of environments suffer from stress.  They 
get sick.  Obviously, people get sick, ulcers, I mean, you see people just crumble, 
people that are more than effective, talented, knowledgeable people that are just 
crushed if they get on the outer circle.  And it’s so hard because people use 
policy to be that explanation as to why people didn’t do something.  But a lot of 
times, unfortunately, I think people are just in that outer circle and nobody’s 
willing to step up and help them.  Nobody’s willing to step up and go, “Let me 
teach you this.”  And I saw that.  On the ship, that second ship that I talked about 
I really saw other females struggling because they were on the outs.  Nobody 
wanted to just pull them aside.  I had one officer, female, who was struggling to 
get her SWO qualification.  And again, I’m combat systems, right?  So I make 
sure that I’ve taught them that requisite knowledge that they need for combat 
systems.  But I walk up to her and I’m like, “Has anybody ever walked you 
through the navigation like if we’re pulling into port and you’re briefing the 
navigation plan? Have you ever looked at a chart and do you really understand 
what you’re reading?  Or are you just reading the [briefing] cards?  She’s like 
“No.  Nobody’s ever taught me.”  I’m like “nobody’s ever taught you?  Like to be 
able to read a turn bearing?” So, as the Combat Systems Officer, I had to sit 
down with her with a chart, with a ruler and talk them through like simple things 
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that I’m like “Something’s broken if the combat systems officer is the one pulling 
people aside and doing a one on one on bridge watch standing, on navigation 
capabilities.”  Even when I made comments about it and I brought it up to the 
chain of command that there are issues and that we’re failing these Sailors, it 
[got] pushed aside.  And I don’t know what to say.  I really, when I address it and 
I bring it up to their attention and yet they do nothing.  My hands are tied because 
then I know my voice means nothing.   
Natalie was isolated both as the only woman Department Head and the only 
African American Department Head.  The only other African American in khakis (i.e., 
Officer or Chief Petty Officer) was the Command Master Chief.  Based on her seniority, 
Natalie should have been the ship’s Senior Watch Officer.  However:  
The senior watch officer, which normally is the most senior department head, 
which would have been me.  But I wasn’t doing that job.  It was given to one of 
the most junior officers, who I thought, and I could still be biased, who was in that 
inner circle.  I mean, even though there were problems with the watch, even 
though there were unqualified people standing watch, and people kept coming to 
me and asking me to make changes and fix stuff.  I’m like “You have to address 
the person who’s in the job.”  And neither one of those things were brought up to 
the CO and the command and XO.  None of those things were every addressed.  
It was all, “Whatever…”  You know it was all, “Hey …?”  And it’s just a biggest 
fear, being a female or being a black or whatever, if you bring a problem to the 
attention of the people that should fix it they always fall back to that, “Oh, well, 
they’re just complaining” instead of looking at the problem and looking at it for the 
problem that it is regardless of who brings it to you.  But it never changed.  
Nothing every changed. 
It turned out that the previous Combat Systems Officer on this ship had also 
been an African American woman and she had been fired from the job.  I asked Natalie 
if the African American woman Command Master Chief was able to work with this group 
effectively. Natalie explained: 
No.  It was unfortunate.  It was very unfortunate on that ship because, in my 
perspective, I thought she was pretty good.  Like everybody has their faults and 
have areas where they need to grow, but I felt like she was kind of in that same 
boat with me.  She was in the outer circle.  Her chiefs loved her, her mess loved 
her, but yet, she couldn’t accomplish the jobs she needed to do because her 
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hands were being tied, I mean. She was the only person I could really talk to 
while I was on board that ship.  Everybody else I didn’t trust, nobody. 
Natalie also related trying to keep the Command Master Chief informed of the progress 
of a humanitarian transfer package for one of her Sailors, a perfectly logical and 
appropriated action.  She was counseled by the XO for involving the Command Master 
Chief.  She described her reaction to this chain of events: 
I was floored, like “I can’t believe this is happening.”  But you know what?  At that 
point I knew how far out of the inner circle I was that this was occurring and that it 
was just, I don’t know what to say.  I mean I was kind of like I don’t know what to 
say.  “Roger.  Roger that” and just kind of press on.  But it was just one of those 
things where there were so many bad things lined up in a row that there were no 
success.  And there was no opportunity for success …. for me, for Command 
Master Chief, for the other female officers that were on board that were 
struggling and needed the help and weren’t being provided it.  I just, I almost felt 
guilty.  I did.  I felt guilty for doing everything I could to leave that ship as soon as 
possible but that’s where I was.   
Ultimately, upon reflection, she concluded that this ship and this wardroom had a 
problem working with African American women.  She was mystified that she hadn’t 
figured it out sooner, given her experiences, those of the Command Master Chief, and 
the previous Combat Systems Officer.  
Xenia, a prior-enlisted LCDR SWO, described what she encountered and how 
she succeeded during her first Division Officer assignment in 1999, when women had 
been assigned to some but not all combatants for about five years: 
[I] checked on board, [I’m] in engineering.   Engineering is predominantly male, 
so my chief, my whole [chain of command] everyone are all male, and mostly all 
white male. Like I said, you’ve got the spit cups, the chew … so shiny, brand 
new officer. So, I’m black and female and tall, I’m not iddy-biddy.  I don’t look like 
some little girl.  So immediately, in my mind, immediately you’re an outsider…so 
that was a bit challenging, but I think had I not had the sort of personality that I 
had I could have easily failed. OK?  I could have easily failed, because they 
weren’t trying to help me.  So the challenges I faced were “who are you, you 
don’t know anything, you’re an ensign, you’re not part of our good old boy team 
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down here in engineering.”  OK?  We would have Division Officer call in the 
morning and the chief would go off with the division and have call and you 
wouldn’t know where it is, and they wouldn’t tell you and then you’d show up and 
it was over.  It was me having to forcefully insert myself into the division.  At the 
same time, as a SWO you have multiple things you do, one of them is your 
watchstanding, your qualifications and all that business, and then learning how to 
run a division.  And you have the straight cowboy SWO COs, XOs.  You know 
what I mean. “This is my little island and I run it as I may” and so there’s just 
testosterone everywhere. It is just very male.  [she gives a manly roar] They say 
what they want.  They do what they want. So that whole environment.  And I 
said, “Well, OK.”  First I had to figure out how to insert myself down there in 
engineering and so I think – I’m not even kidding you – being tall helped me 
because it’s one thing for someone to talk to you and look down to you.  It’s 
another thing for someone to talk to you and maybe have to look up to you 
slightly, or look you in the freakin eye.  So I grew up, you know, brothers, male, 
father – the very dominant role.  And it wasn’t a mean, bitchy thing, but it was 
very directive.  Like, I took on that kind of “Roger Chief, but I’m the division 
officer.  We’re going to sit down and we’re going to talk about these things.  
You’re going to explain it to me. And then we’re going to do this.” And so … and 
also what helped me – I wasn’t 19 or 21 years old.  Mind you I was a little bit 
older. I was commissioned before my 31st birthday.  Shiny new ensign, 31 years 
old. At that point, I’d been enlisted. I had worked for a chief, done all that 
business, gone through school, had met some friends, some mentors, some 
people along the way and so I show up here after all of that and right …You’re 
not going to pull the wool over my eyes. I wasn’t your typical ensign.  Had I been, 
I would have probably failed.  So, I have this thirst for knowledge – always have; 
always will.  To get down there – I’m not afraid to get greasy or to get dirty but I 
do understand the role of an officer and I’m not down there fixing crap.  You’re 
explaining things to me, and so on and so forth. So I understood that dynamic 
there.  But one of the things I think I had to my benefit is the CO of the ship took 
a liking to me. And I think he took a liking to me because you know at that 
particular time when you’re qualifying and just your sense of presence on the 
bridge and your ability to ascertain things, and answer questions quickly and to 
make good tight decisions – they’re all over that. So what happens on a small 
boy [smaller ship] which you probably well know is you get a reputation for being 
a good watchstander and all these sorts of things, and you’re knocking out your 
quals.  You’re doing these things.  That kind of resonates throughout the ship 
and then people, they just kind of get on board.  And so I end up, frankly, having 
a really good relationship with my chief and the new chief came and the 
engineers down there, and really, really … but it was tough.  But I actually kind of 
worked my way in.  And you know we’re all about the technical piece, sure, but 
we’re also about relationships and we’re about communication. And all them men 
down there, a bunch of knuckleheads, and yeah they can fix stuff and whatever, 
but that’s about where it begins and ends.  “Care and feeding” they just know 
nothing about.  Taking care of Sailors, you know they just don’t get that stuff, so 
then you bring that element because I was the only female division officer in 
engineering.  And so it just kind of grew from there and then I had another CO, 
the COs were awesome.  I had some great COs and a CO came on board and 
asked me if I would extend and do my second DIVO tour on there and they were 
getting ready for another deployment, stay on board and be his navigator and I 
said “well it doesn’t make sense for me to transfer and go and learn something all 
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from scratch.  I know this ship like the back of my hand. Sure.”  So I ended up 
doing all my division officer tours on that DDG. 
Xenia described another incident that could have been very devastating to both her self-
esteem and career: 
So my very first bridge experience, fresh out of the NROTC program, unlike 
Midshipman at the Academy and all that crap, we didn’t learn no daggone ship 
driving.  We didn’t do none of that.  We didn’t do NONE of that.   As officer 
candidates we didn’t go out on little YP (yard patrol) boats like they did at the 
Academy and learn the conning commands and all of that. When I graduated 
from Old Dominion, SWOS (Surface Warfare Officer’s School)203 was backed up.  
So, I graduated in June, my SWOS convening date wasn’t until November.  So I 
asked the CO of my NROTC unit if I could go to my ship TDY [temporary duty] 
until SWOS [started] because I had never been on a destroyer before, and I 
thought it would be a great learning opportunity.  Well, unbeknownst to me, 
Ensigns have never shown up on the ship having not gone to SWOS.  So, they 
took me as a brand new ensign checking on board as if I had been through 
SWOS.  Gave me a division.  Put me to work.  Put me on the watchbill.  “Get 
moving.”  And so it was a firehose, crash course in all things JO (junior officer) 
SWO. That leads to my whole first experience on the bridge conning 
[maneuvering the ship].  So, I get on board the ship and we’re getting underway 
in a couple of days, going out for COMPTUEX (Composite Training Unit 
Exercise)204 and I am the conning officer on the bridge when I didn’t even know 
the freakin’ commands.  You want to talk embarrassing?  You want to talk “turn 
right?  Speed up?” and the OOD (Officer of the Deck)205 about to climb down my 
throat and choke me and getting off that watch and feeling about 2 inches tall 
and going to my stateroom and saying “I’m not coming out until I learn every 
conning command.”  They just thought well, you’re a brand new Ensign.  [They 
assumed I’d learned] Just like “Academy midshipmen learn it.” I didn’t go to the 
Academy.  I came from up the street at Old Dominion.  And we didn’t learn NO 
damn conning commands.  I’m not kidding you.  I’m not kidding you. I learned 
                                            
 
203 Surface Warfare Officer’s School used to be an approximately 6 month long school that was designed 
to teach newly commissioned Ensigns all the basics they needed to know as Division Officers aboard 
ship.  Over the past decade and one-half that Navy has gotten rid of the formal school in favor of self-
paced computer based education.  After complaints that new Division Officers were not as capable as 
their former SWOS trained counterparts, the Navy once again modified initial entry training for SWOs.  In 
October 2012 the Navy instituted an 8 week “Basic Division Officer Course.”  Some participants in this 
study attended the 6 month SWOS before it was ended; others did not, resulting in an uneven entry 
experience across participants.  
204 This is an important exercise all the ships in a Carrier Strike Group undergo before a major 
deployment. A Carrier Strike Group consists of an air craft carrier and all the ships (usually a couple of 
cruisers, a couple of destroyers, up to two attack submarines, an oiler and a supply ship) that accompany 
it. 
205 The OOD is the officer in charge of the ship, acting in the Commanding Officer’s stead as his or her 
direct representative. The OOD is responsible to the CO for everything that happens on his or her watch, 
including the safe operation and navigation of the ship. 
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real quick … Would that not have been enough to make you go get underneath 
your rack and never get out?   That, coupled with the day that I showed up on the 
ship, which was a couple days before underway, because at the ROTC unit we 
wore working khaki, but we wore short sleeves.  So, I show up on the ship and 
I’m the only one on the whole ship wearing short sleeves.  So, I have the 
Command Master Chief and the XO saying at Officer’s Call, “Hey, who the hell 
are YOU and why the hell are you in SHORT SLEEVES??”  Once again, I get to 
feel 2 inches tall (she’s laughing). And so, okay, so I can laugh at this shit 
afterwards okay, so this is where it becomes funny.  So, after I go through all this 
hooplah, and three months later I’m all the better for it.  I ship off to SWOS and 
I’m Miss Know-It-All because I was on the ship and I knew how things actually 
ran, the CO of the ROTC unit asked me to come back and give a little chatty-chat 
for the seniors who are graduating at the end of the next semester or whatever, 
so I went back and I told them those stories.  And the punchline in that was, of 
course they laughed and stuff, there’s a lot to be said for doing your homework 
ahead of time, understanding the battle space, the environment and preparing 
yourself, but more importantly not allowing little instances like that to shoot you 
down.  You know, it’s so funny because I have had, and I don’t remember 
peoples’ names, I’m horrible, but I’ve had officers, a little bit junior to me, later on 
in my career say to me “I remember you.  You came to Old Dominion and you 
spoke to our class and I remember you saying blah, blah, blah.”  And I kind of 
smile to myself because of course I don’t remember them but they remember me 
telling them that damn story about being yelled at at officers call because I had 
on short sleeves. Or that I was standing on the bridge trying to conn a ship and 
not knowing the commands. 
In response to her question of me “Would that not have been enough to make 
you go get underneath your rack and never get out?” I had to admit that it really would 
have been.  The situation on the bridge as she described it was mortifying.  So, I asked 
Xenia how she had mustered up the guts to go back up there after she had locked 
herself in her stateroom and learned all the proper deck commands. She explained: 
It’s called being on the watchbill. And you know what else too, there’s definitely 
something to be said for a little positive reinforcement even if it’s just the smallest 
word like “good try.”  Them freakin’ words “good try” at that particular time meant 
more …The officer of the deck. Big, tall.  He was the Combat Systems Officer 
and the Senior Watch Officer at the time, LT William XXXX.  He said it.  And 
even though the CO was going bananas and batshit and the XO was this little 
short little tyrant dude, he said, as I was peeling my face off the floor, “Good Try.” 
I mean, what do you do?  What do you do in an instance like that?  What do you 
say?  “I really don’t know this” And whadya freakin’ cry? What do you do? On 
that same token then, at least then you weren’t at the freakin’ helm, you were the 
conn, and you had a coach, whether it be one of the officers of the deck or the 
XO so as you started to baby step through this process they would be there by 
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your side and explaining to you why the ship reacts the way that it does and 
things like that.  You know, a slow process.  That was just like a crash course, 
that was just like being thrown into the freakin’ fire.  After that, because what the 
senior watch officer did say too was “I’m going to give you an opportunity to get 
those commands down and get you back on this watchbill.”  And so there’s a 
challenge right there, right? It’s like “OK, I suck, really bad, but he’s going to 
allow me to unscrew myself.”  So, whaddya gonna do? Not do it?  [When] the 
senior watch officer says he’s going to give you a little bit of time and when 
you’re ready let me know and I’ll put you back on the watchbill.  That’s a 
challenge.  I’m like I’m going to unscrew myself, learn this crap and I’m going to 
go tell him I’m ready to go back on the watchbill. I’m ready to freakin’ go learn to 
conn.  I didn’t take forever to do it either.  Oh, and by the way, I could have 
never went back to the man … waited for him to come to me, which would have 
looked like I was defeated.  And that defeatist … because it’s so hard, and I know 
you know what I’m talking about to really articulate what this SWO stuff means, 
what all of these little things mean.  But to be defeated from the onset, you would 
have forever have been defeated.  I would have sucked as a driver even if I had 
leaned how to drive.  You wouldn’t have wanted me on the “A Team evolution” 
driving stuff, all that.  If I didn’t pop my butt back up and go to him and say “Hey, 
I’m ready to get back on there,” it would have been done for me.  So I eventually 
got good at driving by living up on the bridge.  (She laughs)  Well, you know, so 
my first tour I was in engineering and I did my qualifications up there and now 
being at sea at the right time is EVERYTHING.  So, you go to sea during 
COMPTUEX, if you go to sea during JTFEX (Joint Task Force Exercise),206 if you 
go when there’s nothing but ship handling evolutions going on and you’re on the 
watchbill, then you get an opportunity to anchoring and do all this kind of crap 
and then my second tour was as navigator, and as the navigator and navigating 
on deployment I lived on the bridge.  And I was a senior OOD so I trained the 
other DIVOs as they came up through.  
Xenia described how she and a group of friends overcame their physical 
isolation, providing each other advice and moral support with the hope they could all 
succeed where ever they were.  Although the SWO community has traditionally had a 
reputation for being cut-throat and competitive, she described a group of SWOs who 
refused to fall into this habit: 
I don’t know what the guys did beforehand, but I have a close-knit network, or 
group of friends, and people that we all do the same business, and we share -- 
endlessly.  And it doesn’t matter what it is. So there’s a group of females.  
There’s 5 of us.  We’re all SWOs.  And 4 of the 5 are all command-selected. And 
                                            
 
206 JTFEX is an underway exercise intended to test a Carrier Strike Group’s ability to operate in hostile 
and complex environments with other U.S. and coalition forces.  
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we … I don’t know how we became this group but we did and we all keep in 
touch.  We’re all spread all over God’s creation but when someone has a baby, 
we all scoot over there and do a shower or something.  When someone has a 
chili-cookoff,  we …whatever, so even though we are geographically dispersed in 
some instances we’re a close-knit group and even when someone gets married, 
we all go to the wedding or whatever.  Let me tell you how racially diverse it is.  
There’s me and then there’s Michelle, who is Korean and white, I guess you 
could say, and then there’s Emily, who’s just a North Carolina belle, you know, 
daddy’s a judge.  Then there’s Shannon, who was born and raised in Virginia 
Beach, a Caucasian female, and then there’s Kendra, who we call our world 
traveler who is now stationed in Singapore.  I think she’s like Irish and Caucasian 
or whatever, so we have a little mix, I guess you could say.  But we all keep in 
touch, and all that kind of stuff.  Then beyond that I also have a network of 
friends, the network of friends who are SWO, who are majority male, because 
that’s just what the hell they all are.  And guys that I went through ECP (enlisted 
commissioning program) with, a couple, or that came up through Department 
Head school and have just kind of remained friends ever since so there’s a little 
group of us, and there’s a group of us called the “CHENGS” and we were all 
Chief Engineers and went through Department Head School together and all that 
kind of stuff.  And all are now Command-selected and we’ll all inevitably go back 
to the fleet around the same time.  So, in saying all that, my hope is when we do 
embark on this next adventure that we have each other’s back and help each 
other out. And a lot of the silly things that occur because you don’t have a 
sounding board.  Things like that DON’T [occur], because you can say “Hey, let’s 
go have a beer and talk about this.  I have this issue, can you help me with it?”  
Or, “What do you think?” and that sort of stuff. And a mentor of mine who, I only 
claim one, like some people throw all these flag officer names around, I only 
claim one flag officer as a true mentor and I met him when he was a commander 
and now he’s a two star – I met him when I was an Ensign.  And one thing that 
he told me after I was commissioned, and I met him at an SNA luncheon was 
“Always have someone you can bounce things off of and talk to that’s not within 
the lifelines of your own ship.  Whether it’s your best buddy or your friend or 
whatever he said but you’re always going to need that throughout your career.” 
And I’ve always kept that in the back of my head as a true statement because 
sometimes, you know, the perspective that you get is most useful, and when 
you’re sitting there looking at the problem it looks entirely different when all of 
you are looking at the same problem.  
Oh, absolutely. … I think we’ll be a different breed.  I really do.  I think it seems 
like it takes forever before you finally get back to sea but I think when we finally 
do, the group that will be out there, because we’re all roughly in the same year-
groups and stuff, and a lot of us know each other, I think it will be different. I think 
we’ll be helping each other out, you know? 
During the course of our interview Xenia actually realized that: 
Not only have I not worked for a female, I’ve never worked for a minority as a 
SWO officer. I have worked for All. White. Males.  Until you asked me that 
daggone question, just now, I didn’t really realize that I have never worked for 
anything as a SWO but a white man. And that’s why I spend more time and 
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mentoring and talking to women and minorities. Not only did I not work for any 
but I didn’t SEE any …women.  Not just black women, but women, period.   
Making a Difference by Mentoring Others to Success 
 Breanna, the Senior Chief Legalman, who generally eschewed expected 
masculine behavior discussed times when strong language might be appropriate, but 
she also emphasized the need to mentor other Sailors to succeed:   
I think that there’s times when you have to be a little bit more intrusive and 
maybe that language is required because there are a lot of young folks that are 
coming in that you have to mother.  And when I say “mother,” there’s a lot of 
chiefs who say, “I didn’t come in the Navy to be someone’s mother or babysit.”  
Well, if you didn’t, you need to get out because I learned about year eight or year 
nine that you are a babysitter.  Call it what you want to call it.  Call it LPO, call it 
LCPO (Leading Chief Petty Officer), but you are going to be nurturing and if 
you’re not in the business of mentoring and nurturing and taking care of people, 
you really need to get out of the military.  If you cannot be calm and 
understanding, the people are not going to be like you.  Everyone wasn’t raised 
like you.  Everyone wasn’t told to be responsible.  You have to be a person, if 
you’re going to be in a leadership position you have to be willing to accept folks 
for just who they are and if they have short comings you need to be able to help 
them get on the right side of the track and not make them feel, you know 
inadequate, make them feel like a fool because they’re not doing things the way 
you’re doing them or they’re not doing things the right way.  You have to 
encourage them and inspire them to do the right thing.  You just can’t just say, 
“You know what? I’m done with you.  You’re a dirt bag.”  You can’t do that in the 
military.  Are folks going to do that in the civilian sector, oh no, you’re going to get 
passed up because the only folks that are going to make it are those people who 
are hitting the mark.  In the military we have to help folks make the mark…We 
have to sleep and eat and live with these people in harm’s way and sometimes 
when a person messes up you’re going to tell them.  It’s not going to be on 
paper.  You’re going to tell them, “You need to get your head out of your 
whatever and this is what you need to do to move forward.”   
Marion, the Command Master Chief, started a women’s mentoring group on the 
aircraft carrier to which she was assigned, intending to help women address the unique  
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challenges they faced. As she explained: 
Some other women in the chiefs’ mess and I started it up but I was the one who 
spear-headed it. We used to have our meetings weekly, go down to the foc’sle 
and it was like basically an open forum where we sat around in a circle and 
talked and networked and talked about [issues concerning women]. “I have to get 
my kid to school at five in the morning and then I have to be on the ship at six.  
Where can you find a daycare that opens up that early?” or something like that, 
people sharing things like that.  “Where can you get help for your bills” or “are 
you being sexually harassed?” or whatever.  Or “how do you conduct yourself as 
a woman on the ship?”  Don’t come here being nasty to other women and 
competing with other women.  Then you go and make friends with the men 
because you think that they’re the only ones being nice to you.  Then you get 
yourself in all kinds of situations.  We talked about anything that they wanted to 
professionally, personal and all that kind of stuff.  And they loved it.  But yeah, 
some of the men on that ship, officers included, they hated it.  The JAG even 
sent me an email, and he cc’d the Command Master Chief on it, to say “I’m really 
fascinated by what you’re starting up and stuff like that.  But just be very careful 
because you’re discriminating against men.”  And I said “You know what?  Your 
male LPO’s, LCPO’s, they can come too.  They need to learn about the things 
that affect women in the Navy, because guess what?  We all talked about other 
things such as “hey, you can be married to a Sailor but when you get pregnant it 
does not impact his career at all.  It does impact your career when you decide to 
have a child when you’re on sea duty.  Not only does it impact you as far as your 
not being as competitive when you have to leave the ship and you’re not on 
arduous sea duty anymore but look what you’ve done to the detailers and 
everybody else that this unexpected loss,” all kinds of things like that.     
I asked her to clarify her intentions in this endeavor because throughout the course of 
our interview she had used terms like “misogynist” and “oppression” and stated that 
rape was about power rather than sex, and I was getting the sense that she was on 
somewhat of a feminist mission.  Marion denied a feminist agenda and explained: 
The way I was guiding them was to reinforce confidence in them and not bringing 
the message to them that men are the enemy or anything like that, because it 
was more of a message of respect, have respect for yourself.  Do the work, put in 
the hard work and you’ll reap the benefits of that.  And “this is what worked for 
me so I could be successful.” And the Navy is not responsible for your child and 
so on and so forth.  There’s choices in everything that you make are your choices 
and that’s it.  It was never anything about, the ‘man hater’s club’ and all that kind 
of stuff.  Never, which is what I, how I see feminists.  Uplift, just making women in 
an environment that’s male dominated, just reinforcing to them that “you can do 
it,” and “you can get there.”  Not accepting that [misogynist] behavior or anything 
like that.  Conducting yourself, and having respect for yourself so that people 
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don’t feel comfortable about being misogynistic towards you and things like that.  
I think that’s what helped me that they knew they couldn’t pull that off with 
[me]…You are going to encounter some assholes in your career, people who are 
still living in the dark ages whether it’s about race or sexism or so on and so 
forth.  But don’t let it take you down.  Don’t stoop to their level.  Hey, report it if 
need be and this is the way you should conduct yourself as a woman to avoid 
it….also helping them to weather the challenges that come with feeling guilty 
about “oh, I’m a mother and I have to deploy.”  And those types of things or either 
“I’m going to deliberately get pregnant because I don’t like this command and I 
want to go back on shore duty” and that kind of stuff and how you would regret it 
in the future when you got older and wiser and realizing that this pain right here, 
this too shall pass, you know, that kind of thing. 
 Leigh, the LCDR SWO who had previously been enlisted in another service, described 
the guidance she provided young women Sailors for being successful at sea as well as 
the example she tried to set: 
I would sit down with them when they first checked on board.  They would see 
me or I would just say in the p[assage]-way “If you need anything, let me know,” 
and if there was an issue, it would be brought to my attention.  Maybe I would sit 
down with them and say don’t get a reputation for yourself.  Do not sleep around 
pretty much with any of these guys.  Nobody is worth your professional 
reputation.  It’s not worth it.  But I thought it was also my responsibility to carry 
myself in a manner that they could be, “Okay, what she’s doing is good to go, 
and she’s telling us to not to do certain things and she’s not doing those things 
either. So, okay, I can respect her because she’s practicing what she preaches” 
and that’s very important.   
 Natalie, the SWO LCDR who described feeling excluded from the “good ol’ boys 
club” despite being a Department Head, one of the more senior officers on the 
Destroyer, noted where she did derive satisfaction: 
But at the same time, being a senior person with a lot of junior enlisted, I was 
really enriched at the way that I could mentor and train the people underneath 
me and to build up my department and to really show them that the bar could be 
raised and we could be the bar for all the rest of the departments to look up to.  
And that’s what we did.  And so I was excited to see that even through all my 
strife, that that could still be accomplished and so, it was two-fold.   
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 Xenia, who had the horrible experience when she was placed on the ship’s 
watchbill as conning officer immediately after she reported aboard her first ship, 
discussed her leadership approach now with more junior Sailors: 
I will tell you, so part of the exhaustion in the whole SWO thing and your hours, to 
me, is the extra time you spend doing other stuff.  And one of the things I kind of 
take a lot of pride in is really mentoring young Sailors.  And I say “young Sailors” 
because I mentor males too.  But, I take, I think, a little special extra time with 
females, particularly if they reach out to me. I speak to everyone but you know 
how sometimes you have some folks that reach out to you and want to come sit 
down and talk about things?  I make the time to do it.  I want to do it and I do it 
because I had NONE of that. None of that, so I know that 15 or 20 minutes I 
could be on my way home, sure, but it’s probably going to mean a heck of a lot 
more to that Sailor if I can give them some time, and I do that.  I found, when I 
was on the carrier in 2010 and I did a couple deployments on there and you just 
start paying attention to things and on an aircraft carrier where there are over 
5000 people the most senior female on board the ship was an O-6 and she was 
Strike Group staff N6, or the Communications Officer.207  The next most senior 
female on board that ship was a medical officer, and she was a commander.  
And then the third senior female aboard that ship was me. On an Aircraft Carrier.  
I could not believe that. Could not believe that.  There was a warrant officer who 
worked in one of the squadrons as a maintenance person, there was an O-1 who 
was in Supply.  You know you’re on a carrier freakin’ 9 months – you get to know 
everybody and you figure out who’s who in the zoo and I couldn’t believe it. So, 
based on that, and I got to know the XO on the carrier, sat some boards and 
stuff, if people would ask if there was someone they could talk to he would 
recommend people to me to talk to is what I’m trying to say.  Whether it be just sit 
down with career guidance “I want to put in a package” you know, whatever, 
people are interested in your story.  When they find out you’re prior enlisted 
they’re like “oh, what did you do?” You know, all that kind of stuff. So, I’ve spent a 
lot of time and I suspect when I go back to the Navy it won’t be any different.  
And I don’t mind doing that.  I really don’t mind doing it. But, I’ll tell you, it’s not 
just women. And I think that’s because men don’t freakin’ know how to talk. They 
don’t know how to, not all of them, I won’t generalize, but many of them don’t 
know how to sit down and have a conversation. When a guys says “ma’am, I’m 
thinking about retiring – there’s the potential that I can make chief but my son is 
starting high school and I really want to be there for his high school years, what 
are your thoughts?”  What the hell is a man gonna tell ‘em?  “Dude, you better go 
be a chief!” [effects a macho voice]  You’ve got an opportunity to put on those 
anchors.  And you know the advice I’d give to him is “that’s not a singular 
decision for you to make.  It’s one for you and your wife to make. That’s a family 
decision. So, a lot of my time is spent doing other stuff, outside what the job 
entails, I’ll tell you that.  A LOT of it. So if I could offer anything to someone in 
                                            
 
207 This means she was not even ship’s company.  She was embarked on the ship as part of the 
Admiral’s staff only for the duration of the deployment. 
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talking to them it’s #1, what do you desire to get out of the service? Are you 
planning to just stay for your initial tour, and are you taking any classes?”  You 
know just stuff I think people normally wouldn’t talk to them about. “Are you 
familiar with this program or that program or this organization?  What are some of 
your challenges?” and things like that.  But what I have to teeter on and not 
become is this “solver of all problems, issues” and the one singular person that 
because you’re a female they go to with every single thing. 
Conclusion 
Women of color are active participants in the “non-movement movement” (Bayat 
2010) to gender-integrate the Navy described in detail in the preceding chapter.  In 
addition to their status as women, as women of color they form a unique and distinct 
constituency within the larger non-movement movement. An African American woman 
SWO may look across the pier and see a white woman SWO standing the same watch 
and recognize that as women their circumstances within the Navy are similar.  The 
same African American woman SWO may look across the pier and if she sees another 
African American woman standing the same watch she knows that she’s not alone in 
her unique experiences as a “double minority,” to appropriate the term used by one of 
my participants.   
The women of color who participated in my research had made the Navy a 
career, most having served for more than twenty years at the time of their interviews.  
As noted previously, “rocking the boat,” aggressively confronting and challenging the 
status quo in the Navy, is not a proven strategy for career success.  Several expressed 
concern with avoiding the negative stereotype of “the angry black woman” or the 
“militant black woman.”  It is little wonder then that they primarily chose agentic 
strategies to address the problems of sexism, racism, and sexism intertwined with 
racism they encountered.  Despite the historical legacy of racism, sexism, and 
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prevailing stereotypes of Black women, participants in my study found creative, 
constructive ways to challenge the system in meaningful ways as change agents.  
Along the way they also provided highly-visible, positive examples to superiors and 
subordinates alike, of Navy women of color as competent, professional warriors.  
In the twenty-first century Navy, officer and enlisted women are increasingly 
diverse in their racial and ethnic composition and visible in positions of power.  In fact, 
the Navy’s first woman 4-star Admiral in the Surface Warfare community is African-
American and a recent ship’s Commanding Officer was Indian-American. While some 
may still adopt masculine leadership styles and gender behaviors, many others now see 
they have alternatives.  When strong, competent, professional, feminine women publicly 
lead, they undermine traditional gender stereotypes and ideology.  When these women 
also happen to be women of color, they also help undermine racialized gender 
stereotypes and racist and sexist ideology.   With the higher degree of diversity present 
in today’s Navy enlisted force, coupled with enlisted commissioning programs and a 
focus on diversity in officer recruiting initiatives, it is likely that women of color will 
continue, in ever greater numbers, to undermine the still prevailing but slowly 
weakening ideology that holds that true warriors can only be white and male.  This 
possibility is also rendered more likely by the apparent propensity of women of color to 
reach a hand down to help others even as they, themselves, continue to climb.  
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CHAPTER 6 
DISCUSSION, CONCLUSIONS, AND  
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Theories addressing the concept of hegemonic masculinity suggest women 
would continue to encounter hostility from their male colleagues upon entering a male-
dominated and socially defined “masculine” enterprise such as the U.S. military, even 
when they entered in fairly large numbers over a sustained period.  When first 
embarking on this research to explore Navy women’s resistance to traditional gender 
norms, based upon existing theory and my own past military experience, I expected to 
find little had changed in the degree to which Navy men openly expressed their 
opposition to women’s presence, especially aboard combat ships.  I also expected to 
find with their ever-increasing numbers and the resultant reduction in their isolation from 
one another, Navy women would more proactively and overtly resist the traditional 
gender norms their male colleagues ascribed to and attempted to impose on them.  I 
was specifically interested in their intentional resistance to hegemonic masculinity and, 
by extension, the potential impact that resistance might have on the gender order, both 
within the U.S. Navy and possibly within larger society.  The results of my study prove 
that I am a poor prognosticator.  They further reveal that existing theories of hegemonic 
masculinity fail to account for the potentially disruptive influence organizational policy 
might have on the maintenance of hegemonic masculinity, especially in an institution 
which has historically served a gender-defining function within larger society.   
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As I have demonstrated in chapter two, official Navy policy regarding women’s 
service has changed dramatically over the past 35 years.  Changes in policy (macro 
level of interaction) have resulted in some changes to daily practice (micro level of 
interaction) but, on the whole, the success of gender integration across the surface 
Navy has been uneven, with women officers ultimately experiencing less overt gender 
discrimination and seemingly greater acceptance among their male officer peers than 
their enlisted women counterparts do among their male peers.  The women officer 
participants in my study overwhelmingly expressed their belief that they were treated 
fairly by the Navy as an organization and also that they were accepted by their male 
peers.  They cited as proof of their acceptance their inability to point to any specific 
instance when they had been denied access to a job, an education program, or special 
duty they expressly sought.  Furthermore, because today’s women Navy officers no 
longer experience constant, direct, and open hostility to their mere presence in the 
workplace from their male peers, my data indicates Navy officers feel they have little 
cause to “rebel” or “resist.”   
In contrast, although they expressed their belief that Navy policies on women 
were largely fair, in their daily experience my enlisted women participants noted actual 
deck plate practices often were not entirely consistent with Navy policies. They made 
clear that they continued to observe or personally experience obvious sexism and 
gender discrimination or harassment in their day-to-day work lives.  The disparity in the 
experience of Navy women on the basis of rank suggests a bifurcated outcome to policy 
changes aimed at gender integration across the Navy, with women officers benefitting 
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most from recent policy changes and enlisted women, especially junior enlisted women, 
benefitting least.  
Despite significant expansion of women’s employment across a wide range of 
military specialties over the past four decades including, most recently, those 
associated with direct ground combat,208 the military continues to serve a gender-
defining function within society that remains officially unacknowledged by the Pentagon.  
That is, for all the angst the prospect of integrating women into combat inspires among 
military men, the Department of Defense has never specifically considered nor 
addressed how the current gender system shapes the military environment for both men 
and women.  As a result, the Department of Defense cannot begin to conceive of ways 
in which the military environment might be shaped to be more inclusive.  As Heimark 
(1997) has argued, the military continues to treat sexual harassment and sexual assault 
as problems, rather than as symptoms of the “deeply entrenched cult of masculinity” 
(Dunivin 1994, p. 536) which pervades Navy culture and is expressed hegemonically, 
both as a form of gatekeeping and a means of keeping the gender line clearly defined 
(Karst 1991).            
Military service in general and combat in particular continue to be viewed across 
society as the ultimate test of manliness, i.e. maleness.  As a gender-defining institution 
the military continues to attract at least some men who are sufficiently insecure in their 
own masculinity that they feel they must prove it to themselves and others. These men 
often hold the most traditional beliefs about sex roles and gender.  They are also most 
                                            
 
208 Although the missions of the Army and Marine Corps are most closely aligned with direct ground 
combat, U.S. Special Forces, including the Navy SEALs, have been directed by the Secretary of Defense 
to incorporate women into their ranks. 
 
 
 
 
391 
likely to feel the most threatened by and therefore hostile toward the presence of 
women, whom they view as encroaching into what had previously been considered 
“male” occupations.  They are also the most likely to express their disdain for women 
working in “men’s” jobs through sexism, gender discrimination, and gender and sexual 
harassment (Miller 1997).209   
The enlisted women in my study seemed inclined to resist these proactively-
hostile aspects of hegemonic masculinity, but they also felt they lacked both the power 
to complain and the confidence that a complaint would be heard and acted upon fairly if 
submitted to their overwhelmingly male leadership. As a result, although they may want 
to be more openly resistant, they may instead sublimate their desires to do so to their 
need to preserve their careers.  Even in instances where women sense there is gender-
based animosity among male colleagues, unless one of these men says or does 
something overt, it is hard to address the problem or complain about it without 
appearing to be “overly sensitive” or a “whiner.”  Most Navy women would, of course, 
wish to avoid either of these labels since they reflect the negative stereotypes of women 
that male Sailors already hold. 
My research data shows that at one end of the spectrum some Navy men, 
including both officers and enlisted, do appear to be more accepting of Navy women in 
non-traditional occupations today than they have been in the past.  Or, at least, they are 
less overtly hostile to women’s presence.  Based upon recent interview data reflecting 
women Sailors’ actual experiences, Navy women do seem to expend less time and 
energy fighting with men in the course of simply trying to do their jobs. My participants 
                                            
 
209 As noted in Chapter 4, Miller (1997) documented army men’s use of gender and sexual harassment as 
a form of protest against women’s encroachment into what they considered “male” territory.  
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reported that some men have even functioned in public ways as allies to their women 
shipmates.210  Yet, at the other end of the spectrum, despite dramatic changes in policy, 
and both internal and external211 political pressure to ensure women’s equal opportunity 
on surface combatants, some male Sailors in the ranks continue to hold sexist attitudes, 
which they convey covertly or tacitly to other male peers and subordinates.  
Furthermore, it seems Navy men are still able to convey many of the old sexist, gender-
stereotyping messages to Navy women even if they no longer do so directly.  That is, 
women in the Navy of 2013 are still learning from their male colleagues that women can 
be:  too feminine; too masculine; too sexual; too slutty; too likely-to-get-pregnant-and-
leave-the-ship; too likely not to pull their own weight; too likely to play the “helpless 
female” or the mommy card; too likely to needlessly complicate the working 
environment; and too likely to cause unnecessary problems, in general, on Navy 
warships.    
Some women, especially officers who occupy positions of power and leadership, 
may internalize these messages, act upon them in their own gender presentation and 
behavior, and “police” the gender presentation and behavior of other women.212  
                                            
 
210 These men are distinguished from those who, while not opposed to women’s presence, remain 
unwilling to challenge the hegemonic male norm by publicly supporting them.  These men might be 
friends to women privately and do them no harm, but they may also be inclined to remain quiet in public 
situations where women encounter gender discrimination or harassment from other male colleagues.  
They provide consent for this reprehensible behavior by their silence.  
211 From the American public, Congress, and the media. 
212 As noted in Chapter 3, and as expressed by study participants, women who seem to have internalized 
the hegemonic male view of other women often expressed most concern that women not conform to 
men’s critical stereotypes of women, due to the negative “halo” effect on all Navy women of such 
conformance.  Of course, some women may actually fully adopt the hegemonic male view of their female 
co-worker, but few of my participants who expressed disdain for “stereotype-conforming behavior” did so 
without linking that behavior to the problems it can create for a woman sailor’s professional success.  
Moreover, as seen in Chapter 4, participants in my study overwhelming rejected the coping strategy of 
“manning up” adopted by so many of their predecessors in their attempts to fit in. Rather, being able to be 
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Alternatively, some women may comment critically on the gender presentation and 
behavior of other women because they are all too aware of how damaging it can be to a 
woman’s Navy career to play in to men’s negative stereotypes.  Is this shaping of 
gender attitudes among some women a triumph of hegemonic masculinity?  Perhaps.  
To make an accurate determination of the role that women’s critique and criticism of 
other women plays within the social dynamic of military hegemonic masculinity, more 
specific research needs to be done.  Such research would especially benefit by 
engaging the growing body of literature focused on human response to stereotype 
threat (see Archer 2012 and 2009; Hoyt & Blascovich 2010; Yeung & von Hippel 2008; 
Steele, Reisz, Williams, & Kawakami 2007; Bosson, Haymovitz,& Pinel 2004; Pronin, 
Steele, & Ross 2004; Kray, Galinsky, & Thompson 2002; Gonzales, Blanton, &  
Williams 2002; Steele, Spencer, & Aronson 2002; Stone, Lynch, Sjomeling, & Darley 
1999; Aronson, Lustina, Good, Keough, Steele, & Brown 1999; and Steele & Aronson 
1995). 
Drawing on Betty Friedan’s three-sex theory, Karen Dunivin (1988), argued that 
some women Air Force officers accepted that they were not men, while simultaneously 
seeing themselves as significantly different from most other women, and acting to 
demonstrate that difference to male colleagues.   Although some of my participants did 
comment critically on the dress and behavior of other Navy women, in the particular 
context of being interviewed about what it is like to be a woman in the Navy, it is not 
clear they would share such critical opinions of their female colleagues with their male 
peers as a means of demonstrating their greater affinity with the men than with the 
                                                                                                                                            
 
both feminine and professional as surface warriors is one way women have resisted men’s efforts to stuff 
them into one box or another.  
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women they were commenting upon.  At the same time, some women officers today 
also appear to be more comfortable being assertive, decisive, and demonstrating 
positive qualities traditionally associated with men, while striving to not tip too far into 
“male” behavior, i.e., swearing, participating in randy banter, adopting authoritarian 
leadership styles, etc. They seem to be better at blending the positive qualities we have 
traditionally valued in (male) Naval Officers with leadership approaches we tend to think 
of as “feminine,” creating a sort of hybrid form of leadership that combines the best 
qualities of both genders:  being physically and mentally tough, decisive, assertive, 
technically proficient, compassionate, fair, approachable, and calm and collected -- 
even under high-stress conditions, etc.  
The enlisted women who participated in my study described working hard to 
strike an acceptable gender balance while also avoiding confirming male stereotypes of 
Navy women.  Though Navy women across service eras often describe this approach 
as simply “being professional,” I have christened it in its most recent form as “doing 
gender a la carte.”  It is a form of resistance both to gender stereotyping and traditional 
gender norms that is built upon the principle of being true to one’s self.  Being 
professionally competent as a war-fighter while simultaneously maintaining their 
femininity and being true to their own self-concept is the primary way women in my 
recent study fought back against the forces of hegemonic masculinity.  This third way of 
being, a strategy that avoids reacting to counter men’s negative stereotypes of military 
women as either sluts or dykes (too feminine or too masculine), seems less satisfying 
as a “resistance movement” because the resistance is more subtle and indirect.   
Counter-intuitively, because this strategy challenges men’s negative stereotypes of 
 
 
 
 
395 
military women indirectly, it probably has the greatest potential to transform gender 
relations in the Navy. 
To recap, on one hand today’s Navy women have far more career opportunities 
in the surface Navy than they have ever had before and, in general, feel far more 
accepted by male colleague than their predecessors. On the other hand, they continue 
to confront and resist the negative stereotypes projected upon them by male Sailors, 
however subtly communicated, that continue to frame military women as one of three 
general types:  slut, bitch, or dyke (Miller 1997 and Archer 2012), with “bitch” occupying 
the middle ground in this gender continuum.  Moreover, at a time when women Sailors 
describe gender relations in the Navy as generally being “good,” that service, and 
indeed the entire Department of Defense, is struggling to address an apparent epidemic 
of sexual assault.  How does one square these two conflicting representations of the 
status of gender relations in the Surface Navy today?  What could possibly account for 
these apparently contradictory outcomes with respect to gender integration in the 
surface Navy over the past twenty-two years?   
Analysis both of my interview data and evolving policies and conditions affecting 
the military suggest the influence of several intervening variables that I failed to take into 
account when formulating my hypotheses at the beginning of this project.  These 
intervening variables also complicated the picture and made it far harder to figure out 
what was going on from my seemingly conflicting data. In part I failed to consider the 
possibility of such intervening variables at the outset because existing theory on the 
influence hegemonic masculinity exerts on the gender performance of both men and 
women fails to address ways in which organizations or social institutions might work, in 
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some circumstances, to contain rather than reinforce hegemonic masculinity.  In the 
following section I will identify these intervening variables and describe the impact I 
believe they have had on women’s experiences with hegemonic masculinity in the 
surface Navy and the nature of their resistance to it. 
Intervening Variables: 
 In the sections that follow I will describe the influence the following intervening 
variables have had on the differential outcome women Navy officers and enlisted 
personnel have experienced in their acceptance by male coworkers:   
1. transition from the draft to the All-Volunteer Force;  
2. changes in the political tide;  
3. manpower shortages, short term; 
4. manpower shortages, long term;  
5. imperative to ensure the Navy reflects the citizenry it serves; and  
6. the Navy’s two-tier system of justice, which results in differential outcomes for 
officers and enlisted personnel.  
 
Transition from the Draft to the All-Volunteer Force (AVF): 
On the positive side, the dissolution of the system of conscription in times of 
military crisis in favor of a standing All-Volunteer Force resulted in a highly 
professionalized and educated force, one widely regarded as among the most effective 
fighting forces ever fielded.  On the negative side, the AVF decoupled the rights of 
citizenship from its obligations.  As a result, a majority of U.S. citizens disengaged from 
the nation’s decisions about military entanglements in foreign countries.   With less than 
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one percent of the population serving in uniform, the vast majority of Americans no 
longer have the direct connection to the military that so many had beginning during the 
draft years of WW II and continuing through Vietnam.  Furthermore, because military 
service is now voluntary, the general public sentiment seems to be that no matter what 
the troops encounter or endure, they volunteered ...  Along with this attitude came 
increased support for other peoples’ children serving, regardless of their gender. 
 Contrary to predictions by social conservatives, first during Operation Desert 
Storm in the early 1990s and again in Iraq and Afghanistan throughout the 2000s, there 
was no public outcry when American daughters came home in body bags.  Moreover, 
most Americans seem to think that if women want to serve the military in greater and 
more dangerous capacities, they should be allowed to do so – especially if their being 
allowed to do so means one’s own son or daughter would not be called upon to serve.  
These attitudes laid the foundations for the expansion of women’s service.  Finally, one 
of the most significant and unintended negative consequences of establishing the AVF 
was the simple fact that in times of emergency the military could no longer rely upon a 
draft to alleviate manpower shortages.  With the inception of the AVF, the military had to 
both attract and retain talented, competent service members to meet its labor 
requirements. This circumstance, more than any other single factor, ultimately led to the 
expansion of women’s service into areas previously open only to men. 
Changes in the Political Tide: 
The second wave women’s movement and the push for ratification of the Equal 
Rights Amendment drove many changes related to women’s military service in the 
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1970s.  These changes were further driven by the positive Congressional and public 
response to the impressive performance of forward-deployed military women during 
Desert Shield/Storm between August 1990 and March 1991; and their equally negative 
reaction to the events of Tailhook made public in the summer of 1992; the Aberdeen 
Proving Grounds Scandal; and the shameful treatment of Anita Hill by old, white, male 
congressmen at Clarence Thomas’ confirmation hearings.  In the 1990s many of the 
changes to women’s military participation were forced by Congress, mostly with a 
figurative gun to the heads of the military brass.  Changes in policy allowed more 
women to serve in more career fields.  The more women served in more and more 
career fields, the more policy changed due to manpower needs and women’s 
demonstrated abilities.  Additional sex scandals along the way drove even more 
changes. Employing women when and where they were needed, alongside infantrymen 
in the field as part of the Lionesse or Female Engagement Teams in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, made it difficult for the Department of Defense to argue subsequently that 
women had not been and could not be combatants.  Eventually even military leaders 
were forced to concede that automatically disqualifying 51% of the population from 
expanded service opportunities purely on the basis of their sex was both arbitrary and 
short-sighted.  Pure politics, operational exigencies, and the positive influence of the 
contact hypothesis all serve as partial explanations for a Navy workplace ostensibly 
more accepting of women. 
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Manpower shortages – short term: 
 In the following section I will describe conditions in the mid- to late-1990s that led 
to an exodus of both men and women SWOs and explain the Navy’s attempts to 
address what it erroneously presumed was a temporary problem. 
Attempts to Stem the Tide 
During more than a decade of war beginning in 2002, manpower shortages were 
driven by contingency operations.  Segal (1995) had argued that despite the influence 
of three broadly defined variables, i.e., military, social structure, culture, the primary 
catalyst behind increases in women’s military participation in Western democratic 
societies has historically been military manpower shortages.  The history of women’s 
participation in the U.S. military outlined in Chapter 2 certainly supports this theory.  
Segal (1995) further hypothesized that women’s participation in the military would 
increase during periods of high or low threat to the national security when: (1) the 
military is technologically advanced; (2) the ratio of combat troops to support troops is 
low; (3) the force structure relies on reservists for wartime mobilization; and/or (4) 
military manpower needs are met through volunteers rather than conscription.  Iskra, et 
al. (2002), expanded Segal’s original model beyond the western democratic context for 
women’s participation, adding a fourth variable, politics, to Segal’s original three.  These 
variables and the theory underlying them were put to the test with our national 
engagement in Iraq and Afghanistan.  Segal (1995) and Iskra’s (2002) predictions 
regarding women’s service proved prescient.   
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Given any reasonable alternative for alleviating manpower shortages, especially 
those in the Surface Warfare Officer community, Navy leadership would have avoided 
changes to the existing status quo with respect to women’s service.  Instead, I argue, an 
accretion of unique factors, both manpower-related and politically-driven, in the mid-to-
late 1990s forced Navy leadership at the highest levels to begin taking a genuine 
interest in attracting and retaining women, especially women Surface Warfare Officers.  
In the mid-to-late 1990s, in large part due to the internet bubble, the U.S. economy was 
booming.  Historically the All-Volunteer-Force military has had more difficulty attracting 
and retaining personnel during periods of economic prosperity.   
Since the repeal of the Combat Exclusion Law in October 1993, the Navy had 
seen a steady increase in the number of women entering the Surface Warfare 
Community.  However, between 1995 and 2002, women SWOs chose to remain in the 
Navy at less than one-half the rate of their male contemporaries.  In fact, in 2002 
approximately 1200 women SWOs, from a total of about 1250, were junior officers in 
paygrades O-1 to O-3.  Most of them had yet to complete their minimum service 
obligation.  There were only 49 women in paygrades O-4 through O-7 (Loewer 2002).  
Although the overall number of senior officers in 2002 was small, that fact alone was not 
particularly surprising, given the limited opportunity for women at sea and the 
consequent limited number of women who chose to become SWOs prior to the repeal 
of the Combat Exclusion Law.  Still, it was clear the Surface Navy was much better at 
attracting women than it was at retaining them.   
According to Vice Admiral Hoewing (2004), then-Chief of Naval Personnel and 
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Manpower, Personnel, Training & Education), the 
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Navy’s “retention among both male and female Surface Warfare Community department 
head (mid-grade) officers, typically with six to ten years of experience, [had] been a 
problem since Fiscal Year 1993.”213  The SWO retention problem, and resulting 
manpower shortage, manifests itself first at the six-year mark because officers who 
attended the Naval Academy or who had scholarships at civilian institutions through the 
Navy Reserve Officer Training Corps (NROTC) incur initial service obligations of five 
years.  Many junior officers who choose to leave the Navy do so at the end of their initial 
service obligation.  Historical data shows that if the Navy can induce a Sailor to stay for 
ten years, the half-way point to full retirement, he or she is highly likely to remain 
through twenty years.   
To increase retention, alleviate manning shortages, and improve its ability to 
attract and retain high-quality officers in the SWO community, the Navy established 
Surface Warfare Officer’s Continuation Pay (SWOCP), known more colloquially as the 
SWO Bonus, in January 2000.214  Since its inception, SWOCP has ranged from 
$50,000 to $75,000, dispersed over five years, in return for service over years six 
through ten of an officer’s continuous ten year service or through two department head 
                                            
 
213 Vice Admiral Gerald L. Hoewing, Statement Before the Military Personnel Subcommittee of the House 
Armed Services Committee on Recruiting and Military Personnel Policy, Benefits and Compensation 
Overview, 2 March 2004, p. 10.  Statement available in its entirety at: 
http://www.navy.mil/navydata/testimony/personnel/hoewing040302.pdf; accessed August 24, 2014.  
214 For years the Navy has used such monetary incentives to retain pilots and nuclear-trained officers 
(Nukes), who were often heavily pursued by civilian companies desiring their skills and training.  Prior to 
establishing such retention incentive pay, the Navy would invest a significant amount of money upfront to 
train pilots and Nukes only to have them lured away with the promise of significantly more pay in the 
civilian sector as soon as their initial service obligation was completed.  However, until 2000, the Navy 
had never had to resort to monetary incentives to attract and retain the required number of Surface 
Warfare Officers.   According to the master Surface Warfare Community Career Planning Brief for 2013, 
“Bonuses are Force-shaping tools applied to influence retention behavior.”    
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tours.215  SWOCP is issued via contract.  The number of contracts available each year 
and the amount to be paid have been determined by retention needs to meet manpower 
requirements. For Year Groups (YG)216 in which either accessions were low or attrition 
is high, the amount of SWOCP bonus was increased to induce the required number of 
officers to remain on active duty.  Additionally, the Navy established yet another 
targeted-retention tool, the Junior and Senior Officer Surface Warfare Critical Skills 
Retention Bonus (CSRB).  However, these initiatives (which mostly amounted to 
“throwing money at the problem”) did little to address the causes driving women’s lower 
retention rates, and thus failed to stem the exodus of women officers from the Surface 
                                            
 
215 For more detailed description see NAVADMIN 156/12 at:  http://www.public.navy.mil/bupers-
npc/reference/messages/Documents/NAVADMINS/NAV2012/NAV12156.txt; accessed August 24, 2014. 
216 A “Year Group” is the cohort of officers that first enters the Navy in a given fiscal year.  For example, 
YG13 consists of all Ensigns (O-1) commissioned from 1 October 2012 through 30 September 2013.  
They will first be eligible for regular active duty retirement upon completion of twenty years continuous 
service in late 2032 or in 2033 depending upon their actual commissioning date.  In the Navy, being a 
member of a Year Group is a bit like embarking on a one-way train.  While there are many possible stops 
across the twenty years of a career where individuals may elect to disembark, no new passengers may 
embark at any point along the way once the train initially gets into motion.  So, the challenge for the Navy 
is to attract the right number of new officers for each year group and retain enough of them along the 
twenty- to thirty-year career journey so that all necessary manpower needs are met.  The Navy can’t 
“make more later.”  It takes about nineteen years for the Navy to “grow” a Captain.  If the Navy gets to 
2022 and does not have enough Commanders in YG13 to selectively screen for promotion to the rank of 
Captain, the Navy cannot just go out and hire more people at the Captain level.  Unlike a University, 
which can hire tenured professors away from other academic institutions, there is no open labor market 
from which the Navy can hire.  It’s not just enough to “attract” (recruit); the Navy has to “retain” (keep) that 
unique experience.  According to the Bureau of Naval Personnel, recent small year groups have 
presented a retention challenge.  For example, YG00 required a 28.6% retention increase over historical 
retention numbers, while YG04 required a 43.1% retention increase over historical numbers.  Since the 
Navy had fewer officers to start with in each of those year groups, it could not afford to lose too many and 
had to work much harder to keep the ones it had.  The Navy turned to monetary incentives to induce 
more officers to remain through the critical years six through ten.  The Navy has not experienced similar 
retention problems among enlisted personnel.  Moreover, the rules for enlisted enlistment, promotion, and 
rating conversion are far less rigid than those for officers, giving Navy manpower specialists far more 
flexibility and power in addressing manpower shortages.  For example, if there are too many Petty Officer 
First Class Electronics Technicians (ET1s) and too few Petty Officer First Class Interior Communications 
Technicians (IC1), the Navy can demand ET1s convert to the IC rating as a condition of re-enlistment to 
complete the twenty years of service needed to earn full retirement. If any given ET1 refuses to convert to 
the IC rating, he or she will not be allowed to re-enlist.  Once the Navy has “force-converted” enough 
sailors to address the shortage they will rescind the requirement for ET1s to change ratings. 
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Warfare community.  The continued loss of qualified women represented a significant 
loss of investment.   
Although the problem of SWO retention, especially among women, was 
increasingly obvious and growing more critical, the senior woman Surface Warfare 
officer at the time, RADM Deborah Loewer, was unsuccessful in convincing her male 
colleagues to adopt measures that would address career and life-choice issues specific 
to women217 in part because manning woes had eased somewhat in the immediate 
wake of two major economic shocks.  First, the dot-com bubble burst on March 20, 
2000.  The accompanying downturn in the economy through the remainder of that year 
and into 2001 made civilian jobs both less available and less attractive to military junior 
officers.  Second, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 further depressed the 
economy, making civilian job opportunities more scarce, while simultaneously inspiring 
renewed patriotism.  These conditions prompted more Naval officers to continue 
serving.   
The NavyTimes reported that the fiscal 2002 retention rate for all SWOs was 
twenty-seven percent.  The fiscal 2003 retention rate for SWOs was up slightly from that 
to 31.5 percent, but Surface Warfare detailers continued to aggressively court junior 
officers as the economy showed signs of improving.  Navy leaders presumed the SWO 
bonus would get the Navy through this temporary crunch.  However, the failure to retain 
women SWOs was troubling enough to generate several theses exploring the 
phenomenon, written by women SWO Master’s degree candidates at the Naval Post 
                                            
 
217 Military career progression is predicated on male biology.  Men can become fathers without 
interrupting their “at sea” career.   
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Graduate School, (see for example Clifton 2003; Sinclair 2004; Taylor 2005; and 
Graham 2006). 
Manpower Shortages – Long Term: 
In the following section I will explore the various factors that when combined 
formed a perfect storm of structural demographic issues that presently challenge and 
will continue to challenge the Navy’s ability to fill its ranks for the foreseeable future. 
Recognizing Diversity as a Both a Strength and a Necessity 
In July 2005, ADM Mike Mullen assumed duties as the Chief of Naval Operations 
(CNO), a position he would hold through September 2007, when he was selected to 
serve as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS).   By then the All-Volunteer 
military had been continuously engaged in war for nearly four years in Afghanistan and 
for two years in Iraq.  With America at the mall and the U.S. military comprised of less 
than one percent of the US population, concerns were growing in some quarters that 
the military was increasingly disconnected from the people it served (see Barreto & Leal 
2007; Betros 2001; Bland 1999; Burk 2002; Feaver 2003, 1999, 1996; Holsti 1999; 
Huntington 1957; Johnson & Metz 1995; Rahbek-Clemmensen, Archer, Barr, Belkin, 
Guerrero, Hall, & Swain 2012; and Schiff 1995  for a sampling of the issues and 
arguments related to civil-military relations).  It is widely held among political scientists, 
military professionals, and republicans that in a constitutional republic, where the 
military is always subordinate to its civilian leadership, the most healthy civil-military 
relationship is one in which the military closely mirrors the population it serves.  
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Furthermore, Navy leadership, led by ADM Mullen, realized the nation’s talent pool was 
changing rapidly, becoming increasingly diverse, and recognized the Navy needed to 
change as well.  ADM Mullen established diversity as a priority during his tenure as 
CNO, focusing specifically on opportunities for minorities and women. 
On August 12, 2005, a mere two weeks before Hurricane Katrina struck, ADM 
Mullen spoke at the 33rd annual National Naval Officers Association (NNOA)218 
Conference in New Orleans.  He told conference attendees, “We need leaders from and 
for every single part of our Navy.  Our leadership should reflect the nation we represent" 
(Chief of Naval Operations Public Affairs 2005).219  Mullen specifically thanked the 
NNOA, saying the association was "critical to helping our Navy improve diversity."  He 
also told attendees he needed their leadership as well and encouraged NNOA members 
to mentor other, more junior officers and enlisted personnel.  The CNO acknowledged, 
"A lot has been done, but we are still in a pioneer world....My intentions are to take big 
steps each year, for four years.  I believe we need to take more risk in this area than we 
have in the past.  I believe from my heart that diversity strengthens the very fabric of 
who we are."  In light of these laudable goals and progressive remarks, during the 
question/answer phase following his remarks a Coast Guard Ensign challenged Admiral 
                                            
 
218 The National Naval Officers Association is widely seen among white members of the Navy officer 
corps as the “African American” officers association, although its membership is open to all ranks and 
ethnic groups.  NNOA had its beginnings in 1970, when LT Kenneth H. Johnson, while serving as Advisor 
for Minority Affairs at the U. S. Naval Academy, sought methods to improve minority interest in 
recruitment efforts and participation in the Naval Academy Blue and Gold Program.  In 1971, faced with 
finding qualified naval officer candidates from minority communities, CAPT Emerson Emory, CAPT 
Claude Williams, CDR Emmanuel Jenkins, CWO James Harris, and LT Johnson began to discuss 
forming an organization to assist minority officer recruitment.  It was noted that fewer than one hundred 
officers of every known minority could be identified and less than fifty of these were African American.  
For more information about NOAA’s origin and mission, see: http://nnoa.memberclicks.net/; accessed 
August 24, 2014.  
219 Full news release available at:  http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=19651; accessed 
August 24, 2014.  
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Mullen’s actions by questioning him about the “all white-male staff [he] just walked in 
here with” (Parrish 2010).220  Both his encounter with the brash, young Coast Guard 
Ensign and the disproportionate harm Hurricane Katrina inflicted upon New Orleans’ 
African American population shortly thereafter would prove to be catalysts for the 
priority ADM Mullen placed on addressing issues of diversity. 
In short order, ADM Mullen determined that pursuing diversity at every level in 
the Navy was a “strategic imperative” (Chief of Naval Operations Public Affairs 2006).221  
Speaking at the Naval Air Systems Command's Total Force Diversity Day on June 29, 
2006, he noted that while the Navy had made great strides in improving diversity in 
recent years, the pace of globalization and the nation’s engagement with ideologically-
driven global terrorism made it necessary for the Navy to renew its efforts and adopt 
change at an even faster pace.  “We’ve got to create a sense of urgency and a belief 
and a commitment,” Mullen said.  “Leadership has to say it: ‘We’ve got to 
change.’…We’ve got to get [diversity] right or it jeopardizes us as an institution” (Chief of 
Naval Operations Public Affairs 2006). 
Also in 2006, as the problem of retaining women within the SWO community 
continued to grow, the Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) conducted a study for the 
express purpose of determining the size difference between female and male SWO 
retention and identifying policies that might increase women’s retention (Stoloff, et al. 
2006).  At this point, women’s retention was little more than ten percent lower than that 
of their male contemporaries.  However, it was clear that as the percentage of women 
                                            
 
220 Complete article available at: http://www.defense.gov/News/NewsArticle.aspx?ID=61315; accessed 
August 24, 2014. 
221 Full news release available at:  http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=24463; accessed 
August 24, 2014. 
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SWOs increased, the retention and resultant manpower problems would be magnified.  
Based upon survey results from a sample of 2128 SWOs in paygrades O1-O4, the CNA 
study found that while SWOs in general had the lowest morale of all communities, 
women SWOs’ had the lowest of all -- by a wide margin.  Whereas thirty-seven percent 
of male SWOs were satisfied with morale, a mere twenty percent of women SWOs 
were. 
The same survey found that while SWOs in general had the lowest satisfaction 
with the status of gender relations of all Navy communities, only twenty-two percent of 
male SWOs indicated they were dissatisfied with the state of gender relations.  In 
contrast, fifty-two percent of women SWOs were dissatisfied with the status of gender 
relations within their warfare community (Stoloff, et al. 2006).  Stoloff, et al. (2006) also 
discovered that enlisted retention was highest of all, but men’s retention regardless of 
status as officer or enlisted surpassed that of women.  Additionally, among officers the 
source of commissioning affected retention rates, with the lowest retention among 
women who were commissioned from the Naval Academy (~ 12%) rather than through 
NROTC (~22%) or Officer Candidate School (~ 25%).  Although Stoloff, et al. (2006) 
found the potential for some sabbatical programs, first unsuccessfully championed by 
RADM Loewer in 2002, “to produce positive return on investment (ROI) and increased 
SWO retention,” the report noted “sabbaticals are not currently in favor by Navy 
leadership. The main reason is that extended leave for personal reasons is 
inappropriate when we are at war.”   
First during his tenure as Chief of Naval Operations, and later in his position as 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, ADM Mullen proactively led Navy leadership to 
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embrace a manpower strategy based not on political correctness, quotas, or affirmative 
action, but rather on simple math and talent. As discussed above, the demographics of 
the workforce continue to change and the talent base continues to shift.  For example, 
by 2008, 70 percent of people entering the workforce were women or minorities; 58 
percent of recent college graduates were women, with a projected 16 percent increase 
in the number of women with advanced degrees over the next decade.  Furthermore, for 
every two Baby Boomers leaving the work force, there is only one Generation X or 
Millennial to take their place.222  
Today’s women SWO officers especially, as documented by Clifton (2003), 
Sinclair (2004), Taylor (2005), Graham (2006), and Stoloff, et al. (2006), reject the 
example their predecessors set for a successful Navy career.  That is, they are unwilling 
function as if they were men, i.e., giving up children, throwing all their energy into their 
career at the expense of everything else, etc.  Women Navy officers223 today demand 
work-life balance, so that they can have a professional career without giving up the joys 
and challenges of parenting.  If the Navy cannot or will not make it possible for them to 
do both, women, SWO officers especially, are prepared to leave the service and have in 
large numbers over the last decade.  Compounding retention problems, even in a weak 
economy, civilian corporations and government agencies continue to view the junior 
military officer (JMO) population as a very attractive talent pool based on their early, 
                                            
 
222Taken from speaking notes of 2011 Task Force Life Work Integration and Human Capital for Defense 
Briefing by CAPT Ken Barrett, the Diversity Director, PowerPoint, formerly available for download at: 
http://www.public.navy.mil/bupers-npc/support/tflw/Pages/default.aspx; accessed March 17, 2014; no 
longer available at this link. 
223SWO career paths are much more rigid than those of enlisted personnel.  Enlisted women have a 
known Sea/shore rotation based upon their rating, making it far easier to plan and have a family.  
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significant leadership experience and drive to succeed, as compared to their civilian 
peers.   
Making the Surface Warfare Officer Community More Women-Friendly 
Under the current Surface Warfare Officer career path, with its flow points based 
upon male biology and traditional sex roles, the most intense years of an officer’s career 
progression coincide with a woman’s prime childbearing years – ages 25 to 37.  Thus, 
the Navy has historically had a much harder time retaining women Surface Warfare 
Officers, with the overall retention rate for women as recently as 2007 at 17 percent, 
compared with 35 percent for men (Wiltrout 2007).  The improvements that both male 
and female Surface Warfare Officers indicated they wanted – a more manageable 
workload, work/life balance, and a less rigid career path – were seen by Navy 
manpower leadership as keys to retaining both qualified officer and enlisted personnel 
across the Navy.224   
Therefore, on June 19, 2007, the Navy announced the formation of Task Force 
Life/Work (TFLW) in Naval Administrative Message (NAVADMIN) 159/07, the goal of 
which was to develop and implement policies, programs, and changes to enhance 
Sailors’ life/work balance by creating initiatives to address the emerging challenges the 
Navy faces in recruiting and retaining the next generation of 21st century leaders.  
According to then-LT Stephanie Miller, head of women’s policy for the Chief of Naval 
Personnel Diversity Directorate, “Improving life/work balance means recognizing that 
                                            
 
224 A significant number of men and women have indicated they desire these changes, although a higher 
percentage of women demand them due to the problems associated with trying to “time” a pregnancy on 
a not-to-interfere basis with a rigid career structure. 
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our Sailors need and want to maintain diverse interests in addition to their Navy 
commitment.  We’ve already taken the first step with the recently updated Pregnancy 
and Parenthood Instruction.  Over the next year, we anticipate being able to implement 
more programs that will enhance a healthy life/work balance” (Dixon 2007).225   
In the words of the Chief of Personnel at the time, then-Vice Admiral Harvey (O-
9), TFLW was not “looking for the ‘easy’ button; it [was] looking for the ‘better’ button”  
(Dixon 2007).  In more recent articulations TFLW’s stated goal has been “to enable 
life/work integration to increase retention of women and millennials in order to be able to 
effectively meet Navy mission requirements in the long-term” (Barrett 2011).  
Furthermore, according to the Chief of Naval Personnel’s Diversity Director, the goal of 
TFLW was not “to change 237 years of Navy history and tradition.”  Rather, the goal 
was “to build upon the best of our traditions while making changes to policy, law, and 
leadership perspective of generational diversity and life/work balance, to influence an 
overall culture change that improve[d] quality of life for Service members and families” 
(Barrett 2011).   
Family-friendly ideas now in practice as the result of TFLW include 
telecommuting, flexible work hours, and Career Intermission Pilot Program (CIPP), 
which was first authorized by Congress in the FY09 National Defense Authorization Act 
(NDAA) (Daniel 2012).226  Although policymakers are careful to point out that the CIPP 
is open to both women and men, officer and enlisted, the policy is widely perceived by 
                                            
 
225 Complete article available at: http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=30159; accessed 
August 24, 2014. 
226 CIPP, currently authorized through FY-2015, allows up to 20 officers and 20 enlisted each year to 
transfer into the reserves for up to three years – with benefits, although without pay – so sailors can 
pursue other life- or career-enhancing experiences such as study, travel, starting a family, or caring for an 
ailing relative. Complete article available at: http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=69807; 
accessed August 24, 2014.  
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Sailors of the fleet as a “career off-ramp for pregnancy” due to its origins distinctly being 
tied to attempts to improve retention of women SWOs (Daniel 2012).227  As a result of 
the recent TFLW-inspired changes to policy there is a growing difference in life choices 
between senior women SWOs and their more junior colleagues.  The Navy credits 
these changes with helping produce a new model for what a successful woman SWO’s 
life-choices can be and for improving retention among women SWOs.  Among women 
Commanders selected for command afloat in 2010, 72 percent were married and 42 
percent had children, as compared to their predecessors among whom only 42 percent 
were married and only 18 percent had children at the same point in their careers.  
Although the Navy’s efforts to make the workplace more woman friendly have been 
advertised as being aimed at both officer and enlisted personnel, in reality women 
Surface Warfare Officers have benefited far more from these changes than their 
enlisted counterparts.  
The Strategic Implications of Long-term Structural Changes in National Demographics  
In the meantime, at the strategic level of service management, Navy leaders 
whose job it was to focus on Navy manpower needs, both in the short term (the next 4-8 
years) and the long term (the next 20-30 years), struggled to understand why the past 
allure of the Navy seemed to have worn off and what to do about it.  Given that today’s 
five-year-olds will be the Sailors the Navy is recruiting in 2030, as one retired Admiral 
noted, “Our national security in 2030 is absolutely dependent on what’s going on in 
                                            
 
227 RADM Deborah Leower began attempts to establish such a sabbatical program to improve retention 
among women SWOs as far back as 2002, and her proposal had made it as far as the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense before it was killed in the budget battle (personal e-mail communication with author 
7FEB06) 
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kindergarten” right now (Christeson, Taggart, & Messner-Zidell 2009).  Perhaps for the 
very first time, the Navy as an organization had to recognize and confront evolving 
workforce demographics and the changing nature of generational expectations for life 
and work that were already familiar to civilian employers.   
Analysis of its work force revealed the Navy is comprised of two percent 
Boomers; fifty-five percent Generation X; and forty-three percent Millenials.  The 
differences in world view and motivational factors between these generations of workers 
could hardly be more profound.  The Navy’s most senior leaders began to realize that in 
terms of social policy, junior Sailors were much more progressive than their leaders or 
Navy policies.  Due to the physical demands on one’s body, regardless of the branch in 
which one serves, war tends to be a young person’s business.  In terms of both age and 
rank, like all the other services, the Navy’s structure looks like a pyramid.  The majority 
of the pyramid including its base is composed of young men and women who are junior 
officers and enlisted.  Most of the enlisted personnel are known as “first termers.”  Most 
will serve a single enlistment and leave the service, only to be replaced by an even 
younger cohort of first termers.228   
Officers may choose to make the service a career or depart after their initial 
service obligation or at any point along the career path to full retirement.  As one moves 
up the pyramid, whether looking at officers or enlisted personnel, people are older, more 
senior in rank, and fewer in number as they reach the 20-year service point and beyond.  
An extremely small number of the most senior officer and enlisted personnel remain in 
                                            
 
228 At any given time, the percentage of first-termers in the Navy ranges from 55-65%.  A number of 
factors affect the percentage of first-termers who choose to reenlist.  These include but are not limited to: 
quality of pay and benefits; operational tempo; strength of the economy; and degree of satisfaction with 
the military way of life. 
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the Navy 30 years or longer.  They form the pinnacle of the pyramid.  Thus, the 2 
percent of the Navy who are boomers are near the top or at the pinnacle of the pyramid.  
Although they outrank the members of Generation X and the Millennials, they are vastly 
outnumbered by the members of those two generational groups. Navy leaders began to 
realize their ideas about women and members of the LGB community appeared 
increasingly archaic to potential recruits of the millennial generation.   
Dwindling Propensity of the Nation’s Youth to Serve 
Beyond the nation’s changing demographics, but also of growing concern to 
Navy leaders and manpower planners was the declining “propensity to serve” among 
young American adults.  According to Dr. Curtis Gilroy, the Pentagon’s Director of 
Accessions Policy, less than 12 percent of young adults eligible for military service are 
interested in serving (Christeson, Taggart, & Messner-Zidell 2009 and 2010).  To further 
complicate matters, even among those young adults who may wish to serve, the military 
service eligibility of our nation’s youth is plunging.  By March 2009, the Pentagon had 
concluded that no more than 25 percent of the nation’s 17-24 year olds, the key 
demographic for first enlistment, was able to meet minimum entry standards for military 
service.  According to the Department of Defense, 35 percent are ineligible due to 
medical or physical problems, including the 27 percent who are obese; 18 percent are 
ineligible due to illegal drug use; 9 percent cannot pass the Armed Forces Qualification 
Test as the result of insufficient math or reading skills, or intellectual deficiencies; 10 
percent cannot join because they have been convicted of one or more felonies or 
serious misdemeanors; and 6 percent have too many dependents under age 18.  To 
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frame this problem in another way, in 2007 only 4.7 million of the 31.2 million 17- to 24-
year-olds were eligible to enlist.  It is possible to obtain waivers for some of these 
disqualifiers.  As of 2009, 1 in 5 recruits required such a waiver, with 66 percent of the 
waivers granted for issues of criminality/misconduct and approximately 33 percent for 
medical issues (McMichael 2009, Christeson, Taggart, & Messner-Zidell 2009 and 
2010).   
Faced with all of the data related to projected Navy manning requirements in 
2050; the nation’s changing demographics; inter-generational differences in motivation 
and propensity to serve; the dwindling numbers of 17- to 24-year-olds who could meet 
recruiting standards; and the ongoing difficulties the Surface Warfare Community was 
having in retaining junior officers, especially women; other Navy leaders in addition to 
ADM Mullen concluded that they were engaged in a battle for talent with the civilian 
world.  In order to continue attracting and retaining sufficient numbers of talented young 
men and women into service, they finally recognized dramatic change was required.   
Ensuring the Navy’s Diversity Reflects that of the Citizens it Serves: 
Table 6.1 (below) depicts projected changes in civilian workforce diversity from 
2009 through 2050 based upon Census Bureau data:   
 U.S. Workforce 
Demographics 
2009 (%) 
U.S. Workforce 
Demographics 
2020 (%) 
U.S. Workforce 
Demographics 
2050 (%) 
White 67 60 50 
African American 13 13 14 
Hispanic 14 18 24 
Asian – Pacific Islander/Native 
American 
4 9 12 
Multi-ethnic or declined to answer 2 - - 
 
Table 6.1 
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In comparison, Table 6.2 (below) depicts the Navy workforce diversity in 2010: 
 Navy  
Active Duty 
Enlisted 
Workforce 
2010 (%) 
Navy Total 
Active Duty 
Officer 
Workforce 
2010 (%) 
White 48 77 
African American 18 8 
Hispanic 18 6 
Asian - Pacific Islander/Native 
American 
10 5 
Multi-ethnic or declined to answer 6 4 
 
Table 6.2 
Table 6.2 (above) illustrates the 25 percent diversity gap between enlisted personnel 
who are 52 percent minority and officer personnel who are 77 percent white.  In 
comparison with the civilian population, Navy enlisted personnel are more diverse than 
the general population, whereas Navy officer personnel are significantly less diverse.  
These figures are problematic to those who believe that the best way to keep the 
volunteer military within a civic republic as closely linked to its citizenry as possible, is 
for that military to mirror in its own racial, ethnic, and economic composition the very 
people it serves.  
Recent top Navy leadership has been pragmatic about national demographic 
changes and the need to break out of the old manning model that depended 
overwhelmingly upon white men.  As a result of the programs and policies specifically 
aimed at making the Surface Warfare Community more women-friendly, rather than 
viewing their gender as a liability, many women SWOs in my study expressed the belief 
that they actually benefitted from their gender.  That is, their perception was that 
because the Navy is trying so hard to attract and, especially, to retain women Surface 
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Warfare Officers, that they actually experienced preferential treatment when compared 
to their male counterparts.  Examples of the perceived preferential treatment include 
offers of more prestigious, career-enhancing assignments and detailers working harder 
to please women including arranging spousal co-locations, possibly at the expense of 
single men, or married men with civilian spouses.229  So, rather than feeling they are 
being discriminated against, nearly all the women Surface Warfare Officers who 
participated in my study thought they were receiving somewhat preferential treatment 
compared to their male colleagues.  I call this perceived phenomenon the “pink 
escalator.” 
 For example, when asked what it was like to be a white woman SWO in the Navy 
today Andrea, the Operations Officer on a West Coast ship responded: 
I don’t really notice anything about it.  I don’t know, I think I’m treated the same 
as everyone else.  At times I do feel like because I’m a woman I have a bit of an 
advantage …Just because the Navy really wants women to stay in.  They really 
want women to be COs [Commanding Officers]. 
Andrea then provided an example of a time when she was treated differently than she 
thought a man would have been in the same circumstances: 
                                            
 
229 “Spousal Co-location” is the term given for assigning a married couple in the same geographic region.  
For example, the wife might be stationed on a ship home-ported out of San Diego, while her husband 
might be stationed at Camp Pendleton, CA, fifty miles up the coast. This arrangement is clearly preferable 
to the wife being stationed in Norfolk, VA while the husband is stationed at Camp Pendleton, CA.  In the 
past mil-to-mil (military husband and wife) couples more or less had to decide whose career was going to 
take precedence and whose career might suffer in order for the couple to be co-located.  This was often 
referred to as “lead-follow.”  The person whose career appeared to have the best potential for promotion 
was “lead” and the person whose career had less potential or who the couple mutually agreed would play 
second fiddle was “follow.”  In the past, the Navy really did not go out of its way to accommodate married 
couples.  The official position was “your spouse didn’t come in your seabag.” If mil-to-mil couples wanted 
to stay together, they had to work it out for themselves.  Today, the Navy works hard to help both parties 
get good jobs and stay together.  Before establishing these initiatives specifically to retain women, women 
Navy officers protested the inflexibility of the SWO career path by exiting the service.  This proved too 
costly to the Navy and resulted in insufficient numbers of people in certain year groups to meet future 
manpower requirements. 
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I released a message, it was the day after the change in command and it still had 
the old captain’s name on it and I… I actually said to myself “if I had been a guy, 
the XO would have lit me up,” but instead he just kind of looked at me and said, 
“don’t do it again.”  So, I have had that and at my second command I was the 
tactical communicator because the commodore wanted a woman’s voice on the 
radio, I was the only female there.  It was South American so he thought that the 
South American ships would really like that, you know, so there was that and 
then the one thing that I didn’t like was, my first command, they wanted a female 
to be legal officer because they just think that females are more organized and 
better with the paperwork. 
Rather than seeing the potential paternalistic sexism lurking within these examples, this 
officer viewed two of these three incidents as reflecting preferential treatment.  
Obviously, more focused research would need to be done to determine if women 
officers are actually receiving preferential treatment in an effort to boost their retention 
numbers.  
Policy versus Practice – Resistance to Diversity Initiatives Persists on the Deck Plates 
In many ways, ADM Mullen’s efforts to increase Navy diversity have been a 
struggle between “Big Navy”230 strategic manpower policy and individual beliefs and 
deck plate practice in the operational fleet.  Changing the culture of an organization is 
not easy, and that is exactly what ADM Mullen attempted to do.  Further, his policies, 
while enacted, continue to be met by males with some degree of compliance and some 
degree of resistance.   Most of the resistance is covert, but it spans the entire chain of 
command, from the most senior to the most junior.  Resistance in the Surface Warfare 
community is most obvious at the operational “pointy-end-of-the-spear,” on the 
deckplates of combatant ships in the fleet, where the culture is less infused with politics 
                                            
 
230 “Big Navy” is a term that refers to the Secretary of the Navy-level civilian and Department of the Navy 
senior military leadership in Washington that makes decisions and sets policy that must be carried out by 
the entire U.S. Navy. 
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than Headquarters staffs.  Due to the differential application of Navy justice depending 
on one’s status as officer or enlisted, resistance is more prevalent among the enlisted 
ranks.  Aboard ship many men are perfectly happy with masculine Navy culture, either 
the way it is at present, or, more likely, in its mythologized past, before the perceived 
era of “political correctness” that began with Tailhook and was widely viewed as 
escalating under DADT.   
It is unclear the degree to which the Aviation and Submarine communities have 
taken Admiral Mullen’s diversity initiatives to heart, especially those related to women.  
Neither the Aviation nor Submarine communities have experienced the same manpower 
problems that drove the Surface Warfare community to embrace women’s service more 
earnestly.  The circumstances which prompted the recent firings of the Commanding 
Officer of the USS ENTERPRISE and the former Commanding Officer of the Blue 
Angels strongly suggest the Aviation community still has a problem with a fraternity-like 
atmosphere and remains hostile to women Sailors.  Furthermore, the Submarine 
community was only recently opened to women officers.  Submariners have little to no 
experience working with women and many of these men may have intentionally elected 
to serve in the Submarine community for the express purpose of avoiding women.  No 
pun intended, but problems associated with gender integration will inevitably continue to 
surface in both these communities, despite diversity initiatives championed by the Chief 
of Naval Operations.  
 
   
 
 
 
 
419 
Attempts to Change Navy Culture 
Essentially, the magnitude of cultural change that Admiral Mullen tried to impose 
first upon the Navy, and subsequently upon the Department of Defense in his position 
as CJCS, was not dissimilar to that of Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, CNO from July 01, 1970 - 
June 29, 1974.  Perhaps not coincidentally for the diversity initiatives he would later 
undertake, Admiral Mullen was commissioned an Ensign in May 1968.  Zumwalt served 
as the CNO during four of Admiral Mullen’s first six formative Navy years.  As Admiral 
Zumwalt later recalled, “When I became Chief of Naval Operations, racism and sexism 
were still an integral part of the Navy tradition. There had never been a black admiral; 
black officers had few prospects for advancement; and women were not permitted to 
serve on ships” (Goldstein 2000).   
In 1970, Admiral Zumwalt issued what he would call his most important directive, 
''Equal Opportunity in the Navy.''  It required commanders of ships, bases, and aircraft 
squadrons to appoint a minority member as a special assistant for minority affairs, 
demanded that the Navy fight housing discrimination against black Sailors in cities 
where they were based, and required that books by and about black Americans be 
made available in Navy libraries.  ''There is no black Navy, no white Navy -- just one 
Navy -- the United States Navy,'' Admiral Zumwalt declared.  Another Z-Gram permitted 
women to serve on ships.  Because women were barred by law from ships that could be 
engaged in combat, a hospital ship, the Sanctuary, was designated in 1972 to break 
tradition, but not without protests from the wives of some enlisted men (Goldstein 2000).   
Whether he realized it or not, the quest ADM Mullen really embarked upon with 
his diversity initiatives of the late 2000s was to begin the process of undermining white, 
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male privilege within a masculine organization that has historically served a gender- and 
citizen-defining function within larger society.  History and Sailors may or may not think 
kindly of him.  When I entered the Navy in 1985, there was no shortage of “old salts” still 
bemoaning how Admiral Zumwalt had ruined the Navy.  As CNO, ADM Mullen 
attempted to change policy and set conditions so that diversity initiatives would survive 
his transfer and eventual retirement.  There is no guarantee that his efforts will 
ultimately succeed.  The Navy is on its second CNO since ADM Mullen, and, while it 
would be hard to rescind the policies and priorities aimed at increasing diversity across 
the force, it is entirely possible to keep the policies and enforce them with little 
enthusiasm or conviction.  At present, this outcome appears somewhat less likely due to 
the intense Congressional and media scrutiny directed at the entire Department of 
Defense, both as the result of the epidemic of military sexual assault and the Defense 
Secretary’s directive to open combat to women.  One can only hope that ADM Mullen’s 
successors embrace with all the zeal of the newly converted his view of diversity in the 
Navy as a strategic imperative.  Only time will tell. 
The Navy’s Two-Tier System of Justice: 
In the sections immediately following I will identify the differences in the way the 
Navy justice system handles problems in leadership and behavior among senior officer 
(CO and XO) and enlisted (CMDCM) personnel, and among more junior officers and 
enlisted service members.   Officer misconduct at any level is almost always a career-
ender.  Means to ending an officer’s career range from the public firing of a unit CO to 
the mere receipt by a junior or mid-grade officer of a mediocre fitness report and 
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unimpressive recommendations for future duty assignments.  In contrast, relatively 
minor misconduct on the part of enlisted service members is frequently handled at the 
lowest possible levels and they are given multiple opportunities to correct their 
deficiencies.   
Enlisted behavior is mostly monitored and misconduct corrected by senior 
enlisted and junior officer men.  As a result, offenses involving equal opportunity issues 
as they relate to women may never be addressed, or if addressed, may be addressed 
privately and informally with none of the adverse career implications one might expect, 
given the Navy’s stated “zero tolerance” for these kind of offences.  Instances of sexism, 
if not taken seriously by male senior enlisted and junior officer leadership who 
themselves may be skeptical of the Navy’s gender-integration efforts, may remain 
invisible to more senior officers and remain unaddressed by the official system of 
justice.  These differences contribute significantly to creating the disparity in officer and 
enlisted Navy women’s deckplate experiences of gender integration, with women 
officers benefitting most from the military justice system and enlisted women, especially 
junior enlisted women, benefitting least.  
Public Accountability for Senior Officers and Enlisted Leaders 
Aside from perceptions that the Navy is trying very hard to keep them happy and 
retain them on active duty, one of the primary reasons women Navy officers feel 
accepted in the workplace today is that they do not experience the same overt sexism, 
gender discrimination, or gender harassment their predecessors experienced.  A 
significant factor in the improved work environment is the fact that senior leaders are 
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more frequently being held publicly accountable when allegations are made about 
inappropriate behavior or hostile command climate.  Even when senior leaders 
personally believe all the old stereotypes (including that women should be barred from 
combat ships) many, though clearly not all, are finally figuring out that they must at least 
be perceived as supporting Military Equal Opportunity initiatives or potentially risk their 
careers.   If a unit CO fails to uphold, or even appears not to uphold equal opportunity 
standards within his or her command, he or she is potentially subject to formal 
complaints.    
Although there are rules against and mechanisms for addressing potential 
reprisal against whistle blowers, a Sailor who complains may quickly find him- or herself 
a target of retribution.  For that reason, very few Sailors ever lodge official complaints – 
even when the circumstances would clearly warrant it.  To preserve their careers, they 
put up with the intolerable situation until either they transfer or the person causing the 
intolerable situation does.  Still, most Navy personnel know the safest way to make 
allegations against their command senior leadership is through the anonymous “1-800” 
complaint hotline, rather than lodging a complaint with the immediate superior in the 
chain of command (ISIC), because hotline complaints move down the chain of 
command whereas complaints to the immediate superior move up the chain of 
command.231  Sailors also know that complaining via the anonymous hotline guarantees 
a higher level of scrutiny because of the politics involved at each echelon.  If a Sailor 
                                            
 
231 The Immediate Superior in the Chain of Command (ISIC) is the unit Commanding Officer’s 
Commanding Officer. For example, the Captain of a Navy ship reports to the Squadron Commander.  If 
the ship’s CO holds the rank of Commander (O-5) he/she will report to a Captain (O-6).  If the ship’s CO 
holds the rank of Captain (O-6) she/he will report to a Rear Admiral (O-7).  Squadron Commanders report 
to Battle Group Commanders, etc.  
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complains to the ISIC, there is no guarantee how far up the chain that complaint will be 
reported.  In fact, it is in the ISIC’s best interest to limit knowledge of such complaints to 
the lowest level possible as the ISIC’s immediate superior may view the ISIC as a failed 
leader if the commanding officers who report to him/her come under scrutiny for 
allegations of misconduct.   
Unfortunately, the Navy justice system, especially the bureaucratic machinery 
associated with anonymous complaints lodged at the service or Department of Defense 
level, treats accused commanders and other senior leaders (Executive Officers, 
Command Master Chiefs (CMDCMs) as guilty-until-proven-innocent out of concern for 
how things look from a political perspective, contrary to the stated norms for our civilian 
system of justice.  As a result, the anonymous complaint system has been successfully 
used against Commanding Officers as a means of exacting revenge.  If a complaint is 
lodged via hotline, the accused CO will, no doubt, be fired if the allegations are 
substantiated.  The accused CO may even be fired if the specific allegations are not 
substantiated but other issues of concern surface during the course of the investigation.  
A CO can be fired with little more justification than his or her immediate superior’s “loss 
of confidence in the individual’s ability to command.”   
The outcome of any complaint against command leadership really depends 
upon: (1) the nature of the allegations; (2) the existence of witnesses or documentary 
evidence; and (3) the immediate superior’s backbone.  An immediate superior might be 
more concerned with being seen as vigorously enforcing Navy policies and ethical 
standards by his/her boss than with getting to the truth.  The outcome of allegations 
may also depend upon the disposition of the immediate superior toward the accused 
 
 
 
 
424 
officer.  If the immediate superior has a good opinion of the accused, the investigation 
may be confined strictly to the allegations as presented and any corrective action meted 
out may be mild.  If the immediate superior has a poor opinion of the accused, the 
investigation may become a “fishing expedition” for problems the immediate superior 
may already suspect exist and any punishment imposed may be fairly harsh.  Although 
the investigation is supposed to be conducted fairly and impartially and without the 
“undue command influence” of the ISIC or others higher in the chain of command, it 
would be naïve to think these conditions always prevail.   
Senior officers and enlisted personnel in positions of command leadership  (COs, 
XOs, CMDCMs) must always be worried about being accused of misconduct, whether 
justly or unjustly, whereas more junior Sailors, whether officer or enlisted, who would 
lodge complaints, must always be worried that they may just as likely reap retribution as 
justice. The Navy justice system can be formidable when mobilized.  However, 
obtaining actual justice under the existing system is a bit of a crap shoot, because the 
dice are politically loaded.   The majority of officers and senior enlisted in positions of 
command leadership take the potential threat posed by the Navy justice system to heart 
and act accordingly.  However, far too many suffer from a shocking level of hubris that 
apparently makes them think either that the rules do not apply to them; that they will not 
be caught; or that they have the power and ability to manipulate the outcome if caught 
(see Appendix F for examples).  This problem is not unique to the Navy.  Ludwig and 
Longenecker (1993) called the phenomenon of ethical failures and misconduct among 
otherwise successful senior corporate executives “The Bathsheba Syndrome.” 
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The tension within the Navy justice system between the threat of exposed bad 
behavior by command leadership, whose behavior is scrutinized by the crew twenty-four 
hours a day, seven days a week, and the disinclination of the vast majority of more 
junior Navy personnel to risk the potential wrath of the system by making accusations, is 
perfectly illustrated by the relatively recent case of Captain Owen Honors.  On January 
4, 2011 Captain Honors was relieved of command of the aircraft carrier USS 
ENTERPRISE by Admiral John C. Harvey Jr., Commander Fleet Forces Command, for 
what the Navy described as a "profound lack of good judgment and professionalism" in 
making and showing to his crew raunchy comic videos while serving as executive officer 
of ENTERPRISE from July 2005 through September 2007, almost four years earlier.232  
During the period October 2005 through December 2007 out of 55 total “XO Movie 
Night” videos produced under the direction and control of the ENTERPRISE Executive 
Officers (Captain Honors and his successor, Captain Dixon), at least 25 contained 
sections that are contrary to acceptable standards: 
Specifically, there were scenes of simulated exposure of genitals; implied 
masturbation; simulated rectal examinations; inclusion of pornographic pictures 
and clips; depictions of shared showers; references to prostitution in foreign 
ports; sexually suggestive language and innuendo; eating excrement and 
drinking urine; negative portrayals of a ship Department Head; homosexual slurs; 
ridicule of individual Sailors (e.g. referring to them as “gay”); drinking alcohol on 
the ship; and gratuitous profanity (Harvey 2011). 
Despite what appears to be behavior clearly in violation of Navy equal 
opportunity standards, no formal complaint was ever lodged by any of the 5000 Sailors 
                                            
 
232 The videos were filmed on the ship and broadcast aboard USS ENTERPRISE via the Shipboard 
Information, Training, and Entertainment closed-circuit television system (SITE-TV) on Saturday evenings 
when the ship was underway.  The XO’s videos were about 5 minutes long and preceded ship-wide 
broadcast of a commercially-produced, recently released, major motion picture, such as Ironman or The 
Dark Knight Rises.   
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serving aboard the ship in the course of this more than two-year period.  The 
investigation that followed publication of the videos found that there were indeed 
complaints and concerns expressed aboard USS ENTERPRISE that Captain Honors 
discounted and even mocked in subsequent videos.  Following his XO tour Honors had 
also successfully commanded the East Coast flag ship, USS MOUNT WHITNEY, before 
returning to the ENTERPRISE as Commanding Officer.   
The videos finally came to Big Navy’s attention and public notice when the 
electronic files were made available to the Virginian-Pilot in December 2010, nearly four 
years after they were first broadcast, by someone who had access to them.  It is highly 
likely that the Virginian-Pilot’s source for these video files had served aboard the ship 
during the period when they were produced and broadcast.  It is also likely that the 
source waited to make the videos public until he or she was no longer assigned to the 
USS ENTERPRISE, and thus no longer subject to overt or covert reprisal from the chain 
of command or fellow crewmembers if the source were suspected to be the “leak.”  
When Admiral Harvey received the results of the formal investigation (see 
Beaman 2011), he recommended that Captain Honors be formally detached for cause 
(fired) and required to show cause for retention (convince the Navy it should not kick 
him out).  Admiral Harvey further recommended the Secretary of the Navy issue 
Captain Honors a Secretarial Letter of Censure for “his violations of expected standards 
of personal and professional behavior and his profound lack of judgment in connection 
with [the] videos” (Harvey 2011).  Admiral Harvey also directed that a copy of the 
investigation and his endorsement of it to be entered into Captain Honor’s service 
record.   
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Admiral Harvey told a group of reporters assembled in his Naval Station Norfolk 
office that "while Captain Honors' performance as Commanding Officer of 
ENTERPRISE has been without incident, his profound lack of good judgment and 
professionalism … calls into question his character, and undermines his credibility to 
continue to serve effectively in command."   Harvey further noted, "It is a fact that as 
Naval Officers, we are held — indeed, we must be held — to higher standards of 
performance and conduct.  Those in command must exemplify the Navy's core values 
of honor, courage and commitment, which we expect our Sailors to embrace and call 
their own" (McMichael 2011).233   To drive these points home Admiral Harvey also took 
the unprecedented action of holding other more junior members of the crew as well as 
more senior leadership accountable for Captain Honor’s leadership failures.  Ultimately, 
Admiral Harvey took the following actions: 
• He forwarded to the Chief of Naval Operations a recommendation that the 
Secretary of the Navy issue Secretarial Letters of Censure to the following officers: 
                                            
 
233 Nave Core Values consist of three basic principles as articulated below:  
Honor: "I will bear true faith and allegiance ..." Accordingly, we will: Conduct ourselves in the highest 
ethical manner in all relationships with peers, superiors and subordinates; Be honest and truthful in our 
dealings with each other, and with those outside the Navy; Be willing to make honest recommendations 
and accept those of junior personnel; Encourage new ideas and deliver the bad news, even when it is 
unpopular; Abide by an uncompromising code of integrity, taking responsibility for our actions and keeping our 
word; Fulfill or exceed our legal and ethical responsibilities in our public and personal lives twenty-four hours a day. 
Illegal or improper behavior or even the appearance of such behavior will not be tolerated. We are accountable for 
our professional and personal behavior. We will be mindful of the privilege to serve our fellow Americans.  
Courage: "I will support and defend ..." Accordingly, we will have: courage to meet the demands of our profession 
and the mission when it is hazardous, demanding, or otherwise difficult; Make decisions in the best interest of the 
navy and the nation, without regard to personal consequences; Meet these challenges while adhering to a higher 
standard of personal conduct and decency; Be loyal to our nation, ensuring the resources entrusted to us are used in 
an honest, careful, and efficient way. Courage is the value that gives us the moral and mental strength to do what is 
right, even in the face of personal or professional adversity.  
Commitment: "I will obey the orders ..." Accordingly, we will: Demand respect up and down the chain of command; 
Care for the safety, professional, personal and spiritual well-being of our people; Show respect toward all people 
without regard to race, religion, or gender; Treat each individual with human dignity; Be committed to positive change 
and constant improvement; Exhibit the highest degree of moral character, technical excellence, quality and 
competence in what we have been trained to do. The day-to-day duty of every Navy man and woman is to work 
together as a team to improve the quality of our work, our people and ourselves.  
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• Capt. John Dixon, Executive Officer of Enterprise for the period September 
2007 to June 2009; 
o Rear Adm. Lawrence Rice, Commanding Officer of Enterprise for the 
period January 2005 to May 2007;  
o Rear Adm. Ron Horton, Commanding Officer of Enterprise for the 
period May 2007 to May 2010  
 
• He issued non-punitive letters of caution to the two strike group commanders 
embarked in Enterprise during the ship's 2006 and 2007 deployments:  
o Rear Adm. Raymond Spicer and  
o Vice Adm. Daniel Holloway,  
 
Admiral Harvey further requested that a copy of the investigation, as well as his 
endorsement, be entered into each of the aforementioned officers' permanent military 
records. 
• He counseled the carrier air wing commander and destroyer squadron 
commodore, embarked in Enterprise during the ship's 2006 deployment: 
o Rear Adm. Gregory Nosal and  
o Rear Adm. Clifford Sharpe (US Fleet Forces Command 2011).234 
 
Admiral Harvey specifically singled out the ENTERPRISE Department Heads, 
Command Master Chiefs (CMDCM)235 (from both ship’s company and embarked units), 
and Special Assistants, specifically the Chaplains, Staff Judge Advocates, Public Affairs 
Officers, Ship Secretary, and Equal Opportunity Advisor as failing in their duties.  His 
                                            
 
234 Story Number: NNS110303-20 searchable at www.navy.mil. Release Date: 3/3/2011 4:40:00 PM;  
http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=58910; accessed August 24, 2014. 
235 Command Master Chiefs are specially screened, selected, and trained to fill the position of command 
senior enlisted advisor.  The CMDCM provides leadership and oversight to the Chiefs’ Mess at each 
command.  The Chiefs’ Mess (all the Chief Petty Officers assigned to a command) may bring 
administrative or operational issues of concern to the Master Chief who might then address these 
problems with the command XO or CO.  The CMDCM serves both a leadership and an intermediary 
function at the command. 
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most stinging criticism was that “as individuals and as the professional leadership of 
ENTERPRISE in their own right, they did not measure up to Navy Core Values” in that 
they allowed “a low standard of personal behavior to become the accepted norm” 
because they did not forcefully speak truth to power (Harvey 2011).  Ultimately, Admiral 
Harvey issued non-punitive letters of caution to 32 of these officers, senior enlisted 
Sailors and Sailors who he concluded had demonstrated deficiencies in personal 
behavior or professional judgment related to the production and broadcast of the videos.  
As one Navy official noted at the time, "The culture has changed.  What was once 
acceptable thirty years ago is very clearly not acceptable now" (McMichael 2011).236   
Changing Standards for the Behavior of Leadership 
In addition to aggressively addressing obvious leadership failures and 
misconduct, the Navy has begun to reject old forms of masculine leadership, which may 
or may not ultimately influence the form of masculinity that is hegemonic in the Navy.  
Increasingly conscious of negative national publicity, the Navy no longer tolerates 
leaders who exhibit abusive or authoritarian leadership styles.  In the not-too-distant 
past the Captain’s rule was absolute law and he could almost behave as badly as he 
wanted with impunity, so long as he accomplished his assigned mission(s).  For 
example, between 1989 and 1990, one Navy Captain, who was destined for selection to 
                                            
 
236 It should be noted, CAPT Honors and most of the senior officers disciplined were aviators.  Naval 
Aviators have their own unique culture and far fewer manpower concerns than the Surface Navy.  As a 
result, the Navy Aviation community is not as advanced in its acceptance of women pilots, especially 
those who aspire to fly the still-sexy carrier-based fighter or attack jets, as the SWO community is of 
women driving and fighting warships.  It is typical for “front running” aviators to serve first as aircraft 
carrier XOs and later as aircraft carrier COs.  Successful tours in these two positions are one route for 
aviators to be selected for promotion to admiral.  Prior to the exposure of these old, offensive videos 
Captain Honors certainly appeared to be on track to be selected for promotion to Admiral.  Admiral 
Harvey, the man imposing the discipline in this case, was a Surface Warfare Officer. 
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Admiral, commanded the newly commissioned USS WASP (LHD-1).  He was known 
throughout the East Coast amphibious fleet for being a “screamer”—for reprimanding 
Sailors, both officers and enlisted, in public, and assigning punishment designed to 
publicly humiliate.  Of course, it was a ship full of men, but he would frequently get on 
the ship’s internal public address system to exhort his crew to “keep their stingers 
up.”237  He was a waterfront terror whose bad reputation preceded him, and yet he was 
rewarded for what he accomplished through fear and intimidation by being promoted to 
Admiral so he could terrorize and intimidate a lot more people.  He was forced to retire 
in the mid-1990s only after being arrested by local civilian authorities for driving under 
the influence.   
In comparison, in less than a decade, this type of behavior in Navy leadership is 
no longer acceptable, in men or women (Thompson 2010a and 2010b).  As an 
institution the Navy has begun to recognize that no one deserves to be verbally or 
emotionally abused, and that leaders who use such tactics really are not good leaders. 
Although leaders today are still held accountable and responsible, they are also 
expected to exhibit an evenness of hand and stability of temperament that motivates 
people, not through fear, but through a genuine desire to perform satisfactorily.  In 1996, 
while my husband was on a six-month deployment to the Arabian Gulf, a male 
Commanding Officer on one of the other Navy ships in the Gulf was fired for being 
verbally abusive as well as for striking his helmsman.  My husband’s own Commanding 
Officer was relieved for abusive behavior and poor judgment shortly after his ship 
                                            
 
237 Men who worked directly for me embarked in USS WASP to conduct ship’s well deck qualifications.  
They related, in great detail and with great incredulity, the miseries they suffered and the indignities they 
witnessed while embarked.  
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returned to home port.   One of the charges that was substantiated and for which Graf 
was fired was “verbal assault.”  Crewmembers at her earlier commands had previously 
but unsuccessfully complained about Graf’s abusive leadership.  The fact that it took 
longer to get CAPT Holly Graf, CO of USS COWPENS, fired for the same type of 
behavior has been widely attributed to both her status as a trailblazer in the Surface 
Navy and her gender (Thompson 2010a and 2010b).   
By 2003, the Navy had established a “high water mark” by firing twenty-six 
Commanding Officers that year. More recently, it fired fifteen in 2009; sixteen in 2010; 
twenty-three in 2011; twenty-five in 2012 (Stars and Stripes 2012);238 and sixteen in 
2013.   Beginning in 2011, along with the names of the Commanding Officers fired 
during the year, the Navy Times also began to publish the names of Executive Officers 
and CMDCMs.239  The Navy has, especially within the officer segment of the Surface 
Warfare Community, what is commonly referred to as a “zero defects mentality.”  That 
is, most people who make mistakes, exhibit “poor judgment,” or violate regulations, 
especially those serving in CO, XO, or CMDCM positions, find their careers effectively 
ended, either through disciplinary or administrative means.  There are very few chances 
to recover or learn from one’s mistakes in this respect.   
 
 
                                            
 
238 Stars and Stripes December 13, 2012. http://www.stripes.com/news/navy/navy-commanders-relieved-
of-duty-in-2012-1.168999; accessed August 24, 2014.  
239 See Appendix F for a comprehensive listing of unit Commanding Officers, Executive Officers, and 
Command Master Chiefs who have been fired, along with summaries of the reasons they were fired and 
internet links to associated press reports where available. 
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Internal Accountability for Junior Officers and Enlisted Personnel 
In contrast to the public manner in which many complaints (either via the chain of 
command or the anonymous complaint hotline) against a unit’s senior leadership (CO, 
XO, CMDCM) are handled by higher authority, within their own commands, COs are 
often able to keep allegations and legal proceedings against more junior personnel out 
of the public eye.  Within individual units, when a complaint is lodged against an officer 
or enlisted person other than the CO, XO, or CMDCM, depending upon the nature of 
the allegations, the investigation and any ensuing administrative or disciplinary action 
are entirely at the discretion of the CO.  This is especially true in cases where charges 
are not referred to Court-Martial.  A CO may dismiss charges or punish an enlisted 
Sailor at Captain’s Mast, the Navy’s non-judicial punishment (NJP) process.  The results 
of Captain’s Mast are not made public beyond the command.  In August 2013, in a bid 
for greater transparency in the justice system, the Navy began announcing the results of 
all courts-martial across the fleet on a monthly basis.  A July 2013 announcement had 
included results of all courts-martial conducted by the Navy from January through July 
of 2013.   
For enlisted personnel, performance and behavior problems are traditionally 
handled at the lowest possible level.  A first minor offense, being late to work by 30 
minutes for example, may be handled by the Division Chief, an enlisted person.  The 
punishment for this offense will be more “instructional” in nature than outright 
punishment.  The Chief might have the Sailor report to quarters 30 minutes early and 
take morning muster (attendance) for a week so the Sailor realizes the importance of 
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getting to work on time.  The Division Chief might refer a second incidence of minor 
unauthorized absence to the Division Officer.  The Division Officer might refer a third 
such offense to the Department Head.  Neither the Division Officer nor the Department 
Head have NJP authority.  The most they can do is counsel the Sailor and order more 
Extra Military Instruction (EMI) aimed at educating the Sailor and eliminating the 
problem behavior.  EMI is intended to be instructional in nature, not punitive.  EMI 
assigned must be directly related to the Sailor’s misbehavior as in the example provided 
above.   
If a pattern of unauthorized absence develops, or if a Sailor commits more 
serious misconduct, say sleeping on watch or drunk on duty, the formal NJP process 
would be used.  Even when charges are formally written up, a Sailor may make it only 
as far as Executive Officer’s Investigation (XOI).  The XO has the power to dismiss the 
charges.  The XO might drop charges of drunk on duty if the otherwise “good” Sailor 
successfully completes a course on using alcohol responsibly, after the XO gives 
him/her a good “ass chewing.”  If the Sailor charged with “drunk on duty” is widely 
regarded as a “problem child,” he or she will likely be heading to Captain’s Mast.  
Frequently, XOI is used as a forum for putting “the fear of God” into a salvageable Sailor 
who has made some bad choices in an attempt to get him or her back on “the straight 
and narrow.”  If this behavior modification technique does not work, or if the charges are 
of a serious nature, the Sailor is referred to Captain’s Mast at XOI.  Even if the Sailor 
goes all the way to Captain’s Mast, the Commanding Officer still might opt to dismiss 
the charges after a “character building” lecture focused on conveying why the behavior 
in question is not acceptable in the Navy.  Punishment for offenses can be awarded 
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only by the Commanding Officer via the NJP process and might include a fine, forfeiture 
of pay and allowances for some period of months, reduction in rank, restriction to the 
ship or base for a designated period, and/or extra duty.   
In contrast, officers generally do not go to Mast but when they do it is conducted 
by the first Admiral in the officer’s chain of command.  More often, if misconduct of 
some kind is substantiated, a civilian charge of DUI for example, the officer will be 
counseled and the incident adversely commented upon in the officer’s next fitness 
report.  The officer’s fitness report marks will also be lowered. That is all it takes to end 
a junior officer’s career.  Actual criminal behavior is often required for an officer to be 
convicted and awarded punishment under the Uniform Code of Military Justice.   In 
general, the UCMJ and military justice system of formal punishment are much more 
frequently used against enlisted personnel than officers.  Even when the misconduct or 
crime is the same, officers frequently get lighter punishment than enlisted Sailors.  
Administratively ending an officer’s career is generally regarded as being far more 
punitive than almost any punishment meted out via the NJP process.  
The point of this process example is to illustrate how misbehavior by enlisted 
personnel judged as relatively minor might be discounted, dismissed, or not effectively 
addressed at multiple levels within the command and that it may never be brought to the 
attention of the XO or CO.  If we use the example of the sexist male third class petty 
officer described in Chapter 3 it is easy to see how sexism at the lowest levels might be 
allowed to persist, perhaps even flourish, and not be addressed via counseling, let 
alone the NJP process.  In the example provided in Chapter 3, the woman petty officer 
turned down a promotion because she knew she would have a daily fight on her hands 
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to manage her sexist colleague, who was the same rank as she but who would have 
been junior in terms of positional authority.  Even though she told her chain of 
command, to at least the level of Leading Chief, that this male petty officer had 
problems with women, none of those more senior men did anything to correct the 
behavior of the male third class petty officer. Even if the woman third class petty officer 
had formally charged her male colleague with sexism, the charges might never progress 
beyond the Department Head or Executive Officer.  Rather than using the Navy 
disciplinary system to enforce existing equal opportunity standards, her enlisted chain of 
command provided the young male petty officer their consent for his continued sexist 
insubordination through their silence. In this particular real-life example, rather than 
addressing the issue of sexism and gender-based insubordination, her male leaders 
chose to view her decision to turn down the career-enhancing chance at leadership as a 
matter of her choice rather than as a consequence of a potentially hostile work 
environment they were allowing to flourish.   
If the allegations of sexism240 had made it to Captain’s Mast, the CO (most likely 
a male) could dismiss the charges, especially if it is a case of “he said/she said.”  
Officers are taught to “look out for [their] people.”  If possible, Unit COs tend to give 
good performers the benefit of the doubt when a clear determination of guilt cannot be 
made.  (Because most COs are men, most COs are likely to self-identify with men who 
are accused of sexism.)  Even when male COs have daughters of whom they are 
protective, they can never truly see themselves in the woman’s position because the 
idea of doing so is so foreign to most male lives that it cannot exert meaningful influence 
                                            
 
240 As discussed earlier, there is no UCMJ article that treats sexism as an offense.  It is likely the male 
petty officer’s sexism would be charged as “provoking speeches and gestures,” disobeying a lawful order 
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on the justice process.  A man might have trouble seeing himself in a woman’s shoes, 
but he would have no trouble placing himself in a man’s shoes -- wondering how he 
might react if he were (falsely?) accused.  In “he said/she said” circumstances, there is 
always the fear that men are being unjustly accused by “powerful” women.241  
The differences in the way the Navy handles justice and discipline depending 
upon one’s status as an officer or enlisted have unintentionally contributed to the 
differential outcome in working environment for women officers and enlisted personnel.  
Male officers, aware of how easily their careers can be derailed by accusations of 
sexual harassment or gender discrimination, are much less likely to display these 
behaviors openly and much more cautious in their dealings with their female colleagues.   
Most wardrooms are relatively small and most Commanding Officers, in their desire to 
successfully complete their command tour, make abundantly clear to their officers that 
they will harshly punish such offensive and discriminatory behavior.  Because the 
wardrooms are small, and officers are frequently thrown together in meetings and at 
meals, it is easier for the COs, XOs, and Department Heads to observe and police the 
behavior of more junior officers.   
In contrast, the CO must rely on his more junior officers and senior enlisted to 
maintain these same standards at their respective levels of the chain of command.  As 
previously noted, although Navy leaders at the highest echelons establish policies, 
individual unit leaders must put them into practice.  Commanding Officers may set the 
tone but they also must rely on their subordinates to convey that same tone by 
upholding established standards in both intent and spirit.  Unfortunately, all-too-often as 
                                            
 
241 See Miller (1997) for a complete discussion of military men’s perceptions of military women as wielding 
un-earned power merely for being women in an increasingly “politically correct” military. 
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one work’s one’s way down the chain of command, that message gets lost, is under-
enforced, or is outright disregarded.  This means that enlisted women, especially those 
most isolated due to serving in non-traditional ratings, often do not experience the same 
feeling of acceptance from their peers that women officers enjoy.  Indeed, they are more 
likely to experience men’s overt hostility.  The class-based, Officer/Enlisted differences 
in the military justice system have inadvertently produced the incongruent situation in 
which gender relations are described as generally being good at the same time as an 
epidemic of military sexual assaults rages on, unabated.  
In addition to the indirect influence these more subtle, intervening variables exert 
over gender relations, the Navy’s failure to acknowledge and directly address the power 
relations inherent in the present system of gender contribute to its on-going issues with 
sexual harassment and sexual assault. In the following section, I will explore the 
problems inherent in the Navy’s existing approach to curbing sexual harassment and 
assault.  
Sexual Harassment and Assault as Problems Rather than as Symptoms 
While ostensibly promoting equal opportunity and work place equity, the Navy 
still does not address issues of gender harassment.  None of the Department of 
Defense or Navy regulations dealing with equal opportunity or sexual harassment define 
or even mention “sexism” or “gender harassment.”242  In contrast, sexual harassment is 
                                            
 
242 See:  DoD Directive 1350.2 addressing Department of Defense Military Equal Opportunity (MEO) 
Program of 18Aug1995, incorporating Change 1 of 7May1997, certified current as of 21Nov2003; 
Secretary of the Navy Instruction (SECNAVINST) 5300.26D of 3Jan2006 addressing Department of the 
Navy (DON) Policy on Sexual Harassment; SECNAVINST 5350.16A of 18Dec2006 addressing Equal 
Opportunity (EO) within the Department of the Navy (DON); Chief of Naval Operations Instruction 
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clearly defined and procedures for addressing it are clearly delineated.   Apparently it is 
assumed that issues of sexism and gender harassment are adequately covered by 
existing equal opportunity laws and regulations prohibiting discrimination generally and 
that such violations, when they occur, will be obvious.  As the axiom goes, there is 
power in naming.  For example, while acknowledging the practice of sexual harassment 
as centuries old, Seigel (2003) dates the origin of the term, and its subsequent use in 
successful court litigation to “a conscious-raising session Lin Farley held in 1974 as part 
of a Cornell University course on women and work” (p. 8).  In other words, it was not 
until we had a term for and definition of the behavior that the legal system could be 
mobilized to address the problem.  
Because there is an institutional failure to define or name issues of sexism and 
gender harassment as very real problems, or even attempt to articulate what sexism or 
gender harassment in daily practice might look like, these types of behavior are harder, 
if not impossible, to effectively combat.  Sailors are not specifically trained about them, 
and women feel less able to report them.  Even if women do report sexism or gender 
harassment, without the right tools and training, military leaders (even those at the 
command level) may either discount the problem as “trivial” or have no idea precisely 
how to address it.  It is no wonder women are reluctant to file complaints, when doing so 
may bring both negative attention upon themselves and little relief (if any) from the 
problem.  As a result, by deploying a more subtle, yet still power-infused, gatekeeping in 
the form of gender harassment, men hostile to women’s presence are largely able to 
inoculate themselves against accusations of misconduct.  
                                                                                                                                            
 
(OPNAVINST) 5354.1F with Change 1 of 20SEP11 incorporated addressing Navy Equal Opportunity 
Policy 
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A growing body of research identifies sexism as what I have come to regard as a 
“gateway hostility.”  Academic research shows that sexism leads to gender harassment 
(Gallagher & Parrott 2011).  In work environments in which gender harassment is 
permitted, there is often a higher incidence of sexual harassment (Firestone & Harris 
1994; Culbertson & Rosenfield 1994; Olson & Merrill 2000; Harned, Ormerod, Palmieri, 
Collinsworth, & Reed 2002; Vogt, Bruce, Street, & Stafford 2007; Gallagher & Parrott 
2011; and LeardMann, et al. 2013).  In turn, workplace sexual harassment is a 
precursor to co-worker on co-worker sexual assault (Sadler, Booth, Cook, Torner, & 
Doebbeling 2001; Sadler, Booth, Cook, & Doebbeling 2003; Harned, Ormerod, Palmieri, 
Collinsworth, & Reed 2002; Gallagher & Parrott 2011; and LeardMann, et al. 2013).  
Accordingly, I argue there is a continuum of hostility toward women who enter 
occupations socially defined as “male.”  Unfortunately, the Navy does not acknowledge 
that full continuum, and only begins to take notice and react when the hostility reaches 
the level of sexual harassment or sexual assault.  To a large degree the Navy has only 
begun to more seriously address issues of sexual harassment and sexual assault 
because of pressure from:  Congress; external advocacy groups, like the Service 
Women’s Action Network (SWAN);243 the mainstream media; and documentary film 
makers, such as Kirby Dick and Amy Zeiring (The Invisible War).  
                                            
 
243 SWAN is a civil rights organization that was founded and is run by veterans.  It proactively advocates 
for service women’s rights and exposes inequities in their treatment.  For example, a recent (Nov 2013) 
research report prepared by the Veteran’s Legal Services Clinic at Yale Law School and issued by SWAN 
in partnership with the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) exposed inequities in the diagnosis of 
PTSD in men and women by the Veteran’s Administration. Among the key findings: VA granted disability 
benefit claims for PTSD related to MST at a significantly lower rate than claims for PTSD unrelated to 
MST every year from 2008 to 2012. The grant rate for MST-related PTSD claims has lagged behind the 
grant rate for other PTSD claims by between 16.5 and 29.6 percentage points every year. 
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As a result of the failure to recognize the importance of lesser forms of sexism 
and gender harassment as precursors to more egregious behavior, the military 
response to sexual harassment and military sexual assault is primarily reactive and 
interventionist rather than preventative.  As noted earlier, sexual harassment and 
military sexual assault are treated as problems, rather than as symptoms of a larger 
problem.  In focusing narrowly on changes to the military justice system and relying 
solely on legal remedies to crimes already committed, the Department of Defense and 
Congress ignore a continuum of hostility that begins at the most benign end of the 
spectrum with everyday sexism and ends with rape at the most destructive end of the 
spectrum.  The Pentagon’s legalistic approach to these issues does nothing to address 
the underlying problem. To truly eliminate sexual harassment, and sexual assault, the 
Department of Defense needs to focus on a strategy for prevention by engaging the 
problem at its earliest points of expression:  sexism and gender harassment.    
Research by Thomas and Thomas (1997) resulted in their recommendation to raise 
awareness of the concept of gender discrimination in the ranks as early as two decades 
ago, with the Navy, unfortunately, paying little heed.  
Given the link between sexual harassment in the workplace and the incidence of 
sexual assault by co-workers, leadership at all levels is central to eliminating these 
problems within the Navy and across the Department of Defense (Firestone & Harris 
1997).  If leaders do not address sexist attitudes and comments among men when 
women are not present, they are sending the message that they agree with those 
beliefs (Hillman 2009).  Unfortunately, the job of minimizing if not eradicating sexism 
and gender harassment may be made more difficult by new forms of technology and 
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social media.  Various innovative and constantly evolving forms of social media give 
military men new, potentially covert, communications channels and new electronic 
“communities” in which they can freely express their actual opinions of their women 
colleagues. See, for example, the Marine Corps Times244 story of March 20, 2014 by 
Martin Matishak “On Policy Allowing Women into Combat, Marines Prepared to Seek 
Exceptions” and public comments associated with this story.245 (Actually, one could 
probably google search “women in combat” and select any article at random to get a 
typical hostile reaction to the idea by present and former military men.)  Even when 
using their real names to comment on stories in Navy Times or Marine Corps Times via 
facebook, true believers in male superiority make little attempt to conceal the contempt 
and hostility they bear for their women colleagues.  In more anonymous venues, those 
that do not use facebook to manage comments and allow the poster to create his or her 
own often-fictional screen name, such as on newspaper websites like those of the San 
Diego Union-Tribune, or the Virginian-Pilot (Norfolk), men can freely express their 
sexism and hostility to women’s presence.   
Men can also text each other on their personnel cell phones while at work to 
covertly convey sexist comments to their male colleagues or instant message one 
another on Navy computers.  In fact, in the case of the Blue Angels Commanding 
Officer who was fired for permitting a hostile work environment (previously discussed in 
Chapter 4) the squadron wardroom used “GroupMe,” a commercial group text 
                                            
 
244 Military Times, Navy Times, Marine Corps Times, Army Times, and Air Force Times are published by 
Gannett Government Media, a subsidiary of Gannett Co, Inc., the largest newspaper publisher in the 
United States.  They are a commercial, independent source for news and information on their respective 
services, or in the case of Military Times, for all the services.  
245 Available at: http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/article/20140321/CAREERS/303210039/On-policy-
allowing-women-into-combat-Marines-prepared-seek-exceptions; accessed August 24, 2014. 
 
 
 
 
442 
messaging application that works across various mobile device platforms, not only for 
official Squadron business, like last minute schedule changes, but also to transmit to all 
members of the wardroom sexually explicit pictures, often of male genitalia.  According 
to the official investigation, GroupMe text conversations often contained “vulgar, 
homophobic, and sexually suggestive statements from members of the Blue Angels, 
both associated with, and independent of, the aforementioned pornographic pictures” 
(Harris 2014).  This practice allegedly stopped once a woman team member expressed 
her discomfort at receiving such pictures on the work-related GroupMe account.  She 
specifically requested the men engaged in these conversations and picture-sharing 
establish a separate account for this purpose that did not include her (Harris 2014). 
Navy data shows junior women are most vulnerable to sexual assault and junior 
men are the most likely perpetrators of that violence.  This suggests, perhaps, that 
some junior men with little time in the Navy may still hold ideologically conservative 
beliefs about women’s proper role in society and therefore harbor hostility toward 
women who challenge traditional gender roles.  These men are most likely to feel their 
masculinity is threatened by women’s presence and to react with hostility.  However, in 
contrast, the Fiscal Year 2013 Department of Defense Report on Substantiated 
Incidents of Sexual Harassment in the Armed Forces (Department of Defense 2014), 
indicates that in the Navy in cases involving formal complaints that were substantiated, 
78 percent of sexual harassers were enlisted, with 58.1 percent of offenders in the mid-
senior pay grades E5-E9 and 19.9 percent in the junior pay grades E1-E4.  
Complainants were overwhelmingly female at 90.5 percent, with 63.1 percent in the 
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lowest pay grades E1-E4.246 So, the least powerful women in the Navy are subject to 
sexual assault primarily from their junior male peers, and to sexual harassment, from 
their mid-grade and senior enlisted male leaders.  It makes sense that the most junior 
men who hold no positional power or authority over their female contemporaries would 
express their hostility in the form of sexual assault rather than sexual harassment.247  
Some Navy men even realize on a gut-level that there may be a connection 
between men’s fear of emasculation at the hands of women and sexual violence.  In 
1979 Jeff McFadden, the deputy brigade commander for the Naval Academy’s last “all-
male” class, commenting on the impact of women’s admittance to the U.S. Service 
academies, speculated on the cause of increasing rape rates: 
Historically, the academies and a few other areas of the military—Marine Corps 
boot camp, airborne training— have provided a ritualistic rite of passage into 
manhood. It was one small area of our society that was totally male. Women now 
have a full range of choice, from the totally female— motherhood— to what was 
once the totally male— the academies, for example. Males in the society feel 
stripped, symbolically and actually. I wonder if that doesn't tie into the increase in 
rapes over the past decade. Rape is a crime of revenge, not passion. In any 
                                            
 
246 Complete report available at: 
http://diversity.defense.gov/Portals/51/Documents/DoD%20FINAL%20REPORT-
FY%2013%20Incidents%20of%20Sexual%20Harassment%20Report_15MAY2014%281%29.pdf; 
accessed August 24, 2014. 
247 Within the DoD and according to 10 U.S.C. 1561, the term “sexual harassment” is a form of sex 
discrimination that involves unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or 
physical conduct of a sexual nature when: 
• Submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of a person’s 
job, pay, or career, or 
• Submission to or rejection of such conduct by a person is used as a basis for career or 
employment  decisions affecting that person, or 
• Such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual’s work 
performance or creates an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment. 
The first two elements require some positional authority over the victim which junior male peers simply 
would not have.  The last element might result from the behavior of any one man or a group of men, but it 
is most likely that more senior enlisted leaders, those in positions of authority, would publicly curtail this 
type of behavior in junior Sailors while possibly practicing it in private themselves.  Publicly prohibiting this 
behavior in subordinates provides good “cover” and “plausible deniability” for their own misconduct.  Such 
tactics would be especially effective if the harassment is carefully executed in private – limiting allegations 
to “he said/she said.”  
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event, the real question isn't the women. The real question is this: Where in this 
country can someone go to find out if he is a man? And where can someone who 
knows he is a man go to celebrate his masculinity? Is that important on a societal 
level? I think it is (Webb 1979). 
Surprisingly, his uninformed speculation is actually supported by a large and growing 
body of research.248   
Maintaining a Sharp Gender Divide through Emphasized Heterosexuality 
Cynthia Enloe (1988), one of the early feminist critics of the military and 
militarism, has argued that the military is so fundamentally masculinized that no woman 
has a chance of transforming it into an organization in which women and men are equal 
(p. xvii).   This can be illustrated in one of the ways men in the military have enacted 
masculinity and reinforced stereotypes of femininity in the past:  through their 
emphasized heterosexuality, often using “militarized” prostitutes as both individual 
entertainment and as a means of group-bonding249 (Sturdevant & Stoltzfus 1992; Moon 
1997 and 1999; and Enloe 1988).  The western Pacific has commonly been known 
across all branches of the military as “Disneyland XXX, Far East” because of the 
mythologized history of sexually-oriented “rest and relaxation” destinations for 
servicemen, including South Korea during and after the Korean war, and Okinawa, the 
                                            
 
248 See Gallagher and Parrott (2011) for an extensive bibliography of research documenting the link 
between hegemonic masculinity and men’s aggression against women.  
249 When I refer to engaging with prostitutes as a means of “group-bonding” I mean the use of 
heterosexual sex and prostitutes as a means of entertainment for a group of military men, such as in the 
past when a Navy ship would pull into Subic Bay, Philippines for “liberty call” and the crew would go, “en 
masse,” to strip clubs and discothèques, which functioned as fronts for brothels, and club “hostesses” 
were really prostitutes.  The older, more experienced sailors “initiated” the younger sailors with little or no 
overseas sexual experience to one of the “rites of passage” and male “perks” of Naval Service, hence the 
old adage bragging that a sailor “has a woman in every port.”  The adage neglects to mention that said 
woman is often “purchased.”  
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Philippines, Thailand, and Australia during and after the Vietnam war, and where (it is 
commonly believed) American men can still indulge any sexual fantasy they might have. 
As a matter of more direct personal experience, as recently as 1996,250 when my 
husband’s ship pulled into Palma de Mallorca, Spain on its first liberty port of a six-
month deployment to the Arabian Gulf, before authorizing liberty for the all-male crew, 
his Commanding Officer assembled the ship’s all-male officers in the wardroom.  With 
great fanfare he handed out “Whore Monger/Operator PQS”251 to those who were 
single, in a feeble parody of the Navy’s official Personnel Qualification Standard (PQS) 
training program.  Clearly, this commanding officer did not perceive that subjecting his 
junior officers to a heterosexual rite of passage he had “grown up with” in the Navy was 
incompatible with, by then, long-established policies on sexual harassment and Navy 
core values.  
Fortunately, at long last, in January 2004 the Department of Defense formally 
instituted a policy expressly forbidding US troops from involvement with women, most 
often for illicit sex, illegally trafficked252 across borders (Allred 2006).   Unfortunately, 
that policy did not address the issue of US troops engaging in sex with prostitutes who 
have not technically be “trafficked” across borders.  So, for example, U.S. service 
members in Germany were barred from acquiring the services of prostitutes from 
Russia or former eastern block nations, but were not barred from acquiring the services 
of local German prostitutes.   
                                            
 
250 This incident occurred well after the fallout from TAILHOOK and the Navy’s institution of a “zero 
tolerance” policy on sexual harassment. 
251  To achieve “qualification” officers were to perform certain specified acts with a prostitute or a local 
woman.  
252 Trafficking involves criminal efforts to lure or kidnap people, usually young women, across borders, 
entrapping them and forcing them into prostitution. It is often linked to organized crime. 
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In the fall of 2004 the Commander of U.S. Forces in South Korea established a 
“zero tolerance” policy on prostitution in addition to the DOD-wide policy against 
trafficking, in response to the domestic and international political fall-out generated by a 
Fox News report in May 2002 which suggested that “courtesy patrols” at off-base 
bars/brothers conducted by U.S. Shore Patrol were aimed more at protecting those 
businesses than the troops who patronized them (Allred 2006).  In October 2005 
President George Bush, via Executive Order # 12473, added “patronizing a prostitute” 
as an offense punishable under the UCMJ, article 134, with an effective date of 15 
November 2005, thus formally ending one of the well-known “perks of the job” for 
forward-deployed male Soldiers, Sailors, and Marines. Some service members attribute 
these changes to yet another act of political correctness that is “ruining” the military by 
“feminizing” it. 
Addressing Issues of Gender and the Influence of Hegemonic Masculinity 
When the Navy talks about “diversity,” it is actually either failing to understand or 
ignoring the influence gender and, specifically, hegemonic masculinity have on both 
men and women in the military.  As mentioned previously, before the advent of the AVF 
in 1973, Erving Goffman (1961) identified the U.S. military as a “total institution.”   More 
recently, Davies (1989) provided a critique of Goffman’s theory and proposed revisions 
to it, acknowledging that “the essential internal nature and purposes” of some 
institutions make them more totalizing than others.  Further, she asserts that the social 
and cultural environments in which total institutions exist may alter the arrangement of 
their essential features in ways that make them more diverse than Goffman’s original 
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conceptualization allowed.  Still more recently, Scott (2010) has argued that asylums 
are less the total institutions of Goffman’s day than “reinventive” institutions.  She 
defines Reinventive Institutions (RIs) as ones which “members elect to join for purposes 
of self-improvement, [and which] appear to celebrate the subjects autonomy but 
suggest a unique form of social control based on mutual surveillance” (p. 213).  Her 
argument centers on applying these qualities to the modern rehab institution, but I 
believe her approach has some explanatory power for the operation of today’s AVF as 
well.  Many service members join the military for purposes of self-improvement (i.e., 
earn college tuition or learn responsibility and self-discipline) and the services (at least 
in their recruiting ads) appear to celebrate service members’ autonomy, and yet, the 
services depend upon social control within the ranks based upon mutual surveillance.  
Although neither Goffman’s (1961) conceptualization of the total institution nor 
Scott’s (2010) conceptualization of the reinventive institution are 100 percent applicable 
to the modern all-volunteer military, both conceptualizations provide some insight into 
the workings of the modern military as an institution.  The Department of Defense might 
use one, both, or some hybrid of these institutional paradigms to identify and target the 
means through which it can shape the military environment and the gender attitudes of 
its service members going forward.   Once it identifies and articulates what qualities it 
does want in its warrior men and women, the Department of Defense could then 
mobilize the power inherent in the processes and functioning of total and reinventive 
institutions to instill those qualities in its newest members.  
Rather than using men’s fear of “failing at masculinity” as a motivating factor, the 
Department of Defense could instead instill the fear in all its warriors of letting down the 
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team.  The Department of Defense would also have to make clear that “letting down the 
team” is not synonymous with “failing at masculinity.”  For example, one might fail the 
team through a lack of moral courage or through consent by silence (as in the case of 
the offensive videos produced by the XO of USS ENTERPRISE).  There are different, 
less harmful ways to shape a “warrior heart.”  The Department of Defense has just not 
bothered to explore them because it has never been forced to confront the possibility 
that military masculinity in its present form, taken to the extreme, can in the 21st century 
be more destructive than productive.   
In her study of convicted rapists, Diana Scully (1994) found that men who are 
sexually violent are more likely to identify with traditional conceptualizations of 
masculinity and believe in male gender role privilege.  Rape is a means of exerting 
power and social control over women, as well as over other men.  Although the 
percentage of military women experiencing military sexual assault each year is far 
greater than that of military men, the number of military men experiencing military 
sexual assault each year is far greater than that of military women.  Male-on-male rape 
also reflects issues of gender power and dominance.   
 In the meantime, the Navy appears to have made some administrative changes 
with potential for, but no guarantee of, positive influence.  As of 2006 misconduct 
related to sexual assault of civilian women, sexual harassment, hazing, and equal 
opportunity incidents resulting in a formal complaint or report were required to be 
reported via unit Situation Report (SITREP).253  When the instruction was updated in 
2011 it required that sexual assaults of Navy victims (both men and women) also be 
                                            
 
253 See Chief of Naval Operations Instruction (OPNAVINST) 3100.6H Special Incident Reporting 
Procedures of 3 Feb 2006. 
 
 
 
 
449 
reported.  Additional updates and changes to the instruction since its issuance in April 
2011 have further directed and clarified reporting requirements.   
By way of personal experience, when I entered the Navy, all racial incidents were 
still reported to higher authority, in fact, all the way up to the Chief of Naval Operations 
and the Secretary of Defense via this SITREP mechanism.  This reporting requirement 
inspired sincere concern in the hearts of Commanding Officers for the racial climate 
within their commands.  Today, presumably because the racial climate has improved, 
the Navy has changed reporting requirements for racial incidents to include only those 
incidents that indicate:  “Major and serious incidents with racial overtones which indicate 
a serious lack of racial harmony and which could become a matter of high Navy 
interest” (Office of the Chief of Naval Operations 2006). 
Establishing sexual assault and sexual harassment as acts that require special 
incident reporting might be an indicator that the Navy now views these crimes against 
women as being as serious and damaging to the Navy’s public image as race crimes.  
On a less positive note, it is possible that because of heightened media and 
Congressional interest, Navy leadership feels the needs to be made aware of these 
incidents as soon as possible, so they are not caught flat-footed by either the press or 
Congress.254 Either way, if special incident reporting requirements inspire the same 
level of concern in unit Commanding Officers for the gender climate of their commands 
                                            
 
254 See Naval Administrative Message (NAVADMIN) 302/11, available at:  
http://www.public.navy.mil/bupers-
npc/reference/messages/Documents/NAVADMINS/NAV2011/NAV11302.txt; accessed August 24, 2014. 
See NAVADMIN 136/12, available at: http://www.public.navy.mil/bupers-
npc/reference/messages/Documents/NAVADMINS/NAV2012/NAV12136.txt; accessed August 24, 2014. 
See NAVADMIN 272/12 available at: http://www.public.navy.mil/bupers-
npc/reference/messages/Documents/NAVADMINS/NAV2012/NAV12272.txt; accessed August 24, 2014. 
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that special incident reporting did with respect to race, even enlisted Navy women might 
begin to experience a work environment more welcoming to their presence.   
In addition to changes to special incident reporting related to sexual harassment 
and sexual assault, in August 2013 the Navy revised its annual evaluation and fitness 
report system to address issues of equal opportunity in two rating categories rather than 
the previous one.  The Navy instituted these changes before they were subsequently 
imposed upon all DoD by Congress via the FY-14 Military Appropriations Bill.  For pay 
grades E1-E6 and W2-O6 changes were made to the “Command” or “Organizational 
Climate/Equal Opportunity” and “Military Bearing/Character” rating categories.  For pay 
grades E7 – E9 changes were made to the “Character” and “Professionalism” rating 
categories.  Specifically:    
• To earn the highest marks in the “Command or Organizational Climate/Equal 
Opportunity” category for E1-O6 and W2-O6 and the “Character” category for E7 
– E9 and the “Military Bearing/Character” category for E1-O6 and W2-O6 and the 
“Professionalism” category for E7 – E9 Sailors must document or demonstrate 
how they “cultivated or maintained command climates where improper 
discrimination of any kind, sexual harassment, sexual assault, hazing, and other 
inappropriate conduct is not tolerated; where all hands are treated with dignity 
and respect; and where professionalism is the norm.”   
• Comments on efforts by the service member and quality of results in fostering a 
command and workplace environment conducive to the growth and development 
of personnel are specifically required in these categories for Commanding 
Officers, Executive Officers, Department Heads, Division Officers, Command 
Master Chiefs, Chief Petty Officers, and Leading Petty Officers who are 
responsible for officer and/or enlisted personnel  Efforts include “establishing, 
training to, and enforcing standards of professionalism.  Results are evident in a 
command where all hands are treated with dignity and respect … It is the intent 
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to assess the contribution of the individual being evaluated toward the personal 
and professional development and fair treatment of assigned personnel, as well 
as the overall command climate.”255 
Changes to fitness reports may make some difference in the degree to which 
Navy women, particularly junior enlisted women, experience sexism and gender 
harassment.  It is likely that special incident reporting for sexual harassment and sexual 
assault will not be an effective new tool in the gender integration arsenal until the Navy 
clearly defines what sexism and gender harassment are; trains Sailors what forms they 
might take on the deckplates; and modifies the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) 
to include articles that specifically address issues of sexism, gender discrimination, and 
gender harassment.  Changes to the UCMJ such as these would clarify what types of 
behavior are unacceptable and make it easier for victims to bring allegations of 
misconduct against sexist bullies. Additionally, if incidents of sexism and gender 
harassment were added to special incident reporting requirements we might begin to 
see less abuse of women service members and more effective and successful gender 
integration in the ranks.   
Silva (2008) argues that “as long as women are committed to upholding gender 
as a system of differentiation – and the superiority of masculinity therein – their ability to 
                                            
 
255 For original instruction see Bureau of Personnel Instruction (BUPERSINST) 1610.10C of 20 Apr 2011, 
available at:   
http://www.public.navy.mil/bupers-
npc/reference/instructions/BUPERSInstructions/Documents/1610.10C.pdf ; accessed August 24, 2014.  
For changes to the original instruction see BUPERSINST 1610.10C CH1 of 28 Aug 2013, available at:  
http://www.public.navy.mil/bupers-
npc/reference/instructions/BUPERSInstructions/Documents/BUPERSINST%201610.1C_CH1.pdf; 
accessed August 24, 2014.     
For PDF copies of the actual evaluation forms: NAVPERS 1610/2 (W2 - O6); NAVPERS 1616/26 (E1 -
E6); and NAVPERS 1616/27 (E7 - E9), see http://www.public.navy.mil/BUPERS-
NPC/CAREER/PERFORMANCEEVALUATION/Pages/SoftwareForms.aspx; accessed August 24, 2014.  
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transform the hierarchal structure of gender in meaningful ways will remain limited” (p. 
939).  I suspect most women do not want to erase all gender differences so that men 
and women are all androgynous beings, like some fictional alien life form in an episode 
of Star Trek.  I think women do enjoy being different from men -- a contrast.  And yet, I 
think it’s possible to retain some “contrast” without concluding that only that which is 
masculine is superior.  The fight in which Navy women are now engaged is one in which 
women strive to be different from but not less than men. 
Recommendations for Future Research 
Military leaders, the overwhelming majority of whom are white men, do not seem 
to have a politically informed, conscious understanding that the military as an 
organization has served a gender-defining function within society.  Historically, the 
military has been the place where young men have come to prove they are men.  
Because most military leaders are men, they are privileged by the existing system of 
power relations within the organization.  The organization they lead has always been 
dominated by men, working in a profession that is socially defined as “male.”    
Unspoken assumptions about the centrality of masculinity to the defense mission 
continue to permeate the air they breathe.  On a gut level, they know military service is 
associated with masculinity, but few have ever pondered the real implications of this fact 
deeply.  Charlotte Perkins Gillman (1911) described just such a cultural condition as 
androcentrism.  Bem (1993), building on Gillman, characterized androcentrism as 
circumstances under which men hold all the relevant positions of power.  As a result: 
males [are] at the center of the universe looking out at reality from behind their 
own eyes and describing what they see from an egocentric – or androcentric – 
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point of view.  They divide reality into self and other and define everything 
characterized as other – including women – in relation to themselves (p. 42). 
In more practical terms in the 21st-century United States this means that the men 
who hold the positions of power describe the world through their own eyes but think 
they have described it “as it exists in some universal, objective sense” (Abrams 1993, p. 
222).  The [white] male experience is taken as “normal.”  The experiences of all others 
are deviations from the norm and, therefore, are neither valid nor worthy of 
consideration.   Those whom [white] men classify as different from themselves are 
“otherized,” treated as foreign or alien.  Most groups who are accustomed to power and 
privilege have a difficult time relinquishing it.  White men, in particular, have difficulty 
recognizing the inherent power and privilege associated their social location in 
American society.  Privileged groups often react with extreme hostility toward the 
group(s) they perceive as the threat to their continued privilege.  Keeping women out of 
traditionally male occupations is really about relieving male anxiety over their 
masculinity and keeping women “in their place” – one that is inferior to men’s place.  
For many men, who they are is what they do.  They cannot separate their work 
from their identity.  Many men are unable to figure out what it means for their own 
masculinity if a woman can do the same job.  Some men still have difficulty 
understanding why women want to join the ranks.  Many still harbor sexist ideas about 
military service and women serving in non-traditional military occupational specialties.  It 
is no surprise that some military men, past and present, react with hostility to women’s 
ever-growing presence in the ranks, viewing it as a threat.  Furthermore, as noted in 
Chapter 4, although the military clearly defines what sexual harassment is and although 
official policy prohibits it, the Department of Defense has not yet defined or addressed 
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issues of sexism and gender harassment.   These are often the more subtle precursors 
to more extreme tactics of resistance to women’s expanded presence, such as sexual 
harassment or sexual assault.  As a result, military leaders are limited in their ability to: 
recognize the destructive potential of sexism and gender harassment; and act to 
minimize their negative influence across the surface fleet.  Consequently, Navy women 
continue to labor under the hegemony of military masculinity.   
Although many military leaders may genuinely want to “fix things,” without looking 
at the real source of the problem between military men and women -- the influence of 
hegemonic masculinity, including the sexism and gender harassment that flow from it -- 
attempts to improve the military justice system and the performance appraisal system, 
amount to little more than “re-arranging deck chairs on the Titanic.”  Certainly, 
excessive alcohol consumption, youthful inexperience, and “bad decisions” may be 
behind some military sexual assaults, as Navy statistics and current remedies seem to 
suggest (see Watson 2013), just as these same factors are behind some sexual 
assaults on college campuses.  However, these are not the only causes behind military 
sexual assault, nor do excessive alcohol consumption, youthful inexperience, and “bad 
decisions” cause the underlying gender discrimination and hostility toward women’s 
presence that help set the conditions where some men continue to believe it is 
acceptable to discriminate on the basis of sex, to sexually harass, or even to rape their 
women colleagues.  With these conditions in mind, and the goal of truly improving 
women’s integration into the war-fighting elements of the Navy, the following 
recommendations for future research are proposed: 
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• Explore the gender attitudes of Navy officer and enlisted men, particularly those 
who have just entered or are within their first four years of service, and especially 
enlisted men filling traditionally “masculine” ratings, to determine the extent to 
which the Navy might constantly be reintroducing the problem of gender 
prejudice and hostility toward women filling non-traditional gender roles.  
• Explore the possibility of identifying while in boot camp Navy recruits with 
extremely conservative gender ideology so aspects of that ideology that conflict 
with Navy values and policies can be addressed early and often, with the ultimate 
goal of reducing gender difficulties across the fleet.  
• Explore the experiences of enlisted women, especially those who are more 
isolated because they serve in non-traditional ratings, to more fully understand 
when and where gender prejudice and hostility toward women is most likely to 
manifest.   
• Identify forms of gender harassment and subtle sexism currently in use on the 
deckplates with the goal of addressing and eliminating these behaviors.  Similar 
research focusing on everyday practices should be conducted in all service 
branches, with the same goals.  
• Explore the gender experiences of the full range of minority women, both officers 
and enlisted, to more fully understand when and where men’s gender prejudice 
and hostility toward minority women filling non-traditional gender roles is most 
likely to manifest and which male demographic is most likely to employ these 
gate-keeping tactics.  At present, most qualitative/ethnographic studies of Navy 
women have focused primarily on white women or African American women but 
even these studies are rapidly becoming quite dated because they were 
conducted before women were widely integrated into combat roles.  At present, 
almost nothing is known about the historical or recent experiences of Navy 
women of other ethnicities or of Navy women who are lesbian, bisexual, or 
transgendered. 
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• Explore the influence that “intersectionality,” or one’s situation within multiple 
interlocking systems of oppression, has on one’s success in the Navy, regardless 
of gender.  At present the Navy tracks promotion statistics on the basis of race or 
gender, but one cannot easily determine how race and gender influence career 
success for either men or women.  The present system also does not track how 
sexual orientation might influence career success.256  The influence of race and 
gender and sexual orientation on Sailors’ military careers should be researched 
to help evaluate the real success of the Navy’s diversity strategy. 
• We must redouble research efforts on gender in the military context to distinguish 
whether the influence of increasing numbers of women serving in non-traditional 
areas of the military are actually contributing to the undoing/redoing of gender, or 
if the form of their doing gender has simply changed without diminishing male 
privilege (Risman 2009). 
• As sexual harassment and gender discrimination have increasingly been driven 
underground and, simultaneously, while military women have increasingly moved 
into military specialties previously closed to them, is it really so surprising that the 
incidence of rape seems to be on the rise?  With more limited access to older, 
less directly violent outlets for their hostility, such as gender and sexual 
harassment, men who believe strongly in maintaining their power over women 
might be more likely to vent their frustration in other more physical or violent 
ways.  While there is no doubt that military women have always been subject to 
sexual assault from their male colleagues, it is possible that the actual number of 
assaults has increased recently because men have found other means of 
expressing their frustration at their perceived loss of power as men or their 
resentment of women who dare to enter male territory.  If the claim is true that 
rape is more about power than sex, then it seems likely that suppressing other 
forms of resistance to women might cause an increase in sexual assaults.   
Research is needed to explore this potential connection between women 
                                            
 
256 For a thorough discussion of this issue, see Barnes 2007. 
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transgressing traditional sex role and gender norms and the apparent epidemic 
of military on military rape as documented by Kirby Dick and Amy Zeiring in The 
Invisible War. 
• Theories of hegemonic masculinity suggest that homosexuals, especially men, 
would be as bitterly rejected in the ranks as women of any sexual orientation, 
and perhaps even more-so (see Karst 1991, pp. 546-563).  Recent reports (see 
Belkin, et al. 2012 and 2013) suggest no adverse consequences associated the 
repeal of DADT.  Belkin and his fellow authors report: 
While harassment, discrimination, and bias remain problems in the wake 
of DADT repeal, with the exception of isolated occurrences, we found no 
evidence suggesting that service-wide patterns of harassment are a 
consequence of repeal. Sexual orientation–based harassment long 
predated DADT repeal, so its mere existence cannot be attributed to the 
new policy of open service. In addition, the majority of LGB service 
members (72.4 percent) report that they have been well treated since 
DADT repeal (Belkin, et al. 2013). 
Since so many lesbian and gay service members were forced to remain in the 
closet while DADT was in force, one might reasonably expect an increase in 
incidents of “harassment, discrimination, and bias” when formerly closeted 
service members “came out.”  This outcome seems particularly incongruent in 
light of the fact that the planned expansion of women into ground combat roles 
continues to be widely met with resistance and that sexual harassment and 
military sexual assault continue to be perpetrated against service women with 
appalling frequency.  Of course, both the Department of Defense and the LGBT 
community have a vested interest in reporting a smooth transition, with few or no 
problems associated with the repeal of DADT.  Given the threat posed to military 
hegemonic masculinity by both women and homosexuals, differences in the 
acceptance throughout the ranks of members of these two groups should be 
thoroughly investigated.    
• There is a problem with the paradigm current academic literature on gender 
resistance produces.  One can do gender in a way that confirms the traditional 
gender order or one can do gender in a way that challenges the traditional 
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gender order.  The problem comes in determining which gendered behaviors 
confirm and which challenge.  At present, five different academics might explain 
the exact same case in completely different ways, and none of them would be 
challenged on the validity of their arguments. There is no objective standard for 
nor clear, widely-agreed upon, definition of gender resistance.  For example, one 
academic might argue that the mere act of women entering male-dominated 
science and technology jobs challenges the traditional gender order.  Another 
might argue that women doing so challenge the traditional order if they 
emphasize their femininity. Yet another might argue that women doing so 
challenge the traditional order if they adopt masculine behavior. Still another 
might argue that women entering male-dominated science and technology jobs 
reinforce the traditional gender order if those women adopt masculine behavior. 
Finally, the fifth academic might argue that women entering male-dominated 
science and technology jobs reinforce the traditional gender order if they 
emphasize their femininity.  While I realize determining whether an action is 
traditional-gender conforming or traditional-gender confounding can be highly 
contingent on the specific circumstances, it is clear that gender scholars need a 
better definition for and understanding of gender resistance.  There has also 
been no analysis of the vast range of studies exploring women’s entry into 
traditionally male occupations in the manner of Hollander and Einwohner's (2004) 
work on resistance in general.   
• Little, if any, research has explored the strategies men use to fit in when they 
chose to pursue non-traditional occupations such as nursing.  Although the 
power dynamics are different, and a glass escalator effect has been identified, 
more work in this area might give gender scholars a more holistic understanding 
of the process and strategies for success among men and women who pursue 
work in fields considered non-traditional for their respective genders.  Male Navy 
nurses (officers) might provide a particularly interesting subgroup for study.  Male 
corpsmen (enlisted) might also prove an interesting subgroup for study, 
especially if  it compares and contrasts the strategies of the average corpsman, a 
job seen as not particularly manly, against those who volunteer to serve as 
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combat medics with infantry Marines, a job seen as requiring a good deal of 
courage.   
• Just exactly what type of gender performance or behavior “un-does” or “re-does” 
gender is under-theorized.  Risman (2009) is right.  We must learn to distinguish 
between behavior that does nothing to change the underlying power dynamics of 
gender that privilege masculinity from that which does.  Unfortunately, she does 
not provide us any real insight into how to do that.  I propose a meta-analysis of 
existing studies exploring the experiences of women integrating predominantly 
“male” occupations.  Such a study should be conducted with the goal of further 
developing theory and understanding of the strategies that women employ when 
they integrate male-dominated career fields. 
• Complimentary to the broad analysis of existing research on gender resistance 
suggested above would be a research effort aimed at men who have 
experienced the gender integration of a “male” occupation, ideally the military.  
The goal of this research effort would be to determine what actions on the part of 
women were effective in changing men’s minds about women’s capacity to 
perform effectively in the job and function successfully in a predominantly 
masculine environment.  Little research has been done exploring how men 
ultimately perceive women either as the result of or despite their gender-
integration strategies.  I think a case could be made that at least some men 
ultimately overcome their bias against women working in non-traditional 
occupations through prolonged exposure.  Perhaps if we had a better 
understanding both of the potential strategies women employ and the relative 
success of those strategies, academics might be able to identify the most 
effective gender integration approaches for women to take in the future.  
• In instances of Military Sexual Assault the Navy’s mandatory reporting format 
requires the collection of certain demographic data on the victim and the 
perpetrator.  From DoD annual reports of Military Sexual Assault, it does not 
appear that this more robust demographic data is being analyzed.  If it is, the 
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results are not being publicly reported.  This may simply reflect the reality that the 
military does not take “intersectionality” or the influence of hegemonic masculinity 
into consideration, or it may suggest the presence of a gender-racial or a rating-
specific problem the military does not want to advertise.  If the Navy is analyzing 
this already-collected data on military sexual assault, it should be encouraged to 
make the results public.  If the Navy is not analyzing this data, it should be 
encouraged to do so, or at least make it available to civilian scholars for their 
analysis.  Goals of this expanded and more robust analysis would be to refine 
our understanding of the connection between hegemonic masculinity, gender 
integration of occupations socially defined as “masculine,” and sexual 
harassment and assault.  Improved understanding of these workplace dynamics 
might aid the Navy, and indeed all the services, in making efforts to address the 
problem that are more precise and effective.   
Despite the passage of more than 70 years, the U.S. military continues to have 
many of the same problems with military men’s acceptance of military women that first 
surfaced during WW II, when stereotypes and rumors were so bad the President and 
First Lady ultimately felt they had to step in to defend the honor and reputation of female 
service members.  It seems the more things appear to change, the more they have 
fundamentally stayed the same.  Even if the percentage of military men who are hostile 
to military women’s expanding roles and mere presence are in the minority, they seem 
to wield extraordinary influence on the process and success of gender integration.  
Their negative influence can be seen in the high rates of sexual harassment and sexual 
assault of military women by their male colleagues.  The military might, at long last, 
stamp out sexual harassment and sexual assault if it were willing to engage the 
continuum of men’s hostility at a much earlier point.   
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In the not-too-distant past, the services proactively used the anxieties produced 
through hegemonic masculinity and the resultant fear of not measuring up as men to 
shape male draftees into fighters quickly.  Recognizing hegemonic masculinity as a 
more-destructive-than-constructive force in a 21st century All-Volunteer Military would 
also be a significant step in the right direction.  In the meantime, military women acting 
individually, albeit in common ways, through the ordinary practices of their everyday 
lives as Sailors, will continue to challenge prevailing assumptions about their place in 
the U.S. Navy.  Women officers especially, feeling accepted by their male coworkers 
and valued by the Navy for all the reasons previously enumerated, have more “space” 
to be themselves, rather than reacting to negative stereotypes.  Their example of 
competent Naval Officers who also just happen to be women is one of the most 
powerful tools of resistance to the existing gender order.  Like pebbles cast into a pond, 
the resulting ripples of their positive example can only expand outward as they increase 
in number and move up the ranks.  As Karst (1991) observed, the more women are 
integrated across the services, the more likely it is that men will see them – and treat 
them – as shipmates rather than stereotypes.  Servicewomen will be accepted as 
warriors when men finally realize that women serving competently in non-traditional 
occupations is neither remarkable nor a threat to their masculinity.   
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APPENDIX A 
 
 
University of Illinois Department of Sociology Letterhead 
 
 
HUMAN SUBJECTS CONSENT / ETHICS PROTOCOL 
 
 
I,                                                                                     , have been asked to participate 
in a study conducted by Judith Vendrzyk, PhD Candidate in Sociology at the University of Illinois 
at Urbana-Champaign, as part of her dissertation research on gender construction and power 
among women in the Navy & Marine Corps.   
 
I understand that my participation in this research will consist of being interviewed in 
person by Judith Vendrzyk and may consist of my being asked to review her analysis and 
conclusions before she publishes her final report as one means to achieve validation of her 
results.  The interview will be audio-recorded to allow a verbatim transcription of the interview to 
be prepared for later analysis.  I understand that the interview may last from 2 to 4 hours, with 
the average length being approximately 2½ – 3 hours.  I understand that Judith Vendrzyk will 
use the information from this interview in her dissertation.  I have been informed that my 
participation will allow Judith Vendrzyk to study aspects of gender construction and power 
relations within the Navy and that there are minimal foreseeable risks involved in my 
participation in this project.  Minimal risks involved stem from possible disclosure of  
personal information, but Judith Vendrzyk has established strict data handling procedures to 
protect the confidentiality of my personal information and interview data.  The other potential 
risks stem from possible temporary mental or emotional stress that I may experience as a result 
of discussing uncomfortable or difficult experiences I have had in the military during the course 
of this interview.  I understand that I may benefit from my participation in this research because I 
may gain personal insight into my own unique experiences through the interview process while 
simultaneously contributing to academic understanding of the gendered power dynamics in a 
male-dominated organization.  Judith Vendrzyk informed me that more than 40 Navy officers 
who participated in similar research conducted through the Naval Post Graduate School in 
Monterey in 1993-4 using similar interview protocol described the experience as “positive” or 
“cathartic”.  
 
I understand that as a voluntary participant in this research I have definite rights.  
Specifically: 
_________  1. My participation in this research is entirely voluntary. 
 
_________  2. I am free to refuse to answer any question at any time. 
 
_________  3. I am free to withdraw from the interview at any time. 
 
I understand that Judith Vendrzyk will tape-record the interview, from which a verbatim 
transcript will be prepared for later analysis.  I further understand that Judith Vendrzyk has a 
plan for scrupulously guarding my personal information.  I also understand that while Judith 
intends to transcribe this interview herself, because preparing verbatim transcripts of recorded 
interviews is such a time and labor intensive process she may at some point find it necessary to 
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seek help in transcribing.  If Judith does not personally transcribe my interview, she will ensure 
that any information on the tapes or digital files that might identify me will be deleted before 
providing the tapes/files to the professional transcriber.  Anyone other than Judith Vendrzyk who 
may transcribe my interview will be required to sign a legally-binding non-disclosure/data 
security agreement to ensure the security and confidentiality of my interview and personal 
information. 
 
I understand that excerpts of my interview may be published as a part of a Doctoral 
Dissertation, or in an academic article for a peer-reviewed publication, or in an academic book, 
but under no circumstances will my name or any other identifying characteristics be included in 
any publication.  Judith Vendrzyk has informed me that a pseudonym or generic reference e.g., 
“one LCDR assigned to a destroyer …” or “one Staff Sgt assigned to an MP company …”, will 
be used in place of my name in any written references to me. I understand that none of my 
personal demographic data will be provided to anyone for any reason at any time. 
 
I understand that if I have questions or concerns after this interview I may contact Judith 
Vendrzyk directly at ph. (309)661-2738 or via e-mail at: Judith.vendrzyk@pobox.com, or her 
research advisor, Dr. Anna-Maria Marshall, via the University of Illinois, Department of 
Sociology at ph. (217)333-1950.  I understand that if I have any questions about my rights as a 
participant in this study I may contact the University of IL Institutional Review Board Office at ph. 
(217)333-2670 (collect calls accepted from research participants) or via e-mail at irb@uiuc.edu.   
 
I agree to participate in Judith Vendrzyk’s dissertation research subject to the rights and 
conditions described above. 
 
 
 (Printed Name)                                                                  (Signature and Date) 
 
Judith M.  Vendrzyk  
        (Signature and Date) 
 
 
 
Please send me a report on the results of this research project (please circle one):       
 
    YES      NO      
 
 
e-mail or mailing address for those requesting research report:   
 
 
_________________________________ 
 
 
 _________________________________ 
                 
 
_________________________________ 
 
 
 
(Researcher retains participant-signed copy; Participant retains researcher-signed 
copy.)  
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APPENDIX B 
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 
1.  How did you come to join the Navy? 
 
 
2.  Do you intend to make it a career? (why or why not) 
 
 
3.  Can you tell me a little bit about the best and worst jobs you’ve had in the Navy? 
(What about them made them the best or worst?) 
 
 
4.  Can you tell me a little bit about the best and worst leaders you’ve had? (What about 
them made them the best or worst?) 
 
 
5.  What is it like being a [as appropriate:  white / African American / Asian American / 
Hispanic American / Native American] Surface Warfare Officer/ESWS-qualified woman 
in the Navy today?  
 
 
6.  Has gender in any way shaped your Navy experience? 
 
6a.   How well do you think men and women get along in the Navy these days? 
 
6b.   Do you ever experience “testosterone overload”? 
 
 
7. Do you ever feel that there’s an inherent social contradiction between being a woman 
and a warrior?  
 
 
8. Do you ever feel boxed in by society’s expectations for how a woman should act or 
present herself or the Navy’s expectations for how a SWO should act or present 
herself?  (How do you handle that? i.e. Do you wear makeup? Do you not wear 
makeup? Are there particular circumstances under which you do or don’t wear 
makeup?) 
 
 
9.  As you have gotten more senior and had more experience have you changed the 
way your respond to these expectations? 
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10. As a woman what behavior do you try to model for your junior personnel, what 
example do you try to set? 
 
11.  What were your views on gender inequality before you joined the Navy? 
 
 
12.  Based upon your Navy experiences has your viewpoint changed?   
 
 
13.  People have varying views on and definitions of the concept of “feminism”.    How 
do you define “feminism”?  
 
 
14.  Would you call yourself a feminist?  
 
 
This is US Navy’s definition of Equal Opportunity: 
 
Equal Opportunity is the right of all persons to participate in, & benefit from, programs 
& activities for which they are qualified. These programs & activities shall be free from 
social, personal, or institutional barriers that prevent people from rising to the highest 
level of responsibility possible. Persons shall be evaluated on individual merit, fitness, & 
capability; regardless of race, ethnicity, national origin, sex, or religion. 
 
 
15. As a woman SWO/ESWS-qualified woman do you feel that you have truly 
experienced Equal Opportunity in the Navy? 
 
 
16. Do you feel the Navy as an organization fully accepts and supports women surface 
warfare officers?  
 
 
17.  Has race in any way shaped your Navy experience (either yours or someone 
else’s)?  
 
 
18. Has religion, either yours or someone else’s, shaped your Navy experience in any 
way?  
 
 
19. Has your practice of or failure to practice religion incurred any career penalties for 
you? 
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20.  Has anyone in the military ever tried to influence your religious beliefs or have you 
ever tried to influence anyone else’s? 
 
 
21.  Given the current state of the economy there is a good deal of discussion these 
days about the growing gap between the wealthy and the poor, and about how the 
middle class is being squeezed.  The saying goes “No one joins the military to get rich”.  
Based on that assumption: 
 
  
• Do you think your socio-economic class has shaped your experiences in the 
Navy in any way? 
 
 
• Do you think your Navy experienceshas or will shape your socio-economic class 
in any way in the future? 
 
 
22.  As a [as appropriate:  white / African American / Asian American / Hispanic 
American / Native American, etc ] woman in the Navy, you’ve probably had a chance 
over the course of your career to reflect upon your experiences and what they have 
taught you about successfully navigating the tensions between military men and 
women.  Is there an observation or insight or a philosophy about that you have 
developed as a result of that introspection that you have not already shared or is there 
some aspect of this relationship that my questions didn’t touch on that you think is 
important that you would like to share now?  
 
 
23. Finally, I have one last demographic question that is rather sensitive.   
 
Caution Respondent:   
I want to remind you that in accordance with the ethical requirements set forth in their 
participant consent form which we have both signed, I am morally, ethically, and 
professionally obligated to protect your confidential information.  I am studying 
resistance to gender norms among heterosexual women in a culturally-defined 
“masculine” organization.  As a social scientist, I cannot simply make assumptions 
about your sexuality.  Can you tell me your sexual orientation?   
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APPENDIX C 
DEMOGRAPHIC QUESTIONNAIRE 
1. Age______________ 
 
2. Race and/or Ethnicity____________________________ 
  
3. Religion (circle/bold one or identify your particular faith in the space provided below if not 
listed):  
 
Protestant (please identify specific denomination)___________________________ 
 Catholic 
 Jewish 
 Muslim 
 Agnostic 
 Other (please identify)____________________________________ 
 Atheist 
 
4. Political Affiliation (circle/bold one or identify your particular affiliation in the space provided 
below if not listed):  
 
Republican 
Democrat 
Independent 
Green Party 
Libertarian 
____________________   
 
5.  Politically, you would describe yourself as (circle/bold one): 
 
 Very conservative 
 Conservative 
 Moderate 
 Progressive 
 Very Progressive 
 
6.  Socially, you would describe yourself as (circle/bold one): 
 
 Very conservative 
 Conservative 
 Moderate 
 Progressive 
 Very Progressive 
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7.  When did you join the military? _____________   
     month/year 
 
7a. For officers - What was your source of commissioning? (circle/bold one): 
 
 NROTC __________________ 
 USNA 
OCS 
Other (please identify/explain if necessary)____________________________________ 
 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. How long have you been in the Navy?  ________/________ 
                  (Years/Months) 
 
9.  What is your designator/rating and paygrade/rate? ____________ 
 
10.  For Officers - Are you prior enlisted?  Yes/No (circle/bold one)   
 
If YES, rating and highest enlisted rate attained? ____________ 
 
11.  Are you married?   Yes/No (circle/bold one)    
 
If YES, see questions 11a-11h.  
If NO, skip to question 12. 
  
 11a. Is your husband in the military? Yes/No (circle/bold one) 
   
If YES, see questions 11b-11c.  
If NO, skip to question 11d. 
 
 11b. What branch and designator/rating/MOS?_________________________________ 
 
 11c. When and how did you meet?__________________________________________ 
 
 ______________________________________________________________________ 
  
 ______________________________________________________________________ 
  
 ______________________________________________________________________ 
 
 ______________________________________________________________________ 
  
  
 11d. How would you describe your husband’s attitude toward women in the military in  
general? 
  
 ______________________________________________________________________ 
 
 ______________________________________________________________________ 
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11e. Do you consider your husband supportive of your career? Yes/No   (circle/bold  
one).  
 
Why? Can you provide an example(s)? _______________________________________ 
 
______________________________________________________________________ 
  
 ______________________________________________________________________ 
  
 ______________________________________________________________________ 
 
11f. Do you & your husband share domestic duties equally? Yes/No   (circle/bold one). 
 
11g. Which of you makes the most career sacrifices to stay together?  ______________ 
 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
11h. How did you come to that decision?______________________________________ 
  
 _____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 _____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 ______________________________________________________________________ 
  
 ______________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
12.  Do you have children?  Yes/No   (circle/bold one)  
  
If YES, please complete questions 12a and 12b.   
If NO, please complete 12c and 12d. 
 
 12a. How many?  Boys _____ Girls_____   What ages?________________________   
  
 _____________________________________________________________________ 
  
12b. Would you say you & your husband/partner/significant other share parenting duties  
equally? 
 
 Yes/No (circle/bold one) Please explain briefly:________________________________ 
 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
 ______________________________________________________________________ 
  
 ______________________________________________________________________ 
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12c. Do you want to have children?  Yes/No   (circle/bold one) 
   
  If YES, 
   
12d. When/How do you plan to fit children in to your life?  ________________________ 
 
______________________________________________________________________ 
  
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
13.  Looking back at the financial circumstances under which you grew up, would you describe 
your family’s socio-economic status as (circle/bold one):    
 
Working poor,  
Working class,  
Lower middle class,  
Solidly middle class,  
Upper middle class, or  
Upper class?   
 
14. Can you provide your rationale for classifying your family’s socio-economic status in the way 
that you did?  What factors did you consider in classifying your family’s socio-economic status? 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
15.  Would you consider your parents “traditional” in their career choices or did they provide you  
with a non-traditional model for marriage and/or career?   
 
Traditional/non-traditional (circle/bold one) Please explain briefly: _______________________ 
 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
16.  Did your parents teach you that you were limited or unlimited in your career aspirations (or 
your choice of games or hobbies) based on your sex?    Limited/unlimited (circle/bold one) 
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17.  Were you active in competitive, organized sports in: 
   
Grade School?  Yes/No (circle/bold one)  Which sports? ________________________ 
 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
How seriously?  Just for fun/College scholarship or professional aspirations (circle/bold 
one) 
 
Please explain briefly _____________________________________________________ 
 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
High School? Yes/No (circle/bold one)  Which sports? __________________________ 
 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
How seriously?  Just for fun/College scholarship or professional aspirations (circle/bold 
one) 
 
Please explain briefly _____________________________________________________ 
 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
College?  Yes/No (circle/bold one)  Which sports? _____________________________ 
 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
How seriously?  Just for fun/College scholarship or professional aspirations (circle/bold 
one) 
 
Please explain briefly _____________________________________________________ 
 
______________________________________________________________________ 
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APPENDIX D 
RANK INSIGNIA OF NAVY COMMISSIONED OFFICERS  
AND RANK AND RATING INSIGNIA OF NAVY ENLISTED PERSONNEL 
OFFICERS: 
 
Navy officers wear their rank devices in different places on their uniforms, depending 
upon the uniform. The three basic uniforms and the type of rank devices are:  
khakis (a working uniform) -- pins on the collar; whites -- stripes on shoulder boards; 
and, blues -- stripes sewn on the lower sleeve. Shoulder boards are also worn on 
bridge coats and reefers. The collar devices are also worn on the right side of the 
garrison cap (a miniature    officer's crest  is worn on the left) and slightly larger devices 
are worn on the epaulets of the raincoat and working jacket.Additionally, line officers 
wear a star above the stripes of the shoulder boards or sleeves but staff and warrant 
officers wear specialty insignia. 
 
 
Officer’s Crest:   
 
 
 
Pay 
Grade Rank Abbreviation Collar Shoulder Sleeve 
O-1 Ensign ENS 
  
 
O-2 Lieutenant Junior Grade LTJG 
  
 
O-3 Lieutenant LT 
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O-4 Lieutenant Commander LCDR 
  
 
O-5 Commander CDR 
  
 
O-6 Captain CAPT 
  
 
O-7 
Rear 
Admiral 
(lower half) 
RDML 
  
 
O-8 
Rear 
Admiral 
(upper half) 
RADM 
 
 
 
O-9 Vice Admiral VADM 
  
 
O-10 Admiral ADM 
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O-11 Fleet Admiral* FADM 
 
 
 
* The rank of Fleet Admiral has been reserved for war time use only. The last Fleet Admirals were in 
World War II. Fleet Admirals during that war were Chester W. Nimitz, William D. Leahy, Ernest J. King, 
and William F. Halsey.  
Specialty Insignia -- Staff Corps 
Commissioned officers in the Navy are either Line officers or Staff Corps officers. Those of the Staff 
Corps are specialists in career fields which are professions unto themselves, such as physicians, lawyers, 
civil engineers, etc. Staff Corps officers wear their specialty insignia on the sleeve of the dress blue 
uniforms and on their shoulder boards in place of the star worn by Line officers. On Winter Blue and khaki 
uniforms, the specialty insignia is a collar device worn on the left collar while the rank device is worn on 
the right.  
    
Medical Corps Dental Corps Nurse Corps Medical  Service Corps 
   
 
Chaplain Corps 
(Christian) 
Chaplain Corps 
(Jewish) 
Chaplain Corps 
(Muslim) Supply Corps 
�  
  
�  
�  Civil Engineer Corps 
Judge Advocate 
General's Corps �  
 
Source: http://www.navy.mil/navydata/nav_legacy.asp?id=267 (Reviewed: 12 August 2009) 
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Rank Insignia of Navy Warrant Officers 
Pay 
Grade Rank Abbreviation Collar Shoulder Sleeve 
W-1* Warrant Officer WO1 
  
 
W-2 
Chief 
Warrant 
Officer 
CWO2 
  
 
W-3 
Chief 
Warrant 
Officer 
CWO3 
  
 
W-4 
Chief 
Warrant 
Officer 
CWO4 
  
 
W-5** 
Chief 
Warrant 
Officer 
CWO5 
  
 
* The grade of Warrant Officer (W-1) is no longer in use.  
**W-5 was established in the Navy in 2002. 
 
Source:  http://www.navy.mil/navydata/nav_legacy.asp?id=266 (Reviewed: 12 August 2009) 
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Specialty Insignia - LDO and Warrant 
Commissioned officers in the Navy are either Line officers or Staff Corps officers. Some have 
advanced through the enlisted rates and are designated for duty in certain technical fields. 
These are Limited Duty Officers (LDO) and commissioned warrant officers (CWO). CWOs and 
Staff corps LDOs wear their specialty insignia on the sleeve of the dress blue uniforms and on 
their shoulder boards in place of the star worn by Line officers. On Winter Blue and khaki 
uniforms, the specialty insignia is a collar device worn on the left collar while the rank device is 
worn on the right.  
 
    
Boatswain Engineering Technician 
Repair 
Technician 
Ordnance 
Technician 
 
 
  
Diving Officer Aviation Boatswain Aviation Ordnance Technician 
Aviation Electronics 
Technician 
    
Air Traffic 
Control 
Technician 
Ship's Clerk Data Processing Technician 
Cryptologic 
Technician 
   
�  
Aerographer Security Technician 
Aviation 
Maintenance 
Technician 
�  
 
Source:  http://www.navy.mil/navydata/nav_legacy.asp?id=268 (Reviewed: 12 August 2009)
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Rate Insignia of Navy Enlisted Personnel 
 
The use of the word "rank" for Navy enlisted personnel is incorrect. The term is "rate." The 
rating badge -- a combination of rate (pay grade) and rating (specialty) is worn on the left upper 
sleeve of all uniforms in grades E-4 through E-6. E-1 through E-3 have color-coded group rate 
marks based upon their occupational field. Group rate marks for E-2 and E-3 are worn on dress 
uniforms only. Personnel in paygrade E-1 do not wear group rate marks. Chief Petty Officers (E-
7 through E-9) wear collar devices on their white and khaki uniforms, and rate badges on their 
Service Dress Blues.  
 
Pay Grade Rate Abbreviation Upper Sleeve Collar and Cap 
E-1 Seaman Recruit SR none none 
E-2 Seaman Apprentice SA 
 
none 
E-3 Seaman SN 
 
none 
E-4 Petty Officer Third Class PO3 
  
E-5 Petty Officer Second Class PO2 
  
E-6 Petty Officer First Class PO1 
  
E-7 Chief Petty Officer CPO 
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E-8 Senior Chief  Petty Officer SCPO 
  
E-9 Master Chief  Petty Officer MCPO 
  
E-9 
Master Chief  
Petty Officer 
of the Navy 
MCPON 
  
 
Source: http://www.navy.mil/navydata/nav_legacy.asp?id=260 (Last Update: 28 June 2009) 
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Rating Insignia of Navy Enlisted Personnel 
 
The enlisted rating badge for Petty Officer Third Class and above consists of two parts. The 
chevrons indicated the pay grade (rate). Between the chevrons and the eagle is a specialty 
insignia indicating the Sailor's job specialty (rating). These insignia appear in silver on blue 
uniforms and Navy blue on white uniforms. For E-3 and below, these insignia appear over the 
rate stripes. This table shows the rating insignia for engineering and hull specialties. The other 
groups are Administration/Medical/Dental, Aviation, and Construction. 
Administration, Deck, Medical, Technical, and  
Weapons Specialties  
 
 
  
BM - Boatswain's Mate CS - Culinary Specialist 
CT - Cryptologic  
Technician  
(Note 1) 
ET - Electronics  
Technician 
 
 
 
 
FC - Fire Controlman FT - Fire Control Technician 
GM - Gunner's 
Mate 
(Note 2) 
HM - Hospital 
Corpsman  
(Note 3) 
    
IS - Intelligence 
Specialist 
IT - Information 
Systems 
Technician  
(Note 4) 
LN - Legalman MA - Master-at-Arms 
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MC - Mass 
Communication 
Specialist  
(Note 5) 
MN - Mineman MT - Missile Technician MU - Musician 
 
 
  
 
NC - Navy Counselor OS - Operations Specialist   
PS - Personnel 
Specialist  
(Note 6) 
   
  
QM - Quartermaster 
RP - Religious 
Programs 
Specialist 
SH - Ship's 
Serviceman   
 
 
 
  
ST - Sonar Technician  
(Note 7) 
TM - Torpedoman's 
Mate YN - Yeoman   
  
Note 1:   
"Cryptologic Technician" currently consists of five branches:  
CTI (Cryptologic Technician - Interpretive); CTM 
(Cryptologic Technician - Maintenance); CTN (Cryptologic 
Technician - Networks); CTR (Cryptologic Technician - 
Collection); and CTT (Cryptologic Technician - Technical).  
Note 2:   
"Gunner's Mate" is used at pay grade E-7 and above. 
Leading to GM: GMG (Gunner's Mate - Guns) and GMM 
(Gunner's Mate - Missiles)  
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Note 3:   The Dental Technician (DT) rating was merged into the Hospital Corpsman (HM) rating 30 Aug 2005  
Note 4:   
Formerly known as RM (Radioman). DP (Data Processing 
Technician) merged into the RM (Radioman) field in 1997. 
The CTO (Cryptologic Technician - Communications) rating 
was merged into the IT rating on 1 Mar 2006  
Note 5:   
Illustrator Draftsman (DM), Journalist (JO), Lithographer (LI) 
and Photographer (PH) merged into MC rating on 1 July 
2006  
Note 6:   Disbursing Clerk (DK) and Personnelman (PN) merged into PS 1 Oct 2005  
Note 7:   "Sonar Technician" has two branches: STG - Surface, and STS - Submarine  
Engineering and Hull Specialties 
 
   
DC - Damage 
Controlman 
EM - Electrician's 
Mate EN - Engineman 
GS - Gas Turbine 
System Technician 
(Note 1) 
  
  
HT - Hull 
Maintenance 
Technician 
IC - Interior 
Communications 
Electrician 
MM - Machinist's Mate  MR - Machinery Repairman 
 
 
Notes 
*Note 1: "Gas Turbine System Technician" is 
used at paygrade E-9 only. 
Leading to GS: 
GSE (Gas Turbine System Technician - 
Electrical)  
and GSM (Gas Turbine System Technician - 
Mechanical).  
Note 2: Navy Diver rating established 1 Jun 2006 
ND - Navy 
Diver (Note 2) 
PM - 
Patternmaker 
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Aviation Specialties 
AB - Aviation 
Boatswain's Mate 
(Note 1) 
AC - Air Traffic 
Controller 
AD - Aviation 
Machinist's Mate 
AE - Aviation 
Electrician's Mate 
   
 
AG - Aerographer's 
Mate 
AK - Aviation 
Storekeeper 
AM - Aviation 
Structural Mechanic 
(Note 2) 
AO - Aviation 
Ordnanceman 
 
   
AS - Aviation Support 
Equipment 
Technician 
AT - Aviation 
Electronics 
Technician 
AW - Aviation 
Warfare 
Systems Operator 
AZ - Aviation 
Maintenance 
Administrationman 
 
 
  
PR - Aircrew Survival 
Equipmentman Notes 
 
*Note 1: "Aviation Boatswain's Mate" is used at paygrade E-9 only. 
Leading to AB: ABE (Launching & Recovery Equipment), ABF (Fuels), 
and ABH (Aircraft Handling).  
*Note 2: "Aviation Structural Mechanic" is used at paygrade E-8 only.  
Leading to AM: AME (Safety Equipment), AMH (Hydraulics), and AMS 
(Structures). 
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Construction Specialties 
 
  
 
 
BU - Builder  
( Note 1) 
CE - 
Construction 
Electrician  
( Note 2) 
CM - 
Construction 
Mechanic  
(Note 3) 
EA - 
Engineering 
Aide  
(Note 1) 
 
  
  
EO - 
Equipment 
Operator  
(Note 3) 
SW - 
Steelworker  
(Note 1) 
UT - 
Utilitiesman  
(Note 2) 
  
NOTES 
*Note 1: BU, EA, and SW become CUCM at pay grade E-9, 
*Note 2: CE and UT become UCCM at pay grade E-9, 
*Note 3: CM and EO become EQCM at pay grade E-9 
 
Source:  http://www.navy.mil/navydata/nav_legacy.asp?id=263 
Last Update: 28 June 2009  
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APPENDIX E 
ALPHABETICAL LISTING OF ALL STUDY PARTICIPANTS 
 NAME* RANK AMPLIFYING INFORMATION 
    
1 Amy ET2 (E-5) Caucasian Electronics Technician (2nd Class Petty 
Officer) with sea duty aboard an air craft carrier, 
was leaving the Navy to pursue a career in 
nursing. 
2 Andrea LCDR (O-4) Caucasian Surface Warfare Officer 
3 Breanna LNCS (E-8) African American Senior Chief Legalman.  She 
began her Navy career as an undesignated 
seaman, working with Boatswain’s Mates in 
Puerto Rico; she later struck for Yeoman and then 
transferred to the Legalman rating.  
4 Barbara LT (O-3) Nuclear qualified SWO of Hispanic decent (mom 
is from Nicaragua); identifies as Caucasian 
5 Claire CAPT (O-6) Caucasian Surface Warfare Officer 
6 Caitlyn LTjg (O-2) Surface Warfare Officer of Hispanic descent (trace 
ancestors to Spain, but the family has been in 
Texas for many generations), identifies as 
Caucasian. 
7 Denise LCDR (O-4) Caucasian Surface Warfare Officer, Naval 
Academy graduate 
8 Diana ET1 (E-6) Caucasian Electronics Technician (1st Class Petty 
Officer) 
9 Elisabeth LCDR (O-4) Caucasian Surface Warfare Officer 
10 Emily LTjg (O-2) Caucasian Surface Warfare Officer, Naval 
Academy graduate 
11 Faith NC1 (E-6) Caucasian, former intelligence analyst converted 
to career counselor (1st Class Petty Officer) 
12 Felicia LCDR (O-4) African American SWO-qualified Supply Officer, 5 
years prior-enlisted service as an Electronics 
Technician 
 
*All names are fictitious to maintain the anonymity of the participant.  
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13 Georgeanne LCDR (O-4) Caucasian former SWO – transferred to 
Meteorology and Oceanography (METOC) 
community, Naval Academy graduate 
14 Haleigh LT (O-3) Filipina SWO, leaving the Navy to pursue a career 
in medicine 
15 Janice EMCM (E-9) Caucasian Master Chief Electrician’s Mate; served 
last tour as Command Master Chief on a large 
amphibious ship  
16 Karen LCDR (O-4) Filipino American former SWO – transferred to 
Meteorology and Oceanography (METOC), 
community, Naval Academy graduate, married to 
a Marine 
17 Leigh LCDR (0-4) African American SWO of Jamaican descent with 
6 years prior-enlisted service in another branch of 
the military, commissioned through Officer 
Candidate School 
18 Melanie LT (O-3) Caucasian Surface Warfare Officer attending 
Naval Post-Graduate School, Monterey CA 
19 Marion DKCM(E-9) African American/Native American Master Chief  
Dispersing Clerk; served last tour as Command 
Master Chief on an aircraft carrier 
20 Natalie LCDR (O-4) African American SWO, Nuclear Power trained 
officer, was “denuked” due to overmanning for her 
year group, commissioned through Officer 
Candidate School 
21 Nikki MM1(E-6) Caucasian nuclear power-qualified Machinist’s 
Mate (1st Class Petty Officer), leaving the Navy 
after failed birth control and the birth of two 
children 
22 Olivia LT (O-3) Caucasian Surface Warfare Officer, attending 
Naval Post-Graduate School, Monterey CA 
23 Paige LT (O-3) Caucasian Surface Warfare Officer attending 
Naval Post-Graduate School, Monterey CA 
24 Quanesha LCDR (0-4) African American SWO with 14 months prior 
enlisted service while going through the 
Broadened Opportunity for Officer Selection & 
Training (BOOST) program 
25 Rachel LT (O-3) Caucasian Surface Warfare Officer attending 
Naval Post-Graduate School, Monterey CA 
26 Rebecca LT (O-3) Caucasian Surface Warfare Officer attending 
Naval Post-Graduate School, Monterey CA 
27 Sabrina LT (O-3) Caucasian Surface Warfare Officer attending 
Naval Post-Graduate School, Monterey CA 
28 Tamara LT (O-3) Caucasian Surface Warfare Officer attending 
Naval Post-Graduate School, Monterey CA 
29 Theresa TMMC (E-9) Hispanic Torpedoman’s Mate, served in  
Command Master Chief positions for last 10 years 
of a 30 year career 
30 Valerie LT (O-3) Asian/Pacific Islander Surface Warfare Officer, 
parents immigrated to the U.S.  
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31 Violet OS1 (E-6) Caucasian Operations Specialist (1st Class Petty 
Officer) 
32 Xenia LCDR (O-4) African American SWO, 7 years prior enlisted 
service as an Ocean Technician, laterally 
transferred to Data Processing which allowed her 
to go to sea, applied for and selected for the 
Enlisted Commissioning Program (ECP), obtained 
her degree and was commissioned through Navy 
ROTC 
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APPENDIX F 
COMMANDING OFFICER (CO), EXECUTIVE OFFICER (XO) AND COMMAND 
SENIOR ENLISTED FIRINGS 
2014 
 
Commanding Officers: 
 
Cmdr. Joe Martinez, skipper of VAQ-140, an electronic attack squadron attached to the 
aircraft carrier USS DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, was fired January 7 by Capt. Terry 
Morris, commander of Carrier Air Wing 7, because of a “loss of confidence in his ability 
to command” according to the release, issued by Cmdr. Mike Kafka, spokesman for 
Naval Air Force Atlantic.  The Judge Advocate General Manual investigation found poor 
leadership and a negative command climate among the squadron’s officers, the release 
stated. It also found Martinez, who took command of VAQ-140 in November 2012, had 
willfully ignored Navy instructions, knowingly submitted inaccurate officer fitness reports, 
made inappropriate racial comments, exercised undue influence on subordinates, and 
made false or misleading statements. 
http://www.navytimes.com/article/20140108/NEWS/301080033/Electronic-attack-
squadron-CO-fired 
 
Capt. John P. Heatherington was relieved of his command of the Naval Ordnance Test 
Unit at Cape Canaveral, Fla., February 18 by Strategic Systems Programs Director, 
Vice Adm. Terry Benedict, and received non-judicial punishment after a command 
investigation determined that golf tournament fundraisers for the annual Navy 
Submarine Ball solicited adult-entertainment establishments, among other businesses, 
for funds.  Heatherington knew of the businesses solicited but failed to take action. 
http://www.military.com/daily-news/2014/02/19/co-fired-after-raising-funds-from-strip-
clubs.html 
 
Cmdr. Dennis Volpe, Commander of the USS TAYLOR was relieved by Capt. Jim 
Aiken, commander of Task Force 65, which controls surface ships in the Navy’s 6th 
Fleet waters in the Mediterranean and Atlantic, on February 24, about two weeks after 
the Florida-based frigate ran aground in the Black Sea.  A preliminary inquiry into the 
grounding resulted in a “loss of confidence” in Volpe’s ability to command, according to 
a 6th Fleet news release. 
http://www.military.com/daily-news/2014/02/26/navy-relieves-uss-taylor-co-after-ship-
ran-aground.html 
 
Cmdr. Jason Leach, the Captain of the USS GERMANTOWN, has been relieved of 
command for failure to use good judgment and uphold standards in relation to a sexual 
assault investigation involving one of the ship's top sailors, Navy officials said Monday. 
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He was removed from command March 6 by Amphibious Force Seventh Fleet 
commander, Rear Adm. Hugh Wetherald, who lost confidence in Leach’s ability to 
command, according to a Navy statement. The relief was the result of a poor command 
climate onboard the Whidbey Island-class dock landing ship.  The command 
investigation that led to Leach's firing was triggered by a Naval Criminal Investigative 
Service investigation into sexual assault allegations against former Command Master 
Chief Petty Officer Jesus Galura. Galura had been removed from his duties onboard the 
ship temporarily on January 7 and permanently on February 11. 
http://www.military.com/daily-news/2014/03/07/uss-germantown-commanding-officer-
relieved.html 
 
A former Blue Angels commander tolerated inappropriate sexual comments and 
pornographic images in the workplace — including photos of naked women in the 
cockpits of the precision flying team's planes — during his time as its leader, the Navy 
said Tuesday, 3 June.  Capt. Gregory McWherter was found guilty of violating two 
articles under the military's code of justice during non-judicial proceedings convened 
June 2 in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. The articles were failure to obey an order or regulation 
and conduct unbecoming of an officer by fostering a hostile command climate and 
failing to stop "obvious and repeated instances of sexual harassment, condoning 
widespread lewd practices within the squadron and engaging in inappropriate and 
unprofessional discussions with his junior officers," the Navy said in a statement.  
McWherter will be given a letter of reprimand that will go in his permanent file and is 
widely seen as a career-ender in the service. The Navy said his command had explicit 
pornography, including photos of naked women in aircraft cockpits; a painting of male 
genitalia in blue and gold on the roof of the center point trailer at the Blue Angels' winter 
training facilities in El Centro that could be seen via google maps; and "sexually 
charged, raunchy, and homophobic humor" on maps and itineraries.  McWherter was 
relieved in April from his duty as executive officer of Naval Base Coronado in California 
amid the allegations related to his second stint as the Blue Angels' leader from May 
2011 to November 2012. The Navy said it did not find problems during his first stint as 
the flying team's Commanding Officer from 2008 to 2010. 
http://www.utsandiego.com/news/2014/Jun/03/ex-blue-angels-commander-gets-letter-
of-reprimand/ 
 
Cmdr. Joseph Biondi was relieved from his duty as Commanding Officer of the Los 
Angeles-class attack submarine USS SAN JUAN on June 4 by Capt. Vernon Parks, the 
Commander of Submarine Development Squadron 12, due to "a loss of confidence in 
his ability to serve effectively as commanding officer," the official news release said. 
"Biondi's relief was related to shortfalls in professional performance, leading to 
leadership's loss of confidence in his ability to serve in a position of command 
authority."  The professional shortcomings were determined from periodic assessments 
and examinations over the course of his command tour, which began in April 2012, 
Hawkins said. The deficiencies were not related to personal misconduct. They had to do 
with how he did his job. 
http://www.military.com/daily-news/2014/06/05/attack-submarine-commander-relieved-
of-duty.html 
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The Commanding Officer of the guided-missile cruiser USS COWPENS, Capt. Gregory 
W. Gombert, and his senior enlisted adviser Master Chief Petty Officer Gabriel J. 
Keeton, have been relieved by Rear Adm. Michael Smith, Commander, Carrier Strike 
Group 3, on June 10 because of a loss of confidence in their work and leadership, 
according to a Navy news release.  The pair were relieved because of a loss of 
confidence in their "ability to effectively lead and carry out their assigned duties," the 
Navy said.  The loss of confidence stems from the results of a series of inspections after 
the San Diego-based ship's return from a deployment to the Western Pacific. Gombert 
and Keeton have been temporarily reassigned, and an investigation is underway, the 
news release said.  Gombert is the third commander of the Cowpens to be relieved 
since 2010. 
http://www.military.com/daily-news/2014/06/11/3rd-cowpens-commander-fired-since-
2010-cmc-relieved.html 
 
Executive Officers: 
 
Cmdr. Garron Morris, the executive officer of Pacific Missile Range Facility Barking 
Sands, Hawaii, was fired by his skipper, Capt. Bruce Hay, on April 25 due to 
“unsatisfactory performance,” Navy Installations Command (CNIC) said in an April 26 
news release.  Morris, who had been the range’s XO for two years, was removed “solely 
based on performance” and not for personal misconduct, said Capt. Ed Buclatin, the 
CNIC spokesman. 
http://www.navytimes.com/article/20140425/CAREERS03/304250062/Range-XO-fired-
failed-performance 
 
The Executive Officer of the Mayport-based cruiser USS HUE CITY, Lt. Cmdr. John 
Liddle, was relieved of duty June 26 after he was found guilty of failing to comply with 
procedures that could have prevented a fire on the ship as it was crossing the Atlantic.  
The fire aboard the USS Hue City broke out about 200 miles northeast of Bermuda on 
April 14, just days after the ship left Mayport, Florida, for deployment, according to U.S. 
Fleet Forces Command.The fire caused $23 million in damage and forced the ship to 
miss its scheduled deployment after investigators found the damage too extensive for it 
to continue. The fire was the result of flammable material being stored in an 
unauthorized location, an exhaust uptake trunk. The fire was extinguished without 
significant injury.  
http://www.stripes.com/news/navy/uss-hue-city-s-no-2-officer-relieved-after-
investigation-into-fire-1.290875 
 
 
Senior Enlisted Leaders: 
 
The Jan. 7 temporary relief of the USS GERMANTOWN (LSD 42) Command Master 
Chief (CMDCM) Jesus Galura was made permanent by Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet, 
Adm. Harry Harris, Jr., February 11.  The relief of CMDCM Galura stems from an 
ongoing investigation into allegations of sexual assault made by a Germantown crew 
member. Because the ongoing investigation continues to look at overall command 
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climate as well as allegations of misconduct by Galura and potentially others, the Navy 
cannot provide details. Harris determined Galura's relief should be made permanent 
due to the length of the investigation and loss of confidence in his ability to effectively 
lead the Chief's Mess and be a contributing member of the command triad. 
http://www.military.com/daily-news/2014/02/11/uss-germantown-cmc-relief-made-
permanent.html 
 
Master Chief Petty Officer Eric Spindle was relieved of his duties as Command Master 
Chief (CMDCM) of the Naval Ordnance Test Unit at Cape Canaveral, Fla., February 18 
by Strategic Systems Programs Director, Vice Adm. Terry Benedict after a command 
investigation determined that golf tournament fundraisers for the annual Navy 
Submarine Ball solicited adult-entertainment establishments, among other businesses, 
for funds.  Master Chief Spindle did not face non-judicial punishment. 
http://www.military.com/daily-news/2014/02/19/co-fired-after-raising-funds-from-strip-
clubs.html 
 
Command Master Chief (CMDCM) Roy B. Carter was relieved of his duties as the 
squadron's Command Master Chief of Helicopter Maritime Strike Squadron (HSM) 70 
by Cmdr. Peter Schnappauf III, the squadron Commanding Officer, on June 24 due to 
Carter's unsatisfactory performance as the senior enlisted leader over an extended 
period of time. Carter has been reassigned to Commander, Helicopter Maritime Strike 
Wing Atlantic in Mayport, Florida.  HSM-70, based in Jacksonville, Florida, is part of 
Carrier Air Wing (CVW) 8 forward deployed with USS GEORGE H.W. BUSH Carrier 
Strike Group conducting maritime security operations in the 5th Fleet Area of 
Operations. 
http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=81847 
 
 
2013  
 
Original listing available at: 
http://www.navytimes.com/article/20130205/CAREERS/302050309/Commanding-
officer-XO-and-senior-enlisted-firings 
 
Commanding Officers: 
 
Cmdr. Thomas Winter was fired January 4 as CO of the submarine USS MONTPELIER 
due to a loss of confidence in his ability to command. 
http://www.navytimes.com/article/20130104/NEWS/301040309/Sub-commander-
removed-following-collision 
 
Cmdr. Luis Molina was relieved January 25 as CO of the attack submarine USS 
PASADENA due to a loss of confidence in executing his duties as the submarine's 
commanding officer. 
http://www.navytimes.com/article/20130125/NEWS/301250313/Attack-sub-Pasadena-
commander-fired 
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Cmdr. Nathan Sukols was fired February 10 as CO of the attack submarine USS 
JACKSONVILLE due to loss of confidence in his ability to command, following a 
collision with a civilian vessel January 10 in the Persian Gulf, which damaged one of the 
sub's two periscopes.  Cmdr. Nathan Sukols received non-judicial punishment and was 
reassigned to administrative duties at Commander Submarine Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet 
at Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam in Hawaii. The firing occurred following an admiral's 
mast on Sunday in Manama, Bahrain. 
http://www.navytimes.com/article/20130210/NEWS/302100309/Navy-fires-CO-XO-of-
attack-sub-Jacksonville 
 
Capt. David Hunter was fired February 15 as CO of Maritime Expeditionary Security 
Squadron 12, Coastal Riverine Group 2, presently in the United Arab Emirates.  In 
addition to unprofessional behavior, Hunter also mismanaged personnel matters. The 
investigation is ongoing. 
http://www.navytimes.com/article/20130215/NEWS/302150316/Security-squadron-CO-
and-CMC-fired-for-bad-behavior 
 
Cmdr. Corey Wofford, CO of the Norfolk, VA-based frigate USS KAUFFMAN, was 
sacked on Friday, February 15 by Capt. John Fuller, commodore of Destroyer 
Squadron 22, for lackluster leadership.  "Fuller lost confidence in Wofford due to his 
poor performance including his failure to establish a culture of procedural compliance 
within the command and his inability to correct identified deficiencies as directed," 
SURFLANT said in the statement. "Ultimately, this led Fuller to lose confidence in 
Wofford's leadership and competence as commanding officer." 
http://www.navytimes.com/article/20130215/NEWS/302150315/Frigate-CO-fired-for-
8216-poor-performance- 
 
Lt. Cmdr. Jack O’Neill, commanding officer of Navy Operational Support Center, Rock 
Island, IL, was fired on March 19 by Capt. George Whitbread, commander of Navy 
Region Midwest Reserve Component Command, due to loss of confidence in his ability 
to command.  Sailors were allegedly hazed during a March 9 drilling weekend, 
according to the Navy.  Details of the hazing, and O’Neill’s involvement, have not been 
released.  The incident was reported March 10, the investigation began the next day, 
and the investigation finished on March 13, said Johnny Michael, spokesman for Navy 
Reserve Forces Command. 
http://www.navytimes.com/news/2013/03/navy-nosc-firing-hazing-command-climiate-
032513/ 
 
Captain Jay Bowman, Commanding Officer, Navy Operational Support Center (NOSC) 
Fort Dix, NJ, was fired on March 27 by Rear Admiral Bryan Cutchen, Commander, 
Navy Reserve Forces Command, due to loss of confidence in his ability to command.  
Captain Bowman is the second NOSC Commanding Officer fired this month and the 
seventh Navy Commanding Officer fired in 2013. 
http://www.navytimes.com/article/20130329/NEWS/303290017/NOSC-Fort-Dix-CO-
sacked-following-investigation 
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Lt. Cmdr. Mark Rice was relieved April 3 as CO of the stricken mine countermeasures 
ship USS GUARDIAN after an investigation determined Rice and ship leaders “did not 
adhere to standard U.S. Navy navigation procedures.” Three other officers were also 
relieved.  
http://www.navytimes.com/article/20130403/NEWS/304030024/Four-fired-marooning-
minesweeper-ocean-reef 
 
Cmdr. Michael Runkle was removed as CO of Mobile Diving and Salvage Unit 2 May 8 
“for a loss of confidence in his ability to command" following the drowning death of two 
crewmembers. 
http://www.navytimes.com/article/20130508/NEWS/305080027/CO-diving-unit-fired-
after-deaths 
 
Navy Capt. Eric Johnson, who as the chief of U.S. Military Entrance Processing 
Command at Great Lakes Naval Training Center, Ill., was in charge of the military’s 
nationwide network of facilities that process incoming recruits before they are shipped 
off to basic training, was temporarily relieved Monday due to an “ongoing investigation,” 
a Pentagon spokesman said.  The order to remove him came from the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense, specifically from Assistant Secretary of Defense for Readiness 
and Force Management Fred Vollrath, said Navy Lt. Cmdr. Nate Christensen, a 
Pentagon spokesman. 
http://www.navytimes.com/article/20130619/CAREERS03/306190031/Military-Entrance-
Processing-Command-chief-removed-from-duty 
 
Capt. Shawn Hendricks, the head of the Navy program that manages the fleet’s IT 
networks was fired June 24 after a “substantiated investigation ... into an improper 
relationship and unprofessional behavior." 
http://www.navytimes.com/article/20130725/NEWS/307250038/Report-CO-torpedoed-
career-perfect-woman- 
 
Capt. Devon Jones, Commanding Officer of Naval Air Facility El Centro, Calif., was 
relieved of his duties July 1 “due to a loss of confidence in his ability to command,” 
according to a Navy Region Southwest news release. Jones' alleged action was under 
investigation at the time of the firing.  
http://www.navytimes.com/article/20130701/NEWS/307010038/NAF-El-Centro-
commander-sacked 
 
Cmdr. Edward White was removed as CO of Strike Fighter Squadron 106 on August 26 
due to “loss of confidence in his ability to command following the preliminary findings of  
an ongoing command investigation into an alleged inappropriate relationship with a 
female Department of the Navy civilian employee.”  
http://www.navytimes.com/article/20130826/CAREERS03/308260044/Squadron-CO-
fired-alleged-affair-civilian-employee 
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Capt. Kevin Knoop was removed as CO of the hospital ship USS COMFORT’s medical 
treatment facility on August 27 “after an investigation identified command climate 
issues and a lack of leadership engagement.”  
http://www.navytimes.com/article/20130827/CAREERS03/308270055/CO-hospital-ship-
s-treatment-facility-sacked 
 
Capt. William Cogar was removed as CO of the hospital ship USS MERCY’s medical 
treatment facility on September 13 after an investigation uncovered evidence he 
mismanaged the physical fitness assessment — and lied about his weight to pass his 
own PFA.  
http://www.navytimes.com/article/20130913/CAREERS03/309130030/Navy-fires-
hospital-ship-s-top-officer-says-he-lied-PFA 
 
Capt. Jeffrey S.  “Chilly” Winter, the Commanding Officer of Carrier Air Wing 17, was 
relieved of duty Friday September 20 by Rear Adm. David Steindl, Commander of the 
aircraft carrier USS CARL VINSON’s Strike Group, due to “a loss of confidence” in 
Winter’s ability to command, following allegations of an “inappropriate relationship” with 
a female junior officer under his command according to the official Navy statement. 
http://www.military.com/daily-news/2013/09/23/carrier-air-wing-co-relieved-over-
relationship.html 
 
Capt. Daniel Dusek, Commanding Officer of the amphibious assault ship USS 
BONHOMME RICHARD, was relieved on October 2  after it was determined that an 
investigation into an alleged bribery scheme "negatively affected Dusek’s leadership 
ability and was a distraction to the command mission."  
http://www.military.com/daily-news/2013/10/02/2nd-high-ranking-officer-relieved-in-
bribery-probe.html 
 
Vice Adm. Tim Giardina, the deputy commander of U.S. nuclear forces, was notified 
Wednesday October 9 that he has been relieved of duty amid a military investigation of 
allegations that he used counterfeit chips at an Iowa casino, the Navy said.  The move 
is exceedingly rare and perhaps unprecedented in the history of U.S. Strategic 
Command, which is responsible for all American nuclear warfighting forces, including 
nuclear-armed submarines, bombers and land-based missiles.  As a consequence of 
being removed from his post at Strategic Command, Giardina falls in rank to two-star 
admiral. He had been suspended by Gen. Robert Kehler, the top commander at 
Strategic Command, on Sept. 3, although that move was not disclosed publicly until 
Sept. 28.  After his suspension Giardina remained at Strategic Command but was not 
allowed to perform duties that required use of his security clearance.  The decision to 
take the next step — to relieve him of duty — was made on Oct. 3, one official said. 
That required approval by President Obama, two defense officials said. The officials 
spoke on condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to publicly discuss 
the internal decision-making. 
http://www.navytimes.com/article/20131009/NEWS/310090029 
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Capt. Lance E. Massey II, USN, was relieved due of his duties as Commander of the 
33rd Maintenance Group by Col. Todd Canterbury, USAF, commander, 33rd Fighter 
Wing at Eglin AFB, FL Nov. 4 due to a loss of confidence in Massey's ability to 
command.  Massey had already been administratively removed from his position on 
Oct. 28.  The action resulted from the initial results of an investigation which determined 
that Massey had engaged in inappropriate conduct directed toward subordinate female 
junior officers on his staff. This conduct included a pattern of inappropriate behaviors, 
such as non-work-related personal conversations initiated by him, and his sending 
unsolicited non-work-related, after hours/off-duty personal text messages to these 
officers' personal phones. 
http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=77450 
 
Cmdr. Nathan Wemett, the commander of the Bahrain-based mine countermeasures 
ship USS DEXTROUS was relieved of his duties November 6 “due to loss of 
confidence in ability to command,” U.S. Navy officials said.  there was no personal 
misconduct involved in the decision to remove Lt. Cmdr Wemett from command. His 
reassignment stemmed from an investigation that revealed “deficiencies in operational 
preparedness, situational awareness, and tactical proficiency,” according to a news 
release from the U.S. Navy 5th Fleet. 
http://www.military.com/daily-news/2013/11/08/minesweeper-co-fired-for-preparedness-
deficiencies.html 
 
The Navy announced November 21 that Capt. David Haas, 45, deputy commander of 
Coastal Riverine Group 1 in Imperial Beach, CA had been suspended while his alleged 
connections to Leonard Glenn "Fat Leonard" Francis were being investigated.  Formal 
charges against Leonard Francis include conspiring with Navy officers on port contracts 
worth more than $200 million and bribing them with cash, prostitutes and Lady Gaga 
tickets. 
http://www.military.com/daily-news/2013/11/22/another-officer-relieved-in-navy-bribery-
scandal.html 
 
Lt. Cmdr. Dennis L. Holmes Jr., the Commanding Officer of Navy Operational Support 
Center Harlingen, Texas, was fired Tuesday November 26 fired by Capt. Jerome 
Hamel, commander of Navy Region Southeast Reserve Component Command, due to 
poor command climate, a Reserve official confirmed. 
http://www.navytimes.com/article/20131127/NEWS02/311270027/Official-Texas-based-
CO-sacked-over-poor-command-climate 
 
Capt. Thomas Craig, the Executive Officer at Naval Health Clinic Quantico, Va., was 
fired November 26 by the health clinic’s Commanding Officer, Capt. Kathy Becker, 
officials of the Navy’s Bureau of Medicine and Surgery said.  Capt Craig’s firing “comes 
as a result of the annual command climate survey and a follow-on command climate 
investigation,” said BUMED spokeswoman Capt. Dora Lockwood, who explained the  
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annual survey was conducted in August and concerns that surfaced led to the 
investigation a month later. 
http://www.navytimes.com/article/20131127/CAREERS03/311270013/Health-clinic-XO-
fired 
 
Two top officers of a U.S. Navy destroyer have been relieved of duty for their response 
to the hazing of female sailors, officials say.  The action against Cmdr. Kenneth Rice, 
Executive Officer of the USS JASON DUNHAM, and Master Chief Petty Officer Stephen 
Vandergrifft, the vessel's top enlisted man, was announced December 20.  Officials 
said that on October 15 a chief petty officer ordered 19 women to clean out two non-
functioning toilets on the Dunham, which is based in Norfolk, Va.  Thirteen of the 
women were told to march to the dock carrying buckets of human waste and to dump it 
in two portable toilets. Because the waste could have been disposed of onboard the 
ship, forcing the women to walk the pier was considered “hazing.”  Cmdr. Michael 
Meredith, the Dunham's Commanding Officer, only learned of the incident on Oct. 21 
and acted properly once he was told, officials say. Officials said the charges against 
Rice and Vandergrifft include failing to notify Meredith.  Rice and Vandergrifft were 
convicted in non-judicial proceedings, officials said. Others on board the Dunham faced 
lesser penalties. 
http://www.military.com/daily-news/2013/12/23/two-navy-officers-relieved-for-response-
to-hazing.html 
 
Executive officers: 
 
Cmdr. James Pickens was fired February 3 as the XO of the frigate USS GARY 
"because of offensive comments and behavior towards the crew.” 
http://www.navytimes.com/article/20130204/NEWS/302040310/Frigate-XO-fired-for-
8216-offensive-comments- 
 
Lt. Cmdr. Lauren Allen was fired February 10 as XO of the attack submarine USS 
JACKSONVILLE due to loss of confidence in his ability serve as XO, following a 
collision with a civilian vessel January 10 in the Persian Gulf, which damaged one of the 
sub's two periscopes.  Lt. Cmdr. Lauren Allen received non-judicial punishment and was 
reassigned to administrative duties at Commander Submarine Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet 
at Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam in Hawaii. The firing occurred following an admiral's 
mast on Sunday in Manama, Bahrain. 
http://www.navytimes.com/article/20130210/NEWS/302100309/Navy-fires-CO-XO-of-
attack-sub-Jacksonville 
 
On March 8, Cmdr. Steve Fuller removed his name from the upcoming weekend’s plan-
of-the-day and left the frigate Kauffman. There was no ceremony or turnover.  An 
experienced executive officer already chosen for command, Fuller saw his rise abruptly 
reversed when his commodore employed a new, last-ditch measure: ruling the XO unfit 
to take charge. Fuller was ordered off the ship.  Capt. John Fuller — the commodore of 
Destroyer Squadron 22 and no relation to the XO — reported that Cmdr. Fuller was unfit 
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for command, according to a Naval Surface Force Atlantic spokesman.  Cmdr. Fuller is 
one of the first executive officers in the surface Navy to be relieved under the new 
screening rules, Naval Surface Force Atlantic acknowledged, a rigorous process 
intended to weed out lackluster leaders before they get command.  Fuller had been 
onboard Kauffman for a year. The new rules require that officers in a fleet-up billet must 
be certified as ready for command by their boss, or ISIC.  “The ISIC must decide if the 
member has the professional competence, intelligence, moral courage and personal 
honor needed for command,” according to the surface Navy’s new instruction.  The 
Commodore recommended that Fuller be stripped of eligibility to command a ship. The 
final call rests with the Chief of Naval Personnel, as it would vacate the result of the 
screening board.  Executive Officers can be down-checked by their boss or can decide 
to opt out of command for reasons like family issues or professional competence. The 
decision on whether to remove them from their post as a result will be made case by 
case, explained Capt. John Nowell, the surface Navy’s top detailer, who noted that the 
XOs can submit a statement to accompany whatever recommendation goes up the 
chain of command.  “The officer is involved in the discussion, and the officer is enabled 
formally to provide rebuttal and feedback if there’s a recommendation made for not 
fleeting up and for being de-screened,” Nowell explained. 
http://www.navytimes.com/article/20130325/CAREERS03/303250034/Frigate-XO-
sacked-under-new-screening-policy 
 
Cmdr. Jason Stapleton, Executive Officer of Patrol Squadron Four, a Hawaii-based P-3 
Orion aircraft squadron, was reassigned March 28 pending an investigation into 
allegations of misconduct.  The commander of Patrol Reconnaissance Wing Two, Capt. 
Christopher P. Ramsden, reassigned Stapleton as a result of the investigation, the Navy 
said.  Executive officers "have a great deal of responsibility for their unit, their assigned 
sailors and their mission," Naval Air Forces said in a release. "The allegations against 
Cmdr. Stapleton are being thoroughly investigated and appropriate action will be taken." 
http://www.military.com/daily-news/2013/03/28/navy-commander-reassigned-over-
misconduct-rap.html 
 
Lt. Daniel Tyler was relieved April 3 as XO of the stricken mine countermeasures ship 
USS GUARDIAN after an investigation determined Rice and ship leaders “did not 
adhere to standard U.S. Navy navigation procedures.” Three other officers were also 
relieved.  
http://www.navytimes.com/article/20130403/NEWS/304030024/Four-fired-marooning-
minesweeper-ocean-reef 
 
Cmdr. Allen Maestas, the XO of Beachmaster Unit 1, was removed by Capt. Kevin 
Flanagan, the Commander of Naval Beach Group 1, on Thursday, May 16 for sending 
inappropriate text messages and emails to two female sailors at his command.  At mast, 
Maestas was found guilty of violating a lawful order, conduct unbecoming, and 
fraternization, Naval Surface Force Pacific said.  The messages were “inappropriate 
and unprofessional and did not respect the senior-subordinate relationship,” said 
SURFPAC spokesman Lt. Rick Chernitzer, who said he did not have access to the 
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emails and messages in question and thus was not able to detail the nature of the 
allegedly untoward messages. Chernitzer said the investigation has concluded. 
http://www.navytimes.com/article/20130516/NEWS/305160017/XO-fired-inappropriate-
texts-emails 
 
Senior Enlisted Leaders: 
 
Operations Specialist Master Chief Gregory Krumholz was fired February 15 as 
Command Master Chief of Maritime Expeditionary Security Squadron 12, Coastal 
Riverine Group 2, presently in the United Arab Emirates.  Master Chief Krumholz was 
cited for unprofessional behavior. The investigation is ongoing. 
http://www.navytimes.com/article/20130215/NEWS/302150316/Security-squadron-CO-
and-CMC-fired-for-bad-behavior 
 
Master Chief Bryant Rice, Command Master Chief of the USS TORTUGA, a Whidbey 
Island-class dock landing ship, was relieved March 25 due to substandard 
performance, Navy officials said.  He was reassigned to the staff of Commander, Task 
Force-76 Monday after CTF-76’s commander, Rear Adm. Jeffrey Harley, lost 
confidence in his ability to lead.  There wasn’t one particular incident that led to Rice’s 
removal as the Sasebo-based ship’s senior enlisted adviser and steward of standards 
and discipline, Harley said. He could not provide specifics, but said Rice’s credibility had 
been undermined and that sailors deserve to be treated with respect and dignity. 
http://www.stripes.com/news/navy/tortuga-s-command-master-chief-relieved-of-duty-
1.213291  
 
Command Master Chief (AW/SW) Jeff Harsh, the enlisted leader at Strike Fighter 
Squadron 14, was removed by Cmdr. Gavin Duff, the squadron’s commanding officer 
on April 19.  Harsh, a former Aviation Ordnanceman, was ousted from his post as the 
“Tophatters” senior enlisted sailor after 19 months in the job.  He’s the third CMC 
canned this year. Harsh is believed to have fallen short of professional standards 
despite receiving counseling on such matters, although it was not immediately clear 
which specific standards were not met. 
http://www.navytimes.com/article/20130420/NEWS/304200001/Lemoore-based-fighter-
squadron-CMC-sacked 
 
The Command Caster Chief of Carrier Air Wing 2 has been fired while officials 
investigate allegations he continued an affair with a female chief petty officer, even after 
his commander told him to stop.  Command Master Chief (SW/AW) Brian K. Page, 42, 
was notified Tuesday May 28 by Capt. Christopher Murdoch, head of CVW-2, that he 
was being reassigned to the staff of Commander, Strike Fighter Wing Pacific, pending 
the outcome of the investigation.  Page admitted to the affair in January, according to 
the Navy’s news release, after the allegations came to the attention of his command. 
Page is married and lived at Lemoore as a geographic bachelor.  His wife filed for 
divorce in February, according to court records in San Diego.  Multiple sources told 
Navy Times the affair spanned at least three years and allegedly began when Page was 
the CMC at Strike Fighter Squadron 14, also at Lemoore. The female chief was then 
assigned to CVW-11, to which VFA-14 was assigned. She retired in December. 
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The affair came to light after Page had been selected to serve as the CMC of the 
aircraft carrier USS GEORGE H.W. BUSH; it cost him that job, according to multiple 
Navy sources familiar with the investigation.  “The administrative action was formal 
counseling and wasn’t captain’s mast, and he wasn’t relieved from the job at the time,” 
said Cmdr. Kevin Stephens, spokesman for Naval Air Forces in San Diego.  “Though 
this withdrew him from the opportunity to become CMC of an aircraft carrier, in the 
CAG’s judgement, he was capable of continuing in the job.”  Page subsequently put in 
for retirement and is slated to retire later this year.  CMCs, as is the case with 
Commanding and Executive Officers, are normally taken out of their command positions 
when found guilty of misconduct, Navy officials tell Navy Times.  And because Page 
was allowed to continue in the job and quietly retire, Navy officials have initiated another 
investigation into how Carrier Air Wing 2 conducted the probe into Page’s affair and the 
fact he was not formally disciplined.  “The decision was made to conduct a process 
review designed to ensure the appropriate investigative steps and reviews were taken,” 
Stephens told Navy Times. “Commander, U.S. Third Fleet will convene the process 
review.” 
http://www.navytimes.com/article/20130530/NEWS/305300033/Carrier-air-wing-CMC-
fired-amid-affair-allegations 
 
Command Master Chief (AW/SW) Terry W. Piper, the senior enlisted sailor of Airborne 
Command Control and Logistics Wing, was relieved Friday June 21 after lying to 
investigators who were looking into allegations he’d misused funds.  During a captain’s 
mast Monday at Naval Base Ventura County, CA, where the wing is based, Master 
Chief Piper was found to have violated Article 107 of the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice — making a false official statement. He was relieved by Wing Commander Capt. 
Todd Watkins, according to a news release from the command.  The violation occurred 
during an investigation of Piper’s alleged improper handling of the command’s morale, 
welfare and recreation (MWR) funds, according to Cmdr. Kevin Stephens, spokesman 
for Naval Air Forces in San Diego.  Though the investigation did not substantiate any 
improper handling of the funds by Piper, he was found to have lied to investigators, 
prompting the charge and his subsequent relief, sources told Navy Times.  Piper was 
given a non-punitive letter of caution and has been reassigned to Fleet Logistics 
Support Squadron 55, also at Naval Base Ventura County. Watkins is pursuing formal 
detachment for cause. 
http://www.navytimes.com/article/20130621/CAREERS02/306210025/CMC-sacked-
lying-investigators%22 
 
The command master chief of the Everett, WA-based destroyer USS SHOUP was fired 
Monday August 26 after being found guilty at captain’s mast of assaulting a junior 
sailor.  Command Master Chief (SW) Rick A. Helwick was relieved of his duties 
following a substantiated allegation that he grabbed a junior sailor by the uniform blouse 
because he was not wearing the proper uniform, according to a Navy statement. 
A Navy official confirmed Helwick was found to have committed assault, which falls 
under Article 128 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. 
http://www.navytimes.com/article/20130826/NEWS/308260039/Destroyer-CMC-sacked-
after-grabbing-sailor-by-uniform 
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Commanding Officers: 
 
Capt. Jeffrey Riedel was fired January 26 as program manager for the Navy's littoral 
combat ship program due to allegations of inappropriate behavior. 
http://www.navytimes.com/article/20120127/NEWS/201270319/Littoral-combat-ship-
program-manager-fired 
http://www.stripes.com/news/navy/navy-reassigns-head-of-troubled-littoral-combat-ship-
program-1.167101 
 
Cmdr. Diego Hernandez was fired February 4 as CO of the ballistic-missile submarine 
USS WYOMING's gold crew for mishandling classified materials. 
http://www.navytimes.com/article/20120217/NEWS/202170319/CO-of-submarine-
Wyoming-fired 
http://www.stripes.com/news/navy/co-of-submarine-uss-wyoming-is-relieved-of-
command-1.168997 
 
Capt. Robert Marin was fired February 10 as CO of the cruiser USS COWPENS "while 
an investigation into inappropriate personal behavior is conducted." 
http://www.navytimes.com/article/20120210/NEWS/202100318/Commanding-officer-of-
cruiser-Cowpens-fired 
http://www.stripes.com/news/pacific/japan/commanding-officer-of-yokosuka-based-uss-
cowpens-fired-1.168248 
 
Cmdr. Jeffrey Wissel was fired February 27 as commander of Fleet Air 
Reconnaissance Squadron 1 amid allegations of "personal misconduct.” 
http://www.navytimes.com/article/20120228/NEWS/202280326/EP-3-squadron-
commanding-officer-fired 
 
Cmdr. Jon Haydel was fired March 12 as commander of the yet-to-be commissioned 
amphibious transport dock San Diego amid an investigation into "personal misconduct.” 
http://www.navytimes.com/article/20120313/NEWS/203130327/Amphib-San-Diego-CO-
fired-amid-investigation 
http://www.stripes.com/news/navy/navy-relieves-commander-of-new-ship-1.171523 
 
Capt. Kim Lyons was fired April 6 as commanding officer of Navy Health Clinic New 
England after a survey found a poor command climate. 
http://www.navytimes.com/article/20120411/NEWS/204110327/Navy-health-clinic-CO-
CMC-fired 
http://www.stripes.com/news/navy-medicine-co-fired-for-poor-command-climate-
1.174217 
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Cmdr. Corrine Parker was fired April 16 as commanding officer of Fleet Logistics 
Squadron 1 after an investigation into accusations of falsification of administrative 
records led to a loss of confidence in Parker's ability to command, said Lt. Matt Allen, a 
Navy spokesman at the Pentagon. 
http://www.navytimes.com/article/20120417/NEWS/204170322/Squadron-commander-
fired-after-records-probe 
http://www.stripes.com/news/navy/navy-commander-fired-for-allegedly-falsifying-
records-1.174887 
 
Cmdr. Dennis Klein was fired May 1 as CO of the attack submarine USS COLUMBIA 
due to a loss of confidence in his ability to command after a number of external 
assessments. 
http://www.navytimes.com/article/20120501/NEWS/205010317/Navy-fires-4-leaders-in-
2-separate-incidents 
http://www.stripes.com/news/navy-fires-two-more-commanders-1.176153 
 
Cmdr. Lee Hoey was fired May 1 as CO of the Navy Drug Screening Lab in San Diego 
due to command climate problems at his command. 
http://www.navytimes.com/article/20120501/NEWS/205010317/Navy-fires-4-leaders-in-
2-separate-incidents 
http://www.stripes.com/news/navy-fires-two-more-commanders-1.176153 
 
Cmdr. Derick Armstrong was fired May 8 as CO of the destroyer USS THE SULLIVANS 
due to a loss of confidence in his ability to command. 
http://www.navytimes.com/article/20120508/NEWS/205080325/The-Sullivans-skipper-
relieved-of-command 
http://www.stripes.com/news/uss-the-sullivans-armstrong-is-10th-commanding-officer-
fired-this-year-1.176692 
 
Capt. Chuck Litchfield was fired June 18 as CO of the amphibious assault ship USS 
ESSEX, in the wake of ESSEX's May 16 collision with the replenishment oiler Yukon as 
both ships were en route to San Diego. 
http://www.navytimes.com/article/20120619/NEWS/206190315/Essex-CO-fired-
command-issues-cited 
http://www.stripes.com/news/navy/uss-essex-skipper-relieved-of-command-in-wake-of-
may-collision-1.180824 
 
Capt. Liza Raimondo was fired June 29 as CO of Navy Health Clinic, Patuxent River, 
MD, due to a loss of confidence in her ability to command due to a significant lack of 
leadership and integrity.  
http://www.navytimes.com/article/20120629/NEWS/206290322/CO-CMC-sacked-at-
Pax-River-health-clinic 
http://www.stripes.com/news/navy/co-cmc-of-pax-river-naval-health-clinic-fired-
1.181718 
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Cmdr. Michael Ward was fired August 10 as CO of Los Angeles-class submarine USS 
PITTSBURGH for allegations of personal misconduct. 
http://www.navytimes.com/article/20120812/NEWS/208120308/Submarine-CO-fired-for-
alleged-misconduct 
 
Cmdr. Franklin Fernandez was fired August 21 as CO of Naval Mobile Construction 
Battalion 24 due to loss of confidence in his ability to command. 
http://www.navytimes.com/article/20120830/NEWS/208300333/Seabee-commander-
accused-of-DUI-fired 
 
Cmdr. Martin Arriola was fired August 30 as CO of the destroyer USS PORTER due to 
a loss of confidence in his ability to command. 
http://www.navytimes.com/article/20120830/NEWS/208300328/Destroyer-CO-fired-in-
wake-of-tanker-collision 
 
Cmdr. Sara Santoski was fired September 1 as CO of Helicopter Mine 
Countermeasures Squadron 15 due to a loss of confidence in her ability to command. 
http://www.navytimes.com/article/20120901/NEWS/209010311/Helo-squadron-CO-
CMC-fired-after-mishaps 
http://www.stripes.com/news/us/navy-helicopter-squadron-commander-relieved-of-duty-
1.187746 
 
Cmdr. Sheryl Tannahill was fired September 14 as CO of Navy Operational Support 
Center Nashville, TN, due to a loss of confidence in her ability to command. 
http://www.navytimes.com/article/20120916/NEWS/209160315/CO-fired-amid-
investigation-of-relationship 
 
Capt. Antonio Cardoso was fired September 21 as CO of Training Support Center San 
Diego due to a loss of confidence in his ability to command. 
http://www.navytimes.com/article/20120921/NEWS/209210316/Training-center-CO-
fired-after-hazing-probe 
http://www.stripes.com/news/navy/training-center-co-fired-after-hazing-probe-1.190283 
 
Capt. James CoBell was fired September 27 as CO of FRC Mid-Atlantic after an 
investigation found he was abusive to subordinates and used them to conduct personal 
favors. 
http://www.navytimes.com/article/20120928/NEWS/209280319/Fired-fleet-readiness-
CO-disputes-investigation 
http://www.stripes.com/news/navy/navy-relieves-another-officer-of-command-1.191202 
 
Rear. Adm. Charles Gaouette was fired October 27 as head of the USS JOHN C. 
STENNIS Carrier Strike Group while the CSG was deployed to the Arabian Sea. The 
Navy cited "inappropriate leadership judgment" for his "temporary reassignment.” 
http://www.navytimes.com/article/20121104/NEWS/211040314/1-star-firing-a-public-
rebuke-for-decorated-CO 
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Capt. Joseph Darlak was fired November 2 as CO of the frigate Vandegrift, along with 
three other officers, after investigators found the ship's crew had behaved 
inappropriately during a September port visit to Russia. 
http://www.navytimes.com/article/20121103/NEWS/211030315/CO-3-officers-sacked-
after-Russian-port-visit 
 
Capt. Michael Wiegand was fired November 8 as head of the Southwest Regional 
Maintenance Center "due to loss of confidence in his ability to command.” 
http://www.navytimes.com/article/20121108/NEWS/211080332/San-Diego-based-CO-
fired-over-contract-issues 
 
Capt. Ted Williams, CO of the amphibious command ship USS MOUNT WHITNEY, was 
fired November 19 for allegations of misconduct. 
http://www.navytimes.com/news/2012/11/navy-2-skippers-fired-alleged-misconduct-fort-
mchenry-mount-whitney-11 
http://www.stripes.com/news/navy-fires-two-more-commanders-1.197792 
 
Cmdr. Ray Hartman, CO of the amphibious dock-landing ship USS FORT MCHENRY, 
was fired November 19 for allegations of misconduct. 
http://www.navytimes.com/news/2012/11/navy-2-skippers-fired-alleged-misconduct-fort-
mchenry-mount-whitney-11 
http://www.stripes.com/news/navy-fires-two-more-commanders-1.197792 
 
Capt. Sean McDonell was fired as the commanding officer of a Jacksonville, FL-based 
Seabee reserve battalion due to "mismanagement and major program deficiencies," 
Navy Expeditionary Combat Command announced November 29. 
http://www.navytimes.com/article/20121129/NEWS/211290328/Seabee-unit-CO-fired-
last-two-CMCs-also-sacked 
http://www.stripes.com/news/navy-seabee-commander-relieved-of-duty-1.198831 
Executive officers: 
 
Cmdr. Shelly Hakspiel was fired May 1 as XO of the Navy Drug Screening Lab in San 
Diego due to command climate problems at her command. 
http://www.navytimes.com/article/20120501/NEWS/205010317/Navy-fires-4-leaders-in-
2-separate-incidents 
 
Cmdr. Alan C. Aber was fired July 16 as the second in command of Helicopter Maritime 
Strike Squadron 71 after it was determined he had violated the Navy's policy on sexual 
harassment. 
http://www.navytimes.com/article/20120716/NEWS/207160328/Helo-squadron-XO-
fired-for-sexual-comments 
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Cmdr. Kyle G. Strudthoff was fired September 11 as executive officer of Helicopter Sea 
Combat Squadron 25 after he was found guilty of conduct unbecoming an officer. 
http://www.navytimes.com/article/20120912/NEWS/209120327/Helo-XO-fired-after-
striking-junior-officer 
 
Cmdr. David Faught was fired September 19 as executive officer of the destroyer USS 
CHUNG-HOON due to a loss of confidence in his ability to perform as XO. 
http://www.navytimes.com/article/20120920/NEWS/209200329/Chung-Hoon-XO-fired-
for-8216-loss-of-confidence- 
 
Cmdr. Ivan Jimenez was fired November 2 as XO of the frigate USS VANDEGRIFT, 
along with the ship's CO and two other officers, after investigators found the ship's crew 
had behaved inappropriately during a September port visit to Russia. 
http://www.navytimes.com/article/20121103/NEWS/211030315/CO-3-officers-sacked-
after-Russian-port-visit 
 
Senior Enlisted Leaders: 
 
Master Chief Electronics Technician (SS) David Turley was fired January 3 as chief of 
the boat of the ballistic-missile submarine NEBRASKA's gold crew. 
http://www.navytimes.com/article/20120210/NEWS/202100319/Top-enlisted-fired-from-
submarine-Nebraska 
 
Senior Chief Aviation Boatswain's Mate (Aircraft Handling) (AW/SW/EXW) Scott 
Bowman was relieved February 21 as command senior chief at Naval Weapons Station 
Earle, NJ, for "unsatisfactory performance." 
http://www.navytimes.com/article/20120222/NEWS/202220334/Top-enlisted-man-at-
Earle-weapons-station-fired 
 
Command Master Chief (SW/AW) Richard Ward was fired February 28 as the top 
enlisted adviser for Navy Expeditionary Logistics Support Group for fraternization with 
two of his chief petty officers and other infractions. 
http://www.navytimes.com/article/20120229/NEWS/202290339/Navy-fires-Cheatham-
Annex-based-CMC 
 
Master Chief Logistics Specialist Scott Splitgerber, a reservist, was fired March 14 as 
command master chief of Navy Cargo Handling Battalion 4 after an investigation found 
he had committed fraternization as well as made a false official statement. 
http://www.navytimes.com/article/20120316/NEWS/203160313/CMC-of-cargo-handling-
unit-fired-for-frat 
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Command Master Chief (SW/AW) Joseph Storms was fired March 27 as the top 
enlisted member of Virginia Beach, VA-based Strike Fighter Squadron 131 for failing to  
obey a lawful order and violating a lawful general order, the Navy said. 
http://www.navytimes.com/article/20120329/NEWS/203290326/VFA-131-s-CMC-fired-
amid-harassment-allegations 
 
Master Chief Machinist's Mate (SS) Charles Berry was fired March 30 as chief of the 
boat of guided missile submarine USS FLORIDA's Gold Crew for "dereliction of duty" 
amid an investigation into hazing claims onboard the submarine, Sub Group 10 said. 
http://www.navytimes.com/article/20120331/NEWS/203310314/Submarine-s-top-sailor-
axed-amid-hazing-probe 
 
Master Chief Hospital Corpsman (SW/AW/FMF) Robert Whitten was fired April 6 as the 
top enlisted sailor of Navy Health Clinic New England after a survey found a poor 
command climate. 
http://www.navytimes.com/article/20120411/NEWS/204110327/Navy-health-clinic-CO-
CMC-fired 
 
Senior Chief Sonar Technician Submarines (SS) Gregory Cordray was fired April 19 as 
the chief of the boat of the Los Angeles-class attack submarine USS ANNAPOLIS for 
alcohol-related misconduct in a foreign port. 
http://www.navytimes.com/article/20120421/NEWS/204210315/Top-enlisted-aboard-
submarine-Annapolis-fired 
 
Master Chief Electronics Technician (SS) Don Williams was fired May 1 as chief of the 
boat of attack submarine USS COLUMBIA for failing to provide adequate leadership. 
http://www.navytimes.com/article/20120501/NEWS/205010317/Navy-fires-4-leaders-in-
2-separate-incidents 
 
Command Master Chief (SW/AW/FMF) William R. Adams was fired June 13 as 
command master chief of the guided missile destroyer USS GRIDLEY for loss of 
confidence in Adams' ability to fulfill his role. 
http://www.navytimes.com/article/20120626/NEWS/206260324/CMC-fired-after-drunk-
driving-arrest 
 
Master Chief Hospital Corpsman Merrilyn Crawford was fired June 29 as top enlisted 
member of Navy Health Clinic, Patuxent River, MD, for a lack of accountable leadership 
that also hurt the command. 
http://www.navytimes.com/article/20120629/NEWS/206290322/CO-CMC-sacked-at-
Pax-River-health-clinic 
 
Command Master Chief (AW/SW) Bobbie Anderson was fired September 1 as 
command master chief of Helicopter Mine Countermeasures Squadron 1 because of 
"unsatisfactory performance." 
http://www.navytimes.com/article/20120901/NEWS/209010311/Helo-squadron-CO-
CMC-fired-after-mishaps 
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Command Master Chief (AW/SW) Kelly Smith was fired September 10 as command 
master chief of the dock landing ship USS GUNSTON HALL while under investigation 
for alleged inappropriate behavior. 
http://www.navytimes.com/news/2012/09/navy-fired-cmc-norfolk-virginia-amphib-
091012/ 
 
Command Master Chief (SCW) Pedro Villacorta was fired November 27 as command 
master chief of Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 14 because of "substandard 
performance." 
http://www.navytimes.com/article/20121129/NEWS/211290328/Seabee-unit-CO-fired-
last-two-CMCs-also-sacked 
 
Command Master Chief (SCW/SS) William McCrae was fired November 27 as 
command master chief of Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 23. 
http://www.navytimes.com/article/20121129/NEWS/211290328/Seabee-unit-CO-fired-
last-two-CMCs-also-sacked 
 
 
2011  
 
Commanding Officers: 
 
Capt. Owen Honors, commanding officer of the aircraft carrier USS ENTERPRISE, was 
fired January 4 for what the Navy called a "profound lack of good judgment and 
professionalism" in making and showing to his crew raunchy comic videos as executive 
officer of the ship from 2005 through 2007. 
http://www.navytimes.com/article/20110104/NEWS/101040314/Carrier-CO-fired-for-
8216-poor-judgment- 
 
Capt. Rex Guinn, commanding officer of the Navy Region Japan legal service office, 
was fired Febraury 17 by Rear Adm. Nanette DeRenzi, commander of Navy Legal 
Service Command and the deputy judge advocate general, for "loss of confidence in his 
ability to command." 
http://www.navytimes.com/article/20110217/NEWS/102170331/Navy-Region-Japan-
legal-service-office-CO-fired 
 
Cmdr. Nathan Borchers of the Norfolk, VA-based destroyer USS STOUT was fired 
March 1 for a "pervasive pattern of unprofessional behavior" among the ship's crew. 
http://www.navytimes.com/article/20110301/NEWS/103010325/Destroyer-CO-CMC-
fired-during-deployment 
 
Rear Adm. Ron Horton was fired as commander of Logistics Group, Western Pacific, on 
March 3 for failing to put a stop to the controversial "XO Movie Night" videos aired while 
he commanded the carrier Enterprise. 
http://www.navytimes.com/article/20110304/NEWS/103040319/Admiral-cited-in-
Enterprise-probe-fired 
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Cmdr. Kevin Harms was fired March 9 as commander of Strike Fighter Squadron 137 
aboard the aircraft carrier Abraham Lincoln by strike group commander Rear Adm. Mark 
Guadagnini "due to a loss of confidence in his ability to command" for allegedly violating 
military ethics rules.” 
http://www.navytimes.com/article/20110311/NEWS/103110344/Lemoore-Hornet-
squadron-CO-fired-on-deployment 
 
Cmdr. Timothy Murphy was fired April 11 as commander of Electronic Attack Squadron 
129 at Naval Air Station Whidbey Island, WA, due to "loss of confidence in his ability to 
command" after he was stopped by authorities on suspicion of driving drunk. 
http://www.navytimes.com/article/20110412/NEWS/104120322/Prowler-training-
squadron-CO-fired-after-DUI 
 
Capt. William Mosk was fired April 18 as commander of Naval Station Rota and 
commander of Naval Activities Spain due to a "loss of confidence" in his ability to 
command and handle issues related to an ongoing criminal investigation at the base, 
according to an official statement. 
http://www.navytimes.com/article/20110419/NEWS/104190315/Naval-Station-Rota-CO-
fired-amid-NCIS-probe 
 
Cmdr. Etta Jones, commanding officer of the amphibious transport dock USS PONCE, 
was fired April 23 on deployment "due to demonstrated poor leadership, and failure to 
appropriately investigate, report, and hold accountable sailors found involved in hazing 
incidents," a Navy announcement said. Jones also "failed to properly handle a loaded 
weapon" during a security alert, which the announcement said "endangered some of 
her crew." 
http://www.navytimes.com/article/20110423/NEWS/104230319/Amphib-Ponce-CO-XO-
fired-in-the-Mediterranean 
 
Capt. Donald Hornbeck, commodore of San Diego-based Destroyer Squadron 1, was 
fired April 23 while an investigation looks into allegations of an "inappropriate 
relationship," the Navy announced. 
http://www.navytimes.com/article/20110425/NEWS/104250315/Destroyer-squadron-
boss-fired-on-deployment 
 
Cmdr. Jay Wylie, CO of destroyer USS MOMSEN, was fired April 27 by Rear Adm. 
Mark Guadagnini, commander of the USS ABRAHAM LINCOLN Carrier Strike Group, 
"due to a loss of confidence in his ability to command stemming from allegations of 
misconduct," according to a 3rd Fleet press release. 
http://www.navytimes.com/article/20110428/NEWS/104280320/Destroyer-skipper-
sacked-for-misconduct 
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Capt. Greg Thomas was removed from command of Norfolk Naval Shipyard the 
weekend of May 21-22 while a formal investigation into the command environment at 
the yard is completed, Navy officials said. 
http://www.navytimes.com/article/20110523/NEWS/105230309/Norfolk-Naval-Shipyard-
CO-fired 
 
Cmdr. Mike Varney, commanding officer of a Seawolf-class attack submarine USS 
CONNECTICUT, was fired June 6 following an investigation into mishandling classified 
material and for lying to and obstructing the inquiry. 
http://www.navytimes.com/article/20110607/NEWS/106070315/Attack-sub-CO-fired-for-
mishandling-material 
 
Capt. Eric Merrill was fired July 15 as commanding officer of the submarine tender USS 
EMORY S. LAND after the ship hit a channel buoy June 21 while heading into Mina 
Salman, a port of Bahrain. 
http://www.navytimes.com/article/20110715/NEWS/107150311/CO-fired-after-sub-
tender-hits-channel-buoy 
  
Cmdr. Karl Pugh was fired July 19 as commander of the Whidbey Island, WA-based 
Electronic Attack Squadron 141 "following non-judicial punishment proceedings for an 
alcohol-related incident that occurred July 12 during a port visit to Manama," 5th Fleet 
officials said in a statement. 
http://www.navytimes.com/article/20110719/NEWS/107190314/Growler-squadron-CO-
fired-on-deployment 
 
Cmdr. Jason Strength was fired July 20 as commanding officer of Navy Recruiting 
District Nashville, TN, after he was "found to have acted in an unprofessional manner" 
both while on liberty around subordinates as well as in uniform at official Navy events in 
Chattanooga, TN, in June, according to a statement from Navy Recruiting Command. 
http://www.navytimes.com/article/20110720/NEWS/107200324/Navy-8216-
Unprofessional-actions-led-to-CO-firing 
 
Cmdr. Robert Brown was fired August 5 as commanding officer of Beachmaster Unit 2 
at Joint Expeditionary Base Little Creek-Fort Story, VA.  Brown was fired over 
allegations of ethics violations uncovered during an ongoing investigation into misuse of 
government resources, according to Naval Surface Force Atlantic. 
http://www.navytimes.com/article/20110805/NEWS/108050308/Beachmaster-CO-fired-
over-ethics-allegations 
 
Cmdr. Laredo Bell was fired August 24 as commanding officer of Naval Support Activity 
Saratoga Springs, NY, following an August 20 driving while intoxicated arrest. 
http://www.navytimes.com/article/20110824/NEWS/108240317/Naval-Support-Activity-
CO-fired-after-arrest 
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Cmdr. Mark Olson was fired September 7 as CO of the Mayport, FL-based destroyer 
USS THE SULLIVANS due to “a loss of confidence in his ability to command," three 
weeks after his ship mistakenly fired at a fishing boat during a gunnery exercise, the 
Navy said. 
http://www.navytimes.com/article/20110907/NEWS/109070322/Destroyer-CO-sacked-
after-ship-fired-on-boat 
 
Capt. David Geisler was fired October 17 as commanding officer of Task Force 53 in 
Bahrain amid an investigation into alleged inappropriate conduct. 
http://www.navytimes.com/article/20111017/NEWS/110170318/Bahrain-logistics-CO-is-
19th-fired-this-year 
 
Cmdr. Joseph Nosse was fired October 19 as commanding officer of the ballistic-
missile submarine USS KENTUCKY for inadequate leadership, according to a 
spokesman. 
http://www.navytimes.com/article/20111020/NEWS/110200336/Ballistic-missile-sub-
skipper-sacked 
 
Lt. Cmdr. Martin Holguin was fired October 27 as commanding officer of mine 
countermeasures crew USS FEARLESS for "demonstrated poor personnel 
management," according to a statement from Naval Surface Force Pacific. 
http://www.navytimes.com/article/20111028/NEWS/110280321/MCM-crew-s-CO-is-
21st-fired-this-year 
 
Cmdr. Jonathan Jackson was fired December 8 as commanding officer of deployed 
Electronic Attack Squadron 134, deployed aboard the underway carrier USS CARL 
VINSON, an investigation into sexual harassment allegations, the Navy said. 
http://www.navytimes.com/article/20111209/NEWS/112090323/Prowler-squadron-CO-
fired-on-deployment 
 
Executive officers: 
 
Cmdr. Andrew Crowe was fired April 1 as executive officer of Navy Region Center 
Singapore for creating a hostile work environment and failing to follow orders. 
http://www.navytimes.com/article/20110401/NEWS/104010318/Executive-officer-fired-
at-Singapore-command 
 
 Lt. Cmdr. Kurt Boenisch, executive officer of the amphibious transport dock USS 
PONCE, was fired April 23 on deployment for failing "to provide support to the 
command and commanding officer." 
http://www.navytimes.com/article/20110423/NEWS/104230319/Amphib-Ponce-CO-XO-
fired-in-the-Mediterranean 
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Capt. Robert Gamberg was fired June 6 as executive officer of the carrier USS 
EISENHOWER during admiral's mast in Norfolk, VA, for conduct unbecoming an officer 
and failure to obey a lawful order or regulation, related to an "improper relationship." 
http://www.navytimes.com/article/20110606/NEWS/106060321/-8216-Improper-
relationship-led-to-Ike-XO-firing 
 
Cmdr. Ralph Jones was fired July 13 as executive officer of the amphibious transport 
dock USS GREEN BAY during deployment in the Arabian Sea after an investigation 
substantiated allegations of personal misconduct. 
http://www.navytimes.com/article/20110713/NEWS/107130321/Misconduct-claims-lead-
to-Green-Bay-XO-s-firing 
 
Cmdr. John Pethel was fired December 21 as executive officer of the amphibious 
transport dock USS NEW YORK for having an "unduly familiar relationship" with a 
female member of the crew. 
http://www.navytimes.com/article/20111222/NEWS/112220331/New-York-XO-fired-for-
fraternization 
Senior Enlisted Leaders: 
 
Senior Chief Yeoman (SS) Savan Patel was fired January 5 after he was arrested and 
charged with drunken driving in Hawaii. Patel was chief of the boat for the attack 
submarine USS LOUISVILLE. 
http://www.navytimes.com/article/20110118/NEWS/101180314/Sub-Louisville-s-chief-
of-the-boat-fired 
 
Command Master Chief (SW/AW) Kelvin Coleman of the USS STETHEM, a Japan-
based destroyer, was fired January 22 after he was arrested in connection with a 
drunken driving incident. 
http://www.navytimes.com/article/20110201/NEWS/102010318/Stethem-CMC-firing-
came-after-alleged-DUI 
 
Command Master Chief (SW/AW) Ron Burnett of the dock landing ship USS ASHLAND 
was fired February 9 "due to loss of confidence" pending completion of the 
investigation into inappropriate touching of a female shipmate. 
http://www.navytimes.com/article/20110209/NEWS/102090328/CMC-fired-over-
touching-allegations 
 
Command Master Chief Meondra Kendley was fired as top sailor for Naval Recruiting 
District San Antonio on February 16 for a loss of confidence in her ability to do the job. 
http://www.navytimes.com/article/20110218/NEWS/102180317/CMC-fired-after-alleged-
sub-par-performance 
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Command Master Chief (SW/AW) Susan Bruce-Ross of the Norfolk, VA-based 
destroyer USS STOUT was fired March 1 for a "pervasive pattern of unprofessional 
behavior" among the ship's crew. 
http://www.navytimes.com/article/20110301/NEWS/103010325/Destroyer-CO-CMC-
fired-during-deployment 
 
Command Master Chief (SW/AW) Roy Mobley was fired as the top sailor at Navy 
Recruiting District Philadelphia on April 5 due to "loss of confidence" amid allegations 
he wore unearned medals and decorations. 
http://www.navytimes.com/article/20110715/NEWS/107150313/CMC-fired-over-medals 
 
Command Master Chief (SW) Donald Darcy was fired as the top sailor aboard the dock 
landing ship USS FORT MCHENRY on December 9 over accusations of misconduct, 
the Navy said. 
http://www.navytimes.com/article/20111209/NEWS/112090321/Amphib-CMC-fired-
amid-misconduct-allegations 
 
Command Master Chief Gary Stewart Wade was top sailor for Strike Fighter Squadron 
113. CNP's office said Stewart was detached for cause and referred Navy Times to 
Naval Air Forces for more information. AIRFOR did not provide that information as of 
January 2012, but according to releasable information, Wade left VFA-113 on August. 
31, three months shy of serving two years at the squadron. He is now a master chief 
electronics technician aboard the carrier Ronald Reagan. 
 
Command Master Chief Clifford Lewis was the top sailor aboard the destroyer USS 
STERETT. He was fired April 8 as the ship was returning from a Western Pacific 
deployment. Naval Surface Force Pacific confirmed he was disciplined for two "alcohol-
related incidents." He was detached for cause September 30 and, according to Navy 
Personnel Command, retired October 31. 
 
Command Master Chief Earl Anthony Lott was the top sailor at Navy Recruiting Region 
East, Millington, TN. Lott was not relieved from his job but was arrested for alleged 
drunken driving while on terminal leave in March, according to officials familiar with the 
incident. Lott was recalled from terminal leave and given nonjudicial punishment. 
 
Command Master Chief Tom Meglen was the top sailor at Naval Technical Training 
Center, Lackland Air Force Base, TX.  A spokesman with Naval Education and Training 
Command said San Marcos police arrested and charged Meglen with driving under the 
influence of alcohol December 28. He was removed from his position December 29 and 
is assigned to administrative duties with the command pending the outcome of the 
incident. 
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Command Master Chief (SCW/FMF) Robert Edward Cuff was the senior enlisted 
adviser for Joint Task Force North at Fort Bliss, TX.  Cuff was arrested July 15 and 
charged with being involved in an international child pornography ring, according to the 
Justice Department. He was later relieved of his position, according to Joint Task Force 
North officials. 
 
2010 Navy Commanding Officer Firings 
Capt. John Titus Jr., CO of the Naval Supply Corps School in Georgia was fired 
January 8 for failing to adequately discipline a junior officer accused of inappropriate 
conduct. 
http://www.navytimes.com/article/20100111/NEWS/1110315/CO-of-Naval-Supply-
Corps-School-fired 
 
Capt. Holly Graf, CO of the Yokosuka, Japan-based cruiser USS COWPENS, was fired 
January 13 after an inspector general’s investigation found problems with her 
“temperament and demeanor,” a spokesman said. 
http://www.navytimes.com/article/20100115/NEWS01/1150331/Cruiser-CO-relieved-for-
8216-cruelty- 
 
Capt. Glen Little, CO of Naval Weapons Station Charleston, SC, was fired after he was 
arrested January 26 on a charge of solicitation of prostitution. 
http://www.navytimes.com/article/20100128/NEWS/1280320/SC-CO-fired-charged-with-
solicitation 
 
Cmdr. Scott Merritt, head of Naval Support Activity North Potomac, was relieved on 
February 12 following nonjudicial punishment.  Sources told Navy Times the NJP 
involved fraternization with a junior Navy personnel. 
http://www.navytimes.com/article/20100215/NEWS/2150315/Naval-Support-Activity-
North-Potomac-CO-fired 
 
Cmdr. Timothy Weber, the commanding officer of the Norfolk, VA-based destroyer USS 
TRUXTUN, was relieved February 17 for having an inappropriate relationship with a 
female officer in his command, according to a Navy statement. 
http://www.navytimes.com/article/20100217/NEWS/2170323/Truxtun-s-commanding-
officer-fired 
 
Capt. William Reavey Jr., CO of Naval Air Station Pensacola, FL, was fired February 
26 for “inappropriate conduct,” officials said. 
http://www.navytimes.com/article/20100301/NEWS/3010320/NAS-Pensacola-CO-fired-
conduct-cited 
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Cmdr. Jeff Cima, CO of the Pearl Harbor-based sub USS CHICAGO, was relieved of 
command March 15 for drunkenness and conduct unbecoming an officer, officials said. 
http://www.navytimes.com/article/20100316/NEWS/3160311/CO-of-attack-sub-fired-for-
8216-drunkenness- 
 
Cmdr. Neil Funtanilla, CO of the destroyer USS THE SULLIVANS, was relieved May 18 
in Manama, Bahrain, after a non-judicial hearing found he was “derelict in the 
performance of his duties.”  The destroyer struck a buoy in the Persian Gulf in March. 
http://www.navytimes.com/article/20100518/NEWS/5180328/The-Sullivans-CO-fired-in-
wake-of-buoy-strike 
 
Cmdr. Herman Pfaeffle, CO of the frigate USS JOHN L. HALL, was relieved for loss of 
confidence in his ability to command on June 22 after hitting a pier April 16 in Batumi, 
Georgia. 
http://www.navytimes.com/article/20100622/NEWS/6220316/Frigate-CO-fired-after-
hitting-pier 
 
Capt. William Kiestler, CO of Norfolk Naval Shipyard, was relieved June 30 as Vice 
Adm. Kevin McCoy, commander of Naval Sea Systems Command, cited a loss of 
confidence in Kiestler’s ability to command. 
http://www.navytimes.com/article/20100630/NEWS/6300320/Shipyard-CO-fired-for-
maintenance-shortfalls 
 
Cmdr. Fred Wilhelm, CO of the dock landing ship USS GUNSTON HALL, was fired 
August 12 by Rear Adm. Dave Thomas after Wilhelm was “charged with sexual 
harassment, maltreatment of a subordinate, simple assault, conduct unbecoming an 
officer, drunk and disorderly conduct and use of indecent language.” 
http://www.navytimes.com/article/20100812/NEWS/8120327/Gunston-Hall-CO-fired-
former-XO-CMC-punished 
 
Capt. David Schnell, CO of the amphibious assault ship USS PELELIU, was relieved 
August 15 by Vice Adm. Mark Fox, commander of 5th Fleet. The relief took place “as a 
result of an investigation into allegations that he acted in an unprofessional manner 
toward several crew members that was inappropriate, improper and unduly familiar.” 
http://www.navytimes.com/article/20100815/NEWS/8150311/Navy-Peleliu-CO-fired-
relief-ops-to-continue 
 
Cmdr. Mary Ann Giese, CO of Naval Computer and Telecommunications Station 
Bahrain, was fired August 21 by Rear Adm. Edward Deets, head of Naval Network 
Warfare Command, after “a preliminary investigation into allegations that she had been 
involved in inappropriate relationships with other Navy personnel,” according to a 
statement from 10th Fleet. 
http://www.navytimes.com/article/20100823/NEWS/8230315/Navy-relieves-Bahrain-
network-CO 
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Capt. David Solms, commanding officer of the Trident Training Facility in Bangor, WA, 
was fired September 14 by Capt. Kenneth Swan, commanding officer of Submarine 
Learning Center in Groton, Conn., because of “inappropriate personal behavior.” 
http://www.navytimes.com/article/20100914/NEWS/9140312/Trident-Training-Facility-
CO-fired 
 
Capt. Ronald Murray Gero, commanding officer of the guided missile submarine USS 
OHIO’s Blue Crew, was fired September 17 by Rear Adm. James F. Caldwell, 
commander of Submarine Group 9 at Naval Base Kitsap-Bangor, WA, after an 
investigation into “improper personal behavior.” 
http://www.navytimes.com/article/20100917/NEWS/9170316/Navy-sacks-three-leaders-
in-one-day 
 
Cmdr. Charles Mansfield, the Executive Officer of Norfolk-based destroyer USS 
MAHAN was relieved late Friday afternoon September 17 for striking a subordinate 
officer while the ship was underway, Surface Force Atlantic said.  Mansfield was due to 
fleet up to ship’s CO following his XO tour according to Surface Force Atlantic 
spokesman Lt. Cmdr. Bill Urban.  Mansfield was relieved by the commander of 
Destroyer Squadron 22, Capt. Jeffrey Wolstenholme, during a captain’s mast 
administrative hearing in Norfolk on charges of conduct unbecoming an officer and 
gentleman, and assault.  Urban said Mansfield was also given a punitive letter of 
reprimand, a certain career-ender. According to Urban, the incident – Mansfield struck 
the other officer, a male, in the ship’s combat direction center – took place while 
MAHAN was underway off the mid-Atlantic coast during a Composite Training Unit 
Exercise on July 9.  The incident was reported to the SURFLANT Inspector General on 
Aug. 6, Urban said. 
www.navytimes.com/news/2010/09/navy-3-officers-sacked-091710w/ 
 
Cmdr. Charles Maher, commanding officer of the attack submarine USS MEMPHIS, 
was fired November 18 by Capt. William Merz, commander of Submarine Development 
Squadron 12, amid the investigation of 10 members of his crew regarding an alleged 
cheating ring involving shipboard training exams. 
http://www.navytimes.com/article/20101119/NEWS/11190323/Skipper-of-attack-sub-
Memphis-fired 
 
Lt. Cmdr. James Rushton and his Executive Officer, Lt. Cmdr. Anne Laird, were relieved 
of duty of the USS CHIEF, a 225-foot mine countermeasures ship with a crew of 80, 
now in San Diego. Capt. Robert Hospodar, Commodore of Mine Countermeasures 
Squadron 2, announced Dec. 8 that Rushton “violated the Navy’s fraternization policy 
by engaging in an unduly familiar relationship with a subordinate female member of his 
crew,” a Navy spokesman said. Hospodar also fired Laird for “misconduct” after “an 
investigation into a violation of the Navy’s fraternization policy” by the pair.  
http://nation.time.com/2010/12/14/navy-fires-top-two-officers-for-being-unduly-familiar-
while-commanding-warship/ 
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Fifteen commanding officers were fired in all of 2009, according to Navy and Navy 
Times records. Information available at the following link: 
http://www.navytimes.com/article/20100815/NEWS/8150311/Navy-Peleliu-CO-fired-relief-ops-
to-continue 
 
